Posts by Don

"Culper, no culping."

(If you know, you know )

Quote from Todd

Quote from Don

I also didn't get the sense that he "devalues" the Menoeceus, but rather sees the two texts as doing two different things.

This is all I meant. The emphasis was intended to be on "relative".

Mea culpa

Quote from wbernys

Rather i think Torquatus is making the more striking idea that all mental pleasures and pains are based on the five senses specifically in either recollection, present experience, or anticipation of sensations of sight, sound, touch, etc. Which i sought to defend.

Oh, I'm agreeing with your premise! My only amplification is that we need a body to even be able to experience the world through the senses. There are no sensations without the ear, eye, tongue, skin, nose, and mind/soul/psykhē working in concert.

Nicely done.

The only summary statement I'd offer is that all pleasure had/has to be bodily in the broadest sense since we exist as mind and body as a whole and we experience everything within our a physical existence. There is no mental without a physical body. When I die, I with cease to be because there is no mind without a body to work with.

I think that's what you're saying with much more eloquence, and that's my take in a nutshell.

Quote from Don

Quote from Todd

it relatively devalues the Letter to Menoeceus.

If that's the case, as much as I respect Sedley, we're going to have some problems, pardner.

Okay, I need to hunker down and ready this...

Okay, read the paper, and, alright, it's fine. But I didn't see it as overly revelatory. Epicurus posits a dyad to explain physics: bodies and space; he posits a dyad to explain the foundation of ethics: pleasure and pain. That seems to be the crux of the argument. To which my response is: Yes, and...? I can appreciate the elegant parallelism, but I'm not wowed by the observation.

I also didn't get the sense that he "devalues" the Menoeceus, but rather sees the two texts as doing two different things. Cicero is presenting a more complete exposition to the general reader. Epicurus was writing a summary to an Epicurean student, albeit with an eye to general application to a wider Epicurean audience. Sedley is clearly aware of the caution that needs to be taken when reading Cicero, too. But it's the text we have to work with. I still think Cicero is a jerk, but I agree with Sedley (and Cassius and...et al) that Cicero provided an invaluable service to future Epicureans by preserving what he did... And I take pleasure in the fact that this would wrankle him.

Quote from Todd

it relatively devalues the Letter to Menoeceus.

If that's the case, as much as I respect Sedley, we're going to have some problems, pardner.

Okay, I need to hunker down and ready this...

So you're trying to illustrate:

There are only two things in the set.

There can ONLY be two things in the set.

One is the opposite of the other.

And so on.

That's a tall order.

I don't like trying to shoehorn the relay race into pain/pleasure analogies.

I also don't like the storm and shore for the pain/pleasure analogies.

I didn't like verdict, pregnant, or cardiac monitor either.

Day and night on Earth don't work either. At the liminal points you get phenomena like twilight and gloaming and dawn.

It seems to me you're trying way too hard.

To me, pleasure and pain are like oil and water. As water is poured in, oil rises and is eventually pushed out of the vessel .

Same analogy of adding sand to a bucket of water at the beach. Sand and water can't occupy the same space.

You are Sisyphus rolling a HUGE boulder uphill trying to come up with the perfect analogy. Don't let the perfect become the enemy of the good enough. You're trying to hit too many points with the same analogy. From my perspective, you're just muddying the waters and not providing any clarity to "There's only two feelings: pleasure and pain." Your methods are not working for me at least.

What's your source for the translation?

PS Never mind. I looked at a bunch of webpages, and they all started out exactly the same way. There must be a readily available public domain translation everyone uses.

Hmmm... I'm not entirely onboard with some of your examples. I'll try to take a look over the next few days. I'd think you'd want to go down the path of oil and water.

A Joyous Twentieth!

Completely agree, Griffin !

Your post and Kalosyni's image made me want to go back and check on VS27 and it's even better than I remembered.

Thread

VS27 - Source in Vat.gr.1950 with some commentary

Manuscript:

epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment/4213/

https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.1950.pt.2/0256

Well, well... This is interesting.

Take a look at Saint-Andre's translation and transcription:

Whereas other pursuits yield their fruit only to those who have practiced them to perfection, in the love and practice of wisdom knowledge is accompanied by delight; for here enjoying comes along with learning, not afterward.

ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων…

Don

October 24, 2023 at 11:57 PM

On the one hand, in the case of other pursuits, the fruit comes for one only just upon complete perfection. On the other hand, in the case of loving and practicing wisdom, the enjoyment teams up with knowing; for enjoyment of the fruition is not after learning, but learning and enjoyment of the fruit is simultaneous. (My own translation from the Vatican manuscript)

I especially like "fruit" being καρπὸς (karpos) "the fruit, harvest, grain". This word is related to the word that shows up in Latin in "carpe diem." Pluck the day!

So, here's the question: Do we engage with the author at his Substack comments? Is it useful to do so?

Okay. I waded into the fray at the Substack for better or worse.

