“Of the Twelve Principles the most important was the third: "The universe consists of atoms and void."
There is no extant text by Epicurus called the Twelve Principles. DeWitt came up with those on his own and gave his list the name of a lost text. I'm not saying "the universe consists of atoms and void" isn't a fundamental principle, but there is no way Dewitt should be saying it's "the third." Sorry. This aggravates me every time it comes up.
FWIW .. Here's my take on that...
And please remember, it's not "happy happy joy joy" on the rack, the wise one is experiencing εὐδαίμονα (eudaimonia), well-being. See numerous other threads on this forum where we've discussed, dissected, and dived down that eudaimonic rabbit hole.
It sounds like a great experience! Sorry I couldn't make it.
No promises, but maybe I'll try to drop by for a little.
Egads. Just finished sweaty yard work. I won't be able to attend. All the best to everyone!!
I was thinking Don might weigh in from another direction as well. Don is very strong on PD10 being a reference to reprobate acts being bad because they do in fact lead to pain in most cases.
Okay, now having re-read the proem, I will weigh in from my customary ( Cassius may say predictable 
) direction. To me, it seems Lucretius is setting the imaginary hazards against the real hazards of living a pleasurable life. In practical terms, those activities - not abstract vices but real-life activities involving those behaviors - likely lead to more pain than pleasure in the long run. That's my take on PD10 + 11 + 12 (I take those as a unit) and that's my take here. Indulge in these of you wish. There's no divine commandments. But you'll have to reap the consequences.
Wasn't Hercules a favorite of the Stoics? By setting up Epicurus' deeds as greater than those of Hercules, Lucretius would in a way be thumbing his nose at the Stoics.
Great episode everyone. 🎉
One nit to pick: While I realize it's a common English idiom, my contention remains that we have to be careful using phrases like "when we're dead" or "being dead" and so on.
We can't "be" dead. When we are, death is not. When death is, we are not. Perpetuating that idiom undercuts "death is no thing." "After we die" is fine. "When we have died" would work. "When we're dead" could be taken as admitting there's a "we" that could "be" dead, could sense "being dead." Don't give the eternalists an opening.
No promises, but maybe I'll try to drop by for a little.
That's a good one.
I literally have this VS hanging on my door frame at work (Greek large font, English caption)
οὐ δεῖ λυμαίνεσθαι τὰ παρόντα τῶν ἀπόντων ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ἀλλʼ ἐπιλογίζεσθαι ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα τῶν εὐκταίων ἦν.
VS35. Don't ruin the things you have by wanting what you don't have, but realize that they too are things you once did wish for.
Epicurus using the word "blame" in the second quote makes sense to me, as I read it as him saying that we can only hold ourselves accountable for what is in our control
I'd say you're firmly on base.
Here's that section from my Menoikeus translation, and I just realized I need to correct the text. Here is the correct version:
133j. ᾧ καὶ τὸ μεμπτὸν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκεν.
καὶ τὸ μεμπτὸν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον
μεμπτὸν "to be blamed; blameworthy"
ἐναντίον "opposite, contrary"
This phrase is normally translated as some permutation of “both blame and praise.” However, the word "praise/praiseworthy" is not in the Greek but implied by the juxtaposition of καὶ τὸ μεμπτὸν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον which literally means "that which is blameworthy and that which is its opposite."
παρακολουθεῖν "following beside, following closely, c. dat., Dem.: of a physician, π. νοσήματι Plat.; so, π. τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς Dem.: of an audience, to follow with the mind, Aeschin."
πέφυκεν "brought forth, produced"
Which brings us to the end of verse 133 and our consolidated literal translation:
Seeing that, whom do you consider is better or more powerful than one who holds pious beliefs concerning the gods; one who has absolutely no fears concerning death; one who has rationally determined the τέλος of one's natural state; and the one who grasps that, on the one hand, good things (namely pleasures) are both easily attained and easily secured, and, on the other hand, evil things (or pains) are either short in time or brief in suffering; someone who laughs at Fate which is introduced onto the stage of life by many as the mistress of all things? For that person, even though some things happen by necessity, some by chance, and some by our own power, for although necessity is beyond our control, they see that chance is unstable and there is no other master beyond themselves, so that blame and its opposite are inseparably connected to themselves.
But with Epicureanism, I haven't "sinned" if I do something that results in more pain than pleasure. It's a learning process. Sometimes I drink too heavily on a night out and feel hungover the next day, and realise that I would've been better off drinking more moderately. But it's not some kind of stain on my soul. Life can be messy and Epicurus, from what I understand, gets this. There's nothing inherently despicable about living a life filled with pain, it's just misguided and unnecessary.
