Posts by Godfrey

Cassius I just saw your post. A quick answer would be that desires and choices and avoidances are all practically evaluated in terms of the goal of pleasure. But they aren't the same thing.

To drill further into desires....

To my understanding, and I think Philodemus supports this, desire was something that was dealt with in detail in Epicurean communities. Since it requires the setting of limits which are specific to each person and to each context, this would be the most effective, practical way to treat desires.

Theoretically, it would appear that one key to working with desires is to understand what Epicurus meant by "natural" and "unnatural". If I'm not mistaken, the unnatural desires are the only ones that he says have no limits.

PD15 The wealth demanded by nature is both limited and easily procured; that demanded by idle imaginings stretches on to infnity.

PD29 Among desires some are natural (and necessary, some natural) but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary, but due to idle imagination.

PD30 Natural desires that afford no pain if they are not indulged, though they are eagerly pursued, arise from groundless opinion; and when they are not dispelled it is not because of their own nature but because of the man's groundless opinion.

LM127 ...on the one hand, there are the natural desires; on the other, the 'empty, fruitless, or vain ones.' And of the natural ones, on the one hand, are the necessary ones; on the other, the ones which are only natural; then, of the necessary ones: on the one hand, those necessary for eudaimonia; then, those necessary for the freedom from disturbance for the body; then those necessary for life itself. [128] The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind, that is for our physical and our mental existence, since this is the goal of a blessed life. (Don's translation)

LM130 Additionally, we believe αὐτάρκεια is a great good. Not so that we are furnished with the use of a few things; but, if we were to have many things, we would be content with few things. Those in need who are genuinely convinced of this find extravagance more pleasant, and that every natural desire is easily procured, and an empty desire difficult to get. (Don's translation)

I've run out of time and will have to leave this for now. The bones are here, but they still need parsing

First, an aside. The obvious occurred to me after posting #1 above, that being that separating pleasure and desire, and understanding desires as unlimited, provides an answer to the idea that pleasure can't be the good because it knows no limit. This of course in conjunction with PD03.

In the Zoom call last week, we discussed pleasure being conflated with desire. I'm posting here to continue that discussion. My general premise is that people trying to discredit Epicurus have consistently conflated the two, which leads to getting caught up in endlessly discussing types of pleasure and ultimately ends with the attempt to rank pleasures.

In reviewing the Principal Doctrines, there seems to be a clear distinction between pleasure and desire. PD03, PD05, PD08, PD09, PD10, PD12, PD18, PD19, PD20 discuss pleasure; PD10, PD11, PD15, PD26, PD29, PD30 discuss desires. This quote by Stefano Maso, from a post of Nate's, got me thinking about limits of pleasures, pains and desires:

"...it is important to understand the ethical basis of Epicurus’ doctrine, and, in particular, its therapeutic proposal.... Epicurus pithily expressed it [the tetrapharmakos] as follows: “Were we not upset by the worries that celestial phenomena and death might matter to us, and also by failure to appreciate the limits of pains and desires, we would have no need for natural philosophy” (KD 11 = LS 25.B.11; cfr. KD 1–4, 10, 20, and Ep. Men. 133).

It is interesting to note that the tetrapharmakos also rests on a doctrine of the “limit”... This doctrine applies to everything that exists and is perceived within the cosmos. Take atoms: we have isolated atoms that eternally fall and never combine with others; but we also have atoms that combine into endless, more or less changeable structures. The gods constitute the ultimate “limit” of this changeability, for they are eternally stable atomic compounds. They never change because, by definition, they are intangible: they never collide with other atoms or other compounds. Take death: by definition, it never has anything to do with life. It constitutes the “limit” of life. Take pain and, in parallel, pleasure: each constitutes the other’s “limit.”

Based on this doctrine of the “limit,” Epicurus infers that we must not fear the gods, because they are imperturbable and, hence, take no interest in us or interfere with other atomic compounds (Ep. Men. 123–124). We must not fear death, because when it exists, we do not; and as long as we are alive, we cannot perceive it (Ep. Men. 124–127). We must not fear pain, because it may be more or less intense: if it is light, it is so easily endurable that at its limit it can be perceived as pleasure; if it is extreme, a loss of sensibility occurs and we no longer feel it (KD 4). Finally, we must not fear pleasure, in the sense that we must not fear the dissatisfaction that affects those who give themselves over to the pursuit of the most intense and prolonged sort of kinetic pleasure, as did the Cyrenaics....

