Posts by Godfrey

As for a compilation, I hadn't really thought of taking it much further but can keep at it. My main source right now is The Hellenistic Philosophers by Long and Sedley: they've already done much of the work with their compilations of their own translations. But there's certainly more out there, particularly comparative translations of various passages. BTW is there an online source of Sextus Empiricus? I found the Bury book online, which is good, but the Sextus passage that I used above is in book 7, and his translation of Against the Professors stops at book 6

Quote from Cassius

In other words, I have always thought that Diogenes Laertius's statement about seeing multiple oxen and then over time forming a picture or definition of an ox is something that definitely does happen - I think that's probably the conceptual reasoning process.

I think we're on the same page, except for this quote. The oxen problem, to me, is part of function 1 but I see how there is also a rational, function 2 element to it. For function 1, learning begins in the womb and follows from there, so as an infant you could passively perceive oxen (or pictures of oxen) and at the same time hear people talking about oxen. Your faculty of pattern recognition would take this information and process it into a notion of oxen. This is what I understand, hopefully correctly, from Lisa Feldman Barrett and other current neuroscientists.

Self-evident does seem problematic. Like so many words it apparently has a technical meaning and a common meaning. The dictionary definition is near the end of post #2. Epicurus' definition, I think, is:

PD24 ...what is already present through sensation, through feelings, and through every focusing of thought into an impression... Long and Sedley, 1987

PD24 ...that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind... Bailey, 1926

To my understanding, this snippet refers to the "data" that comes from the faculties and which is then examined using Epicurean reasoning. Maybe instead of "self-evident" it could be called "evidence from perception"?

Cassius do you remember Voula Tsouna's Zoom epibolai presentation for the 2021 Hellenistic Forum? This was one of the passages that she used in her presentation. If I read my illegible notes correctly, she and Elizabeth Asmis interpreted "focusing of thought" as a conscious operation whereas A.A. Long felt it was not a conscious process. Much of that discussion was over my head though, so I may have that wrong. But I believe I'm correct in my understanding that this snippet is only referring to the signs, not the method of inference. Is that what you're saying as well? So that addressing this is addressing a re-phrasing of "self-evident"?

If "focusing of thought" is thought of as a non-conscious process, such as light focusing through a lens, that would read similarly to Bailey's "intuitive apprehension", "apprehension" meaning understanding or grasp. This seems to be describing the anticipations if I'm understanding it correctly.

The Hellenistic Philosophers has a translation of Sextus Empiricus, Against the professors 7.211–16 (Usener 247, part) (p. 142-3, kindle version) which seems to me to be a great start for an outline of methods of inference (or Epicurean logic, Epicurean reasoning, Epicurean processing). I edited and rearranged the text to get the beginnings of an outline.

1. The Basics

A. Self-evidence is the foundation and basis of everything.

B. True opinions: attested and non-contested by self-evidence

C. False opinions: contested and non-attested by self-evidence

D. Conjectural opinions: awaiting verification through attestation and/or contestation

2. Definitions

A. Attestation: perception through a self-evident impression of the fact that the object of opinion is such as it was believed to be.

Example: if Plato is approaching from far off, I form the conjectural opinion, owing to the distance, that it is Plato. But when he has come close, there is further testimony that he is Plato, now that the gap is reduced, and it is attested by the self-evidence itself.

B. Non-contestation: the following from that which is evident of the non-evident thing posited and believed.

Example, Epicurus, in saying that there is void, which is non-evident, confirms this through the self-evident fact of motion. For if void does not exist, there ought not to be motion either, since the moving body would lack a place to pass into as a result of everything’s being full and solid. Therefore the non-evident thing believed is uncontested by that which is evident, since there is motion.

C. Contestation: is something which conflicts with non-contestation. It is the elimination of that which is evident by the positing of the non-evident thing.

Example: the Stoic says that void does not exist, judging something non-evident; but once this is posited about it, that which is evident, namely motion, ought to be co-eliminated with it. For if void does not exist, necessarily motion does not occur either, according to the method already demonstrated.

