Posts by Cassius

This topic has already been referenced in the link below, but we can use this thread for the more specific tracking down of the question.

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RE: Lucretius' Appearance - Research into What He Looked Like

Here's another cameo in plaster that is supposed to be Lucretius.

epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment/3376/

c. 1820, Pietro Paoletti

As for Munro's ring, I have now traced its history for a period of more than 50 years. I will present my findings tomorrow evening

Joshua

January 24, 2023 at 5:52 PM

Yes every person probably needs a different percentage, depending on their background. As a general expectation, however, I doubt that much progress in the understanding of the ethics can occur without dealing with the canonics. And since the issue of "gods" is generally treated under physics/canonics, that another reason not to underestimate their importance.

I agree with Don's post and analogize to pattern recognition, and also suggest that we can go further based on other citations.

In addition to the Centaur analogy, but I am convinced we also have to take into account what Lucretius said in Book 5 as to why the gods could not have created the universe:

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[181] Further, how was there first implanted in the gods a pattern for the begetting of things, yea, and the concept of man, so that they might know and see in their mind what they wished to do, or in what way was the power of the first-beginnings ever learnt, or what they could do when they shifted their order one with the other, if nature did not herself give a model of creation? For so many first-beginnings of things in many ways, driven on by blows from time everlasting until now, and moved by their own weight, have been wont to be borne on, and to unite in every way, and essay everything that they might create, meeting one with another, that it is no wonder if they have fallen also into such arrangements, and have passed into such movements, as those whereby this present sum of things is carried on, ever and again replenished.

Seems to me that Lucretius is arguing that the gods could not have created the universe because (if they pre-existed the universe) then they would never have been exposed to any "pattern" that gave them the idea of a universe.

And that sounds like a very good argument to me that remains valid today.

Carrying the point forward, where do these "patterns" come from? It isn't sufficient to say that they are "etched" into us at birth, or for us to just say that this is precursor to genetic encoding and that that answers our concerns. How did that "etching" come about? Did the gods etch us, as the Stoics would probably argue? Or did it just "randomly" happen, which I think is equally untenable?

It looks to me like Epicurus would have said that in an eternal universe, nothing can be said to come absolutely "first." Instead, what has always eternally been happening is the flow of atoms through void.

From that perspective the sequence would be more like:

Atoms have always flowed through void naturally, combining into bodies, from which emergent properties and qualities have arisen. There was never a "first body."

As bodies grow they give off from their surfaces flows of atoms, which flows are in the shape of their surfaces. These flows of atoms in the shape of their surfaces are images.

The images are constantly flowing through the universe, some images combining with each other in ways that do not reflect their true origins (such as images of centaurs). Other images largely or fully retain fidelity to their original source, and thereby conveying to us sensations of concrete objects which we can be confident have independent existence external to us.

The atoms have always combined into bodies, and so this flow of images has also always existed. Simultaneously, along with these filmy flows, more solid bodies have combined into living beings. These living beings have thus always been exposed to the flows of images. Over time, individual species of living beings develop, as a result of their continued impact with flows of atoms, an ability to think, and over time the repeated exposure to light and dark and eventually trees and stars become exposure to trees and universes and more abstract relationships, one of which abstract relationships becomes identified as "divinity."

So to say simply that "prolepsis is the faculty that allows us to recognize the shapes or forms of the images that strike us" (which is pretty close to saying that it is "pattern recognition") is helpful. But the rest of the story seems to me how they are tied to the flow of images, which arise from the atoms themselves turning into bodies and in turn giving off images, thus eliminating any concern about divine origin of the whole process from start to finish. The "flow of images" would explain both the origin of the proleptic faculty and how it sharpens over time.

And it seems to me that "flows of images" remains a valid way to look at the situation, even though we don't think exactly in those terms today. We don't talk about "atoms" in quite the same way either, but the word continues to be useful, and the word "images" can be useful too if we are careful about what it means.

