Posts by Don

Quote from Max DuBoff

"I think the evidence that Epicurus believed a complete life can't get any better is clear; I don't know how else to interpret KD 3, 18, and 20-21, and Men. 128 and 131." To reiterate, I think there's strong evidence that Epicurus thought this; I personally don't know why he was so committed to it. But that doesn't change that, as far as we can tell, he was really committed to it. I don't necessarily disagree with your point about reaching an implausible interpretation; but, at least as things stand now, your approach seems to me to have more problems.

I always appreciate it when references to specific texts are given. It provides assurance that we're all looking at the same thing, although interpretation/translations sometimes/often differ.

In your assertion that "the evidence that Epicurus believed a complete life can't get any better is clear" you refer to those specific texts. Here's my take and a little of why I'm not entirely onboard with your interpretation.

To my understanding:

KD3 is Epicurus statement as to why pleasure CAN be the summum bonum against other schools' assertion that pleasure is inexhaustible or never able to be satisfied and therefore cannot be the telos. There IS a limit to pleasure, and it is the “The removal of all feeling of pain ... Wherever a pleasurable feeling is present, for as long as it is present, there is neither a feeling of pain nor a feeling of distress, nor both together.” (Inwood & Gerson (1994)) I think a key phrase there is "for as long as it is present." To me, this echoes Diogenes Laertius' "Two sorts of happiness (eudaimonia) can be conceived, the one the highest possible, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be augmented, the other admitting addition and subtraction of pleasures." (10.121) I've always added "such as mortals enjoy" to the end in my mind; BUT Epicurus did say clearly that we can "live as a god among humans" (Men. 135) BUT we are not gods. That's also clear. Epicurus did not teach some kind of apotheosis from what I have read. We're still mortal. We still die. I will admit that there is a tension between living "as a god" and being mortal.

KD18 covers both physical and mental pleasures. Satisfying physical pleasures, per this KD, doesn't bring increase but only brings diversification/ variation / embellishment, depending on the translation of ποικίλλω. I like Epicurus' use of this word in that it evokes the various colors in a work of embroidery or other cunning workmanship. That's a poignant metaphorical connotation. The limit of mental pleasures in KD18 are specifically said to be due to reflecting on these bodily pleasures and sensations related to them and also having a eradicated "the greatest fears" to which I'm equating the fears of death, the gods, divine wrath: the first two KDs and VSs and first two lines of the Tetrapharmakos.

KD20 & 21: Again, this is Epicurus emphasizing how pleasure has a limit and why it can be the summum bonum. The "perfect way of life (I&G)/ complete life (Long) / complete way of life (S-A)" τὸν παντελῆ βίον (ton pantele bion) still to me evokes a life in which all goals are accomplished, in this case, the limits of pleasure have been achieved. But is it the understanding that pleasure is the telos along with the eradication of the fundamental fears of death and the gods that makes that "pantele" life or the actual elimination of all pain? I don't think Epicurus teaches that ALL pain can be eradicated from the life of the mortal human. He certainly couldn't do it, but he could do battle against physical pain and his greatest fears were eradicated, root and branch, from his mind. KD21 reinforces that what we REALLY need, at our most basic level, is limited. We can add variation of pleasures, but we don't NEED them. I think this is illustrated by Epicurus' periodic fasting and eating minimally so he KNEW what he needed to live pleasurably. So, if the going ever got tough, he knew exactly what was necessary for him.

I'm not going into Menoikeus since I think I've addressed that before. One other item I wanted to touch briefly on is:

Quote from Max DuBoff

Well, Epicurus's deathbed letter gives evidence that, in other cases of extreme pain, that pain won't interfere with blessedness. (Ditto for the, perhaps implausible, claim in Diogenes Laertius that the sage will be happy under torture.) If I didn't have this evidence, I'd predict that that pain would interfere with blessedness; and I worry that it does despite the claim that it doesn't. But I really believe Epicurus thought the pain didn't interfere, and the challenge is explaining why.

