Pleasure, Desire and Limits

    In the Zoom call last week, we discussed pleasure being conflated with desire. I'm posting here to continue that discussion. My general premise is that people trying to discredit Epicurus have consistently conflated the two, which leads to getting caught up in endlessly discussing types of pleasure and ultimately ends with the attempt to rank pleasures.


    In reviewing the Principal Doctrines, there seems to be a clear distinction between pleasure and desire. PD03, PD05, PD08, PD09, PD10, PD12, PD18, PD19, PD20 discuss pleasure; PD10, PD11, PD15, PD26, PD29, PD30 discuss desires. This quote by Stefano Maso, from a post of Nate's, got me thinking about limits of pleasures, pains and desires:


    "...it is important to understand the ethical basis of Epicurus’ doctrine, and, in particular, its therapeutic proposal.... Epicurus pithily expressed it [the tetrapharmakos] as follows: “Were we not upset by the worries that celestial phenomena and death might matter to us, and also by failure to appreciate the limits of pains and desires, we would have no need for natural philosophy” (KD 11 = LS 25.B.11; cfr. KD 1–4, 10, 20, and Ep. Men. 133).

    It is interesting to note that the tetrapharmakos also rests on a doctrine of the “limit”... This doctrine applies to everything that exists and is perceived within the cosmos. Take atoms: we have isolated atoms that eternally fall and never combine with others; but we also have atoms that combine into endless, more or less changeable structures. The gods constitute the ultimate “limit” of this changeability, for they are eternally stable atomic compounds. They never change because, by definition, they are intangible: they never collide with other atoms or other compounds. Take death: by definition, it never has anything to do with life. It constitutes the “limit” of life. Take pain and, in parallel, pleasure: each constitutes the other’s “limit.”

    Based on this doctrine of the “limit,” Epicurus infers that we must not fear the gods, because they are imperturbable and, hence, take no interest in us or interfere with other atomic compounds (Ep. Men. 123–124). We must not fear death, because when it exists, we do not; and as long as we are alive, we cannot perceive it (Ep. Men. 124–127). We must not fear pain, because it may be more or less intense: if it is light, it is so easily endurable that at its limit it can be perceived as pleasure; if it is extreme, a loss of sensibility occurs and we no longer feel it (KD 4). Finally, we must not fear pleasure, in the sense that we must not fear the dissatisfaction that affects those who give themselves over to the pursuit of the most intense and prolonged sort of kinetic pleasure, as did the Cyrenaics....

    <a href="https://www.epicureanfriends.com/index.php?thread/2586-do-pigs-value-katastematic-pleasure-summer-2022-k-k-discussion/&amp;postID=18884#post18884">Do Pigs Value Katastematic Pleasure? ( Summer 2022 K / K Discussion)</a>


    PD11 (KD11) was of particular concern to me after our Zoom discussion because it mentions both pains and desires. The concern brought up in the discussion was that this was somehow advocating for an "absence of pain" position. After digesting this quote, I don't think that that's the case, although I don't think of it in the terms Maso uses in his final sentence above.


    My take is this: Epicurus takes the natural goal of life to be pleasure, the natural evil to be pain. Increasing pleasure decreases pain, and vice versa. Failure to understand natural science increases pain (fear) and by the same token proper understanding increases pleasure. Failure to understand the limits of pains and desires increases pain and decreases pleasure. There's no need to worry about the limit of pleasure in this context (which Epicurus already defined in PD03) and therefore he doesn't mention it. How to understand the limit of pain? He describes this in PD04: as per Maso, pain is limited by pleasure. Pain and pleasure naturally limit each other.


    But what about the limit of desires? Reading the PDs and the Letter to Menoikeus, it becomes clear that desires can be unlimited, which differentiates them from both pleasure and pain. This is why the categories of desires are important to understand. These categories are a tool to help us to impose our own limits on our desires, which have no natural limit other than the "natural and necessary" desires. This then becomes one of the key methods to increase pleasure and reduce pain.

    Nice summary, Godfrey . I would agree with all of your points.

    And I also agree that getting the distinction between desires and pleasure clear in one's mind is crucial. I particularly like your point about desires being potentially limitless while pleasure/pain each have a natural limit (the elimination of the other feeling: No pain = all pleasure simply because if one is filled **with** pleasure, there's no room for pain. It's the *filling up with pleasure* that's important, not the "removing pain.")

    On the desire side, one can continue to lust for power no matter how much power you already have. You can desire more money, no matter how much money you already have. There is no natural limit to those kinds of desires. In one sense, that's why they're empty/void, *nothing* can fill them up!

    Thank you for starting this thread Godfrey! I think there's a lot of useful thought there and I agree with your direction.


