Very much enjoyed the novel The Sparrow by Mary Doria Russell on this topic
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Very much enjoyed the novel The Sparrow by Mary Doria Russell on this topic
Display More QuoteDisplay More-GAUNT-
All places that the eye of heaven visits
Are to a wise man ports and happy havens.
Teach thy necessity to reason thus:
There is no virtue like necessity.
Think not the King did banish thee,
But thou the King. Woe doth the heavier sit
Where it perceives it is but faintly borne.
Go, say I sent thee forth to purchase honor,
And not the King exiled thee; or suppose
Devouring pestilence hangs in our air
And thou art flying to a fresher clime.
Look what thy soul holds dear, imagine it
To lie that way thou goest, not whence thou com’st.
Suppose the singing birds musicians,
The grass whereon thou tread’st the presence
strewed,
The flowers fair ladies, and thy steps no more
Than a delightful measure or a dance;
For gnarling sorrow hath less power to bite
The man that mocks at it and sets it light.
-BOLINGBROKE-
O, who can hold a fire in his hand
By thinking on the frosty Caucasus?
Or cloy the hungry edge of appetite
By bare imagination of a feast?
Or wallow naked in December snow
By thinking on fantastic summer’s heat?
O no, the apprehension of the good
Gives but the greater feeling to the worse.
Fell sorrow’s tooth doth never rankle more
Than when he bites but lanceth not the sore.
I was thinking of this exchange in Richard II in relation to 'ataraxia under duress'. John of Gaunt is Bolingbroke's father, and has dutifully argued for his own son's banishment--a service to the king which he comes to bitterly regret. One senses that his advice is as much for himself as for his son. But Bolingbroke is having none of it. "Who can hold a fire in his hand by thinking on the frosty Caucasus?"
I had thoughts of ataraxia under duress watching this interview with David Hogg. He addresses the idea specifically (using calm not ataraxia, of course) starting around 0:58.
VS08. The wealth required by Nature is limited and is easy to procure; but the wealth required by vain ideals extends to infinity
"Required?"
Yeah, I don't see *required* in the Greek. It literally just says "is" ἐστιν.
As literal as possible:
ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος "The wealth of nature..."
καὶ ὥρισται* καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστιν, "is the best and easily procured...
ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν (kenōn doxōn "empty beliefs/principles/doctrines") εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει. "But that of empty opinions runs onto infinity."
*πλοῦτος ploutos. Ex., plutocracy. Wealth, riches.
**ὥρισται is, according to LSJ, a contraction of ὁ ἄριστος (o aristos) from which we get aristocracy. So, it literally means "best, finest; best in its kind, and so in all sorts of relations, serving as Sup. of ἀγαθός (agathon "good"). I'm wondering if the "limited" translation is from the idea of oligos as in oligarchy as in rule by a few or limited number. If I've misunderstood ὥρισται I am more than open to correction!
PS. There is ὁριστός from ὁρίζω (horízō, “separate, delimit”) but ὥρισται with its sense connected to "the good" seems to me to make sense here.
I would be curious to get Eikadistes 's take.
PS: I found it interesting that the predicates in the first phrase are ὥρισται ooristai and εὐπόριστός euporistos. The first appears to be a feminine plural and the second appears to be masculine? So, do they apply to ploutos (it would appear given the ending of the euporistos) or to "nature" physeos? This is where my Greek knowledge begins to break down ![]()
Per LSJ:
εὐπόρ-ιστος , ον, (πορίζω)
A.easy to procure or secure, Id.Ep.3p.63U., Sent.21, Fr.469, Dsc.Eup. Praef.: Sup., ἀμπεχόνη, οἰκία, Ph.2.424, cf. Phld.D.1.15; feasible, Cic.Att.7.1.7; εὐπόριστα (sc. φάρμακα), τά, common, family medicines: title of work by Dsc., Orib.Eup.Praef. (called περὶ ἁπλῶν φαρμάκων in codd. of Dsc.Eup.); also, ordinary food, opp. game out of season, Plu.Luc.40, Pomp.2. II. Act., providing one's subsistence with ease, Ptol.Tetr.155.