We got off on a Greek tangent, but I wanted to say that that's well put. Teachers and students in the Garden definitely corrected each other, pointed out mistakes, and gave frank feedback. One had to acknowledge one's mistakes, too; and you've given good examples of "could have made better choices." And there's nothing "sinful" about overindulging in wine, for example. But if you're going to, you've made a choice and you'll have to deal with the consequences. No more, no less.
The word akin to that also occurs in DL X.137:
137] He further disagrees with the Cyrenaics in that they hold that pains of body are worse than mental pains ; at all events evil-doers (ἁμαρτάνοντας hamartanontas) are made to suffer bodily punishment ; whereas Epicurus holds the pains of the mind to be the worse ; at any rate the flesh endures the storms of the present alone, the mind those of the past and future as well as the present. In this way also he holds mental pleasures to be greater than those of the body.
ἁμαρτάνοντας
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἁμαρτάνω
Maybe something like a physical therapy regimen necessary to walk again? Going to the dentist for some painful procedure to prevent future difficulties?
Fair enough; however, those desires are still not based on empty desires which have no limits.
To my mind, this doctrine addresses desires that do not arise from genuine need but from empty values ingrained by social conditioning.
Exactly. It's important to make the distinction between unnecessary desires (which are part of pleasure seeking in Epicurus' philosophy) and the empty desire that have no limit. Note, I'm saying the desires have no limit. Pleasure itself always has a limit, ie, the absence of pain.
some desires which will take a lot of effort to obtain but also which will lead to great bodily or mental pain if they are not achieved.
This strikes me as well represented by sanantoniogarden 's examples. The desire to walk when this inability is due to injury is well founded.
It's probably worth noting that of course this isn't saying that there won't be some desires which will take a lot of effort to obtain but also which will lead to great bodily or mental pain if they are not achieved.
I'm not necessarily disagreeing, but do you have examples of these?
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Philosophers, X.120: "The school holds that sins are not all equal ; ..."
Δοκεῖ δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἁμαρτήματα ἄνισα εἶναι. ...
(The school) Holds the doctrine that failures are unequal, ... (my translation)
LSJ: ἁμάρτημα , ατος, τό,
A. failure, fault, S.Ant.1261 (lyr.); freq. in Att. Prose, Antipho 3.3.8, Th.2.65, etc.; midway between ἀδίκημα and ἀτύχημα, Arist.EN1135b18, Rh.1374b7; sinful action, opp. κατόρθωμα, Zeno Stoic.1.54, cf. PTeb.5.3, etc.; “τὸ περὶ τὴν τέχνην λεγόμενον ἁ.” Pl.Plt.296b, cf.Ap.22d; “εἴς τινα” Id.Lg.729e; “περὶ τὸ σῶμα” Id.Grg.479a.
"midway between ἀδίκημα and ἀτύχημα" occurs in Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics. ie, between something intentional wrong or error of judgement and misfortune or fault of ignorance, a mistake.
Middle Liddell: 1. a failure, fault, sin, Soph., Plat. 2. a bodily defect, malady, id=Plat.
I like flags. Here is a suggestion from ChatGPT of an Epicurean flag:
Hurrah for Vexillology!!
I like the design , but it reminds me of the Unitarian Universalists:
If you wanted to be cryptic, replace the E with a ēta Η for ΗΔΟΝΗ (hēdonē) "pleasure" ηδονή
Would you be able to sum up this flawed view of katastematic pleasure that mainstream academia purports?
For me, the mainstream academic and frankly broad public general position seems to boil down to:
Now, there are some great academics and lay proponents of Epicurus out there (Looking at you, Austin and Sedley!), but that's my take above on the general vibe of the hoi polloi.
For the record, I don't think the kinetic/katastematic distinction is the most paramount issue to be resolved in Epicurean philosophy. I do, however, believe it needs to be addressed. As with all things Epicurus, the loss of ancient texts from actual Epicureans is problematic. We have that whole "through a glass darkly" issue in trying to get at what the school itself thought.
On rereading (okay, skimming through) Nikolsky, I find that argument less and less compelling. That paper, to my reading, seems to be implying Epicurus didn't use the distinction between kinetic/katastematic. This simply seems to blatantly contradict the quotation from Epicurus himself in Choices and Avoidances cited in DL X.136.
I remain intrigued by Gosling and Taylor.
We've had some knock-down-drag-out threads on this. I was reading a good long one from 2023! There is no one consensus among long time forum members that I can see. That doesn't make us rivals! Just means this is a thorny issue with multiple possible perspectives. This seems a good a place as any to rejoin that discussion, because Kalosyni 's question about negation follows right on from Epicurus' use of a-taraxia and a-ponia.
Yes, Don thanks, that is a comment by Diogenes Laertius, who is consistent with Cicero and Athenaeus (if Nikolsky's comments below are correct).
It's not a comment by Diogenes; it's a quote from Epicurus' own work.