    Quote from Godfrey

    But what about the limit of desires? Reading the PDs and the Letter to Menoikeus, it becomes clear that desires can be unlimited, which differentiates them from both pleasure and pain. This is why the categories of desires are important to understand. These categories are a tool to help us to impose our own limits on our desires, which have no natural limit other than the "natural and necessary" desires. This then becomes one of the key methods to increase pleasure and reduce pain.


    As Joshua might say, however, having identified that at least some desires can be unlimited, and that a limit has to be imposed upon them, we are, "only at the beginning" of the analysis.


    Always referencing VS63 that a life that is too frugal can be just as mistaken as a life that is too extravagant, the knowledge that we need to impose a limit on some desires only gets us started. Where is that limit? How do we determine where it is? Is it possible that there are any absolute rules on limiting desires, or is it all contextual? There are probably many other questions about the application of the question.


    So once we all agree, as I presume we do, that at least some desires are limitless and it will produce a more pleasurable life if we self-impose our own limit, how do we go about doing that without falling into the trap of thinking that the answer as to how much to limit is simply "limit all desires as much as possible?"


    Because that "limit all desires as much as possible, and don't even think about pursuing anything that is not absolutely natural and necessary" is the clear message I get from modern writers. I don't get that from the full body of Epicurus' work at all, but focusing on "limit all desires as much as possible, and don't even think about pursuing anything that is not absolutely natural and necessary" is an excellent way to limit enthusiasm for Epicurus to Buddhists and Stoics, two groups that I would maintain are polar opposites of Epicurus.

    Well, to play devil's advocate, we DO have to limit all desires in some sense. Eating food and drinking water are both natural and necessary but if we overeat or even drink too much water (hyponatremia), it's going to lead to pain.

    And yes, I'm using water as an example to be provocative ;)

    Right, we do limit desires, even the desire for life to accommodate us to our mortality.


    The issue I think is how to articulate how much of anything to pursue.


    The answer cannot be "no more than causes any pain" because we sometimes do chose pain as Epicurus said, for greater pleasure, and we seek not that which is longest but the most pleasant.


    The great problem is that much Epicurean discussion makes it sound like Epicurus was a modern minimalist, whereas "the least in every aspect" is not necessarily or even likely to result in the greatest pleasure (UNLESS you get tripped up on the "go live in a cave" outlook on the things we have been discussing).


    The trick is to give full effect to VS63 in a way that applies generally as a philosophic guide.

    Well so as not to leave this question up in the air for too long without giving my answer, I personally think the answer lies in the obvious as to pleasure and pain. The goal of life is to live as nearly as possible along the pattern described by Torquatus (which is so close to the letter to Menoeceus that I see no reason to doubt it's reliability):


    "Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement."


    Advanced beings higher than ourselves may be able to actualize a life such as this combined with complete freedom from pain, but we as humans cannot. Therefore it is up to us to as best we can approach the goal at the cost of experiencing some pains. The precise mix of pleasures and pains open go us is contextual, and our appetites for pleasure and tolerance for pain are individual. In a universe without fate or supernatural gods or absolute perspectives or right and wrong, we each are left by Nature to pursue pleasure and avoid pain on such terms as we ourselves decide to be appropriate. At the end of the road our lives are over, and if we have a chance to reflect on our past before we die, we are going to want to think that we did the best we could under our own circumstances to have exerted all our mental and physical energies to have lived as well as possible.



    It's interesting to note that in that summary there is no distinction between kinetic and katastematic - just the positive presence of numerous and vivid pleasures of every type of both body and mind. Nor is there any drawing out in detail of a description of absence of pain or absence of disturbance - other than the obvious role that these can be used to describe a life that is full of experiencing normal pleasures of all kinds without interruption. Nor is there any discussion of natural and necessary or limitations of desires - these are practical tools that we as humans must come up with and apply intelligently to our circumstances, but they aren't part of the philosophic definition of the ultimate goal. They are contextual and will differ in application from person to person and place to place and time to time.

    Quote from Cassius

    It's interesting to note that in that summary there is no distinction between kinetic and katastematic

    True. There's no distinction, but...

    Quote from Cicero

    undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain

    Quote from Cicero

    strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness

    To my reading, both of those are solid descriptions of ataraxia and aponia, ie, katastematic pleasure. So, katastematic pleasure is mentioned but the distinction itself between katastematic and kinetic was not important enough to mention.

    Quote from Don

    So, katastematic pleasure is mentioned but the distinction itself between katastematic and kinetic was not important enough to mention.

    When one fills a glass with water, the glass is full of water without any air, and we no longer leave room for the people of sour disposition to say that it is "half-empty." If we want to squash the people of sour disposition fully (which we may need to do if their name is Plato) then we might usefully call the quality of being full "the state of zero-emptiness."


