Posts by Cassius

So that others can more easily profit from the example in the future, the discussion of the development of AxA's Toronto group via meetup has been moved here:

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RE: Toronto Canada Meetup Group (Discussion on Implementation)

Yes it sounds like you handled everything beautifully. i will split this off into a thread where it will be easier to find for people looking for this topic in the future.

Cassius

February 23, 2025 at 5:47 PM

Yes it sounds like you handled everything beautifully. i will split this off into a thread where it will be easier to find for people looking for this topic in the future.

Quote from Matteng

Why should someone hold pleasure for evil ?

Some do it as Torquatus said because they do not know how to pursue pleasure inteliigently.

But there are large numbers of people who are by disposition or training (mostly training) who think that asceticism is preferable, because they hate the world and life in it. The Epicureans may not have had much experience in confronting large numbers of those people, or more likely the Epicureans were being charitable by not focusing on them, but this latter is by far the more dangerous group,

Emily Austin on this point, from her Chapter 14:

Epicurus considers the fear of death one of the greatest impediments to the tranquil life. Deep and persistent fear puts tranquility out of reach. Just to be clear, though, Epicurus is like most people—he really enjoys living, and he’s therefore in no rush to die. Some contemporaries and predecessors of Epicurus did run around telling people that life is bleak, and that death is a welcome reprieve from human suffering, but Epicurus thinks that’s nonsense. The Cyrenaics were a competing hedonistic philosophical school and numbered among them was a man dubbed “Hegesias the Death Persuader” for the power of his argument that life is more painful than pleasant.² Hegesias was reportedly run out of town for his effects on the young. That life is unpleasant is an odd view for a hedonist, and Epicurus felt at pains to deny it.

...

Here again, the importance of limits for psychological well-being plays a role in Epicurus’ claim that happiness does not require more time. He writes that “unlimited time and limited time contain equal amounts of pleasure, if one measures by the limits of reason.”¹⁶ On the surface, this appears false. If our pleasures are additive, then when I combine yesterday’s pleasures with today’s pleasures, I have more pleasures because I have lived longer. That means that the me of today has experienced more pleasure than the me of yesterday. If life were unlimited, then pleasure would be as well.

Epicurus claims, though, that our reason tells us that tranquility is a stable and complete state, not an additive state. Enough is enough at every moment we have it. We do not have more tranquility or more happiness by having it longer. In that sense, we do not have more “enough” tomorrow. We have enough all the time we live. He develops this thought at greater length in Principal Doctrine 20.

I just noticed the abstract to the Sedley article: a very good summary especially the first sentence:

Eudaimonia, happiness, is a property of a whole life, not of some portion of it.

What can this mean for hedonists? For Epicurus, it is made possible by the mind's capacity to enjoy one's whole life from any temporal viewpoint: to relive past pleasures and enjoy future ones in anticipation, importantly including confidence in a serene closure. Enjoying your life is like enjoying a day as a whole, not least its sunset. Although pleasure is increased by greater duration (contrary to a more favoured reading), and premature death therefore better avoided, the finitude of human life as such does not lessen its value, and even a premature death need not prevent a life's being enjoyed as 'complete'. In this chapter, the above interpretation is documented, explained, and contextualized in terms of Epicurus' diametrical opposition to his contemporaries, the Cyrenaics.

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Brilliant summary. Flies in the face of much prominent academic orthodoxy. Prompts me again to say that David Sedley is at or near the top of greatest living writers on Epicurus. Without him and a few others we'd have a largely stoicized Epicurean academic world taking the position that duration has no relationship to pleasure.

"The confusion stems from the (perhaps deliberate) parallel construction, by which the sum total of pleasures is related to the sum total of the sentient human."

I think that's a particularly important observation. I'm not able to validate that it is true from the Greek, but I think that the description of what Epicurus is doing is accurate. It looks to me like Epicurus is definitely evaluating "the sum total of pleasures" in relation to "the sum total of the sentient human."

To me, the comparison of the "sum total of pleasures" to the "sum total of the sentient human" is the "vessel" analogy. Just as the example is given in the opening of Lucretius Book 6, you can view a human life as a vessel (jar / vase / whatever) and realize that a vessel or a life can only be filled so far with pleasures.

After you pour in pleasures and fill the vessel of life to the rim, you can vary the pleasures by pouring in more pleasures, but some of the existing pleasures will overflow over the rim (the same quantity that you pour in will be expelled). The vessel can never get "more full."

