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I didn't mean to dispute that the texts present this as a quote, just to point out that it is Diogenes Laertius presenting it out of context, so more than just relying on him to present it accurately, we're relying on him to have judged the context correctly
Hmm. If that's the concern, we would arguably have to throw out the majority of fragments and even Cicero since he also didn't necessarily cite context but cherry picked what he wanted.
Please correct me if I am wrong, but in addition to being "rare" this is a statement by Diogenes Laertius
Not from my reading. The original specifically says "And Epicurus in On Choices says as follows..." Then gives the quote.
I see no evidence in the core Epicurean texts that the Epicureans got around to mentioning the word "katastematic" except at best in rare instances.
Sure, rare, but:
The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."
ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρέσεων οὕτω λέγει: "ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται."
Sorry, don't have time to read your full post right now. I will!
But Epicurus literally defined katastematic pleasure as ataraxia (freedom from trouble in the mind) and aponia (freedom of pain in the body).
My contention is that anytime those concepts come up in his and other Epicurean writings, they're talking about katastematic pleasure. They don't use the word because it's not necessary. By definition: freedom from trouble in the mind and freedom of pain in the body = katastematic pleasure.
They don't mention the term every time because it really didn't matter to them. It was a tautology: pleasure = pleasure.
Compare my Arisocles/Eusebius quote in #123 (also available here at the end of chapter 18 for in situ context:
with Cicero in De Finibus:
For if he means the same as Hieronymus, who holds that the Chief Good is a life entirely devoid of trouble, why does he insist on using the term pleasure, and not rather 'freedom from pain,' as does Hieronymus, who understands his own meaning? Whereas if his view is that the End must include kinetic pleasure (for so he describes this vivid sort of pleasure, calling it 'kinetic' in contrary with the pleasure of freedom from pain, which is 'static' pleasure), what is he really aiming at? For he cannot possibly convince any person who knows himself5 — anyone who has studied his own nature and sensations — that freedom from pain is the same thing as pleasure. This, Torquatus, is to do violence to the senses — this uprooting from our minds our knowledge of the meaning of words ingrained. Who is not aware that the world of experience contains these three states of feeling: first, the enjoyment of pleasure; second, the sensation of pain; and third, which is my own condition and doubtless also yours at the present moment, the absence of both pleasure and pain? Pleasure is the feeling of a man eating a good dinner, pain that of one being broken on the rack; but do you really not see the intermediate between those two extremes lies a vast multitude of persons who are feeling neither gratification nor pain?" 17 "I certainly do not," said he; "I maintain that all who are without pain are enjoying pleasure, and what is more the highest form of pleasure." "Then you think that a man who, not being himself thirsty, mixes a drink for p99 another, feels the same pleasure as the thirsty man who drinks it?"
So, they're all feeding off each other, pointing back to earlier sources:
Cicero 106–43 BC
Aristocles of Messene 1st-century CE
Eusebius 260 – 339 CE
To reply to your post, Cassius :
something that people assert to be as important as this - to take the place of pleasure itself in the discussion of Epicurus - very much needs to be sharpened down to a fine point so that it can be placed in proper perspective
Katastematic pleasure isn't taking the place of pleasure per se. They're redefining pleasure in an almost Ciceronian way and substitute their definition for pleasure writ large. Many of the "mainstream" commentators are ONLY focusing on that third state - the calm, the absence - that Epicurus included within his definition of pleasure when he rejected there was a neutral state with no motion of the soul atoms. He said, in strong opposition to the Cyrenaic position (and others), that there is no neutral state. That state - the freedom from pain and trouble in the body and mind - is included in Epicurus's definition of pleasure. There is only pleasure OR pain, full stop. That *feeling* of calm, of the stable well-functioning state of body and mind, IS pleasurable. But Epicurus included ALL pleasures within the definition of Pleasure, whether "kinetic" when the soul-atoms were in motion in the moment, whether one was remembering or anticipating a past or future pleasure, or whether one was experiencing the absence of pain and trouble in body and mind. I'm going to posit (for now) that those last two categories of pleasure fall under "katastematic" pleasure. Furthermore, wherever Epicurus is writing about calm, freedom from pain or trouble in body or mind, remembering or anticipating pleasure, etc. that he's writing about katastematic pleasure whether the word gets used or not. For him, I believe, there was a distinction without a difference. It was all pleasure and so all of it fell under the descriptor of "good." The problems arise with some desires for specific pleasures that led to pain, or pleasures at certain times that were unwise or not prudent. We make better decisions when we're calm and working well in body and mind and that, I think, is why Epicurus laid an importance of emphasis on that aspect, but ALL pleasures were within the realm of consideration in context and choices.
