Posts by Don

Quote from Godfrey

Pleasure is good. It's a good. It's The Good. It feels good. It's everything described in the previous 138 posts.

LOL! Well, when you put it like that...!

Epicurean bumper sticker anyone?

Quote from Godfrey

Todd you have mentioned repeatedly that in this thread you are only discussing ethics. I think that that's a mistake, because there's no Epicurean ethics without the physics.

I see Godfrey 's point. I would add that isolating the philosophy from its historical context isn't possible either. Not that this is necessarily being done in this thread! Just something to keep in mind. Epicurus was reacting to the philosophical and cultural environment in which he found himself. His philosophy is a direct attack/response to Cyrenaic, Platonic, and Aristotelian positions of his day. It would be up to Philodemus and later Epicureans to address Stoic ideas.

Quote from Godfrey

I think that we all agree that pleasure is the positive/attractive part of the faculty of Feelings. As such, a prudent understanding of one's feelings and desires is the core of Epicurean ethics.

I can agree with that.

Quote from Nate

In his Epistle to Menoikeus, Epicurus declares HΔONH ("pleasure") to be the ΠPOTON AΓAΘON the "first good". Interestingly

Here's my commentary from my translation on that phrase:

129a. ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν,

ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον "fundamental/primary good"

Remember πρῶτον from way back in 123b! (Note: This refers to the place in the letter that many translators use "First, ..." I disagree with that ordinal number approach since he never uses a number elsewhere.) Since it's used there and here, I contend that, in neither place, is it meant to convey "first" as an ordinal number but rather "fundamental, primary"

...

129b.ii. καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες.

• "and against this (ἐπὶ ταύτην)
• κανόνι τῷ πάθει “by the standard of feeling (i.e., pleasure and pain, the pathe)”; “by the standard of the reaction (singular) we have of pleasure or pain”
  • ...
• κρίνοντες “judging, deciding + (accusative” πᾶν ἀγαθὸν “every good thing,” i.e., “every pleasure” against or by the κανόνι τῷ πάθει “the standard of how we react to what happens to us when we experience - or consider experiencing - that specific good thing.
• “And against this (that pleasure is a fundamental good and common to our nature), judging every good thing (i.e., every possible pleasurable experience) by the standard of how that pleasure affects us or how we react to considering experiencing that pleasure.”

129c. Καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον,

• σύμφυτον “born with, congenital, natural, inborn”, takes the place in this phrase of συγγενικὸν above (129a.)
• “And because this (pleasure) is the fundamental/primary and inborn good…”

129. Because we perceived pleasure as a fundamental good and common to our nature, and so, as a result of this, we begin every choice and rejection against this, judging every good thing (πᾶν ἀγαθὸν) by the standard of how that pleasure affects us or how we react to considering experiencing that pleasure. And because pleasure is the fundamental and inborn good, this is why not every pleasure is seized and we pass by many pleasures when greater unpleasant things were to result for us as a result: and we think many pains better than pleasures whenever greater pleasure were to follow for a longer time by patiently abiding the pain.

Thanks!!

Oh, that is a lot of reconstruction. Some day, I'll try to track down a manuscript image.

Even so, I don't have a problem with ΤΟΝ ΧΡΗΣΤΟΝ. It really does seem to be synonymous with TΟ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ. He are the two definitions side by side:

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, χρηστός

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἀγα^θός

To excerpt some of the definitions:

ΑΓΑΘΟΝ good, serviceable; good, blessing, benefit

ΧΡΗΣΤΟΝ useful, good of its kind, serviceable; good for its purpose, effective; as Subst., benefits, kindnesses

Quote from Todd

Quote from Don

Quote from Todd

it just has the special property of not referring to any other good?

Yes, I think that's my position.

This is a little surprising to me, because you seemed adamant earlier that prudence was the highest good most cardinal, chief, greatest good thing. (Sorry, it was Nate who said it was highest.)

But now I understand that you mean "[first?] in a category that also includes pleasure"! How do you reconcile these things?

