Posts by Don

Paper: The concept of the good (tagathon) in philosophy before Plato

https://philarchive.org/archive/PACTCO-8v1

Quote from Godfrey

Yet the argument blithely proceeds....

Maybe it was just to try and shut Socrates up.

"By Zeus, yeah, sure, I agree with you. (Now please, just shut...)"

"Ah, but what about..."

"Yeah, okay! That, too. (Just please, shut the...)"

" And yet,..."

"Excuse me, I have to go to the bathroom."

"Ah, when you return we shall talk about..."

"Oh, I'm not coming back.. (By Zeus, what a @#$&!)"

Quote from Cassius

still say some very "sharp"
things about philosophical opponents!

LOL. Let's say "frank" things

This was a fun video from the visual effects guys on YouTube:

Quote from Little Rocker

Plato is a slippery bastard

It always warms my heart when I read things like this. Makes me feel better for thinking Socrates was an annoying jerk. Not sure I would have voted to convict and condemn him, but his disregard for his wife and children are at the top of my list for holding the opinion that he was a jerk.

I think I like where Godfrey is going.

I'm wondering if we're (me included) of we're getting the technical/philosophical meaning of "good" and the colloquial/everyday meaning of good conflated.

I'm starting to think that within the philosophical debates going on among Platonist, Aristotelian, Epicureans, Cynics, Stoics, et al., that there was a set of traits or phenomena that were under discussion as to which one was the one "to which all others point": Pleasure, Courage, Virtue, Practical wisdom, Contemplation, Piety, etc. The debate seems to then have been which of these were the telos/summum bonum, making the others means to that literal end. Epicurus clearly came down on the side of pleasure, making all the others subordinate. Those are the "goods" of which, according to the Epicurean school, pleasure is the telos/"highest good." I may even have to go back and research what those things were called as a group. It may not even be "goods."

The colloquial use of the adjective "good" - as in describing anything as "this is good" - is predicated on its producing pleasure: "all pleasure is 'good'" at least to the Epicureans. The other schools would not consent to that characterization I'm sure. It appears that what is good is contextual.

Just came across this. Haven't had a chance to peruse, but here it is:

The Good in Ancient Philosophy | open.conted.ox.ac.uk (beta)

agathon ἀγαθόν good — often with a connotation with utility and advantage (for the agent), i.e. ‘good for’

Quote from Cassius

And that leads to "the highest good" having multiple meanings

See, I don't agree with that. The "highest good" or summum bonum or τέλος telos is "that to which all other good things points." You can paraphrase that as need be, but that's the definition as I see it in the texts.

Todd That summary was very helpful to get us back on track and to clearly present your position. Thank you! I am taking pleasure in this discussion, and hope I've engaged in a respectful manner.

Of course, I have thoughts ...

Quote from Todd

1) There is no such thing as a good (or a bad) in nature. The concept of a good is a product of human reason. So first we need to define what a good is (or stop talking about them).

I would agree that humans are the ones to assign concepts to natural phenomena. That said, from the human perspective, there are good things and bad things in nature with respect to their effect on humans. And I'm consciously using "good thing" and "bad thing" not the platonic sounding "good" and "bad."

Quote from Todd

2) How would we define a good, using only the tools nature gave us? Pleasure and pain seem like the obvious tools for the job.

I found the LSJ definition of αγαθός instructive in that it used words like benefit to define the word. A "good thing" provides a benefit of service. That's why other schools can say virtue or reason are "good things." For Epicureans, a good thing is that which leads to pleasure. Likewise, a bad thing produces pain.

Quote from Todd

3) A good, then, is something that produces pleasure. Producing pleasure is not just a property that goods happen to have. It is the very standard by which we are able to say they are goods at all. It is the ONLY property of a good, as such. Everything that has this property is a good. Nothing that lacks this property is a good.

I *think* I agree with that. I'll admit I'm still parsing that paragraph. There's a lot going on in there.

Quote from Todd

4) So is pleasure a good? Does it produce pleasure? No, it IS pleasure. Therefore, it is not a good.

That's an interesting question. I still maintain that pleasure is that to which all goods point, or, to be more exact to my thinking, pleasure is the ultimate motivation underpinning all....

Hmmm. That's not right. Hmmm, I'm going to have to cogitate on this a little more.

It remains a fact that Epicurus used the word "good" and "the good." It behooves is to understand why.

Quote from Todd

Don suggested an idea earlier, that there is a category called Goods that includes pleasure and a sub-category called Instrumental Goods. (A Venn diagram would be handy here.)