Nor Bailey. He simply references PD15:
XV. The wealth demanded by Nature is both limited and easily procured; that demanded by idle imaginings stretches on to infinity. (Bailey)
ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ὥρισται καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν (kenōn doxōn "empty beliefs/ principles/ doctrines") εἰς ἄπειρον (apeiron - one of the words Epicurus used to describe the extent of the universe) ἐκπίπτει.
Another excerpt of interest from Epicurus, On Nature, book 14, column 24 (using Les Epicuriens, Google Translate on the French, and the papyrus transcription):
...we must count ourselves fortunate in this, too - that all who are engaged in such trivialities may have some sort of remedy by which it is possible, simply to attain at times calmness (κα̣τα̣στάσεις katastaseis) in the contemplation of nature, to get rid of their inborn ([σ]υμφύτου; French: connaturel) [trouble; ταραχ]ῆς], which even later [missing 1 column].
[ἀ-]
γ̣απητ[ὸν] καὶ τοῦτ[ο], τὸ
δὴ πάντα τὸν συνε̣[χό]με-
νον̣ [ταῖς] τοιαύταις περι-
εργ[ε]ίαις ἔχειν οἱονὶ φάρ-
μακ̣ον δι' οὗ κα̣τα̣στάσεις
ἁ̣πλ[ᾶς ἔστι]ν ἐν τῆι περὶ φύ-
σε[ως θεωρί]αι ἀπαλλαγή-
σε[σθαι τῆς σ]υμφύτου ἑαυ-
τα̣[ῖς ταραχ]ῆς ἣ καὶ ὕσ̣τε-
10ρον̣ [ ̣ ̣] ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ η̣πο ̣ ̣ σιτ ̣ ̣
γε [ ̣ ̣] ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ὥστε ̣ ̣ ̣ υ̣ ̣
[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣] ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ τοιού̣[τοι]ς ̣ ̣
[ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣] ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣ ον̣ [ ̣ ̣ ̣] ̣ ̣ ̣ ̣
[ -ca.?- ]
Compare to Fragment 116. I summon you to sustained enjoyment and not to empty and trifling virtues, which destroy your confidence in the fruits of what you have.
ἐγὼ δʼ ἐφʼ ἡδονὰς συνεχεῖς παρακαλῶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπʼ ἀρετὰς κενὰς καὶ ματαίας καὶ ταραχώδεις ἐχούσας τῶν καρπῶν ἐλπίδας.
in the cases of schadenfreude, déjà vu, or a cappella
Who gets to decide what these words actually mean? Who do we all accept is the authority?
This question is similar to the whole "Eskimos have a hundred words for snow" myth. The Inuit may have individual words for different types of snow, but English can still convey the meaning. It just takes more words. The may be one word in Inuktitut for it, but English can still say "packed snow that can be used to track an animal etc."
As to "who gets to decide", the authority at the present is the LSJ for ancient Greek that's available on Perseus.
The Thesaurus Linguae Latinae (TLL) is the most authoritative dictionary of ancient Latin. It is the only lexicon to cover all surviving Latin texts from the earliest times down to AD 600. Another is the Lewis and Short.
These dictionaries take into account scholarship, context, historical linguistics, and other factors to convey the range of meaning inherent in the words.
Easy is due to the eu- prefix on the verbs in lines 3 & 4 of the Tetrapharmakos
Don are you aware of any other reference stating "easy" other than the tetrapharmokos ?
Line 3: euktēton εὔκτητον
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ε , εὐκρα_τό-μελι , εὔκτητος
Line 4: euekkarterēton εὐεκκαρτέρητον
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ε , εὐδρομ-ία , εὐεκ-καρτέρητος
Compare euekkritos
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ε , εὐδρομ-ία , εὐέκ-κρι^τος
Also is this Voula Tsouna? Do you have the more specific cite?
It's a mashup of Tsouna, Les Epicuriens, and the text from the actual papyrus at papyri.info. No individual cite, just the Philodemus.
a particular text does demand the "EASY"
Easy is due to the eu- prefix on the verbs in lines 3 & 4 of the Tetrapharmakos.
Take a look at the LSJ definitions for a number of words in ancient Greek that begin eu-. Many have the connotation of easy, easily, without effort, honestly, etc.