Are you doing this in an effort to maintain the consistency of everything Epicurus ever said?

Prudence is the "most cardinal, chief, greatest good thing" in the instrumental goods category which includes everything except pleasure within the larger category of goods things.

Pleasure is "the" good thing that stands alone to which all the instrumental good things point.

As far as Epicurus's words, yes. If we can't reconcile the scant texts that we have, we're just picking and choosing cafeteria style. At least that's my goal.

Quote from Nate

Though, I am not sure that this nuance was universally recognized, as Philodemus identifies "the good" as TΩN AΓAΘΩN on one occasion, TON XPHΣTON on one, and TAΓAΘON on another, so, even then, the technical usage seems irrelevant.

It's all good.

The difference between TΩN AΓAΘΩN and TAΓAΘON is necessary if one is using genitive vs accusative cases. The article wouldn't end in a vowel in the genitive case so it couldn't be elided with the following vowel.

Could you share the context of TON XPHΣTON? I'd be very curious. It really appears to be synonymous with ΑΓΑΘΟΝ

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, χρηστός

Quote from Nate

Epicurus also describes ΦPONHΣIΣ ("prudence") as being the APXH, the "beginning" or "foundation". Incidentally, he also identifies HΔONH ("pleasure") as both the APXHN ("beginning") and TEΛOΣ ("end").

I've taken that as prudence is the foundation of all our choices and rejections. Pleasure is both the beginning and end, literally and figuratively, of our very existence.

Lucretius implies pleasure is the "supreme good" bonum summum, too:

Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, BOOK VI, line 1

So he,

The master, then by his truth-speaking words,

Purged the breasts of men, and set the bounds

Of lust and terror, and exhibited

The supreme good whither we all endeavour,

And showed the path whereby we might arrive

Thereunto by a little cross-cut straight,

And what of ills in all affairs of mortals

Upsprang and flitted deviously about

(Whether by chance or force), since nature thus

Had destined; and from out what gates a man

Should sally to each combat.

...veridicis igitur purgavit pectora dictis

et finem statuit cuppedinis atque timoris

exposuitque bonum summum, quo tendimus omnes,

quid foret, atque viam monstravit, tramite parvo

qua possemus ad id recto contendere cursu,

quidve mali foret in rebus mortalibus passim,

quod fieret naturali varieque volaret

seu casu seu vi, quod sic natura parasset,

et quibus e portis occurri cuique deceret,

...

Quote from Todd

it just has the special property of not referring to any other good?

Yes, I think that's my position.

Quote from Todd

The Good, does not belong in the category of goods. It is different category.

From your perspective, what would that category be?

Quote from Todd

1. goods (as referenced above) are things that produce pleasure. That is our definition of a good in this context.
2. We agree to stop referring to pleasure as a good. The Good, if you really must. Never a good. Please?

1. Within the context of Epicureanism, "goods" are instrumental to producing pleasure. Agreed. In other philosophies, the goods are ends in and out themselves. In Stoicism, virtue is "the highest good." That's what leads me to insisting that pleasure is not only "a good" but "the good" among "goods."

1a. I'm going to have to go back and see the specific words that Epicurus used when talking about prudence and pleasure and their being "goods."

2. See #1.

Quote from Todd

If it seemed like I was making a distinction there, that was not my intent.

"lower-case goods" == "goods"

I was being too clever for my own good.

Okay, I'll go along with that. Maybe I was being pedantic.

That said, it sounds like we agree that there are "goods" (αγαθός) as a category.

Is our hangup then seeing "the good" (ταγαθον < το "the" + αγατθον "good") as being one of these "goods" but being special in that it is the only "good thing" that does not point to any other "good thing"?

Quote from Todd

I have not seen anyone arguing that there is overlap between those 2 categories - that pleasure is also a type of lower-case good. Is that correct?

Unfortunately, I don't think I'm onboard with that.

There are no "lower case" goods. From what I read, there are "goods" (αγαθός) as a category and there is "the good" (ταγαθον < το "the" + αγατθον "good").