The problem people express with the "happy under torture" phrase (and it must be something Epicurus taught because it comes up in multiple sources) is that Epicurus, to my reading, never meant the sage would be joyous or giddy or happy in the common effervescent way we sometimes think of that. Diogenes Laertius uses "eudaimonia" that slippery, untranslatable, multivalent word. To me, and I admit this is likely idiosyncratic, the only reason I can think that a sage could have eudaimonia on the rack is if it means they could feel they did everything they could to have avoided this outcome. They would be in extreme pain, crying out, no question. If they were doing it to protect a friend, if they knew they had done everything to avoid it, they would still have an underlying sense of well-being and maybe that they had lived well and that the pain couldn't go on forever. They're not happy happy joy joy. But they have some perspective to give them some kind of "eudaimonia." And we're also talking a "sage" here, not your average student of the philosophy. Is some of this hyperbole to give the student confidence, to illustrate "here's the kind of mental fortitude you can get from following this path." Likely. But I'd rather take this idea of the sage rather than the Stoic sage who can't be concerned if his wife and children die in a war and who takes no more concern for a dead child than a broken cup.

Quote from Max DuBoff

Alex Gillham's in his 2018 dissertation

Also

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/362560907_How_Are_Friends_and_Friendship_Worthwhile_to_the_Advanced_Epicurean

All you really needed was one literate person in a given Epicurean community to read any correspondence or texts. My understanding is that it was common to listen to texts. This is what I understand happened in early Christian communities.

Ancient Greece and Rome were also much more oral cultures, too.

Consider too that the Peripatetics literally walked around while discussing philosophy, so it is easy to imagine students and teachers in the Garden sitting around discussing and teaching and listening to lectures. My understanding is that On Nature was a series of lectures Epicurus gave. The only writings of Aristotle are the lecture notes compiled by a student of his.

Quote from Cassius

do you agree with a statement Don in an earlier post that he believes tranquility is specifically defined in terms of a lack of fear of gods and of death?

Quote from Max DuBoff

No, tranquility must be the absence of all fears.* Epicurus identified fear of the gods and of death as particularly common fears, so he devoted a lot of attention to them. But there are plenty of other fears.

*I've been struggling recently with fear of future pain. As KD 4 notes, fatal pain will be short; but it'll be bad when it happens, so it seems like the sage should justifiably fear it in the meantime, thus disturbing the sage's tranquility.

If I'm being invoked, I feel I need to expand my thoughts on this. Cassius , what I think you're referring to is this below where I wrote:

Quote from Don

I understand that ataraxia refers specifically (for Epicurus) to the absence (a-) of "disturbance" (tarakhe) in the mind caused by fear of the gods, anxiety about death, worry about having "enough" and what other people think, etc.

I'll freely admit that "etc." is doing a lot of heaving lifting.

As for a what Epicurus thinks is covered under ataraxia, he says in the Letter to Herodotus: "mental tranquillity (ataraxia) means being released from all these troubles and cherishing a continual remembrance of the highest and most important truths." (10.82) The "all these troubles" refers back to 10.81 to his assertion that "the greatest anxiety (τάραχος) of the human mind arises through the belief that the heavenly bodies are blessed and indestructible, and that at the same time they have volitions and actions and causality inconsistent with this belief ; ... if men do not set bounds to their terror, they endure as much or even more intense anxiety (ταραχὴν) than the man whose views on these matters are quite vague." This is similar to the Letter to Pythocles where Epicurus writes (DL 10.85): "In the first place, remember that, like everything else, knowledge of celestial phenomena, whether taken along with other things or in isolation, has no other end in view than peace of mind (ἀταραξίαν) and firm conviction." So, getting a firm understanding and belief that celestial phenomena are not caused by supernatural forces has the goal of peace of mind/ataraxia.

As Max DuBoff points out, "Epicurus identified fear of the gods and of death as particularly common fears, so he devoted a lot of attention to them." I would say he devoted a lot of attention to them because he identified them as the most important and detrimental disturbances to our minds. The first big hurdle we have to get over to establish ataraxia. Getting a correct perspective on the gods and not fearing them comes first in Principal Doctrines, first in the Vatican Sayings, first in the Letter to Menoikeus, first in the Tetrapharmakos. I would say he placed paramount importance of ridding ourselves of those fears and anxieties of the gods and death and related topics like supernatural causes of celestial phenomena, divine punishment, etc.

