Posts by Cassius

Here's a section in Book 1 of Lucretius describing the lower limit in size of atoms. Seems to me as noted before that this is not an assertion of a particular size, but that whatever the lower limit in size is, it must be sufficient to carry on these requirements.

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[551] Again, if nature had ordained no limit to the breaking of things, by now the bodies of matter would have been so far brought low by the breaking of ages past, that nothing could be conceived out of them within a fixed time, and pass on to the full measure of its life; for we see that anything you will is more easily broken up than put together again. Wherefore what the long limitless age of days, the age of all time that is gone by, had broken ere now, disordering and dissolving, could never be renewed in all time that remains. But as it is, a set limit to breaking has, we may be sure, been appointed, since we see each thing put together again, and at the same time fixed seasons ordained for all things after their kind, in the which they may be able to reach the flower of their life.

[565] There is this too that, though the first-bodies of matter are quite solid, yet we can give account of all the soft things that come to be, air, water, earth, fires, by what means they come to being, and by what force each goes on its way, when once void has been mingled in things. But on the other hand, if the first-beginnings of things were to be soft, it will not be possible to give account whence hard flints and iron can be created; for from the first all nature will lack a first-beginning of foundation. There are then bodies that prevail in their solid singleness, by whose more close-packed union all things can be riveted and reveal their stalwart strength.

[577] Moreover, if no limit has been appointed to the breaking of things, still it must needs be that all the bodies of things survive even now from time everlasting, such that they cannot yet have been assailed by any danger. But since they exist endowed with a frail nature, it is not in harmony with this that they have been able to abide for everlasting time harried through all the ages by countless blows.

[584] Once again, since there has been appointed for all things after their kind a limit of growing and of maintaining life, and inasmuch as it stands ordained what all things severally can do by the laws of nature, and what too they cannot, nor is anything so changed, but that all things stand so fast that the diverse birds all in their due order show that the marks of their kind are on their body, they must also, we may be sure, have a body of unchanging substance. For if the first-beginnings of things could be vanquished in any way and changed, then, too, would it be doubtful what might come to being, what might not, yea, in what way each thing has its power limited and its deepset boundary-stone, nor could the tribes each after their kind so often recall the nature, habits, manner of life and movements of the parents.

[599] Then, further, since there are extreme points, one after another \[on bodies, which are the least things we can see, likewise, too, there must be a least point\] on that body, which our senses can no longer descry; that point, we may be sure, exists without parts and is endowed with the least nature, nor was it ever sundered apart by itself nor can it so be hereafter, since it is itself but a part of another and that the first single part: then other like parts and again others in order in close array make up the nature of the first body, and since they cannot exist by themselves, it must needs be that they stay fast there whence they cannot by any means be torn away. The first-beginnings then are of solid singleness; for they are a close dense mass of least parts, never put together out of a union of those parts, but rather prevailing in everlasting singleness; from them nature, keeping safe the seeds of things, suffers not anything to be torn away, nor ever to be removed.

[615] Moreover, if there be not a least thing, all the tiniest bodies will be composed of infinite parts, since indeed the half of a half will always have a half, nor will anything set a limit. What difference then will there be between the sum of things and the least of things? There will be no difference; for however completely the whole sum be infinite, yet things that are tiniest will be composed of infinite parts just the same. And since true reasoning cries out against this, and denies that the mind can believe it, you must be vanquished and confess that there are those things which consist of no parts at all and are of the least nature. And since these exist, those first-beginnings too you must needs own are solid and everlasting.

[628] And again, if nature, the creatress, had been used to constrain all things to be dissolved into their least parts, then she could not again renew aught of them, for the reason that things which are not enlarged by any parts, have not those powers which must belong to creative matter, the diverse fastenings, weights, blows, meetings, movements, by which all things are carried on.

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I am becoming more convinced of the importance of following Epicurus' advice to Pythocles to "most of all give yourself up to the study of the beginnings and of infinity and of the things akin to them..."