"He (sc. Aristippus the Younger) clearly defined pleasure as the end, inserting into his doctrine the concept of pleasure related to motion. For he said, there are three conditions (katastasesis) of our temperament: one, in which we are in pain, is like a storm at sea; another, in which we experience pleasure and which can be compared to a gentle wave, for pleasure is a gentle movement, similar to a fair wind; and the third is an intermediate condition, in which we experience neither pain nor pleasure, which is like a calm. He said we have perception of these affections alone (toutôn de kai ephasken tôn pathôn monôn hêmas tên aisthêsin echein). (F5 Chiesara=SSR IV A 173 and B5)."
Source:
Epicurus didn't accept this "third state". He included this "calm" under the category of pleasure. That's the katastematic pleasures.
I realize I need to read more.
Now I'm done for today... Oh, wait, it's already Saturday. I'm done for now then.
By the way, if this line of reasoning is correct, then the categories of katastematic and kinetic pleasures is irrelevant to a "modern" Epicurean because the Ancient Greek categories are built on a concept of the movement (or not) of "atoms" of the "soul/mind/psykhē" and that's *not" how our bodies and minds work.
Don't misunderstand. It could be interesting in an historical sense in understanding the controversies and rivalries between schools. And it appears to have been vitally important to the ancients.
But in applying the classical precepts to modern lives when we understand neurons and dopamine and so on, it's irrelevant. Epicurus would then have taught that ALL pleasure is pleasurable: in the moment, in anticipation, in remembrance. All of it. I do think he taught that freedom from pain and trouble in the body and mind was vitally important, but there's no injunction to ONLY experience that.
I know I seem like Negative Nellie here
"Iron sharpens iron" as the saying goes. Keep the questions coming!
wouldn't the pleasure you get from planning and carrying out some activity in expectation of the reward that the activity will bring be something that has to ring of "action"? I thought that katastematic was supposedly implying "rest" or "static."
I'm coming to the understanding that it isn't necessarily an action like we think of "doing something". Look at that excerpt again,:
Nor, (the Cyrenaics) say, is pleasure brought about through memory or expectation of goods, as Epicurus held: for the motion of the soul is obliterated by time’ (DL 2.89–90) (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα)
The movement, the action, is the "motion of the soul (ψυχής psykhes)" that happens while one is *experiencing* a pleasure in the moment. It appears the Cyrenaics did not believe that their was any "motion of the soul" during "memory or expectation" of pleasure. The "motion" (κίνημα kinēma; related to kinesis, kinetic) only happened during the pleasure of the moment. Possibly "memory or expectation" was experienced in the "state", the soul/mind was "static." In fact, "the motion of the soul is obliterated by time." The motion of the soul stops - it is "obliterated." Stops= static. It is simply in a state of readiness to move again *with the next pleasure of the moment.* However, Epicurus taught that the pleasure of "memory or expectation" in that state *was* in fact just as much pleasure as that experienced in the moment.
Granted, I need to read more Cyrenaic papers now (I didn't see that coming as necessary!), But the bit I've read from scanning the ones I've found, that's the direction I'm heading.
FYI, here's another paper:
There are a number on Academia by Sedley, Warren, and others.
And I'm deliberately staying away from Cicero until I can get some more sources, hopefully actual texts being quoted by other authors and not paraphrased into characters in Cicero's work.
Fascinating stuff!
Just with that tantalizing bit, it would seem to me to look like the kinetic pleasures were pleasures experienced in the moment. Katastematic pleasures, which the Cyrenaics didn't recognize as pleasures, are the ones that are "brought about through memory or expectation of goods."