<a href="https://www.epicureanfriends.com/index.php?thre…18884#post18884">Do Pigs Value Katastematic Pleasure? ( Summer 2022 K / K Discussion)</a>

PD11 (KD11) was of particular concern to me after our Zoom discussion because it mentions both pains and desires. The concern brought up in the discussion was that this was somehow advocating for an "absence of pain" position. After digesting this quote, I don't think that that's the case, although I don't think of it in the terms Maso uses in his final sentence above.

My take is this: Epicurus takes the natural goal of life to be pleasure, the natural evil to be pain. Increasing pleasure decreases pain, and vice versa. Failure to understand natural science increases pain (fear) and by the same token proper understanding increases pleasure. Failure to understand the limits of pains and desires increases pain and decreases pleasure. There's no need to worry about the limit of pleasure in this context (which Epicurus already defined in PD03) and therefore he doesn't mention it. How to understand the limit of pain? He describes this in PD04: as per Maso, pain is limited by pleasure. Pain and pleasure naturally limit each other.

But what about the limit of desires? Reading the PDs and the Letter to Menoikeus, it becomes clear that desires can be unlimited, which differentiates them from both pleasure and pain. This is why the categories of desires are important to understand. These categories are a tool to help us to impose our own limits on our desires, which have no natural limit other than the "natural and necessary" desires. This then becomes one of the key methods to increase pleasure and reduce pain.

Quote from Don

we can rely more on the pleasure that arises from within us than we can on the pleasures that arise from external circumstances.

This seems to make perfect sense based on practical day-to-day experience. It also strikes me as a correction of the Stoic inner citadel idea.

Don I'm coming to the idea that the detailed discussions of types of pleasure, such as katastematic and kinetic, are a misunderstanding and obfuscation of what Epicurus was saying. The way I read the PDs and the letters, pleasure is pleasure. Sure there are varieties of pleasures, but they are of very minor concern.

What I see as the problem is conflating pleasures and desires. It's very easy to do, and in conflating them, one can then imply that there are greater and lesser pleasures and hence pleasure can't be "the good". But the way I read Epicurus' works, he treats pleasure and desire very differently. He categorizes desires, but not pleasures. And in doing so he provides a way to understand and work with desires. A way that is intended to result in an abundance of pleasure. Worrying about what type of pleasure is best serves no purpose for living his philosophy. (Some of these thoughts were prompted by the Liebersohn article in which he tried to make a connection between katastematic-kinetic and necessary-unnecessary. In reviewing Epicurus' writings and giving it some thought, I think he totally missed the boat [if you will].)

An interesting thing, though, is that Epicurus does mention desire and pain together. I only recently noticed this, and haven't yet given it adequate thought. But I don't believe that this leads to either an "absence of pain" or a "remove all desire" interpretation. He makes clear that we choose some pains for a greater pleasure. I think that he's doing something similar by ranking desires: he's giving us a practical framework to work with desires, just as we can use pain as a tool to increase pleasure.

Quote from Don

I don't think there is a neutral state although I'm going to have to go back to Barrett and Lembke to think about this in light of their research. (Sent thoughts, Godfrey ?)

Practically speaking I don't think there's a neutral state.

Neurologically speaking I'm not qualified to answer that. But of course I'm happy to toss out an opinion. The affective circumplex and the teeter totter are both conceptual models or analogies and therefore it could be assumed that they don't fully represent the biological processes at work. They seem to imply a neutral state at 0,0 or at perfectly level, respectively. But it could be that these implied states are a failure of the analogies, or that they are so infinitesimal as to be meaningless.

Quote from Don

We use the goal of pleasure as the guide in making our choices and rejections.

And the experience of pleasure, as well as pain, also provides feedback regarding our choices and avoidances. The process is a loop.

Don enjoy the pleasure of feeling better!

If Liebersohn was correct in his assertions (in his paper on Kinetic-katastematic pleasure) that the Letter to Menoikos was written around 296 or 295 BCE and that it was written for people new to the philosophy, does this have any relevance in placing LM in relation to other passages on pleasure? More or less developed due to being written when he was older or younger? More broad brushed for a newbie reader? Or are the contexts of the other passages too vague to make any reasonable assumptions?

Quote from Cassius

- There is no supernatural realm and no meddling God or gods.

- There is no heaven and hell and no existence after death.

- There is no fate and you are not a billiard ball.

-There is no absolute right / wrong / sin/ evil / good / virtue / depravity.

- Nature gave us only pleasure and pain as guides for us to make decisions on how to live.

- Do your best to intelligently maximize the pleasure and minimize pain in your life because you only live once.