As we get close to recording I definitely want to be sure we go over citations as to what the Epicureans meant by "true" or "real." Including what Bryan just quoted, several are:

Diogenes Laertius [31] Logic they reject as misleading. For they say it is sufficient for physicists to be guided by what things say of themselves. Thus in The Canon Epicurus says that the tests of truth are the sensations and concepts and the feelings; the Epicureans add to these the intuitive apprehensions of the mind. And this he says himself too in the summary addressed to Herodotus and in the Principal Doctrines. For, he says, all sensation is irrational and does not admit of memory; for it is not set in motion by itself, nor when it is set in motion by something else, can it add to it or take from it. [32] Nor is there anything which can refute the sensations. For a similar sensation cannot refute a similar because it is equivalent in validity, nor a dissimilar a dissimilar, for the objects of which they are the criteria are not the same; nor again can reason, for all reason is dependent upon sensations; nor can one sensation refute another, for we attend to them all alike. Again, the fact of apperception confirms the truth of the sensations. And seeing and hearing are as much facts as feeling pain. From this it follows that as regards the imperceptible we must draw inferences from phenomena. For all thoughts have their origin in sensations by means of coincidence and analogy and similarity and combination, reasoning too contributing something. And the visions of the insane and those in dreams are true, for they cause movement, and that which does not exist cannot cause movement.

U244

Sextus Empiricus, _Against the Logicians_ II (_Against the Dogmatists,_ II).9: Epicurus said that all sensibles were true and real. For there is no difference between saying that something is true and that it is real. And that is why, in giving a formalization of the true and the _false_, he says, “that which is such as it is said to be, is true” and “that which is not such as it is said to be, is false.”

Letter to Herodotus [51]: For the similarity between the things which exist, which we call real, and the images received as a likeness of things and produced either in sleep or through some other acts of apprehension on the part of the mind or the other instruments of judgment, could never be, unless there were some effluences of this nature actually brought into contact with our senses. And error would not exist unless another kind of movement too were produced inside ourselves, closely linked to the apprehension of images, but differing from it; and it is owing to this, supposing it is not confirmed, or is contradicted, that falsehood arises; but if it is confirmed or not contradicted, it is true.

Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, I.7.22: Turn next to the second division of philosophy, the department of Method and of Dialectic, which its termed Logikē. Of the whole armor of Logic your founder, as it seems to me, is absolutely destitute. He does away with Definition; he has no doctrine of Division or Partition; he gives no rules for Deduction or Syllogistic Inference, and imparts no method for resolving Dilemmas or for detecting Fallacies of Equivocation. The Criteria of reality he places in sensation; once let the senses accept as true something that is false, and every possible criterion of truth and falsehood seems to him to be immediately destroyed. {lacuna} He lays the very greatest stress upon that which, as he declares, Nature herself decrees and sanctions, that is: the feelings of pleasure and pain. These he maintains lie at the root of every act of choice and of avoidance.

U247 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, I (Against the Dogmatists, I) 203: Epicurus says that there are two things which are linked to each other, presentation and opinion, and that of these presentation (which he also calls 'clear fact') is always true. For just as the primary feelings, i.e., pleasure and pain, come to be from certain productive factors and in accordance with productive factors themselves (for example, pleasure comes to be from pleasant things and pain from painful things, and what causes pleasure can never fail to be pleasant, nor can what produces pain not be painful; but rather, it is necessary that what gives pleasure should be pleasant and that what gives pain should, in its nature, be painful), likewise, in the case of presentations, which are feelings within us, what causes each of them is presented in every respect and unqualifiedly, and since it is presented it cannot help but exist in truth just as it is presented […lacuna…] that it is productive of presentation. And one must reason similarly for the individual senses. For what is visible not only is presented as visible but also is such as it is presented; and what is audible is not only presented as audible, but also is like that in truth; and similarly for the rest. Therefore, it turns out that all presentations are true. And reasonably so. For if, the Epicureans say, a presentation is true if it comes from an existing object and in accordance with the existing object, and if every presentation arises from the object presented and in accordance with the presented object itself, then necessarily every presentation is true.