I think this is important: (emphasis added)
‘Nor, (the Cyrenaics) say, is pleasure brought about through memory or expectation of goods, as Epicurus held: for the motion of the soul is obliterated by time’ (DL 2.89–90) (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα). I take this to mean that although you can, implicitly, derive mental pleasure now from a bodily pleasure you are likewise enjoying now, the mental enjoyment is eliminated when you are temporally separated from the bodily pleasure, whether it lies in the past or the future.7
[89] ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις, ὡς εἴρηται παρ᾽ Ἐπικούρῳ, δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς μὴ εἶναι ἡδονή: οὐδὲ ἡ ἀηδονία ἀλγηδών. ἐν κινήσει γὰρ εἶναι ἀμφότερα, μὴ οὔσης τῆς ἀπονίας ἢ τῆς ἀηδονίας κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀπονία οἱονεὶ καθεύδοντός ἐστι κατάστασις. δύνασθαι δέ φασι καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν τινας μὴ αἱρεῖσθαι κατὰ διαστροφήν: οὐ πάσας μέντοι τὰς ψυχικὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀλγηδόνας ἐπὶ σωματικαῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἀλγηδόσι γίνεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ ψιλῇ τῇ τῆς πατρίδος εὐημερίᾳ ὥσπερ τῇ ἰδίᾳ χαρὰν ἐγγίνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ μνήμην τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ προσδοκίαν ἡδονήν φασιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι: ὅπερ ἤρεσκεν Ἐπικούρῳ. 27 [90] ἐκλύεσθαι γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα. λέγουσι δὲ μηδὲ κατὰ ψιλὴν τὴν ὅρασιν ἢ τὴν ἀκοὴν γίνεσθαι ἡδονάς. τῶν γοῦν μιμουμένων θρήνους ἡδέως ἀκούομεν, τῶν δὲ κατ᾽ ἀλήθειαν ἀηδῶς. μέσας τε καταστάσεις ὠνόμαζον ἀηδονίαν καὶ ἀπονίαν. πολὺ μέντοι τῶν ψυχικῶν τὰς σωματικὰς ἀμείνους εἶναι, καὶ τὰς ὀχλήσεις χείρους τὰς σωματικάς. ὅθεν καὶ ταύταις κολάζεσθαι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας. χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὸ πονεῖν, οἰκειότερον δὲ τὸ ἥδεσθαι ὑπελάμβανον. ὅθεν καὶ πλείονα οἰκονομίαν περὶ θάτερον ἐποιοῦντο. διὸ καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν αἱρετῆς οὔσης τῆς ἡδονῆς τὰ ποιητικὰ ἐνίων ἡδονῶν ὀχληρὰ
πολλάκις ἐναντιοῦσθαι: ὡς δυσκολώτατον αὐτοῖς φαίνεσθαι τὸν ἀθροισμὸν τῶν ἡδονῶν εὐδαιμονίαν ποιούντων.
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Β, Κεφ. η᾽. ΑΡΙΣΤΙΠΠΟΣ
At some point, I'd like to consolidate my thinking on this topic with relevant citations to the source material. I think it would also be fruitful to really understand what the Cyrenaics thought as Epicurus drew a definite contrast between them and the Garden.
To expand on Metrodorus and VS45, here are other uses of πραγμάτων (pragmatōn) that are in line with those and pertinent to my thinking:
Ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου κατειδὼς οἶδεν, ὡς εὐπόριστόν ἐστι τὸ <τὸ> ἀλγοῦν κατ᾽ ἔνδειαν ἐξαιροῦν καὶ τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελῆ καθιστάν: ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲν προσδεῖται πραγμάτων ἀγῶνας κεκτημένων.
One who perceives the limits of life knows how easy it is to expel the pain produced by a lack of something and to make one's entire life complete; so that there is no need for the things that are achieved through struggle. (Saint-Andre)
Saint-Andre note on the text: The word ἀγών, translated here as "struggle", originally referred to the contests pursued by athletes at public festivals such as the Olympic games; Epicurus is not necessarily counselling against personal discipline (such as that involved in learning true philosophy), but against the trials and dangers of action in the public arena.
My note on the text: The use of πραγμάτων (pragmatōn) here is perfectly in line with the idea of "external circumstances or things." Plus the pain referred to in the first part ἀλγοῦν from ἄλγος can refer to both pain of the body or of the mind, which to me aligns with aponia and ataraxia, respectively.
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἄλγος
PD38 also uses pragmatōn twice:
When circumstances have not changed and things that were thought to be just are shown to not be in accord with our basic grasp of justice, then those things were not just. But when circumstances do change and things that were just are no longer useful, then those things were just while they brought mutual advantage among companions sharing the same community; but when later they did not bring advantage, then they were not just.
ἔνθα μὴ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν περιεστώτων πραγμάτων ἀνεφάνη μὴ ἁρμόττοντα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν τὰ νομισθέντα δίκαια ἐπʼ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔρων, οὐκ ἦν ταῦτα δίκαια· ἔνθα δὲ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκέτι συνέφερε τὰ αὐτὰ δίκαια κείμενα, ἐνταῦθα δὴ τότε μὲν ἦν δίκαια ὅτε σενέφερεν εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν τῶν συμπολιτευομένων, ὕστερον δʼ οὐκ ἦν ἔτι δίκαια ὅτε μὴ συνέφερεν.
Not quite as directly relevant but still nominally applying to circumstances and actions.