I'm putting this here primarily as an interesting tidbit but also partly in reference to numbers 7 & 8 on my initial list.
From Philodemus, On Choices and Avoidances, columns 4 and 5:
[4] [Epicurus teaches us that good is easy for us to procure] and that evil is [not] only limited precisely because it is useless to have defined the good (τἀγαθόν), if it is difficult, if not impossible, for us to attain, nor to have fixed limits to evil, if it is difficult to bear because of its long duration. This knowledge has the effect of prohibiting both the pursuit of any [good] which is not by nature capable of eliminating pain - such are, most of the time, the [goods] which have motivated a search eager in humans -, and let none be discarded which does not prevent having pleasure -- that is how one must [conceive] most of [those which are acquired] gradually. And, in reverse, for [missing approximately 20 lines]
[5] [missing 3 lines] After that, it is also necessary to take into account the differences that present the desires (ἐπιθυμ̣[ιῶ]ν̣) relating to the pleasures and to what produces them, since precisely the lack of discernment on this subject gives rise to serious errors concerning the choices and the rejections. It is indeed because they regard as what is most necessary the goods which are most external to them, I mean a sovereign power, a dazzling fame, an exceptional wealth and sources of pleasure of this sort and other similar ones that they are in charge of the most painful evils; and that, conversely, [they remain deaf to their most necessary appetites] (ἀναγκαιοτάτων), because they take them for what is most exterior to them [missing about 20 lines].
Notes:
The "external" in the middle of column 5 is: External; alien; ξενοτάτων
II. c. gen. rei, strange to a thing, unacquainted with, ignorant of it; III. strange, unusual.
A related word appears in Epicurus fragment 266:
From the perspective of the infinite time that has passed, nothing novel occurs in the universe.
οὐδὲν ξένον ἐν τῷ παντv ἀποτελεῖται παρὰ τὸν ἤδη γεγενημένον χρόνον ἄπειρον.
The idea of ξένος is the strange, foreign, something or someone from "outside". There's a whole cultural thing about xenia but I don't think that's relevant in the current context.
Of course this is no knock on the musk ox. It may even make it more Epicurean! I'm just questioning this particular analogy
Hey! Anything to make them musk ox more Epicurean ![]()
So, we can't judge what brings the musk ox pleasure!
I'm finding it difficult to swipe between Kalosyni 's responses and my first post, so for easier reference, here are the two closer to each other.
- Epicurus advocates strengthening a quiet, calm, anxiety-free mind.
- Not completely correct -- "strengthening" implies you do all sorts of things. But we only see that this is some kind of result that happens to correspond to removing fear of death and the gods (an after affect).
- Equanimity/tranquility/ataraxia is available at all times, even under duress and trying circumstances.
- Not correct - impossible to do and where is this in Epicurean philosophy?
- IF we can cultivate ataraxia, we have a much better chance of making a good choice to remove, move around, or avoid the "obstacle to pleasure" than we would if we get anxious, feel "psychological unrest" or get agitated or fearful.
- Not correct - we cultivate prudence so that we don't choose pleasures with cause much worse pains
- Tranquility / ataraxia are not the "goal of life" but Epicurus stresses over and over the importance of freedom from disturbance in the mind and "pain in the body" (I have a problem with this kind of translation of aponia, but we'll leave that for another time.) (Still not that time btw
)
- Not completely correct - "Epicurus stresses over and over" -- this is an exaggeration, perhaps we should count when and where this is stated in the texts (how many times?)
- PLEASURE is the goal, and tranquility is pleasure, freedom from anxiety is pleasure, but it is pleasure that is always available to us which is why Epicurus places such importance on it - NOT exclusionary importance as the ONLY pleasure we should pursue but of significant and paramount importance to give us the possibility of the best pleasurable life possible in addition to all the other pleasures we can experience.
- Correct.
- My metaphor of what is meant by ataraxia / tranquility / calm is the picture of a musk ox, facing into the howling winter wind, legs braces, ice forming on its hair and face, knowing the disturbance will eventually pass ("Pain is short...") and it can then go on and paw the snow for luscious plants to eat. (Note: just a metaphor btw. Not saying musk oxen are Epicureans.)