When the "sum total of the sentient being" is full of pleasure, it is full of pleasure, and you can never be more full than full no matter how much time you spend pouring in new pleasures.

Quote from Godfrey

In a worldview where life is finite, infinite time does nobody any good.

Godfrey if I am reading this correctly then I think you are right in the same way as Don's point in several posts above. Pleasures differ from one another in terms of duration, intensity, and parts of the experience that are involved. For a being with a finite life span, infinite time before and after our lives is of only intellectual relevance. Those are correct and important points.

I also agree that this phrasing amounts to a "shibboleth" - a challenge to think more deeply about the problem analogous to "the sun is the size it appears to be."

But I think there is also more that is going on. While it is true that (1) our bodies have finite lifespans and (2) that pleasures differ (which means that we have to choose intelligently among those pleasures), there is still the question of "Is it better to live a longer time than a shorter time?" which needs to be answered.

Epicurus' wording of this section of the PDs can be read productively and be seen to address this, or the section can be read as ridiculous on its face and used to attack Epicurus, as Cicero is doing.

Appearing to assert that "infinte time contains no greater pleasure than finite time" (as if length of time has no bearing on our experience of pleasure), has very much the same effect as appearing to assert that "the sun is the size it appears to be" or that "by pleasure we mean the absence of pain."

These statements are either profoundly helpful if you understand that they are challenging you to reason about these issues properly, or they are ridiculous on their face if you think they mean what people who doesn't understand or accept the way nature really works think they mean.

See what you think when you've read the Sedley article that Don just linked to from Academia.

Quote from Don

Epicurus denies that:

1. the length of time contributes anything to living happily

I believe that I could agree with this if it's an accurate translation. You can live a "happy" short life or a "happy" long life. The length of the life doesn't necessarily equate to one's overall happiness

Perhaps, but I am not sure there.

I do think Epicurus knew the difference between pleasures that last a short time vs. a long time. But on the other hand, long pleasures are not necessarily the most pleasant. So it really makes a difference how you phrase what it is you are talking about.

Yes and note the switch in wording between happiness and pleasure, which adds more potential for confusion.

Did not Epicurus say that one can be "happy" even in the bull of phaloris, but that would not mean that the torture itself is pleasurable.

There's a lot of switching going on between general concepts vs particular feelings that has to be taken into account.

In other words, the reason we're having this discussion is not because Epicurus wanted to argue that there's no difference between a long pleasant life and a short pleasant life.

We're having the discussion because Epicurus wanted to show how pleasure can be viewed as having a limit - an utmost point that can be reached. In the case of virtue they've defined their utmost point as "pure virtue" -- virtue with no mixture of sin; good with no mixture of evil.

In the case of Epicurus's argument he has defined the utmost point as "pure pleasure." Pure Pleasure with no mixture of pain.

In both cases the utmost point is theoretical. It's a description using generalized words that tells you nothing about what specific activities the person being considered is actually doing with their time to reach the point of pure virtue or pure pleasure. The only thing you can say about whatever activities the "Virtuous" person is engaged in is that they are virtuous. The only thing you can say about whatever activities the "Pleasurous" person is engaged in is that those activities are pleasurable.

There's nothing wrong with this analysis as long as you admit that it's a purely logical and philosophical perspective. The real person in the real world still has to make specific decisions about what virtues to pursue and what pleasures to pursue. But this kind of analysis does give you a logical framework to organize your thoughts, and that is very valuable.

Joshua the passage that Cicero states right after the part that we are quoting bolsters the argument that this entire discussion is related to the Philebus argument.

Cicero is essentially arguing exactly what Plato argued: that virtue can be the good because it has a limit (it can be "consummated") while pleasure cannot be the good because it has no limit; it can always be made better (by adding more).

He who places good entirely in virtue can say that happiness is consummated by the consummation of virtue, since he denies that time brings additions to his supreme good; but when a man supposes that happiness is caused by pleasure, how are his doctrines to be reconciled, if he means to affirm that pleasure is not heightened by duration? In that case, neither is pain. Or, though all the most enduring pains are also the most wretched, does length of time not render pleasure more enviable? What reason then has Epicurus for calling a god, as he does, both happy and eternal? If you take away his eternity, Jupiter will be not a whit happier than Epicurus, since both of them are in the enjoyment of the supreme good, which is pleasure.