As to infinity at the larger scale, it is the boundless size of the universe (and the amount of atoms and void) that makes possible the coming together of all that we see around us to come together, and this makes it possible for us to understand the creation of our worlds without divine intervention. Epicurus was reasoning that if the universe were not infinite in size but either atoms or void were infinite, then things would be tight-packed or would never come together in the first place.

As to infinity at the smaller scale, it is the fact that division is *not* boundless that forms the basis of confidence that the atoms are the transmission and regulation method by which the things that we see around us work in repeated patterns. Epicurus was reasoning that the minimum size of atoms is what makes it possible for the world to operate on a regular basis without divine supervision.

So in continuing to try to trace Epicurus' thinking, I think it's any obvious question to ask:

What did the Epicureans think to be the lower limit in size, and the upper limit in size, of an individual atom?

I think there are text references either in Herodotus or Lucretius or both about this which would be worthwhile to collect.

I seem to remember that the upper limit was considered to be either (1) large enough to be visible to us (none are), or (2) so large that a single atom would crowd out the rest of the universe. My memory is wrong there because that's a huge difference in size. I seem to remember (1) being said somewhere, but option (2) makes more logical sense. Maybe there's a way to relate both from different passages.

On the downside of size there is similar discussion. I seem to recall that it all comes back to the smallest size being deduced to be something like "large enough to perform its function of carrying on the eternal characteristics of size, shape, and weight."

Obviously here i am not looking for a discussion of modern scientific theory - that can be done somewhere else.

I am looking for what we can find out about this from the Epicurean texts, because pinning down how the Epicureans reasoned on this would likely give us some important insights into how Epicurus was thinking and developing his philosophy. I'd relate this right up there with "the nature of the gods" in importance, because it's the key to understanding how the universe operates *without* the direction of the gods.

Credit for this goes to Bryan for bring this to our attention:

PDF here: https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment…glass-cups-pdf/

Here is a link for the Roman glass reconstructions.

https://www.etsy.com/listing/1588603493/roman-beaker-with-scenes-of-horses-and?show_sold_out_detail=1&ref=nla_listing_details

This one has the name "Metrodoros"

https://www.etsy.com/listing/1573839522/roman-circus-beaker-showing-boxers-049a?show_sold_out_detail=1&ref=nla_listing_details

"(DIODORUS) defeats (POLYNEIKES), who is judged by an arbiter (the only clothed figure), depicted with his rod;

(ACHILLES) and DAMOCRATES box with their guards raised defensively;

(M)ETRODO(RUS) defeats (OLYMPIAC);

a victorious (PO)LYBICUS adjusts his victor's laurel crown;

IS(IDORUS) throws a punch at (FELIX).

The base section features four more laurel crowns alternating with crossed victory palms, which also appear over the tripod tables separating each half of the vessel."

Lastly, pictured below, the "LABE THN NEIKHN" cup translates as: 'Seize the Victory.' The design makes leaves out of the seams.

https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment/4984-img-4195-jpg/

one of the theories is that the ‘circus beakers’ were souvenirs that were produced inexpensively and could be purchased at or after games.

In contrast, the productions by the famous ancient glassworker Ennion seems to have been more highly valued.

(https://www.etsy.com/listing/157444…listing_details)

Ennion - Wikipedia

Twentier since you seem to have read into this, any comment on Joseph Campbell and his work? (I've heard of him but know virtually nothing.)

The method Diogenes Laertius used to divide the schools has always seemed to be difficult for a lot of people (including me) to follow. It would be good to assemble the reasoning to the extent possible and see what DL himself aligned with what, and what he considered fundamentally different. Clearly dogmatist vs skeptic is one huge division, but is "ethics" vs "dialectic" another, and if so what does that mean?