- Don't agree -- sounds Stoic - if that ox was smart he would find some bushes and other oxes to hunker down with instead of standing out in the wind -- luckily we aren't oxes.
- Don NOTE: See post 11 above for more context on this.
- My reading of katastematic pleasures, including ataraxia, are those that arise from within ourselves and that these are the only pleasures in life that we can be confident of at all times.
- Too vague -- if you are talking about being confident in your bodily health, and enjoying feeling healthy in the body, then I will agree
- The kinetic pleasures arise from our interaction with external stimuli and phenomena.
- What about sitting out in the sunshine and the feeling that comes with enjoying that? (And this strengthens the feeling of "health in the body")
- Metrodorus stresses the importance of both kinds of pleasures, but he also wrote a book entitled "On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects."
- In my opinion what Metrodorus wrote doesn't take into consideration how the environment that you live in (which contains physical objects) affects your physical and mental well being. We are animals which require certain basic conditions for our physical and mental well being.
- Cassius raises the point that the following is a new assertion to him and he is not "aware of textual citations to support it": my reading of katastematic pleasures, including ataraxia, are those that arise from within ourselves and that these are the only pleasures in life that we can be confident of at all times.
- This seems not completely correct -- I am confident that my next meal with bring pleasure -- is that something which arises only in myself?
- Cassius countered with citing Diogenes Laertius quote about the wise man will "cry out and lament" when on the rack.
I countered his quotation with the quote just prior to that with "even if the wise man be put on the rack, he is happy (eudaimonia)."
- I don't agree with this "happy on the rack" -- I personally think this "happiness in all circumstances" doesn't make sense to me.
So, that'll be a little easier to refer to. I'm not saying I agree or disagree with Kalosyni's points at this point, but I do think they move the conversation forward. Thanks!
Ok so yes there is a list of Metrodorus' works in DL and that's not in it, right? Is It clear that Clement is talking about the same Metrodorus?
As I remember, DL doesn't list all of Epicurus's titles either. There are titles mentioned elsewhere that aren't in his list.
Wow! Y'all have been busy. I'll respond to your various points, but I had to provide some context for my musk ox analogy.
The musk ox (umingmak "the bearded one" in the language of the Inuit) is easily my favorite animal, followed closely by the tardigrade (yes, big nerd here).
In the habitat in which the musk ox lives - the northern Arctic tundra - there are no trees, no bushes, nothing to hide behind. In fact, they typically prefer windswept land in winter where the wind keeps the snow swept away. They'll either stand in the wind or lay down in a gale to reduce their exposure. They appear unfazed by the conditions, and my metaphor was that they know the storm will pass, "the pain will be brief."
It's not a perfect analogy by any means, but, hey, I got to talk about musk oxen ![]()
The description of kinetic and katastematic from The Faith of Epicurus by Benjamin Farrington (1967) is spot on from my perspective:
Quote from Farrington, p. 132" 'pleasure' may be eitherr kinetic (i.e., produced by a stimulus from without) or katastematic (i.e., a state of the organism created by itself without external stimulus)."
I posted a screenshot of this page on a prior thread.
I really started down this road in part with the discovery of Metrodorus being quoted in Clement of Alexandria's Stromata II.131, p. 498 which states (in translation )
Quote from Clement of AlexandriaMetrodorus, in his book On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects, says: What else is the good of the soul but the sound state of the flesh, and the sure hope of its continuance?
The primary source for my contention was simply the title of Metrodorus's book: On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects. The Greek title reads: Περι του μειζονα ειναι την παρ' ημας αιτιαν προς ευδαιμονιαν της εκ των πραγματων αγαθον. The idea that the source of our well-being/eudaimonia is greater "in ourselves than that which arises from Objects" tells me that we can't *rely* on objects outside ourselves for pleasure (happiness, eudaimonia, well-being). We can certainly take pleasure in them, but we can't rely on them. The only thing we can have the most confidence in are the pleasures that are within ourselves. That's how I read that title.
The πρᾶγμᾰ in the title (πραγματων is simply the genitive plural) means "deed, act; thing; circumstances (in the plural)."