I know Eikadistes said earlier in the thread that The Good wasn't a good (and I'm paraphrasing from memory so feel free to correct me!), but I'm not so sure about that.

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Α α, , ἀγαθο-εργέω , ἀγα^θός

For anyone who's interested, here's a similar thread:

Thread

From The "Golden Mean" to tbe "Summum Bonum" - Useful or Deceptive Frames of Reference?

This discussion (split from here: What do you mean from the "Golden Mean" of Aristotle? ) reminds me of two other recent things that have been in my mind:

(1) i was discussing with someone a new sort of 'self-help' book that the person was reading, which focuses on what I perceive to be psychological self-help techniques geared toward reaching goals. My comment was to ask whether that person had first identified their real goals, as is makes sense to me that is usually would be appropriate to…

Cassius

February 13, 2022 at 5:30 AM

Quote from Todd

But then he goes on to say that the highest good is prudence. It seems that Epicurus said this, so he's on solid ground there.

Right. The highest *instrumental* good thing.

Quote from Todd

Nevertheless, I think it is useless and counter-productive to even discuss a "highest good" once you have established that pleasure is not it.

I don't think we've established that.

Quote from Todd

And providing the most pleasure is the only criteria we have to consider a good "highest", right?

No. We're getting hung up on the word "highest" here. It's not a value like "best." Well, in a way but not primarily. It's the highest at the summit towards which all other good things point. Or, within this discussion, to which all other good things serve as instrumental things.

Quote from Todd

And even if you could find one "highest good", so what? Are there some important goods that almost everyone will want to have? Sure. And Epicurean ethics should talk about those. But there is no need for a universal ranking to apply to everyone in all circumstances.

It's not a ranking. We're not putting good things into a hierarchy. I'll get to Epicurus's prudence in a moment. I've had this discussion with Cassius before, too. Pleasure is the only good thing that doesn't point to something else. That's what makes it the "highest", telos, goal, summum bonum, etc. The cheese stands alone, to use the Old McDonald had a Farm song. Practical wisdom/prudence can be characterized as the most cardinal, chief, greatest good thing (not The Good) because it is through this virtue that we're able to make them best decisions for what pleasures to choose and from which pleasures to flee. Butt it's still subordinate to and instrumental for achieving pleasure.

And so the foundation of all these and the greatest good (τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν) is φρόνησις, practical wisdom. On this account, practical wisdom is prized more dearly than philosophy itself, and from practical wisdom springs forth all the remaining virtues, teaching us that a pleasurable life does not exist without the traits of wisdom, morality, and justice; nor do the traits of wisdom, morality, and justice without pleasure: because the virtues grow together with a pleasurable life and the pleasurable life is inseparable from these.

Quote from Todd

translate between the Epicurean texts and the "modern, plain English" meanings.

That's always the issue with texts originally written in a foreign language which we don't read. We (and I'm including myself here!) are at the mercy of translators and scholars, but they bring their own biases and interpretations. That's why I tend to use multiple English words where the texts have one, to try and pull out some nuances. Even if we spoke *modern* Greek, we'd still be at a disadvantage.

To pull this back to "good," that word has it's own semantic baggage in English but it's been decided over the decades that that's a "good" enough "equivalent" to αγαθός. It's important to remember that, but it's what we have to work with.

Quote from Todd

I don't think I'm going to budge on this.

I respect your conviction.

Quote from Todd

Pleasure isn't just a good.

What would you call it then? And that's not meant as sarcasm! I'm just wanting to see what word you'd use to describe it.

Quote from Todd

You can't even talk about goods until you have a standard to determine what is a good anyway.

I've found it instructive to always go back to the source texts and the words used. When anyone - Aristotle, Epicurus, et al. - talked about "good" or "the good" as it's uniformly translated into English, the words used are αγαθός (agathos) "good" and ταγαθον (tagathon, basically the previous word with the definite article "the" bound to it) "the good."