    But I doubt if there is much call in life, short of dealing with obstinate manipulators like Plato, to dwell on terms like "zero-emptiness." Nonstandard terms tend to confuse regular common-sense people. And for good reason - why would people of good faith talk in riddles? The answer to that is that people like Plato are not acting in good faith, and they love word games as a way to deceive the man-on-the-street.


    Sometimes we have to fence with Platonists and it is necessary to use nonstandard words to show how pleasure can be continuous.


    But the price of playing footsie with Plato is you get quoted talking abstractly, and that can be taken out of context and used against you by tricky lawyers like Cicero.


    Maybe Shakespeare had the best advice for how to deal with lawyers! :)


    At any rate, part of our legacy now for those who are students of Epicurus is to become familiar with the terms of this debate. From 50 BC on to today it has become necessary to learn to see Cicero's challenge can not only be defused, but turned around and used as a method of explaining how Epicurus meant what he said and said what he meant when he identified "Pleasure" as the guide and goal of life.


    I keep forgetting to mention this, but I think the same answer here is the proper framework by which to understand the otherwise perplexing hypothetical of the statue of Chryssipus mentioned by Torquatus. We've got to be quick footed enough to know that something that can be both an excellent answer to Chryssipus but also a deadly mistake if mishandled in responding to Cicero. I place no blame on Torquatus but entirely on Cicero - had Cicero let him, Torquatus could have explained all this probably much along the lines we are doing now, and saved the world 2000 years of misunderstanding.


    But that misunderstanding was exactly what Cicero was trying to accomplish.

    Henry VI, Part 2 Act 4:


    DICK. The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers.


    JACK CADE. Nay, that I mean to do. Is not this a lamentable thing, that of the skin of an innocent lamb should be made parchment, that parchment, being scribbl'd o'er, should undo a man? Some say the bee stings; but I say 't is the bee's wax, for I did but seal once to a thing, and I was never mine own man since.

    First, an aside. The obvious occurred to me after posting #1 above, that being that separating pleasure and desire, and understanding desires as unlimited, provides an answer to the idea that pleasure can't be the good because it knows no limit. This of course in conjunction with PD03.

    Godfrey I can't get rid yet of a nagging concern that evaluating desire on its own separate from pleasure is going to lead to problems of its own, but I am more than happy to suspend that concern while this path is developing. With that caveat I would say yes you are right in this last point.

    To drill further into desires....


    To my understanding, and I think Philodemus supports this, desire was something that was dealt with in detail in Epicurean communities. Since it requires the setting of limits which are specific to each person and to each context, this would be the most effective, practical way to treat desires.


    Theoretically, it would appear that one key to working with desires is to understand what Epicurus meant by "natural" and "unnatural". If I'm not mistaken, the unnatural desires are the only ones that he says have no limits.


    PD15 The wealth demanded by nature is both limited and easily procured; that demanded by idle imaginings stretches on to infnity.

    PD29 Among desires some are natural (and necessary, some natural) but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary, but due to idle imagination.

    PD30 Natural desires that afford no pain if they are not indulged, though they are eagerly pursued, arise from groundless opinion; and when they are not dispelled it is not because of their own nature but because of the man's groundless opinion.


    LM127 ...on the one hand, there are the natural desires; on the other, the 'empty, fruitless, or vain ones.' And of the natural ones, on the one hand, are the necessary ones; on the other, the ones which are only natural; then, of the necessary ones: on the one hand, those necessary for eudaimonia; then, those necessary for the freedom from disturbance for the body; then those necessary for life itself. [128] The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind, that is for our physical and our mental existence, since this is the goal of a blessed life. (Don's translation)

    LM130 Additionally, we believe αὐτάρκεια is a great good. Not so that we are furnished with the use of a few things; but, if we were to have many things, we would be content with few things. Those in need who are genuinely convinced of this find extravagance more pleasant, and that every natural desire is easily procured, and an empty desire difficult to get. (Don's translation)


    I've run out of time and will have to leave this for now. The bones are here, but they still need parsing :/

    Quote from Godfrey

    Theoretically, it would appear that one key to working with desires is to understand what Epicurus meant by "natural" and "unnatural". If I'm not mistaken, the unnatural desires are the only ones that he says have no limits.

    Speculating on how these limits might work, what I come up with is that:

    - Natural desires are limited through the natural limits of pleasure and pain.

    - Natural but unnecessary desires don't cause any pain. They may be vain, but it doesn't really matter since there's no pain involved.

    - Unnatural desires are not subject to the natural limits of pleasure and pain. This is due to being unaware of or consciously ignoring the experience of one's pain caused by a specific desire.

    Quote from Cassius

    But I doubt if there is much call in life, short of dealing with obstinate manipulators like Plato, to dwell on terms like "zero-emptiness." Nonstandard terms tend to confuse regular common-sense People.