Peter Konstans very helpfully collected some cites for us on this point here:

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RE: Pros and Cons Of Considering Epicurean Philosophy To Be A "Religion"

I recommend reading the academic book

Pleasure, Mind, and Soul, Selected Papers in Ancient Philosophy by C. C. W. Taylor

The second chapter examines the Epicurean thesis that all perceptions are true, arguing that what it means is that every instance of sensory presentation (widely construed, to include dreams, hallucinations, and imagination as well as perception proper) consists in the stimulation of a sense-organ by a real object, which is represented in that perception exactly as it is in…

Peter Konstans

March 25, 2024 at 4:13 AM

Quote from Julia

I agree. It might be worthwhile shifting more activity towards building/growing the wiki and other more organised knowledge bases. I already got in trouble for how much time I spent on some forum posts, so I doubt I'll be editing much myself, but I think that would be the way to go

Yes further Wiki / knowledge base development is where I plan to spend much of my time. But you should *never* consider yourself "in trouble" for lengthy contributions! They are welcome and needed, no matter how long they are! We really need more "articles" here that address things in longer form, and we can feature them accordingly so people won't treat them in the same way as they treat the ongoing "discussions." You and everyone are invited to contribute things like that! Currently our "Articles" section is really sparse, and that needs to change. We've had some good material in the past, such as Elayne's "On Pleasure, Pain, And Happiness," and we need more of it.

Related to this is the question of priorities. Lately I've devoted a lot of time to discussing Prolepsis and other detailed aspects of the gods issue. Those are enjoyable to me and are helping to fill in some gaps that need filling, but at the same time, the overall goal of the forum is more oriented to providing understandable and persuasive explanations of the "core issues" (such as the full list of 11 that are currently featured on the front page of the forum) which are of more interest to and needed by the vastly larger number of people.

I would like us to always try to steer our activities so that we always keep that in mind, not only because it helps us meet new people and expand our circles of friendships, which Epicurus emphasized, but also because it helps us focus on issues where we either do or should agree, rather on details where we are inevitably left to speculation and therefore less unanimity of opinion.

There's obviously also a lot of turnover among are participants - the majority of people drop by and stay for a relatively short while and then fade away. it's much more important for us to identify and focus on the clear core issues that have "staying power" - and that keep people coming back - than it is to blaze new trails on relatively obscure issues.

Our biggest challenge is to develop ongoing activities and interactions that lead to greater sense of community so that the effort as a whole can have the kind of staying power that is needed.

Quote from Remus

This confirms, once again, that everything sounds better with a posh English accent.

I very much agree with Remus - I feel exactly that way myself.

However Kalosyni's post reminds me of something I started to post this morning but held back. Now I'll go ahead:

The seductiveness of the posh English accent is not without its problems, and I actually prefer a strong "neutral" "midwestern" or other accents to the Academic English style in many cases.

I am exaggerating here, but the posh English approach scares me when I think about how they can read "Tea and crumpets at Two is Delicious" with exactly the same poshness and diffidence and tone of voice as when the read: "So great is the power of religion to prompt men to evil deeds."

However I see it perfectly suited to Cicero and Plato and even Aristotle!

Done and thanks Joshua! We can eventually delete posts 4 and 5 from this thread....

As usual, lots of caution, but this is an interesting recent article on one particular target of interest:

James Webb detects signs of life on exoplanet K2-18b

Webb Telescope's study on K2-18b reveals potential but inconclusive signs of extraterrestrial life; advanced technology needed for certainty.

www.earth.com

Lots of good photos here:

Webb Image Release- Webb Space Telescope GSFC/NASA

The Latest NASA Released Webb Image is featured on this page. The James Webb Space Telescope's revolutionary technology will study every phase of cosmic…

webb.nasa.gov

I can't determine when this went online but it looks very recent.

Well done in how it provides both closed caption and an on-line outline of the topic being discussed.

And interesting graphics too --

Very well done and thanks Julia for making us aware of this!