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Also something along the lines of "perception/sensations are our primary means of understanding. Reason can only be an effective tool in evaluating information that the senses provide: it cannot provide correct information about the world if it seeks to undermine the senses."

Quote from Cassius

pursuing the details on difficult topics can be very motivational.

Yes, this is a very useful discussion. Painful at times but great for getting clarity. Thanks Cassius and Don !

Quote from Cassius

We also know that for example Epicurus divided things into "natural and necessary," and that that distinction was significant to be recorded several places very clearly, including the principal doctrines, the letter to Menoeceus, and the vatican sayings

Quote from Don

To that, I'd say "Bingo!" According to On Choices and other quoted material, Epicurus used the words katastematic and kinetic. Yes, I will continue to "assert" that. But *maybe* they weren't central to his philosophy because THEY'RE BOTH PLEASURES. He didn't see the need to belabor the point.

This discussion has me thinking further about pleasures v desires. Whether with nefarious intent or through misunderstanding, it seems to me that the Platonic/Ciceronian treatment conflates and confuses pleasure with desire, and that this is a major cause or the katastematic-kinetic brouhaha.

Don's quote seems to hit on a key: of course there are different types of pleasure, but they're all pleasure. And pleasure is the goal, not any particular type of pleasure. More specifically, the experience of the feeling which is pleasure is the goal (or guide, if you prefer).

As to Cassius' quote, Epicurus clearly has a division of "things into natural and necessary". Correct me if I'm missing something, but I've never found a connection between pleasure and natural and necessary in any of the writings of Epicurus. The connection that he consistently makes, in all cases (at least in translation) is between natural and necessary and desires. In the PDs it's between desires and pains. But never pleasures.

Why? My thinking is that pleasure is typically a result. Desires are something that we can tangibly work with. Epicurus' concern is with describing practice, with things anybody can do to achieve pleasure. He doesn't care what type of pleasure you achieve, he's concerned with how you go about achieving pleasure. And to him, you do this by working with your desires and with your pains. If you understand your desires, you will be more effective at achieving pleasure. As you minimize your various pains, these will by definition be replaced with pleasure. But you must always remember that your guide and goal is pleasure. Understanding desires and removing pains are only tools for pursuing pleasure. We can also pursue various pleasures for pure enjoyment, but for an effective practice to achieve lasting pleasure he focused on working with desires and on things which cause pain.

To me, this is the important concern for a practicing Epicurean. And the Golden Ones and The Cow have done a fine job of diverting the focus to sorting out fancy pleasures. But since they have been so successful, it's useful for us to untangle the mess that they've created.

Thanks for that compilation Don !

Quote from Don

One can take pleasure in being in a state one can describe as being "undisturbed" or in a state one can describe as "pain-free." I simply don't accept that ataraxia and aponia are not "sensed."

I tend to agree with this statement. I think it's a slippery slope from "not sensed" to "neutral state". But I would say that it's a different quality of pleasure: quieter, more subtle.

It sounds like Seneca is describing aponia and ataraxia. But that's a good quote; I'm certainly curious what list he might be referring to!

Quote from Kalosyni

There is just this very open way of referring to different desires, and as I think about it then it would only make sense if Epicurus had clearly defined all of these categories.

I've always understood Epicurus' descriptions of the types of desires as all that's required. I agree with Cassius that these are principles which provide guidance in making decisions. We can use them now, in a society much different from that of Epicurus, whereas a specific list from ancient Greece could be open to misinterpretation. For example, from some of Don 's posts it sounds like the typical Athenian diet may have been much different from what we eat today. So for us it would be unnecessary and possibly bothersome to try to mimic the ancient diet when we have modern standards as to what is healthy and easily obtained.

Liebersohn's article is a fascinating case study. His simple proposition is that katastematic pleasure is necessary, whereas kinetic pleasure is unnecessary.

However it quickly becomes evident that his thinking is grounded in Platonism and this defines his entire approach to arguing his proposition. I imagine that even conceiving of this proposition was determined by his evident Platonic background, but it's possible to examine his proposition from outside of Platonism, which of course is how I and most of us here would probably approach it.

Here are two ways that he states his proposition:

1) "As the removal of pain is a necessary condition for Epicurean ataraxia and aponia, 'katastematic' pleasure, having to do with the removal of pain, is the necessary pleasure pertaining both to the process of removing pain and to its result... while 'kinetic' pleasure is an unnecessary pleasure having nothing to do with the removal of pain, e.g. it starts after pain has been removed." [Now this sounds thoroughly Platonic, Ciceronian perhaps]

2) "I propose to distinguish between 'moving towards an end', i.e. movement which has an end (the absence of pain) and 'moving qua moving', i.e. movement which has no end (it is concerned with its own movement)". [If he had left out the parenthetical "absence of pain", I might find this an interesting topic for discussion. But I haven't given that much thought because that's not what he's arguing. It is, however, why I read his article.]