Well, I have to share thoughts on that Now I'm not so sure on that, but as I said above, those are Epicurus's words (well, not instrumental. I'm going to have to dig a little more on this one).

It seems my action item is to define "good" if I want to stay the course on that topic. Stay tuned.

Sounds good.

Quote from Todd

I'll cut him some slack if he made a few mistakes, or occasionally said some things that were not consistent.

There's also the ongoing issue that so much of what Epicurus "said" is filtered through unreliable and hostile witnesses, ex., Cicero, Plutarch, et al.

Quote from Cassius

the Plutarch fragment:

“That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about, prating meaninglessly about the good.” Epicurus, as cited in Usener Fragment U423

Does that fragment mean "anything that produces pleasure should be considered good" and you should not obsess over other implications of the word 'good'"?

Come with me, this way, down another tunnel in the rabbit warren:

That Plutarch fragment is a little more complex than I first realized. That specific excerpt is a little misleading. Here's the link to Perseus:

Plutarch, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, section 7

(Emphasis and notations added)

Quote from Epicurus as reported by Plutarch

Like unto this is that of Epicurus, where he saith: The very essence of good arises from the escaping of bad, *and* a man's recollecting, considering, and rejoicing within himself that this hath befallen him. For what occasions transcending joy (he saith) is some great impending evil escaped; and in this lies the very nature and essence of good, if a man attain unto it aright, and contain himself when he hath done, and not ramble and prate idly about it.

The archaic language is hard to parse. Bailey provides more context:

Quote

That which creates Joy insuperable is the complete

removal of a great evil. And this is the nature of good, one can once grasp it rightly, and then hold by it, and not walk about babbling idly about the good.

Is Plutarch saying that Epicurus said don't talk about "the good" or don't talk about escaping the evil that brought you pleasure? Just experience the pleasure of escaping the evil and move on with your life? That's going to take some parsing in Plutarch's Greek.

Quote from Godfrey

Pleasure is good. It's a good. It's The Good. It feels good. It's everything described in the previous 138 posts.

LOL! Well, when you put it like that...!

Epicurean bumper sticker anyone?

Quote from Godfrey

Todd you have mentioned repeatedly that in this thread you are only discussing ethics. I think that that's a mistake, because there's no Epicurean ethics without the physics.

I see Godfrey 's point. I would add that isolating the philosophy from its historical context isn't possible either. Not that this is necessarily being done in this thread! Just something to keep in mind. Epicurus was reacting to the philosophical and cultural environment in which he found himself. His philosophy is a direct attack/response to Cyrenaic, Platonic, and Aristotelian positions of his day. It would be up to Philodemus and later Epicureans to address Stoic ideas.

Quote from Godfrey

I think that we all agree that pleasure is the positive/attractive part of the faculty of Feelings. As such, a prudent understanding of one's feelings and desires is the core of Epicurean ethics.

I can agree with that.

Quote from Nate

In his Epistle to Menoikeus, Epicurus declares HΔONH ("pleasure") to be the ΠPOTON AΓAΘON the "first good". Interestingly

Here's my commentary from my translation on that phrase:

129a. ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν,

ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον "fundamental/primary good"

Remember πρῶτον from way back in 123b! (Note: This refers to the place in the letter that many translators use "First, ..." I disagree with that ordinal number approach since he never uses a number elsewhere.) Since it's used there and here, I contend that, in neither place, is it meant to convey "first" as an ordinal number but rather "fundamental, primary"

...

129b.ii. καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες.

• "and against this (ἐπὶ ταύτην)
• κανόνι τῷ πάθει “by the standard of feeling (i.e., pleasure and pain, the pathe)”; “by the standard of the reaction (singular) we have of pleasure or pain”
  • ...
• κρίνοντες “judging, deciding + (accusative” πᾶν ἀγαθὸν “every good thing,” i.e., “every pleasure” against or by the κανόνι τῷ πάθει “the standard of how we react to what happens to us when we experience - or consider experiencing - that specific good thing.
• “And against this (that pleasure is a fundamental good and common to our nature), judging every good thing (i.e., every possible pleasurable experience) by the standard of how that pleasure affects us or how we react to considering experiencing that pleasure.”