    I assume we're talking about "katastematic" here.


    If so, I'll say your statement is true, but...

    1. It was not a "nonstandard term" during Epicurus's lifetime or during the founding and early centuries when the philosophy of the Garden was popular and widespread.
    2. It doesn't have to be - nor should it be - the first thing that's talked about when introducing the philosophy to people.
    3. We need to have a response to the academics who DO use this term extensively. Because, as we know, people will say, "Didn't Epicurus say this katastematic pleasure was the be-all and end-all of his philosophy?" We need to be able to use the word, understand it (even if we may have a different take), and be able to defend our position. I cede nothing to the academics who want to make Epicureanism into "Stoicism-lite" or "Platonic hedonism" or some minimalistic ascetism that can be safely ignored and marginalized! By Zeus! I refuse to allow academics who themselves sometimes can't even agree on a translation let alone an interpretation dictate the terms of this discussion!

    I have no problem using "katastematic" pleasure and defending my Interpretation. I'll use academic research papers and academic authors, but I certainly don't have to agree with their conclusions. Add I'll do my best to describe my Interpretation to "common-sense people" and let them come to their conclusion. And I do hope I've been using (for the most part) common-sense language in my posts at least. (btw, Just to be clear, this is NOT a polemic directed against Cassius !! I just get a tad fired up sometimes. ;) )

    Quote from Cassius

    I can't get rid yet of a nagging concern that evaluating desire on its own separate from pleasure is going to lead to problems of its own,

    Um, Epicurus did the same thing in distinguishing desire and pleasure. So ... Just throwin' that out there.

    Pleasure is, by definition, good.

    Desires can be natural, unnatural, necessary, unnecessary, or empty. Desires are NOT all good by any means.


    They're of course connected. We have desires for pleasures. But pleasure is separate from desire.

    Eating is pleasurable. However, the desire *to eat* can come in many permutations, some necessary, some unnecessary, even though eating is natural:

    • I want to eat because I'm actually hungry.
    • I want to eat because I'm worried.
    • I have the munchies. I'm bored.
    • I want to eat because my friend is eating and I don't want them to eat alone even though I ate recently.
    • I want to eat popcorn because that's what I do at the movie theater even though I'm not hungry.
    • I want to eat at this one specific restaurant in Chicago but I can't travel there now. (Now, this one could turn into a pleasant memory!)

    Is frugality defined in terms of desire though, or only in terms of fulfillment of desire? I would say the latter (using modern, regular-people language and understanding of these terms). I can have unlimited desire, and be painfully restrictive to the point of still being overly frugal. But this would lead to a very unhappy life.


    Or I could have only the bare minimum (necessary) desires, but be open to pleasure whenever it's available even outside and beyond my desire and not be frugal at all.


    Is VS63 speaking against limiting desire, or is it speaking against avoiding the pleasure needed to satisfy your natural desires?




    I am really fascinated by this discussion and am interested to see where it goes. I'm especially interested to go look deeper into the natural and unnecessary desires because how I think of it, a desire always causes at least some amount of pain if it's unfulfilled (though sometimes even more when it is fulfilled) What are some examples of natural and unnecessary desires in my life? Also, as a queer person I always get a bit itchy when people start using the word "unnatural" so this is another time when I have great appreciation for the level of individuality when it comes to what things are good to pursue in Epicureanism

    This post was in my head before I read post #19, so it's not a reply but there's probably some overlap.


    I've been stewing over where my thinking and posts on the desires are leading, and I'm beginning to form a conclusion. When a person is new to EP, they go through a process of working to understand the categories of desires. In so doing, they form a broad idea of how these apply in their life. Basically, what is natural and necessary for themselves, and what is pretty much out there for them so that it can reasonably be considered to be "unnatural", or causing unending distress for them.


    After living with the philosophy for a while one no longer needs to give much thought to what for them is natural and necessary and what for them is unnatural and therefore unnecessary. At this point, where the rubber meets the road is in the day to day practice of choices and avoidances, and the majority of these would now constitute working with the category of natural and unnecessary desires. The big choices have been made.


    This leads me to think that the critical category for the practicing Epicurean is natural and unnecessary. Practically speaking, how might I maximize my pleasure in doing a particular activity? Or is a particular activity something to pursue, or might it cause me unending distress. Take playing golf as an example. Personally, getting serious about golf would probably cause me great distress. But playing a non-competetive game with friends, in a spectacular natural setting, could be very pleasant.


    Reaching a point where one has answered the big questions and is living in the "sweet spot" of working with natural and unnecessary desires sounds to me like the Epicurean "good life".


    The philosophical implication of this is that the absence of pain crowd have made two category errors. The first is to confuse pleasure and desire, and the second is to focus on the natural and necessary category. Those living the philosophy are living in the natural and unnecessary category.