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But philosophy, the pursuit of wisdom, has had a twofold origin; it started with Anaximander on the one hand, with Pythagoras on the other. The former was a pupil of Thales, Pythagoras was taught by Pherecydes. The one school was called Ionian, because Thales, a Milesian and therefore an Ionian, instructed Anaximander; the other school was called Italian from Pythagoras, who worked for the most part in Italy. [14] And the one school, that of Ionia, terminates with Clitomachus and Chrysippus and Theophrastus, that of Italy with Epicurus. The succession passes from Thales through Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, to Socrates, who introduced ethics or moral philosophy; from Socrates to his pupils the Socratics, and especially to Plato, the founder of the Old Academy; from Plato, through Speusippus and Xenocrates, the succession passes to Polemo, Crantor, and Crates, Arcesilaus, founder of the Middle Academy, Lacydes,¹⁰ founder of the New Academy, Carneades, and Clitomachus. This line brings us to Clitomachus.

[15] There is another which ends with Chrysippus, that is to say by passing from Socrates to Antisthenes, then to Diogenes the Cynic, Crates of Thebes, Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Chrysippus. And yet again another ends with Theophrastus; thus from Plato it passes to Aristotle, and from Aristotle to Theophrastus. In this manner the school of Ionia comes to an end.

In the Italian school the order of succession is as follows: first Pherecydes, next Pythagoras, next his son Telauges, then Xenophanes, Parmenides,¹¹ Zeno of Elea, Leucippus, Democritus, who had many pupils, in particular Nausiphanes [and Naucydes], who were teachers of Epicurus.

[16] Philosophers may be divided into dogmatists and sceptics: all those who make assertions about things assuming that they can be known are dogmatists; while all who suspend their judgement on the ground that things are unknowable are sceptics. Again, some philosophers left writings behind them, while others wrote nothing at all, as was the case according to some authorities with Socrates, Stilpo, Philippus, Menedemus, Pyrrho, Theodorus, Carneades, Bryson; some add Pythagoras and Aristo of Chios, except that they wrote a few letters. Others wrote no more than one treatise each, as Melissus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras. Many works were written by Zeno, more by Xenophanes, more by Democritus, more by Aristotle, more by Epicurus, and still more by Chrysippus.

[17] Some schools took their name from cities, as the Elians and the Megarians, the Eretrians and the Cyrenaics; others from localities, as the Academics and the Stoics; others from incidental circumstances, as the Peripatetics; others again from derisive nicknames, as the Cynics; others from their temperaments, as the Eudaemonists or Happiness School; others from a conceit they entertained, as Truthlovers, Refutationists, and Reasoners from Analogy; others again from their teachers, as Socratics, Epicureans, and the like; some take the name of Physicists from their investigation of nature, others that of Moralists because they discuss morals; while those who are occupied with verbal jugglery are styled Dialecticians.

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18] Philosophy has three parts, physics, ethics, and dialectic or logic. Physics is the part concerned with the universe and all that it contains; ethics that concerned with life and all that has to do with us; while the processes of reasoning employed by both form the province of dialectic. Physics flourished down to the time of Archelaus; ethics, as we have said, started with Socrates; while dialectic goes as far back as Zeno of Elea. In ethics there have been ten schools: the Academic, the Cyrenaic, the Elian, the Megarian, the Cynic, the Eretrian, the Dialectic, the Peripatetic, the Stoic, and the Epicurean.

Quote from Don

"ἡ διαλεκτική (sc. τέχνη) dialectic, discussion by question and answer, invented by Zeno of Elea"

Thanks Bryan and Don! I'll correct calling Achilles an Athenian next week. So dialectic was invented by the Eleatics!? Very interesting! So I wonder to what extent, if any, are these paradoxes related to dialectic. So the proper characterization of Zeno is despoiler.or some similar synonym....

