... because i am not at all sure that such as think as this exists. If there is a change in state, as in removal of pain, then there is some action going on that explains the source of the pleasure. I do not believe that "absence of pain" alone is an activity, any more than "calmly" expresses an activity. As per the argument in these articles, especailly Wenham perhaps on this particular point, all pleasure comes through sensation, and absence of sensation is death. If you are sensing pleasure, you are sensing "something' -- even if your mind is merely contemplating, which you find enjoyable. i think it ends up being a non-sequitur, and essentially on the feeling of pleasure itself, to talk in terms of "absence of" as describing the positive experience of pleasure.
That's why this entire issue of katastematic pleasure is so important, and why Nikolsky and gosling and taylor and Wenham write to refute it. As Nikolsky state most explicitly, the entire issue of "stastic pleasure" was likely invented by a later stoic as part of their categorization obsession, and it seems to me very likely that Epicurus would have rejected the classification if he himself had been asked about it.
I agree. I don't believe in anything static as well. But for the sake of analysis, we can't help using the term since it is how we state pleasure that is not kinetic or moving. But anyways, my point is that pain and painlessness can not exist at the same place at the same moment the way the absence of pain and pleasure can not exist at the same place and at the same moment, too.