Lining the two sources up like that is a reminder of DeWitt's view that the reference to "the Epicureans generally" adding a fourth criteria was arguably a mistake. The way you've translated that "focus of the mind" reference would appear to indicate that there's no reason to split the term into two, and that it's best to think of there being only three categories, with the third being something like "the faculty that is involved in the focusing of the mind" as what Epicurus originally set forth.

Quote from Bryan

I agree, Godfrey. Also, of course, given the word "conception" is appropriate here is itself an indication that this is an idea and is past the point of preconception.

Great way to state it Bryan!

Quote from Bryan

"Before they see their first example" is too early to have an anticipation, as the anticipations are a sense just like the others. We cannot see anything until we have something to look a

And that's a great clarification too. It's not like an innate idea of numbers is encoded at birth, what we're searching for is a description of a mechanism that swings into action as soon as it is exposed to ________, just like the eyes swing into action when they open and are exposed to light.

Very good video! And while we're still searching for ways to say it precisely, I'd have to say that Yes "prolepsis is involved with numbers - and it seems to involve something "inmate" as in the example of the babies used in the video.

Before they have seen the first example of a difference in quantity, they have some kind of "etching" that tells them that difference in quantity is significant to them.

And I think that "before they have seen the first example" is where we need to focus as we try to describe a faculty of prolepsis. Not on how it gets more accurate with practice, but how and why it is there in the first place, just like pleasure and pain and the other faculties are also there at birth. Focusing on adults forming conceptions of oxes after seeing more and more of them is not the place to look.

I think this video illustrates the best way forward is to look again at babies, just like with pleasure and pain, at a time period when Nature is fully in control and there is no possiblity of corruption through mistaken opinion.

So just for clarification, I have set up a "conversation" with those who volunteer to help with Quiz creation, and we'll use that conversation thread to tell each other about updates and discuss the details of the quiz questions. It would probably undercut the "fun" if we posted each comment and thereby gave away all the questions and answers before they were used more publicly.

So we'll continue to take in this thread discussion of those who wish to volunteer in the project, but the thread won't expand on a day to day basis as we will move that part to a private discussion. If you wish to add yourself to the conversation list and participate in updating the list, just post here and we'll add you to the conversation.

1 - Great research work Bryan - thank you!

2 - (This is a poorly-thought-out comment but I will make it anyway) Consistent with that research and other things that we've discussed, it seems to me that LR's suggestion here:

Quote from Little Rocker

Would that mean something like, the gods' properties of being 'immortal and indestructible' are definitional, but that the gods having the property of 'living being' is one of τὰ Συμβεβηκότα?

... might be plausible as I can see "being a living being" as being more important than "deathlessness." We could not conceive of a god not being a "living being," but we could conceive of particular a god voluntarily giving up its immortality, because a particular god might choose for some reason to stop acting to maintain its deathlessness. Is it not possible to imagine that a god too might choose to leave the theatre when for some reason (hard to describe) the play ceased to please it? At the very least, it would not make sense to deprive a god of the free will to make such a decision.

Edit - My eyes have trouble following the Greek so I'll just refer to separable and inseparable. So to restate what I wrote, I can see "being a living being" as being inseparable from godhood. If you aren't living you can't be a god. But I can see "incorruptibility' as being separable from godhood, because I can imagine a god choosing to exit the theatre, and actually I can't imagine depriving a god of such a power. I find it conceivable to say that a god who chose to exit the theatre was still, while he existed, a god, and I can't imagine "trapping" a god into a situation where he could not choose to stop existing.

Oh that's great and we will very much appreciate your help! Let me set up a shared document that we can all work on together, and I will send a link by "conversation" to you and anyone else who is willing to help.

This episode is now on Youtube:

As another relevant analogy, we see Torquatus in On Ends arguing that Epicurus establishes the foundations of friendship, and implicitly justice, far more soundly by basing it on pleasure than do those who invoke fictional views of justice as established by gods or "Natural Law." Diogenes of Oinoanda makes much the same argument.