D. Non-attestation: opposed to attestation, being confrontation through self-evidence of the fact that the object of opinion is not such as it was believed to be.

Example, if someone is approaching from far off, we conjecture, owing to the distance, that he is Plato. But when the gap is reduced, we recognize through self-evidence that it is not Plato. The thing believed was not attested by the evident.

E. Self-evident: evident without proof or reasoning (from Merriam-Webster online)

It would probably be helpful to agree on plain English versions of these definitions!

Not covered here is the idea of multiple satisfactory theories from Pythocles and Lucretius. I don’t have a cite at hand but that seems much more straightforward than this.

Getting away from Philodemus On Signs for a moment, I’ve been looking at The Hellenistic Philosophers by Long and Sedley for original quotes from Epicurus regarding signs and methods of inference. I also had a look at a cluster of Principle Doctrines that are relevant (PD 22 & 23 are from Nate’s compilation, with thanks).

PD22 We must take into account both the underlying purpose and all the evidence of clear perception, to which we refer our opinions. Otherwise, everything will be filled with confusion and indecision. O'Connor (1993)

PD23 If you resist all the senses, you will not even have anything left to which you can refer, or by which you may be able to judge of the falsehood of the senses which you condemn. Yonge (1853)

PD24 (1) If you are going to reject any sensation absolutely, and not distinguish opinions reliant on evidence yet awaited from what is already present through sensation, through feelings, and through every focusing of thought into an impression, you will confound all your other sensations with empty opinion and consequently reject the criterion in its entirety. (2) And if you are going to treat as established both all the evidence yet awaited in your conjectural conceptions, and that which has failed to <earn> attestation, you will not exclude falsehood, so that you will have removed all debate and all discrimination between correct and incorrect. Long and Sedley (1987, p. 135-6, kindle version)

Letter to Herodotus 37-38 (1) First, then, Herodotus, we must grasp the things which underlie words, so that we may have them as a reference point against which to judge matters of opinion, inquiry and puzzlement, and not have everything undiscriminated for ourselves as we attempt infinite chains of proofs, or have words which are empty. For the primary concept corresponding to each word must be seen and need no additional proof, if we are going to have a reference point for matters of inquiry, puzzlement and opinion. (2) Second, we should observe everything in the light of our sensations, and in general in the light of our present focusings whether of thought or of any of our discriminatory faculties, and likewise also in the light of the feelings which exist in us, in order to have a basis for sign-inferences about evidence yet awaited and about the non-evident. Long and Sedley (1987, p. 136, kindle version)

Are the data from the canon "signs"? I would assume this to be the case; does that do anything to tie inferences or processing into the Canon? Sorry to be so daft about this, it's definitely not my strong suit.

BTW The Hellenistic Philosophers sections 15, 16, 17 and 18 have some pertinent texts. I plan to review these tomorrow.

So, in outline:

Physics

Canonic

- the faculty of Sensations

- the faculty of Anticipations

- the faculty of Feelings

- the process of Epicurean reasoning

Ethics

Or are you saying this:

Physics

Canonic

- the faculty of Sensations, mediated by Epicurean reasoning

- the faculty of Anticipations, mediated by Epicurean reasoning

- the faculty of Feelings, mediated by Epicurean reasoning

Ethics

These outlines consider the Canon to encompass the entire Epicurean epistemology, which makes sense. I've been thinking of the Canon as restricted to faculties, and that it's a tripod, which doesn't allow for either reasoning or a fourth leg. Is this how DeWitt presents it? I don’t remember.

To my understanding, the type of logic that doesn't connect to canonic data is not really a part of Epicurus' philosophy and doesn't belong in the outline.

Quote from Cassius

I am not sure what you mean there, however (?) I have a feeling that you are using the word "prolepsis" in that sentence as if it is interchangeable with "concept." I am still not ready to embrace that "anticipations" = "concepts." Are you?