Alfred Koerte's anthology of the sayings of Metrodorus also referenceσ the following (using Google Translate, I know... but it's the quickest route):
Cicero, De Finibus II, 28, 92 ipse enim Metrodorus, paene alter Epicurus, beatum esse describit his fere verbis cum corpus bene constitutum sit, et sit exploratum ita futurum. (...for Metrodorus himself, almost another Epicurus, describes himself as happy in these words, when the body is well constituted, and the future is thus explored.)
Cicero Tusc. disp. II, 6, 17 Metrodorus quidem perfecte eum putat beatum, cui corpus bene constitutum sit et exploratum ita semper fore. (Cicero Tusc. disp. 2, 6, 17 Metrodorus, indeed, considers him perfectly happy, whose body is well formed and examined, and will always be so.)
Cicero Tusc. disp. V, 9, 27 tu vero Metrodore, qui. . . definieris summum bonum firma corporis affectione explorataque eius spe contineri, fortunae aditus interclusisti ? (Cicero Tusc. disp. 5, 9, 27 you, Metrodorus, who . . You have determined that the highest good is contained by the firm affection of the body and its explored hope, have you blocked the access of fortune?)
Cicero de officiis III, 33, 117 nam si non modo utilitas sed vita omnis beata corporis firma constitutione eiusque constitutionis spe explorata, ut a Metrodoro scriptum est, continetur, certe haec utilitas et quidem summa — sic enim censent — cum honestate pugnabit. (Cicero de officii III, 33, 117 For if not only utility, but every happy life is contained in the firm constitution of the body and the hope of its constitution, as it is written by Metrodorus, surely this utility and indeed the highest - for so they think - will fight with honesty.)
Hoc fragmentum paene ad verbum congruit cum Epicuri fragmento 68 Us. (This fragment agrees almost verbatim with Epicurus' fragment 68 Us.).
Using Attalus' site, here is Usener 68 which appears to be quoted from Plutarch and Aulus Gellius:
Quote from Usener 68Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 4, p. 1089D: It is this, I believe, that has driven them, seeing for themselves the absurdities to which they were reduced, to take refuge in the "painlessness" and the "stable condition of the flesh," supposing that the pleasurable life is found in thinking of this state as about to occur in people or as being achieved; for the "stable and settled condition of the flesh," and the "trustworthy expectation" of this condition contain, they say, the highest and the most assured delight for men who are able to reflect. Now to begin with, observe their conduct here, how they keep decanting this "pleasure" or "painlessness" or "stable condition" of theirs back and forth, from body to mind and then once more from mind to body.
Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, IX.5.2: Epicurus makes pleasure the highest good but defines it as sarkos eustathes katastema, or "a well-balanced condition of the body."
This is just a start, but I thought I'd establish where my train of thought left the station first.
PS: Please note that the English translations from Koerte are really bad, now that I go back and read them more closely. They are simply cut and paste Google Translations from the Latin. Consider them at best poor Cliffs Notes. Refer to the Latin and puzzle out your own translations would be my recommendation.
In the spirit of "not being done" and to not further hijack this thread (Sorry, @waterholic !), I have created a new thread for the discussion of whether we can be more confident in katastematic pleasure rather than kinetic pleasure...
This thread grows out of another thread, specifically my "soapboxing" posts that were a response to @A_Gardner and @Cassius where I "took a stand for ataraxia."
For those who don't want too much review, my primary contentions were:
And that is where we left it. I encourage anyone interested in the full context to go back and read the other thread. I'm starting this one so as not to further hijack the other thread. In this thread, we will inevitably talk about the katastematic/kinetic pleasure "controversy" but my primary goal at the beginning is to establish (IF I can establish) that katastematic pleasure... or pleasure primarily experienced in the mind as a stable state... is the one in which we can be more confident than pleasures resulting from external stimuli or phenomena.
Let the games begin...
Here's the Google translate:
41] When he approaches them, so that he neither abhors the divine deity nor allows past pleasures to flow away and rejoices in their constant remembrance, what is it that he can approach here, that is better?
41] Ad ea cum accedit, ut neque divinum numen horreat nec praeteritas voluptates effluere patiatur earumque assidua recordatione laetetur, quid est, quod huc possit, quod melius sit, accedere?