Torquatus:

[70] Men are found to say that there is a certain treaty of alliance which binds wise men not to esteem their friends less than they do themselves. Such alliance we not only understand to be possible, but often see it realized, and it is plain that nothing can be found more conducive to pleasantness of life than union of this kind. From all these different views we may conclude that not only are the principles of friendship left unconstrained, if the supreme good be made to reside in pleasure, but that without this view it is entirely impossible to discover a basis for friendship.

I think Epicurus blows to pieces any concept of "universal" rights that is alleged go be based on or protected by a god of Nature in a Stoic kind of way

But replacing it is the acknowledgement that humans by nature experience pleasure and pain as motivations, and where pain is inflicted one can expect pushback. Sometimes we will choose pain and deal with the pushback, but Epicurus leads to acknowledgment that the results are up to us. If we want certain rights (and we do) then it is up to us to act to obtain and keep them.

That's a much more realistic way of looking at things, and since it more consistent with reality it's very arguably more effective.

In regard to Don's notable beard, this is why I prefer how the 1743 edition translates Lucretius' "eventum" as "event" rather than accident.

Yes the philosophers seem to prefer to use the word, "accident," but in English parlance "accident" implies "fortuitousness" or "chance" in a way that should not be presumed.

It would probably raise the eyebrows of the normal person to think that it is an "accident" that Don has a beard worthy of Epicurus. It's much more appropriate to say that Don's beard is an "event" of Don's life, which conveys that it is an event that has occurred after much deliberate thought, rather than as an "accident" that Don lost his access to his razors through no input of his own.

Yes it is true that Don's beard could be removed from him without Don losing his identity, and that's what makes his beard an "event." But Don's beard surely should not be thought of to arise "by accident" any more than other emergent properties of bodies arise by "accident." Indeed, it's exactly the point of Epicurean physics - that emergent properties do not arise by the intention of gods, but neither do they arise "randomly" or by "chance" or "accident." Most things in the universe arise from the "laws of nature" that arise repeatedly, reliably, and predictably from the movement of the atoms through the void.

For those who find this topic interesting, we explored it further with the Latin from Lucretius in this thread:

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RE: Time in Epicurus, Lucretius, and Aristotle

[…]

Yes that is exactly the point.

In the mechanical aspects of the universe, things are not "accidental/fortuitous" in the sense that the exact same combinations of the same atoms in the same way at the same places will accidentally/fortuitously produce different results - they produce repeatable and reliable results, and that is why we see the regularity in the universe. The word "accident" can imply that the result could be otherwise for unknowable factors, and I would say that that is why…

Cassius

September 6, 2023 at 9:42 AM

Strangely to me, I don't recall that DeWitt makes much reference to comparing "we cannot be born twice" to the "born again" statements of Christianity.

Is being "born again" an obvious question that arises to everyone everywhere? I wonder what the probabilities are that the Epicureans were known for this "can't be born twice" and that that infuenced the use of the analogy.

As for me, if I were an early Christian talking about miraculous salvation, my wishful thinking would focus on "never dying" or "staying young" but remaining at least a young adult. Even if I were a miracle worker I don't think I'd consider being literally "born again" to be particularly appealing, so I doubt I would have normally thought to talk in those terms.

Maybe Dewitt or others argue this somewhere and I am not aware of it.

John 3:1-21

3 Now there was a man of the Pharisees named Nicodemus, a ruler of the Jews. ² This man came to Jesus^[a] by night and said to him, “Rabbi, we know that you are a teacher come from God, for no one can do these signs that you do unless God is with him.” ³ Jesus answered him, “Truly, truly, I say to you, unless one is born again^[b] ” he cannot see the kingdom of God. ⁴ Nicodemus said to him, “How can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter a second time into his mother's womb and be born?” ⁵ Jesus answered, “Truly, truly, I say to you, unless one is born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God. ⁶ That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.^{[c] 7} Do not marvel that I said to you, ‘You^[d] must be born again.’ ⁸ The wind^[e] blows where it wishes, and you hear its sound, but you do not know where it comes from or where it goes. So it is with everyone who is born of the Spirit.”