Definitely not. My working theory of a prolepsis (anticipation) is twofold. The faculty itself is one of pattern recognition. An individual anticipation arises from the faculty and based on what has been input into it. That input begins in the womb and continues onward. The anticipation, in both cases, is an instantaneous reaction to an experience, but based on a person's input history it may vary from person to person.

So a child, or a person who has little interest in poetry, may react to the word "poem" (not think, as it's a reaction) "a bunch of lines that rhyme". But a poet, or a scholar of poetry, might react entirely differently (I can't say how, as I'm neither a poet nor a scholar!).

Could this be why there's a quote, I don't remember where, about only Greeks being able to learn the true philosophy? Among other things, other peoples don't have the "correct" anticipations.

I've got some monkeys typing away in my garage... I'll keep you posted.

The quote in post #1 is online at https://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/app/app70.htm.

It has a link to the book on Amazon, the book is:

Ancilla to Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Complete Translation of the Fragments in Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker Paperback, August 15, 1983 by Kathleen Freeman.

"This book is a complete translation of the fragments of the pre-Socratic philosophers given in the fifth edition of Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker."

I'm not sure what that means, since Philodemus wasn't a pre-Socratic. Diels must have used fragments from other ancients which refer to pre-Socratics since there's not much left from them.

I believe that item 4 in post #1 comes from Pyrrho and from ancient Buddhism. It certainly is cryptic!

For me, the first issue is to define what Epicurean "logic" is and where it fits into an outline. That would be necessary to teach the system to a junior high school student: to provide the complete, coherent system.

Secondly would be to contrast the Epicurean view to other views.

Rather than call it Epicurean logic, maybe "methods of inference" is a good term to use, per Philodemus.

As to placing "MOI" in an outline, it shouldn't be in the canon as it's not direct experience (as discussed in the thread linked to in post #48. But a current problem is that it’s something of an afterthought (speaking for myself). One suggestion is:

Overview of Epicurean philosophy:

1. Physics

1A. Canonic

1B. Methods of Inference (dependent upon Canonic)

1C. Natural science (dependent upon Canonic and MOI)

2. Ethics (dependent upon Physics)

This strikes me as an unintended instance in which to examine epistemological methods of inference

For starters, I would posit that there are two different prolepseis on display here as to what constitutes a poem. From there, we have evidence of an unlikely situation: an acrostic. There seem to be two opposing views on acrostics: 1) they are a relatively common and recognized technique in ancient poetry, and 2) they are purely random occurrences.

One approach to the current evidence is to blindly accept the statements of classical scholars, one of which we have among us in the person of Joshua. Personally, in this instance, this is my approach and I base it on my interactions with Joshua and the fact that he supports the assertions in the paper which are purportedly made by experts in the field.

Another, equally valid, is to look for more evidence of the use and acceptance of acrostics, and perhaps more evidence of the variety of structures in ancient poetry.

Yet another approach is to examine the odds of a given acrostic occurring and to make inferences from that.

Or one could say that we just can't know the answer to this thorny problem.

One could also say that we need to understand the motivations of each person making assertions. And to go a step further, one could try to determine if these people really exist or are programs on a supercomputer in a remote location in Utah.

This appears to be what is known of Nausiphanes' tripod, which is said to have inspired Epicurus' tripod of truth.

From Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, by Kathleen Freeman, [1948], at sacred-texts.com p. 124

Quote

75. NAUSIPHANES OF TEOS

Nausiphanes of Teos lived in the time of Alexander, and after.

He wrote a book called The Tripod, on epistemology and method. This was said to have been the source of Epicurus’ Canon. It is preserved in epitome only, by Philodemus.

1. (The man of science has the capacity for rhetoric, even if he does not practise it).

2. (The wise man will pursue rhetoric, because honour depends on winning a reputation for cleverness in politics, rather than on the over-lauded virtues.

The wise man is he who can persuade his hearers; this power belongs to the man of science, its source being his knowledge of the facts, so that he could pass on his own convictions not only to his pupils but to any race of people. Having a knowledge of the facts, he is able to lead his audience where he wishes, because he can tell them what is to their advantage, which is what they wish to hear. The scientist has command of the best diction also: not that created by vain imagination and usage, but that based on the nature of things. He also has command of logic, without which knowledge is impossible, and is best qualified in that art indispensable to a statesman in a democracy or monarchy or any other constitution, of calculation of the future from the known facts.