Chapter 10. EUCLIDES

[106] Euclides was a native of Megara on the Isthmus,¹or according to some of Gela, as Alexander states in his Successions of Philosophers. He applied himself to the writings of Parmenides, and his followers were called Megarians after him, then Eristics, and at a later date Dialecticians, that name having first been given to them by Dionysius of Chalcedon because they put their arguments into the form of question and answer. Hermodorus tells us that, after the death of Socrates, Plato and the rest of the philosophers came to him, being alarmed at the cruelty of the tyrants. He held the supreme good to be really one, though called by many names, sometimes wisdom, sometimes God, and again Mind, and so forth. But all that is contradictory of the good he used to reject, declaring that it had no existence.

[107] When he impugned a demonstration, it was not the premisses but the conclusion that he attacked. He rejected the argument from analogy, declaring that it must be taken either from similars or from dissimilars. If it were drawn from similars, it is with these and not with their analogies that their arguments should deal; if from dissimilars, it is gratuitous to set them side by side. Hence Timon says of him, with a side hit at the other Socratics as well²:

But I care not for these babblers, nor for anyone besides, not for Phaedo whoever he be, nor wrangling Euclides, who inspired the Megarians with a frenzied love of controversy.

Lucretius Today Episode 244 is now available: "Zeno's Paradoxes: Profundity Or Gaslighting?" Transcript is available here. As always with these transcripts, remember that this is AI generated and may contain major errors or differences from the recorded version. If you come across something significant we'll appreciate it if you let us know and we will correct it.

Don -- Some of these old hymns seem to be sung in "unrecognizable" ways nowadays. Do you have a youtube link to the version of the tune you're thinking of?

Erik - Sorry that you missed us tonight. Please respond to your Welcome message and we will get you set up to attend soon! thanks

Erik can you let us know the basis of your interest since you are brand new? we try to avoid Zoom bombing so please identify yourself first.

In addition to whatever comments follow, for those of us who can be with us tonight in our "First Monday" meeting, I suggest we consider this a topic of discussion,

I started this thread and subforum to point to David Furley's book in part because it is useful in discussion of Zeno's paradoxes. There is much more in the book for those who have time to investigate.

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“With Epicurus, the position may have been much simpler [than Aristotle]. His [Epicurus’] view was that the real world of atoms and void was composed of minima. Any account of the basic structure of the world therefore must consist of counting the minima: there is nothing more to it.

What we should expect, therefore, a priori, is that Epicurus would regard geometry as irrelevant to the study of nature, because one of its essential principles (that of infinite divisibility) was contrary to the facts of nature.

There is little evidence for Epicurus’ views about geometry, but such as it is it exactly confirms this expectation. Sextus, at the beginning of his Adversus Mathematicos, reports that the Epicureans regarded the matlzemata (a class of subjects to be learnt which included geometry) as “contributing nothing to the perfection of wisdom.”

Proclus, in his Commentary on Euclid (Friedlein, p. 199), divides the critics of geometry into two classes: those who object to its principles, and those who complain that its theorems do not follow from the principles as given. The former class is divided into those who criticize the principles of knowledge in general (the Sceptics), and those who criticize the principles of geometry alone (the Epicureans).

The Epicurean theory of minimal parts, if it has been correctly described in this essay, was a typical piece of Epicurean philosophy. We might say that Epicurus was confronted with a choice between infinite divisibility and minimal parts. He thought he saw that the former alternative would lead him into positions inconsistent with experience: for instance, it would be necessary for a man to be able to “reach infinity in thought,” and this was contrary to experience.

There was no counter-evidence against the existence of minimal parts in nature; the analogy of the senses suggested that there was a minimum; so he opted for this alternative, and doggedly worked out the details, in so far as he thought it necessary. But he made no attempt, apparently, to work out a fully systematic mathematical theory to support his physics. On his own premises, there was no reason why he should. His purpose was to teach peace of mind.”