I'm not a scholar and don't want to disturb my ataraxia by making a counter argument to his article. I do want to point out that he's apparently done a great deal of research in preparing his article. He even quotes DeWitt: "as was rightly detected by N. DeWitt... [EAHP pp. 7-8]... Plato did not regard pleasure as the highest good since it is "becoming" rather than "being".... And a chunk of his article is devoted to discussing Nikolsky. But his conclusions are for the most part diametrically opposed to what I think I would conclude from reviewing the same material that he reviewed. (The only footnote that I checked was one referencing Long and Sedley's The Hellenistic Philosophers. He seemed to be referencing from a different edition than the kindle version that I have, and I couldn't find his reference on the pages that he cited. However what I guessed he was referring to didn't say at all what he was suggesting, but I can't say that I was pointing to the same quote as he was.)

The way he approaches his proposition is steeped in absence of pain and, apparently, hierarchical pleasures. And he favorably mentions absence of pain as a neutral state. It pretty much made my head spin the way his conclusions seemed to differ from mine. When he points out a passage that I would read as supporting my interpretation of pleasure, he argues off in an entirely different direction. But I do find this article to be useful as a case study, although I've spent more than enough time with it now and leave that study to someone more academically minded than me.

There are two things he suggests, which I don't think that I've heard before. First is that the Principle Doctrines may include statements by later Epicureans as well, based on Bailey's Epicurus The Extent Remains pp. 344-7. This is counter to my understanding: has it ever been disputed or disproved, or is this accepted? I thought this was the case with the Vatican Sayings but not the Principle Doctrines.

Secondly, he gives a date for the Letter to Menoeceus as c. 296-295 BC (J.E Hessler, Proposte sulla data di conposizione e il destinatario dell'Epistola a Meneceo, <Cronache Ercolanesi>, XLI (2011) pp. 7-11). He also states that this letter "was intended to reach a wider public who might still be under the influence of an erroneous philosophy or of the unsupported maxims and opinions of popular thought [per Bailey ETER p. 327]... in the [LM] there appear colloquial terms such as 'necessary-unnecessary' (Menoec. 127), while technical terms such as 'kinetic' and 'katastematic' populate treatises such as [that referenced in Diogenes Laertius X 136], addressed to the devoted Epicurean." Liebersohn states elsewhere that Menoeceus was a beginner in the philosophy; to my understanding there's no information regarding Menoeceus; this must be inferred from the Bailey quote or perhaps some foreign language publication.

One last comment. To go out on a limb, I'm still not convinced that there are necessary and unnecessary pleasures. I'm convinced that there are necessary and unnecessary desires, but to me desires are quite different from pleasures. So for me, his proposition is invalid on these grounds although others here may disagree.

I was there about 4 years ago. And to the original in the 1980s. Of course there's also the Getty Villa in Malibu, CA: a replica of the Villa de Papyri

Don for a 2000 year sidestep, does your interest in homeostasis come from reading Dopamine Nation? That book has been on my list for quite a while but I haven't got around to reading it.

Just curious. I don't want to derail this thread! Great research!

If you haven't already, take a look at Long and Sedley's commentary in the Pleasure section of The Hellenistic Philosophers. They devoted a page or so to this topic.

So we don't have much to go on from Epicurus himself, including this fragment:

The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."

Can any significance be derived from the fact that he wrote that peace of mind and freedom from pain imply a state of rest, whereas joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity? Could he have been suggesting that a katastematic state isn't experienced directly, but only through such pleasures as peace of mind and freedom from pain? Could he have been discounting katastematic pleasure altogether and answering Plato, et al, that it is only a mental description based on experienced pleasures?

This is a great example of the much documented issue of lack of documentation

Further, Cicero’s opposition to Epicurus is well established. Knowing his agenda, relying on his presentation of what has become such a key idea is pretty much guaranteed to lead us into the conundrum we're grappling with. This was his agenda after all.

Quote from Don

My question: Does this describe a life of katastematic pleasure as a foundation filled with kinetic pleasure?

Reading it in this context and considering the source, it strikes me as quite a sarcastic and misleading description of that. As we often discuss, "a life of ease", of otiosus, might be absolute pleasure to some people yet entirely odius to others. And "crammed full of pleasures" seems to indicate disdain for prudent choices and avoidances.