Yes, I agree there are plenty of other fears and anxieties, and I would agree Epicurus tries to teach how to alleviate them. So, yes, ataraxia could include the eradication of fears and anxieties both at the level of gods and death but also at the level of less significant or overwhelming sources of pains.

He tries to eliminate or alleviate, for example, fear of future pain by his living example of his last days and the observations of "pain is short if..." But he also tries to get us to replace fear and anxiety with prudence, virtuous behavior, wise choices. If we fear what might happen to our loved ones after die, make plans for what happens after we die. If we fear retribution from enemies, try to not make enemies or stay away from them. All this would contribute to a stable peace of mind that we are doing, have done, or will do everything within our power to trust that the pleasures we have now continue into the future.

So, for his at least, I would say ataraxia includes freedom from fear and anxiety writ large; with the caveat that the BIG ONES are death and the supernatural gods.

Quote from Cassius

We're packing a lot into this conversaton already

LOL Ya think so?

We have to be careful and not conflate pleasures with desires. There are not necessary, natural, and empty pleasures. There are necessary, natural, and empty desires.

Anything that brings pleasure is good, but some pleasures are not worthy to be chosen due to the pain they bring in their wake.

Quote from Cassius

when Epicurus referred to pleasure he meant all that is desirable... Even Epicurus' extension of pleasure to "all that is desirable"

I'd be careful with that phrasing. Empty desires are still "desirable." Or are you citing a specific text that I forgot? By pleasure he meant all that is pleasurable (yes, maybe that's a tautology), all that gives pleasure and not pain.

FWIW, here's a post I did on katastematic pleasure, specifically looking at aponia:

Post

RE: Neither "ataraxia" nor "not ataraxia", but "Joy as the goal"

Great thought-provoking posts, @Matteng and @wbernys . I'll address a couple points in a bit.

For me, there has to be something to the fact that aponia and aponos, in regular popular ancient usage, meant things like non-exertion, laziness; without toil or trouble,free from the necessity of labour. The adverb aponōs shows up in Herodotus as "without trouble":

[…]

I know Epicurus redefined some words to fit his philosophy, but they were all still in the semantic range of the popular usage.…

Don

May 3, 2026 at 7:35 AM

Quote from Cassius

Friendship is, by Maxs's account, additive in exactly the way ice cream and a fine view are additive. More trust, more years, more depth is always better, other things being equal. If additive goods are structurally barred from contributing to a "perfect" or "complete" life, and only katastematic pleasure can clear that bar, I don't see why wisdom would single out an additive good as its single greatest tool for reaching blessedness. Does "additive" really disqualify a good from being central to the blessed life, or doesn't it?

By additive, I take it he means more and more can be added, but adding more and more friends doesn't seem to me to be in the same category as eating more and more ice cream. Eating more and more ice cream or wine or fish leads inexorably to pain and indigestion. Making more and deeper friendships leads to more security, more pleasurable memories, more support. More friends also varies the pleasure of friendship.

Quote from Cassius

4. Would a tranquil person with no friends, no joys, no positive pleasures — just an undisturbed, empty mind — count as having achieved the blessed life in full?

By definition, someone with a tranquil mind is experiencing pleasure. We're also not only minds but bodies. There's no way to have "tranquility" in one's mind without a body, one is a physical sensing being to be tranquil in the first place. While I think I understand what you're getting at, #4 seems to be a little bit of a straw man. Having no friends and no other pleasure wouldn't lead to tranquility, with no friends, there's no security or support, leading to more anxiety. For my understanding of the philosophy, a primary purpose of a tranquil mind, free from anxiety and fear and worry, is to more fully experience every other choiceworthy pleasure and to make prudent decisions on what those are. PD27 states that friendship is the wisdom, wise choices, leads to friendship. A wise, tranquil person is likely to have friendships.

Since Cassius brings up PD27, I thought it might be instructive if we all refresh our minds on what it says (using St. Andre English trans):

Of all the things that wisdom provides for the complete happiness of one's entire life, by far the greatest is friendship.

ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις.

The original does use μακαριότητα "blessedness" (directly related to μακάριος etc.)

This could be referring to friendship as a result of one's wise choices. The PD could be reworded/paraphrased as "Friendship is the greatest thing that wisdom provides for one's entire blessed life."

Max DuBoff : I want to really emphasize that I greatly appreciate your willingness to engage on these topics. This thread has grown WAY beyond a "Welcome Max DuBoff" so this has been both intellectually stimulating and fun. Thank you.

Quote from Max DuBoff

I think it'd be more helpful to write a few paragraphs than respond to individual points.

Agreed. I like your approach. I may ramble here, but I'll try and respond to your points and see where we may differ and where it may end up we have the same interpretation but different words. Possibly?

Quote from Max DuBoff

In On Moral Ends he assumes that the good simply is the summum bonum, i.e., what leads to blessedness. But Epicurus has an entirely different assumption: there are goods that don't contribute to blessedness, and some goods that actively impede blessedness.

So, my understanding of Cicero (On Ends, 1.42) and Aristotle (Nichomachean Ethics is that the summum bonum / telos / τἀγαθόν is that to which all actions and decisions point. It is the final answer of asking people "But why did you do that?":

Quote

...the Good is That at which all things aim.” ~Aristotle

"...it clearly follows that actions are right and praiseworthy only as being a means to the attainment of a life of pleasure. But that which is not itself a means to anything else, but to which all else is a means, is what the Greeks term the Telos, the highest, ultimate or final Good. It must therefore be admitted that the Chief Good is to live agreeably. " ~Cicero (via the character of Torquatus)

If one keeps asking the question of someone, "Why did you do that? Why did you make that choice?" The final answer (from a psychological hedonist approach if we want to go there) is "It gave me pleasure." So, that is why pleasure is the summum bonum / telos / τἀγαθόν. It is "That at which all things aim."

I would also agree that all pleasures are by nature good. If actions, thoughts, memories, bring pleasure, that is good by Epicurus' definition. Pleasure = good; pain = bad.

Quote from Max DuBoff

But Epicurus has an entirely different assumption: there are goods that don't contribute to blessedness, and some goods that actively impede blessedness. So it's important to ask, on top of what is good (i.e., pleasure), what we should actually pursue, because we can't pursue all the goods (not just because we don't have time/space, but because some goods preclude other goods).

I don't know if I agree that Epicurus has an entirely different assumption. I read Epicurus as still accepting the challenge of identifying "That at which all things aim." He identifies pleasure as "That at which all things aim." He also says that some pleasures bring more pain than pleasure in the end (ex., endless drinking bouts, constant revels, etc.). He's not saying these are not pleasurable, but having insatiable appetites for them is detrimental to your physical health and mental tranquility, the goal of a blessed life (Men.128)

Quote from Max DuBoff

When I emphasize tranquility, it's in this context. PD 25 is the lode star of my interpretation: "If you do not, on every occasion, refer each of your actions to the goal of nature, but instead stop short at something else when making either avoidance or pursuit, your actions will not follow arguments" (trans. Inwood and Gerson, with my modifications). I understand "the goal of nature" as particularly connoting katastematic pleasure (following the use of this term in Men. 133 and VS 25, where it most naturally refers to katastematic pleasure).

Why do you understand "the goal of nature" as particularly connoting katastematic pleasure? I've translated that in Men. 133 as "one who has rationally determined the τέλος of one's natural state" which I take "the natural state" to be pleasure, one's telos is to pursue pleasure. And, if I understand your previous posts, you equate "pleasure" in this sense specifically with tranquility, correct? VS25 is interesting, but I don't see how katastematic pleasure plays into that "goals of nature" VS25: Poverty is great wealth if measured by the goals of nature, and wealth is abject poverty if not limited by the goals of nature. I suppose it could with the same sentiment in Lucretius (5.1117-1119, emphasis added) when he talks about a "mind content":

Yet were man to steer
His life by sounder reasoning, he'd own
Abounding riches, if with mind content
He lived by thrift; for never, as I guess,
Is there a lack of little in the world.