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Quote from Robert

I can see some possible objections. An Epicurean might not use the phrase "becoming more fully human," and "God" here is presumably the Christian version (though perhaps perfect and incorruptible, as an Epicurean deity should be). Still, the idea seems to be that we humans can reach a divine state through a practice of mindful living, as opposed to traveling after death to some mysterious region outside of physics and nature.

i see your point Robert and think you're on the right track. Certainly the embrace of focusing on living now and denying christian distinctions between body and soul ring true to Epicurus.

And as you say the problem would be in the connotations of how "god" is used there, and "saving" life, and becoming "more fully human."

And last but not least, it's always a major red flag in my book when a formulation completely fails to use the word "pleasure." There are lots of people who have lots of good ideas on lots of things, but in my view probably the core trait of something being "Epicurean" is that it is willing to stand up and say straightforwardly that it is the "pleasure" of living that makes life worth living. It can sound like a word game sometime to insist on the word "pleasure," but anyone whose not willing to go all the way to the use of that term, in defiance of all the normal prejudice and peer pressure against it, isn't really in sync with Epicurus. Being willing and unafraid to stand up for "Pleasure," as in Emily Austin's book title "Living for Pleasure," is to me one of the best possible litmus tests to apply.

And sadly this is where a lot of the "atheist" literature out there fails so badly. The "Good without God" approach accepts the Platonic and other premise that there is a "good" other than "pleasure," and in the end that philosophical debate is the real battleground.

Don:

This question cries out for your discussion on the meaning of bread and water, but I am not sure where to point him. Do you happen to know the best place for your longest discussion of it?

Epicurean Philosophy | When Epicurus said that you could live on bread and water, with an occasional treat of some cheese, I presume the bread was more nutritious than today... | Facebook

When Epicurus said that you could live on bread and water, with an occasional treat of some cheese, I presume the bread was more nutritious than today’s but…

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John Bramwell
When Epicurus said that you could live on bread and water, with an occasional treat of some cheese, I presume the bread was more nutritious than today’s but have never given it much thought. I know Epicurus had the occasional drop of wine but was his diet that frugal?

It seems to me that a point I would stress is that we are not "saving reality" by finding mathematical solutions to Zeno's paradoxes.

We're "saving mathematics" (or maybe more specifically, a form of propositional logic) by finding answers, but in the end, what we care about is living life happily, not saving mathematics or propositional logic.

People are harmed if they waste their lives in uncertainty and doubt, taken in by argument that motion is impossible and their senses cannot be trusted. Further, the good reputation of philosophy is harmed when people take these arguments seriously without immediately pointing out the ultimate validity of the senses.

The point to be emphasized is the one made by Seneca about mice and cheese and syllables. Word games can be fine if they are played for fun, or for sharpening our skills with words, but word games are not what life is about, and word games are not beneficial when they start interfering with life rather than enhancing it.

Norton says in the article that we can choose to take a "kinder" view of what Parmenides and Zeno were doing, but I see no reason to be so charitable from the information we have to go on. Much more likely is that they were not massively deluded OR in the grip of a mad fantasy, but testing out ways to gaslight people into doubting the validity of their senses, a path many others have followed.

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It is hard to believe that Parmenides and Zeno really believed that motion is impossible. The evidence of our senses is powerful, unrelenting and, I believe, irrefutable. Someone who genuinely believes that all change in illusion would seem to be massively deluded and in the grip of a mad fantasy.

We can cast a kinder light on Parmenides and Zeno's project if we understand them not to be challenging change, but to be challenging the accounts we give of it. Can we really reason reliably about motion using the concepts we have? We think we can. Zeno says otherwise. Look at them more closely and you will find them to be an internal mess.

The UC Davis article is very helpful. We don't need it for this episode, but at some point we will want to clarify what the writer is asserting in the part i underlined below.