Epicurus is responding to Plato by saying that pleasure does have a limit, and that limit is reached when your experience is "full" of pleasures with no mixture of pains.

Epicurus' argument is not any more guilty of gamesmanship with words than is the Stoic argument that the virtuous man is purely virtuous. The Stoics still have to point to individual people and individual cases of people pursuing virtuous activities, and Epicurus still has to point to individual people and individual cases of people pursuing pleasurable activities. But the words provide a model which is understandable and serves as a target to work to achieve.

Here's the Reid edition, which we used in the podcast because it seemed more literal.

But I shall be reminded (as you said yourself) that Epicurus will not admit that continuance of time contributes anything to happiness, or that less pleasure is realized in a short period of time than if the pleasure were eternal. These statements are most inconsistent ; for while he places his supreme good in pleasure, he refuses to allow that pleasure can reach a greater height in a life of boundless extent, than in one limited and moderate in length.

More context:

XXVII. But we dwell too long upon very simple matters. When we have once concluded and demonstrated that if every- thing is judged by the standard of pleasure, no room is left for either virtues or friendships, there is nothing besides on which- we need greatly insist. And yet, lest it should be thought that any passage is left without reply, I will now also say a few words in answer to the remainder of your speech. Well then, whereas the whole importance of philosophy lies in its bearing on happiness, and it is from a desire for happiness alone that men have devoted themselves to this pursuit, and whereas some place happiness in one thing, some in another, while you place it in pleasure, and similarly on the other side all wretchedness you place in pain, let us first examine the nature of happiness as you conceive it. Now you will grant me this, I suppose, that happiness, if only it exists at all, ought to lie entirely within the wise man’s own control. For if the life of happiness may cease to be so, then it cannot be really happy. Who indeed has any faith that a thing which is perishable and fleeting will in his own case always continue solid and strong? But he who feels no confidence in the permanence of the blessings he possesses, must needs apprehend that he will some time or other be wretched, if he loses them. Now no one can be happy while in alarm about his most important possessions; no one then can possibly be happy. For happiness is usually spoken of not with reference to some period of time, but to permanence, nor do we talk of the life of happiness at all, unless that life be rounded off and complete, nor can a man be happy at one time, and wretched at another; since any man who judges that he can become wretched will never be happy. For when happiness has been once entered on, it is as durable as wisdom herself, who is the creator of the life of happiness, nor does it await the last days of life, as Herodotus writes that Solon enjoined upon Croesus. But I shall be reminded (as you said yourself) that Epicurus will not admit that continuance of time contributes anything to happiness, or that less pleasure is realized in a short period of time than if the pleasure were eternal. These statements are most inconsistent ; for while he places his supreme good in pleasure, he refuses to allow that pleasure can reach a greater height in a life of boundless extent, than in one limited and moderate in length. He who places good entirely in virtue can say that happiness is consummated by the consummation of virtue, since he denies that time brings additions to his supreme good; but when a man supposes that happiness is caused by pleasure, how are his doctrines to be reconciled, if he means to affirm that pleasure is not heightened by duration? In that case, neither is pain. Or, though all the most enduring pains are also the most wretched, does length of time not render pleasure more enviable? What reason then has Epicurus for calling a god, as he does, both happy and eternal? If you take away his eternity, Jupiter will be not a whit happier than Epicurus, since both of them are in the enjoyment of the supreme good, which is pleasure. Oh, but our philosopher is subject to pain as well. Yes, but he sets it at nought; for he says that, if he were being roasted, he would call out how sweet this is! In what respect then is he inferior to the god, if not in respect of eternity? And what good does eternity bring but the highest form of pleasure, and that prolonged for ever? What boots it then to use high sounding language unless your language be consistent ? On bodily pleasure (I will add mental, if you like, on the understanding that it also springs, as you believe, from the body) depends the life of happiness. Well, who can guarantee the wise man that this pleasure will be permanent? For the circumstances that give rise to pleasures are not within the control of the wise man, since your happiness is not dependent on wisdom herself, but on the objects which wisdom procures with a view to pleasure. Now all such objects are external to us, and what is external is in the power of chance. Thus for- tune becomes lady paramount over happiness, though Epicurus says she to a small extent only crosses the path of the wise man.