129c. Καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον,

• σύμφυτον “born with, congenital, natural, inborn”, takes the place in this phrase of συγγενικὸν above (129a.)
• “And because this (pleasure) is the fundamental/primary and inborn good…”

129. Because we perceived pleasure as a fundamental good and common to our nature, and so, as a result of this, we begin every choice and rejection against this, judging every good thing (πᾶν ἀγαθὸν) by the standard of how that pleasure affects us or how we react to considering experiencing that pleasure. And because pleasure is the fundamental and inborn good, this is why not every pleasure is seized and we pass by many pleasures when greater unpleasant things were to result for us as a result: and we think many pains better than pleasures whenever greater pleasure were to follow for a longer time by patiently abiding the pain.

Thanks!!

Oh, that is a lot of reconstruction. Some day, I'll try to track down a manuscript image.

Even so, I don't have a problem with ΤΟΝ ΧΡΗΣΤΟΝ. It really does seem to be synonymous with TΟ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ. He are the two definitions side by side:

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, χρηστός

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἀγα^θός

To excerpt some of the definitions:

ΑΓΑΘΟΝ good, serviceable; good, blessing, benefit

ΧΡΗΣΤΟΝ useful, good of its kind, serviceable; good for its purpose, effective; as Subst., benefits, kindnesses

Quote from Todd

Quote from Don

Quote from Todd

it just has the special property of not referring to any other good?

Yes, I think that's my position.

This is a little surprising to me, because you seemed adamant earlier that prudence was the highest good most cardinal, chief, greatest good thing. (Sorry, it was Nate who said it was highest.)

But now I understand that you mean "[first?] in a category that also includes pleasure"! How do you reconcile these things?

Are you doing this in an effort to maintain the consistency of everything Epicurus ever said?

Prudence is the "most cardinal, chief, greatest good thing" in the instrumental goods category which includes everything except pleasure within the larger category of goods things.

Pleasure is "the" good thing that stands alone to which all the instrumental good things point.

As far as Epicurus's words, yes. If we can't reconcile the scant texts that we have, we're just picking and choosing cafeteria style. At least that's my goal.

Quote from Nate

Though, I am not sure that this nuance was universally recognized, as Philodemus identifies "the good" as TΩN AΓAΘΩN on one occasion, TON XPHΣTON on one, and TAΓAΘON on another, so, even then, the technical usage seems irrelevant.

It's all good.

The difference between TΩN AΓAΘΩN and TAΓAΘON is necessary if one is using genitive vs accusative cases. The article wouldn't end in a vowel in the genitive case so it couldn't be elided with the following vowel.

Could you share the context of TON XPHΣTON? I'd be very curious. It really appears to be synonymous with ΑΓΑΘΟΝ

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, χρηστός

Quote from Nate

Epicurus also describes ΦPONHΣIΣ ("prudence") as being the APXH, the "beginning" or "foundation". Incidentally, he also identifies HΔONH ("pleasure") as both the APXHN ("beginning") and TEΛOΣ ("end").

I've taken that as prudence is the foundation of all our choices and rejections. Pleasure is both the beginning and end, literally and figuratively, of our very existence.

Lucretius implies pleasure is the "supreme good" bonum summum, too:

Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, BOOK VI, line 1

So he,

The master, then by his truth-speaking words,

Purged the breasts of men, and set the bounds

Of lust and terror, and exhibited

The supreme good whither we all endeavour,

And showed the path whereby we might arrive

Thereunto by a little cross-cut straight,

And what of ills in all affairs of mortals

Upsprang and flitted deviously about

(Whether by chance or force), since nature thus

Had destined; and from out what gates a man

Should sally to each combat.

...veridicis igitur purgavit pectora dictis

et finem statuit cuppedinis atque timoris

exposuitque bonum summum, quo tendimus omnes,

quid foret, atque viam monstravit, tramite parvo

qua possemus ad id recto contendere cursu,

quidve mali foret in rebus mortalibus passim,

quod fieret naturali varieque volaret

seu casu seu vi, quod sic natura parasset,

et quibus e portis occurri cuique deceret,

...

Quote from Todd

it just has the special property of not referring to any other good?

Yes, I think that's my position.

Quote from Todd

The Good, does not belong in the category of goods. It is different category.

From your perspective, what would that category be?

Quote from Todd

1. goods (as referenced above) are things that produce pleasure. That is our definition of a good in this context.
2. We agree to stop referring to pleasure as a good. The Good, if you really must. Never a good. Please?

1. Within the context of Epicureanism, "goods" are instrumental to producing pleasure. Agreed. In other philosophies, the goods are ends in and out themselves. In Stoicism, virtue is "the highest good." That's what leads me to insisting that pleasure is not only "a good" but "the good" among "goods."

1a. I'm going to have to go back and see the specific words that Epicurus used when talking about prudence and pleasure and their being "goods."

2. See #1.