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The totality is said to be unlimited. The argument is that a limitation of the totality would require that it have an end-point or extreme. An end-point can exist only as the beginning of something else. But there is nothing other than the totality (as had already been established), so the totality has no extreme and consequently is unlimited. This lack of limitation applies both to bodies and the void. If the void were limited and bodies were unlimited (in number), there would be no place for all the bodies. On the other hand, if the bodies were limited and the void unlimited, there would be so much space available for bodies that they would not meet with one another to form anything stable, but instead move in a scattered fashion throughout the universe. Note that once again, appeal must be made to sense-perception for the datum that that there are stable bodies which are not in motion (a claim that modern science has since overthrown). This view flies against that of Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle. In particular, Aristotle believe that the totality of bodies can be limited by something which is not itself body and which lies outside the cosmos, namely the prime mover (Physics, VIII, 10), which he identified with God (Metaphysics XII, 7).

This also to me appears to be a typo:

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Fate

We are told by Cicero that Epicurus introduced the swerve to solve a problem only directly related to that of the motion of bodies: "the necessity of fate" (On Fate, 22). Lucretius describes the reasoning involved

Presumably that should be INdirectly (?)

And the Pittsburgh site is great -- opens with a full characterization of the absurdity of it all!

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Yes, paradoxes can be intellectually demoralizing—almost a type of brain-clearing trick

I should be clear that for those who like them they are fine. I've been known to like math puzzles myself and I recall when I was very young there was something about "magic squares" (I forget) that I was into doing for a while. But the majority of people aren't into those kind of games, and it's a total turnoff to make them think that they should be, and it seems to me that that's what I've witnessed a lot in philosophy over the years (at least in college) - it seemed to me it was being used as a game for the amusement of insiders to confuse and put off the outsiders, rather than for the help to everyone that it should be.

One more comment on Zeno for tonight; Most of the youtube videos seem fixated on explaining the math, and "solving the math problem," as if "saving mathematics" is what is important about the exercise.

To me, that totally misses the point. The point is that Zeno was using math to make normal people doubt the validity of their senses, to try to persuade them to think that "everything is one" and that "void cannot exist" and the motion and change are impossible.

These would be very damaging to human happiness if accepted. And even more damaging to happiness is that they persuade people to think that philosophy is impractical and in fact nonsensical. The truth is, as in Seneca's quote, that people do need philosophy, and they need the kind of philosophy that Epicurus was offering, but people who are made jaded and cynical by being told that "Zeno's paradox" is profound philosophy are going to check out before they finish their first philosophy class. And it's my view that people need to realize that that kind of "turn off" reaction is exactly what was expected and hoped for by Zeno (and his variants after him). They want people to give up looking for a true philosophy that they can understand, and default to give THEM the sole claim to philosophy and wisdom and the right to define was is moral what is desirable in life.

That's why it's important to deal with Zeno's paradoxes and to give them the treatment they deserve. It's a shame they don't seem to be listed specifically in the list given by Diogenes Laertius. I wonder if we should not consider the Eleatics to be under the umbrella of the "Logicians" in this passage. "Destroyers" also makes sense to me as a good term - at least as a start! Or maybe they were related more to Antidorus and deserve the title "Maniac." The two adjectives together seem to me most appropriate.

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"Heraclitus he called ‘The Muddler,’ Democritus [he called] Lerocritus (‘judge of nonsense’), Antidorus he called Sannidorus (‘Maniac’), the Cynics [he called] ‘Enemies of Hellas,’ the Logicians [he called] ‘The destroyers,’ and Pyrrho [he called] ‘The uneducated fool.’"

I went looking for a youtube video that reflected what I think is the proper attitude to take toward Zeno's "paradoxes" (I think the proper attitude is contempt without finding something suitable. However here's one where Meg Ryan illustrates the stupidity of it:

And here is one that, but giving some very good quotes from the people who came up with this, does a good job of setting the table:

Unfortunately, after setting the table by showing the quotes which make clear what kind of nonsense the Eleatics were after, it drops the ball and leaves things hanging.