I looked at the LSJ (THE standard reference for ancient Greek) definition for αγαθός:

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἀγα^θός

What I found instructive was the various connotations of that word:

II. of things,

1. good, serviceable

2. of outward circumstances, to good purpose,

3. morally good

4. ἀγαθόν, τό, good, blessing, benefit, of persons or things; as term of endearment for a baby, blessing!, treasure!; confer a benefit on . . , :—in pl., ἀγαθά, τά, goods of fortune, treasures, wealth; “ἀγαθὰ πράττειν” fare well; also, good things, dainties: good qualities; good points, of a horse.

To me, what it's getting at are "What things in life or this world confer benefit? What do we consider to provide a service to us?"

With these connotations, Epicurus seems to me to say wisdom, morality, and justice are goods because they provide the benefit of our living pleasurable lives.

But they aren't the end of goods. Pleasure is that to which all other goods point or end up - all other things that provide benefit to our lives ultimately do so because they provide us with pleasure.

So he uses ταγαθον when he talks about the expansiveness of pleasure here:

Fragment 67. I do not think I could conceive of the good (τἀγαθὸν) without the joys of taste, of sex, of hearing, and without the pleasing motions caused by the sight of bodies and forms.

LOL! I like your "clickbait" caveat

I was with you up until the end but let me try to at least explain why I don't *fully* embrace your post there.

I see your reference to DeWitt 's "summum bonum fallacy" and I've expressed my skepticism for that DeWittean idea before on the forum. As I remember her rests his argument on the fact that Latin doesn't have a definite article and that always seemed weak to me.

I also think that many times (myself included) have equated English "highest good" as "the best good." While "summum" means 'top, summit" I don't interpret that as "best" as in quality. It's the "good" that's reached at the end, it's the good to which will other goods point. Metaphorically, if you're walking up the path past all other goods asking "What is behind this? Why do I do this?" You'll end up finding at the summit the moving toward pleasure (and avoiding pain).

All the ancient philosophies asked the question "What is it to which all goods point?" Epicurus had an answer, and a powerful one.

I've explained my take on this in my commentary to Book 1 of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics:

I found this Vatican Saying interesting, translated by Saint-Andre:

60. Everyone departs from life just as they were when newly born.

πᾶς ὥσπερ ἄρτι γεγονὼς ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἀπέρχεται.

[NOTE] This saying is a bit cryptic. Some translations render it almost as meaning that the soul is born again at death, but clearly that would be at odds with the rest of what Epicurus says (e.g., Principal Doctrine #2). I take it to mean that human beings do not change throughout life in their essential needs: a person who is dying, just like a newborn baby, needs only to not be hungry, not be thirsty, not be cold .

Quote from Todd

"Older people are more complicated. They seek pleasure in more advanced ways, and they often appear to seek pain in the short-term. But they hope that will bring them even greater pleasure later."

I think that is a great formulation. It avoids the "infants are just better" problems.

I could see that formulation, but I'd push back on "infants are better."

They're not better. They're a data point. Animals are another data point. These demonstrate through observation that this is a natural inclination to seek pleasure and avoid pain.

Adults not seeking pleasure but are another data point demonstrating what happens when we don't skillfully seem pleasure.

Pain and pleasure don't tell us what to act upon but themselves. They are a guide. We use our reasoning ability to weigh outcomes and seek that which will lead to a maximally pleasurable life.

Quote from Todd

I guess the fundamental problem I have is the idea that living things start good, and then get worse.

Oh, I don't necessarily think good/bad is the way to go. We as humans are observed (especially as children) to instinctively gravitate towards what gives us pleasure (in the widest sense) and to recoil from that which gives us pain. It's not good or bad. That's just what happens. As adults, we should learn - per Epicurus - how to do that skillfully to provide ourselves with a maximally pleasurable life. Some adults find other motivations and stop listening to their pain/pleasure guide.

Quote from Todd

Maybe this will be clarifying: In your opinion, is the cradle argument an example of "reasoning"?

I would call it observation, seeing things the way they are.