To me, the goal of nature / telos / summum bonum is to live pleasurably and, yes, to have a blessed life. I agree that tranquility is a vital component of the pleasurable, blessed life, but, again, Epicurus specifically says in Men. 128 that "The steady contemplation of these facts (the categorization of desires) enables you to understand everything that you accept or reject in terms of the health of the body and the serenity of the soul — since that is the goal of a completely happy life." (St. Andre trans.) Both bodily health and a tranquil mind are the goal of a complete blessed' life.

To single out tranquility as THE blessed life leaves out the first part: "health of the body." Why isn't that as important as tranquility? I would propose that maybe "the health of the body" is the other katastematic pleasure of aponia by another name? It seems me that the pleasure of those endless drinking bouts is not choice-worthy because it would be detrimental to health of the body AND the serenity of the mind. PD5 plays a role here, too, in describing how to live a pleasurable life which doesn't specifically cite tranquility (although I can see that it could be implied if one is living wisely, justly, and nobly since "The greatest fruit of justice is serenity (ataraxia)." (U519)

Quote from Max DuBoff

Lots of pleasures are good additively: when I eat ice cream, it's always better if I eat more ice cream (other things being equal, which, to be fair, they're not). ... So these kinds of pleasures can never support a perfect life.

Your ice cream analogy, to me, breaks down along these lines, too. The idea that pleasures are good additively breaks down the same as endless drinking bouts. That also seems like Plato's argument as to why pleasure can't be The Good.

Epicurus drank with his friends, he wrote a whole work titles Symposium where they talked about wine and sex. I can easily see Epicurus saying a short drinking bout or a single drinking bout can be cautiously engaged in. It's the endless string that's leads to pain. Same with ice cream. A little is tasty, more and more leads to indigestion and pain. This is where prudence is the most important instrumental virtue. To know when to stop a given pleasure before it turns to pain is an application of practical wisdom.

I'm going to leave any deeper look at katastematic and kinetic pleasure for the light of day. I think it's a useful categorization or at least interesting. If Epicurus thought it was important enough to point out, that's good enough for me to try and get a handle on it. (There are some who think Epicurus didn't even teach this, but I can't agree with that direction.)

I don't know if this is illuminating for my position, but this is what I get for putting this off until late at night.

Quote from Godfrey

"Perfect" seems to have platonic connotations of an ideal state, a state that doesn't empirically exist. "Complete," on the other hand, implies something that one can judge for oneself.

I personally like something like "complete" to riff on the connotation of "all (pan-) goals (telos) have been met or achieved." There's nothing lacking, which I realize form an English semantic perspective, you could use "perfect." But to me, "perfect" leaves the door open for the potential for that Platonic ideal concept to creep in.

Quote from Cassius

what exactly does "tranquility" mean and what does it entail?

Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus (DL 10.82; Hicks via Perseus): [82] But mental tranquillity (ataraxia) means being released from all these troubles and cherishing a continual remembrance of the highest and most important truths.

[82] ἡ δὲ ἀταραξία τὸ τούτων πάντων ἀπολελύσθαι καὶ συνεχῆ μνήμην ἔχειν τῶν ὅλων καὶ κυριωτάτων.

Quote from Cassius

Epicurus considered himself to be happy even during his last days of extreme physical pain. ..., as Epicurus tells us that his mental pleasures from friends and philosophy outweighed the physical pains.

Slight quibble: he didn't write that his mental pleasures outweighed the physical pains, but he did write that he could contend with his pains with the mental pleasure of his memories: ἀντιπαρετάττετο "metaphorical, hold one's ground against, Epicur.Fr.138: abs., stand in hostile array" (LSJ) I like the image of drawing up battle lines against your pain.

Quote from Cassius

Tranquility/Ataraxia/Ascetic construction

I think it's a jump to always immediately go from discussion of the importance of tranquility/ataraxia to seeing this as an endorsement of asceticism. I don't necessarily see people who write "tranquility is the ultimate pleasure" or "tranquility is the goal" to also always be saying "Epicurus said that it is vital to live like an ascetic hermit in a cave and never experience any source of pain ever." I also don't always see this same implication by those who talk of absence of pain but that's another thread.