Here's Joe Rogan giving a look of astonishment at the suggestions. I don't know who he's talking to but I see this as the attitude that anyone of common sense would have toward hearing this kind of thing stated: He says something like "maybe we should stop listening to these people."

After listening to the descriptions of these paradoxes I see these as very close to the ontological arguments for god. "Because in my mind I can imagine a god of infinite power, such a god must exist," IS VERY SIMILAR TO: "Because I can in my mind imagine that there are an infinite number of points between two other points, it must be impossible to count them all or walk across a room." To me this is very similar nonsense. Both should be rejected out of hand and considered nonsense on the ground that the reality perceived through the senses always trumps the allegations of "logic constructed by the mind" when that logic cannot ultimately be traced back to something that can be verified through the senses. Neither the purely mental contention that all-powerful beings exist nor the purely mental contention that all distances can be infinitely divided have any connection to the reality that we perceive through our senses, and both should be rejected as absurd without any more consideration than would be given to the person who asserts that all knowledge is impossible, or who asserts a totally deterministic view of human nature.

That's where Isaac Asimov's criticism of Socrates comes into play as well, and I think it applies to Zeno of Elea as well, of whom I feel also "sick and tired":

Quote from Isaac Asimov "The Relativity of Wrong"

First, let me dispose of Socrates because I am sick and tired of this pretense that knowing you know nothing is a mark of wisdom. No one knows nothing. In a matter of days, babies learn to recognize their mothers. Socrates would agree, of course, and explain that knowledge of trivia is not what he means. He means that in the great abstractions over which human beings debate, one should start without preconceived, unexamined notions, and that he alone knew this. (What an enormously arrogant claim!) In his discussions of such matters as "What is justice?" or "What is virtue?" he took the attitude that he knew nothing and had to be instructed by others. (This is called "Socratic irony," for Socrates knew very well that he knew a great deal more than the poor souls he was picking on.) By pretending ignorance, Socrates lured others into propounding their views on such abstractions. Socrates then, by a series of ignorant-sounding questions, forced the others into such a mélange of self-contradictions that they would finally break down and admit they didn't know what they were talking about. It is the mark of the marvelous toleration of the Athenians that they let this continue for decades and that it wasn't till Socrates turned seventy that they broke down and forced him to drink poison.

But my attitude is best expressed in the quote from Seneca, where I think he's channeling Epicurus rather than his Stoic friends.

Quote from (Seneca’s Letters – Book II Letter XLVIII)

And on this point, my excellent Lucilius, I should like to have those subtle dialecticians of yours advise me how I ought to help a friend, or how a fellowman, rather than tell me in how many ways the word “friend” is used, and how many meanings the word “man” possesses. Lo, Wisdom and Folly are taking opposite sides. Which shall I join? Which party would you have me follow? On that side, “man” is the equivalent of “friend”; on the other side, “friend” is not the equivalent of “man.” The one wants a friend for his own advantage; the other wants to make himself an advantage to his friend. What you have to offer me is nothing but distortion of words and splitting of syllables. It is clear that unless I can devise some very tricky premises and by false deductions tack on to them a fallacy which springs from the truth, I shall not be able to distinguish between what is desirable and what is to be avoided! I am ashamed! Old men as we are, dealing with a problem so serious, we make play of it! ‘Mouse’ is a syllable. Now a mouse eats its cheese; therefore, a syllable eats cheese.”

Suppose now that I cannot solve this problem; see what peril hangs over my head as a result of such ignorance! What a scrape I shall be in! Without doubt I must beware, or some day I shall be catching syllables in a mousetrap, or, if I grow careless, a book may devour my cheese! Unless, perhaps, the following syllogism is shrewder still: “‘Mouse’ is a syllable. Now a syllable does not eat cheese. Therefore a mouse does not eat cheese.” What childish nonsense! Do we knit our brows over this sort of problem? Do we let our beards grow long for this reason? Is this the matter which we teach with sour and pale faces?