The man who employs continuous discourse will be best able to employ the dialectic method and vice versa, because both depend on an accurate judgement of how to lead pupils from the known to the unknown; that is, they depend upon a knowledge of the 'right time' and 'right measure' in speaking).

3. (Nausiphanes gave 'immovability' as the goal of life, this being the name he gave to Democritus’ 'imperturbability').

4. (Of those things which appear to exist, nothing exists more than it does not exist).

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Here's a link to a previous post:

Post

Thoughts On The Alleged "Fourth Leg of the Canon"

I don't have time for a long post but I wanted to start this topic with a couple of general thoughts which are prompted by our recent discussions of images in book four of Lucretius, plus the articles from the Encyclopedia Brittanica (thanks Nate) as to the development of skepticism within the Academy, as well as the Stoic/Academic interplay involving how the Stoics attempted to remain dogmatic. Let me particularly highlight this paragraph:

[…]

Now as to the Epicureans, here is the primary…

Cassius

May 3, 2021 at 8:49 AM

Quote from Cassius

I presume you're reading other recent threads like the one by Eric and my goal is that we come up with a presentation on these issues understandable enough for the average junior high age student.

You presume correctly!

Often the canon is tied to physics, which makes sense to me since the faculties are part of the material world. But the canon isn't logic. Or are you saying that logic belongs in the canon? I've understood logic, or reasoning, as a process that we use to evaluate our sensations, anticipations and feelings. Is logic/reasoning then "mental focusings"?

Googling "epistemology" gets:

Quote

"epistemology, the philosophical study of the nature, origin, and limits of human knowledge. The term is derived from the Greek epistēmē (“knowledge”) and logos (“reason”), and accordingly the field is sometimes referred to as the theory of knowledge." Encyclopedia Britannica

It appears that this puts logic firmly in the canon. Does this make "the tripod of truth" into "the QuadroPod of truth"? Guess I have some reading to do.

I have a very basic "big picture" question: where does this topic fit into an outline of Epicurean philosophy?

On the one hand it seems that it belongs with the Canon, but on the other hand, logic isn't part of the Canon as I understand it. The Stoics have Physics, Logic and Ethics; we have Physics, Canonic, Ethics (or Physics/Canonic, Ethics). I'm not even sure at the moment where these outlines came from.... Do they appear in ancient texts (Diogenes Laertius, I think?) or are they modern interpretations? Could it be that a proper EP outline is Physics/Canonic, Logic, Ethics? Are the basic outlines of EP and Stoicism actually the same, just with different ideas in each topic? Or is this a muddling of EP by later Epicureans who were arguing with the Stoics?

Wouldn't placing this topic of signs and methods of inference into the larger outline of the philosophy be a good first step toward developing an outline of Epicurean "logic"? I think it might be helpful in assisting us to remember why we're grappling with this difficult and rather distasteful , but important, topic in the first place.

De Rerum Natura is the gift that keeps on giving.... The attached paper discusses references in the poem to Aratus, Homer and others as well as some of the related cross-fertilization between ancient poets. It also discusses Lucretius' use of the theme of light and his references to Epicurus as the sun and himself as the moon, among other things.

I just started reading it to find out what an acrostic is, but it sucked me right in and totally exposed my ignorance of the classics.

Glad you enjoyed it Joshua , you're quite welcome.

From reading the article it seems like there are interesting connections to be drawn, such as the solar plexus having an association with sight and the throat having an association with listening. I don't go in for the woo, but there are connections throughout the body that we don't normally think of and which can perhaps deepen understanding of certain pleasures and pains in some instances.

The attached paper goes beyond lines from movies to discuss two entire movies. I've watched Harold and Maude a couple of times over the years but I'm not familiar with Bad Boy Bubby. I can't remember if there are any quotable quotes in H&M or not....