I deeply respect your passion and think I understand the reasons you see this as a slippery slope, but ataraxia/tranquility IS fundamental to Epicurus' philosophy. Freedom from anxiety is absolutely foundational to Epicurus' philosophy. I would prefer Dr. Austin not use "ultimate pleasure" to describe tranquility. I'd prefer "foundational pleasure" or some other adjective, but she does an excellent job in putting that in context throughout her book.

Epicurus himself writes to Herodotus that "mental tranquillity means being released from all these troubles and cherishing a continual remembrance of the highest and most important truths." And "we must not suppose that our treatment of these matters fails of accuracy, so far as it is needful to ensure our tranquillity (ataraxia) and blessedness (makarios)." To Pythocles, he writes "if you fight against clear evidence, you never can enjoy genuine tranquility (ataraxia)." So, tranquility, peace of mind, freedom from anxiety IS foundational. Yes, it's foundational because it is pleasurable to experience tranquility, but it is also foundational because it sets the stage for every other aspect of the blessed life as well.

Quote from Cassius

Did Emily Austin make a mistake in entitling her book "Living For Pleasure?" Should she have titled it "Living For Ataraxia/Tranquility"?

As I remember, she insisted that "pleasure" be in the title.

FYI...

Epicurus: Fragments - translation

Quote from wbernys

Don, could you give a few excerpts in English? it's in German I think and I wouldn't want others to go through the hassle of translation.

I think I've quoted it elsewhere. I didn't say it was readily helpful

See also this for the sayings of Hermarchos:

(Sorry for the length of this. It grew in the telling, so to speak )

Again, welcome aboard our little boat here (in keeping with U163).

Quote from Max DuBoff

I might recommend Tim O'Keefe's Epicureanism book over DeWitt.

DeWitt can also sometimes be a slog in his writing styel and I've stated elsewhere that I don't like his fondness for reading too much into scanty evidence. I use him sparingly myself, and I like his academic papers much more than Epicurus and His Philosophy. Throwing no shade on DeWitt's fans here, but I've always found him difficult to embrace. I give him 10/10 on his passion for Epicurus though!

My go-to recommendation for anyone looking to delve into Epicureanism today as a lived philosophy is Dr. Emil Austin's Living for Pleasure. Hands down. That's my current top of the list for anyone curious about "What's this whole Epicurean thing about?" It was a pleasure getting to talk with her on the podcast.

Thanks for the links to your papers. I found them interesting. I certainly agree that the ancient Epicureans had sex, and I liked your mentions of Epicureans' marriage and long-term relationships.

One related thing that hit me very recently is that, upon reading Gedney's recent Substack post, he pointed out that Epicurus in his Will makes arrangements for the son and daughter of Metrodorus which means/implies that Epicurus was the one who had responsibility for the children so to be the one able to make this request. (The question remains: What happened to their mother? But a woman wouldn't have had "custody" in ancient Greece anyway) I don't mean to imply (necessarily) that Epicurus was playing tag with the kids when they were younger, but he seems to have had a custodial/in loco parentis relationship to these children. If he was helping to raise the children, it doesn't seem he'd disapprove of a relationship by which children come into the world.

Quote from Max DuBoff

Tranquility is a pleasure but not the only pleasure. At the same time (and here I'm wading into a perhaps controversial interpretation), tranquility is the only pleasure upon which blessedness, i.e., a perfect or complete life, is based.* (*I tend to refer to blessedness rather than happiness because "happiness" is quite nebulous. "Blessedness" is a bit nebulous too but at least connotes the life of the gods.)

LOL I like your "perhaps" there...bring on the controversy as far as I'm concerned. Discussion engenders understanding.

Quote from Max DuBoff

if there were another pleasure that could improve tranquility, a human life could never be perfect/complete (PD 20), and it couldn't be the limit of the magnitude of pleasure (PD 3).

To make sure I'm following your train and we're talking about the same things:

• tranquility = ataraxia?
• blessedness = makarios?
• happiness = eudaimonia? (I personally like "well-being" rather than happiness)

Would you say those line up generally (FULLY realizing there's never a one-to-one)?