Once again, here's the LSJ entry for πράγμα (pragma) (pragmatōn is simply the plural genitive of pragma, ie, "of pragmas")
PS: I don't pass up an opportunity to recommend Eikadistes 's compilation of the Principal Doctrines. Always instructive to see alternative translations along with the original Greek.
In light of Metrodorus's book title and reference, I found VS45 very interesting:
VS45 The study of what is natural produces not braggarts nor windbags nor those who show off the culture that most people fight about, but those who are fearless and self-reliant and who value their own good qualities rather than the good things that have come to them from external circumstances.
οὐ κομποὺς οὐδὲ φωνῆς ἐργαστικοὺς οὐδὲ τὴν περιμάχητον παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς παιδείαν ἐνδεικνυμένους φυσιολογία παρασκευάζει, ἀλλὰ σοβαροὺς καὶ αὐτάρκεις καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀγαθοῖς, οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων μέγα φρονοῦντες.
Note that what Saint-Andre translates as "external circumstances" is πραγμάτων - the exact same word Metrodorus uses in his book title: Περι του μειζονα ειναι την παρ' ἡμας αἰτιαν προς εὐδαιμονιαν της ἐκ των πραγματων
There's also the μειζονα and μέγα in the two passages.
I think VS45 and the title of Metrodorus's book title are saying the same thing: we can rely more on the pleasure that arises from within us than we can on the pleasures that arise from external circumstances.
In my view: The pleasure from internal sources is katastematic ; the pleasure from external activities and circumstances is kinetic (arising from πραγμάτων ).
The problem that most people legitimately won't understand is that "engagement with the moment" involves every intellectual and emotional response in life no matter how "sublime" and "high" and even "noble."
See, I don't think my definition/examples of katastematic pleasures are sublime, high, or noble. I think they're just different than dancing, drinking, dining, having sex, etc. Freeing ones mind from an erroneous belief or delusion doesn't involve a physical/visible action but a mental action. As Eikadistes mentioned, it's all based on a physical bodies so I hesitate to say "physical" but it'll do.
I'm trying to understand why Epicurus felt obliged(?) to use the katastematic/kinetic dichotomy but I do not think he dwelt on it. He needed to differentiate his school clearly from the Cyrenaics and this seems to have been the fastest route. So he took it and moved on.
I can't imagine Epicurus saying, for example, "If you wish to make Pythocles Happy, do not give him more happiness, but diminish his joy and delight."
Good one! 
I think it is important to re-state that the mind is a type of body, and that the satisfactions of the mind are, themselves, pleasures of the body. Regardless of any schema designed to organize the different pleasures into categories, all pleasures are pleasures of the body, require some type of energetic motion to instigate, and some of those active bodily pleasures are felt by the mental organ instead of the visual, auditory, chemical, kinesthetic, or thermal organs.
I think this is an important observation. Yes, the mind is a body composed of atoms just like the rest of the physical universe. I also think there are katastematic and kinetic pleasures, but I'll get to that in a moment. Nate's point though is one reason I'm always skeptical of some commentators saying that the motion of kinetic has to do with atoms moving. I don't think that's it at all.
I am very suspicious of the concept of katastematic pleasures in the first place because the related word katastēmatikós was elsewhere used to describe "sedation". If that were accurate, then the Cyrenaics would have a legitimate point about equating ataraxia with dreamless sleep.
On re-reading your post, Nate: Are you saying you're skeptical of the concept itself of katastematic pleasures? Or that Epicurus used that dichotomy between katastempatic/kinetic?
As for Epicurus using the term, in my mind, I'm (fairly firmly) convinced that he did. The quote from On Choices and Avoidances in Diogenes Laertius plus other citations and references sort of clinches it for me. By Zeus, even DeWitt seems to have accepted it 
On the concept itself, I am not too concerned about colloquial uses of the term katastematic like "sedation." LSJ simply glosses it as "pertaining to a state or condition."
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Κκ , κατάσσυ^τος , καταστηματικός
see also
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, κατάστημα
So, to me, katastematic pleasures are those that pertain to a state of being (a state of being free of fear, a state of being free of pain, a state of being calm, a state of being in homeostasis, etc.) which can be extended with little effort. Once the "fear of death" is eliminated, one can exist in a state free of the fear of death indefinitely (as long as one doesn't fall back into error... although the characteristics of the wise one include "once the sage has become wise, they will no longer fall back into ignorance". Once you eliminate a false belief, it's eliminated.)
Kinetic pleasures - those sanctioned by the Cyrenaics and others as "pleasures" - are active pleasures in which one engages in the moment. Kinetic pleasures are fleeting but they provide variety to one's existence.