Would you really know what philosophy offers to humanity? Philosophy offers counsel. Death calls away one man, and poverty chafes another; a third is worried either by his neighbor’s wealth or by his own. So-and-so is afraid of bad luck; another desires to get away from his own good fortune. Some are ill-treated by men, others by the gods. Why, then, do you frame for me such games as these? It is no occasion for jest; you are retained as counsel for unhappy men, sick and the needy, and those whose heads are under the poised axe. Whither are you straying? What are you doing? This friend, in whose company you are jesting, is in fear. Help him, and take the noose from about his neck. Men are stretching out imploring hands to you on all sides; lives ruined and in danger of ruin are begging for some assistance; men’s hopes, men’s resources, depend upon you. They ask that you deliver them from all their restlessness, that you reveal to them, scattered and wandering as they are, the clear light of truth. Tell them what nature has made necessary, and what superfluous; tell them how simple are the laws that she has laid down, how pleasant and unimpeded life is for those who follow these laws, but how bitter and perplexed it is for those who have put their trust in opinion rather than in nature.

Over the years I have heard repeated references to Victor Stenger as a physicist whose views are among those which some find most closely supportive of atomism and other aspects of Epicurean philosophy. I see we have an article here already by Godfrey which I will move into this section.

Unfortunately I have never found time to read him myself, but I hope to correct that oversight. For that reason, I don't know if he ever specifically commented on his general approval or disapproval of Epicurus except in regard to basic atomism.

Until I'm able to comment further, i've set up this subforum to expand on Godfrey's earlier observations and allow people a place to make more specific comments.

Here is a good biography of Stenger written on Skeptic.com after his death. Here's his Wikipedia entry.

I see that some Stenger resources are no longer available on the web, but a version on Archive.org exists at this link. These articles include:

Quote

Quantum Time Travel. Reality Check column in Skeptical Briefs Vol. 10, No. 2, June 2000, showing why the Time Travel Causal Paradox ("Grandfater's Paradox") does not apply for pure quantum states, thus allowing time to be reversible at the quantum level.

If you want to read a Short Primer on Quantum Mechanics  go here.

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Papers, Talks and Preprints:

• The Mystical World of Quantum Mechanics Essay that appeared in The Times Higher Educaton Supplement January 5, 2001, p. 20. OK to distribute, with credit.
• "Quantum Quackery." This article appeared in Skeptical Inquirer Vol. 21. No. 1, January/February 1997, p. 37. It was based on an invited talk at the World Skeptics Congress in Buffalo in June, 1996. Link to article on CSICOP web site
• A video of talk on "Quantum Quackery" given at Cal Tech in June, 1996 is available from The Skeptics Society.
• "Quantum Metaphysics." Talk given at the Westminster College, Oxford Conference on the Modern Spiritualities, March 1995. Appearing in "Modern Spiritualities," Prometheus Books1996. Also published in The Scientific Review of Alternative Medicine 1(1), 26-30, 1997.
• "Mystical Physics." Paper published in Free Inquiry 16(3)1996. PDF.
• "Myth of Quantum Consciousness." Paper published in The Humanist, Vol. 53(3), May/June 1993. pp. 13-15. PDF file of paper.

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Book Reviews by V. Stenger:

• "The Dreams that Stuff is Made Of." Review of Dreams of a Final Theory by Steven Weinberg. Published in Free Inquiry 13(3) Summer 1994, p. 59. Text file of review.
• Review of Cranks, Quarks and the Cosmos by Jeremy Bernstein. Published in Physics Today, August 1993. Text file of review.

We can use this thread to make general comments, but those who are more familiar with specific aspects of his work than I am are encourage to start independent threads with titles that reflect the subject.

Also, if anyone runs across any earlier threads on Stenger that need to be moved here, please let me know.