Let's see how far apart we actually are. I would agree that "tranquility" (to stick to English for a moment) is the foundation upon which a life of blessedness or happiness is built. I understand that ataraxia refers specifically (for Epicurus) to the absence (a-) of "disturbance" (tarakhe) in the mind caused by fear of the gods, anxiety about death, worry about having "enough" and what other people think, etc. To try to get a handle on this, I tried to go through and find all the occurrences of the word and variants in the ancient texts a while ago. I was surprised at how many times it comes up in the Letter to Herodotus, like " mental tranquillity means being released from all these troubles and cherishing a continual remembrance of the highest and most important truths." (10.82) So, if we free ourselves from those sources of pain, our minds/souls/heart/psykhe become a solid foundation upon which to build our well-being/blessedness. The seas calm, and we can sail our boat with confidence that we can weather any storm because we KNOW gut-level what really matters, how much we really need if worse comes to worst, and can effortlessly enjoy pleasures without frantically grasping for them, fighting for prestige, glamor, riches, fame, constant luxuries.

It's not that other pleasures "improve" tranquility (ataraxia), it's that tranquility is the foundation by which other pleasures can be experienced as good unadulterated by fear, anxiety, disturbance.

Letter to Menoeceus 128 is very important. Completely agree. Here's my translation so readers know to what we're referring:

Quote from Letter to Menoikeus, Don (trans.)

The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind, (that is for our physical and our mental existence), since this is the goal of a blessed life. For the sake of this (i..e.,the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind), we do everything in order to neither be in bodily or mental pain nor to be in fear or dread; and so, when once this has come into being around us, it sets free all of the calamity, distress, and suffering of the mind, seeing that the living being has no need to go in search of something that is lacking for the good of our mental and physical existence. For it is then that we need pleasure, if we were to be in pain from the pleasure not being present; but if we were to not be in pain, we no longer desire or beg for pleasure. And this is why we say pleasure is the foundation (arkhe) and fulfillment (telos) of the blessed life.

So, I read the "goal (telos) of a blessed life" is BOTH the health of the body and the tranquility of the mind (ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν <τῆς ψυχῆς> ἀταραξίαν). Plus pleasure is the foundation and fulfillment again because there are only two feelings, and we eliminate those sources of pain that we are able to. We seek for pleasure as the foundation (the cradle analogy) and, when we eliminate pains, pleasure fills our blessed life to the brim.

I will add that Diogenes Laertius says that the Epicureans believed there were "Two sorts of happiness (eudaimonia) can be conceived, the one the highest possible, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be augmented, the other admitting addition and subtraction of pleasures." To me, this implies that the "highest well-being/happiness" is only enjoyed by the gods. We mortals, while being able to approximate the blessed life of the gods will always have a well-being that can be augmented by addition and subtraction of pleasures.

Quote from Max DuBoff

it couldn't be the limit of the magnitude of pleasure (PD 3).

PD3 doesn't say The limit of "tranquility" is the removal of all pains. It says the limit of pleasure is the removal all pain. I won't belabor this, but if there are only two feelings - pleasure and pain - if all of one is removed, you're left with the other.

I don't believe you can read the PDs in isolation. The original text didn't have versification, so I encourage people to read "units" so to speak. I believe PD20 needs to be read in the context of PD19, 20, 21, and 22. "Finite time and infinite time contain the same amount of pleasure (τὴν ἡδονὴν)... The flesh assumes that the limits of pleasure (ἡδονῆς) are infinite, and that infinite joy can be produced only through infinite time...You must reflect on the fundamental goal and everything that is clear, to which opinions are referred; if you do not, all will be full of trouble and confusion." To me, this again is hammering home the two feelings - pleasure and pain. Pleasure is not infinite because its limit is the removal of all pain. Again, one is banished, the other one fills that void. There's no vacuum in the feelings. We can feel pleasure (positive affect) or pain (negative affect) when we're alive. There is no neutral state per Epicurus and it seems modern neuropsychology.

Okay, I've rambled on long enough for now. Look forward to discussion from all.