Katastematic pleasure is the music playing in the background of the movie scene pulling the story together. Kinetic pleasures are the explosions and action sequences and provide the variety to the story. Both are necessary for an interesting superhero movie (Sorry, best film analogy I could come up with!)
Quick thought:
As animals, we have a desire to feel pleasure.
As humans, we have the capacity to choose which desires to feel pleasure we pursue.
Let's start with some definitions and we're going to focus on the word Epicurus uses not the translation for right now:
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἐπιθυ_μ-ία
I'm including the Blue Letter Bible entry to illustrate that the Christians took επιθυμία to be inherently bad. Mostly I think because any choice not sanctioned by the church was evil. Rememder that the Greek for choice is αίρεση hairesē whereby we get English heresy.
And finally, some translations for επιθυμία :
Woodhouse, S. C. (1910) English–Greek Dictionary: A Vocabulary of the Attic Language, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited.
appetite idem, page 35.
aspiration idem, page 45.
bent idem, page 74.
caprice idem, page 112.
concupiscence idem, page 156.
craving idem, page 182.
desire idem, page 215.
hunger idem, page 410.
inclination idem, page 428.
itch idem, page 461.
longing idem, page 498.
lust idem, page 505.
passion idem, page 597.
predilection idem, page 634.
proneness idem, page 653.
vagary idem, page 942.
want idem, page 961.
whim idem, page 976.
wish idem, page 983.
So you can decide to fulfill an επιθυμία or not. It is an opportunity for a volitional and/or a cognitive act. It could also be a sensory stimulation as in realizing you're hungry or thirsty.
You want something. You decide whether or not you pursue it, to fill that perceived need. So, sensation may be part of it.
The feeling you experience by fulfilling that want, desire, passion, hunger, longing is either pleasurable or painful.
Still thinking...
I think Godfrey 's point that desires (επιθυμία ) and pleasure (ηδονή ) are two different things is a very important one, and conflating the two is part of the trouble in discussing this topic.
In re-reading G&T I'm struck by their conclusion in 19.4.30:
It seems simplest just to suppose that when the organism is functioning harmoniously it is always having some form of perception; that since the operation is harmonious the perception is pleasant and without pain; and that is just what aponia is. Ataraxia is the condition when, because of correct views, our expectations are undisturbed by fear, our desires do not pursue empty objectives and our memories are pleasant: this leaves us to enjoy our pleasures unanxiously.
This seems in line with where I'm coming down, especially in light of Metrodorus 's fragment. G&T's "when the organism is functioning harmoniously it is always having some form of perception" seems to me to have parallels to the homeostasis and interoception of modern biology. Their "this leaves us to enjoy our pleasures unanxiously" seems again to bolster the points I was trying to make in post #92 above. Ataraxia and aponia become the condition (katastema) that is always available to us once we internalize Epicurus's teachings, freeing us to enjoy the pleasure that comes from our prudent choices of which desires will lead to a pleasurable life.
I keep coming back in my mind to one of the biggest challenges here being the over-restrictive definition of pleasure that we live under today
Agreed. There's a linkage of "pleasure" with "profligacy" or "indulgence" in modern parlance... And it seems Ancient parlance, too.
that if you feel ANYTHING at all (and we are constantly feeling lots of things as part of being alive) then those feelings are either (1) pleasure or (2) pain.
Agreed. I am coming around to feeling this and not just intellectually thinking it. I don't think there is a neutral state although I'm going to have to go back to Barrett and Lembke to think about this in light of their research. (Sent thoughts, Godfrey ?)
On a related note, it seems Dewitt was fully on board with katastematic and kinetic pleasures in Epicurus's philosophy.
To me, this is making more and more sense (in light especially of Metrodorus's book reference). We can be more sure of internal freedom from pain in the body and internal freedom from disturbances in the mind than we can of external sources of pleasure... Even if necessary pleasures are easy to come by. The katastematic pleasures of ataraxia and aponia are "states or conditions of being" generated from within ourselves. We free our minds from trouble and fear by internalizing Epicurus's principles on the gods, death, the nature of the universe, etc. - by mulling them over and accepting or rejecting their validity and veracity. We free our bodies from pain by healthy habits and prudent choices. *Ataraxia & aponia* allow for continuing pleasure regardless of external circumstances. If we have them, we have well-being (eudaimonia). Kinetic pleasures or pleasures of sight, sounds, touch, etc. vary the pleasure and we enjoy luxuries if and when they become available.
Not an entirely thought out position, but this is where I'm heading.