FWIW, katalepsis shows up in Diogenes Laertius:

33] By preconception they mean a sort of apprehension or a right opinion or notion, or universal idea stored in the mind ; that is, a recollection of an external object often presented,

Τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἱονεὶ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν ἢ ἔννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν ἐναποκειμένην

I think it's hiding in other forms within the texts. Bryan pulled these out in the past, I think.

My possibly idiosyncratic position on Epicurean prolepsis, filtered through possibly a modern lens, is that prolepsis is the faculty that allows us to make sense of the ever-flowing flood of sense perceptions coming into our physical and mental senses. Prolepsis picks up or sorts out patterns that correspond to real world phenomena. The senses register colors, shapes, etc to the eye in a kaleidoscopic flood. Prolepsis picks out patterns and reoccurring patterns that can be worked on by reason. The flood of colors random shapes etc come first; this shape holds together, moves together, has some permanence over time - this seems significant. Then reason steps in and names it a dog (or canem or cù or whatever your culture names that shape).

Quote from Cassius

So as per our prior discussions I think you too agree Don that just like the sensations, the "prolepses" are never "opinions."

Agreed, but I believe Epicurus thought that the mind/soul could receive images/eidolon directly as a sense like taste, touch, etc. Reason then have meaning to those perceived images. That's why, according to Epicurus, we can have a prolepsis of justice and other immaterial or abstract concepts.

In the midst of these conversations, I feel the need to state for myself: modern neurobiology and psychology would appear to show the human brain doesn't work like the ancient Greeks thought. Understanding how Epicurus vs Stoics vs Skeptics thought sensation, reason, prolepsis, katalepsis, etc worked is enlightening in light of their positions, but I feel no need to accept any specific detail that doesn't hold up to modern scrutiny to consider myself an Epicurean.

Quote from Cassius

I wanted to limit prolepsis to 5-sense exposure to concrete objects

Doesn't Epicurus also include grasping concepts with the mind as a sense, too?

Quote from Todd

I think there is a simple answer to the meaning of natural/unnatural. It refers to the criterion provided by nature: the feelings.

A natural desire is one that is likely to result in net pleasure if fulfilled.

An unnatural desire is one that we only imagine as likely to produce pleasure, but in fact is likely result in net pain. Also referred to as "vain and empty". The first definition that comes up when I search "vain" is "not yielding the desired outcome; fruitless" - the desired outcome being pleasure. Empty means empty of pleasure.

Agreed. Well stated.

Quote from Cassius

So you are in the "alignment with nature's goal" camp rather than "inborn at birth" camp?

I don't know whether I'd say I'm encamped. That sounds like I'm queueing up for battle. But yeah that appears to be my current (checks watch) perspective.

Quote from Cassius

nature as "aligned with the goal of nature"

As aligned with the natural goal of seeking pleasure. The way you stated it seems more of a tautology.

Quote from Cassius

Presumably there could be something destructive inborn in us at birth that is NOT aligned with the goal of nature, thus those are two different things.

Agreed, but I'd like us to come up with examples before we plant that flag. According to Epicurus, ALL our actions, decisions, etc. ultimately end up as a pursuit of pleasure.

Quote from Cassius

Separate and apart from the necessary criteria, what does "natural" mean? Because I can see someone arguing that if it's natural, it's natural from the start and forever, just like atoms have shape, size, and weight.

As is my wont, let's consult LSJ: The word Epicurus uses is φυσικός (physikos) "natural, produced or caused by nature, inborn, native; of or concerning the order of external nature, natural, physical." So, I take that to mean a desire which is aligned with the natural order of things, in other words, a desire which aligns with the natural order of seeking pleasure. If a desire leads to pain with no accompanying pleasure (I'm thinking the desire for the pleasure of a healthy body via the pain of exercise is natural) that's an "empty/vain/corrosive" desire.

Quote from Cassius

I presume your "Yes" means you think that you don't think it is sufficient to say "the desire was present at birth

Actually my yes was responding to "something about the way we pursue it"

Good questions, Cassius . I'll circle back to those. However, I think we need to acknowledge that Epicurus didn't use natural and unnatural all the time. In the Menoikeus, he wrote:

Quote

Furthermore, on the one hand, there are the natural desires; on the other, the 'empty, fruitless, or vain ones.' And of the natural ones, on the one hand, are the necessary ones; on the other, the ones which are only natural; then, of the necessary ones: on the one hand, those necessary for eudaimonia; then, those necessary for the freedom from disturbance for the body; then those necessary for life itself.

Not natural and unnatural, but natural, "empty," and necessary. He didn't even use unnecessary in that text.

If course. PD29 does use the familiar categories:

Among desires, some are natural and necessary, some are natural and unnecessary, and some are unnatural and unnecessary (arising instead from groundless opinion).

And VS20 as it appears in the manuscript:

Of the desires, on the one hand, there are the natural and necessary; then the natural ones and the not necessary ones; then the not natural and not necessary arising from empty belief.

MFS's recently posted translation of Oinoanda include:

[for us to show] which of the desires are natural, and which are vain.

Of the desires some are vain, others nat-

Now, those that are natural seek after such things as are [necessary] for our nature’s enjoyment, [while those that are vain] …

Yes, I'm picking nits but they're nits that deserve picking.