Don I agree with everything you just wrote.

So if we accept Rackham's translation, which I am not sure we should) that "Epicurus, as you yourself were saying, maintains that long duration can not add anything to happiness, and that as much pleasure is enjoyed in a brief span of time as if pleasure were everlasting."

What should we say to somone who says something like:

Epicurus is denying that pleasure is increased by duration or rendered more valuable by its continuance.

Of course Mr. Mitsos could be being unfair to Cicero. Let's see what De Finibus ii 83 says:

EDIT - looks like it's 88, not 83.

The Loeb / Rackham translation of that is:

"It may be enjoined that Epicurus, as you yourself were saying, maintains that long duration can not add anything to happiness, and that as much pleasure is enjoyed in a brief span of time as if pleasure were everlasting."

which appears to come from the underlined part below:

[88] haec dicuntur inconstantissime. cum enim summum bonum in voluptate ponat, negat infinito tempore aetatis voluptatem fieri maiorem quam finito atque modico. qui bonum omne in virtute ponit, is potest dicere perfici beatam vitam perfectione virtutis; negat enim summo bono afferre incrementum diem. qui autem voluptate vitam effici beatam putabit, qui sibi is conveniet, si negabit voluptatem crescere longinquitate? igitur ne dolorem quidem. an dolor longissimus quisque miserrimus, voluptatem non optabiliorem diuturnitas facit? quid est igitur, cur ita semper deum appellet Epicurus beatum et aeternum? dempta enim aeternitate nihilo beatior Iuppiter quam Epicurus; uterque enim summo bono fruitur, id est voluptate. 'At enim hic etiam dolore.' At eum nihili facit; ait enim se, si uratur, 'Quam hoc suave!' dicturum.

Another way to ask this is : Is Cicero summarizing Epicurus accurately here?

Quote

Cicero takes Epicurus to be clearly (though wrongly) denying that pleasure is increased by duration (voluptatem crescere longinquitate) or rendered more valuable by its continuance (De Fin. ii 83).

In other words, did Epicurus in fact deny that pleasure is increased by duration or rendered more valuable by it's continuance?

Quote from Joshua

I still tend to think Epicurus was responding to Plato's Philebus in his discussion of limits, duration, and death. I'll have to review that dialogue.

Yes, that I think is the ultimate answer. "Limit" has multiple meanings and so does any variation of "greater." Unless you add something extra such as "in every respect" then it's going to be a very fair reading to acknowledge that what you're saying is "greater" is not greater "in every respect." What Epicurus is talking about is the limit of Pleasure, but pleasure has many aspects, of which one is time, and not all pleasures are equal in time or in many other respects.

And that's where you come back to what Epicurus said to Menoeceus that just as the wise man does not choose the most food, but the most pleasant food, the wise man does not choose the longest life, but the most pleasant.

That right there is a clear illustration. The food the wise man chooses is better to him, but not more in quantity, and the time the wise man chooses more pleasant for him, but not longer in time.

But the difference in quantity of food and length of time is not physically abolished by the choice of the wise man. The wise man is simply intentionally choosing to ignore the quantity difference and the time difference. because he has mentally chosen to recognize that the pleasantness is more important to him than the extra time or the extra quantity.

So that's why I think Long and Sedley are clearly correct: Epicurus would recognize that length of time is something that can definitely be desirable, but it is not the overriding factor. The overriding factor is what you choose to feel and recognize as the most pleasant for you. The mind can influence what it finds pleasurable even more than can the body.

So it is perfectly proper to say "infinite time contains no greater time than finite time" on the grounds that the "greater" you are talking about is what you deem to be "the most pleasant." What is "most pleasant" for you is something that you can choose to recognize as something that doesn't necessarily get better with significantly more time.

One example is standing on the tip of the mountaintop - the more time you spend there the less you're likely to want to stay.

So I would say too that this is why Epicurus is saying several times that you get to this recognition through "reason" and through "the mind." The body itself is not able to figure this out, nor is someone who doesn't have the benefit of Epicurean philosophy and who thinks that unlimited time will necessarily allow him to reach greater heights of pleasure.

To repeat what I agreed with Don earlier, this view of duration totally gets rid of fear, and that's very important. But not everyone is as subject to "fear" as are others, and it is perfectly legitimate and in fact natural when you are young to take the position - "I am not afraid of death or anything else -- I simply want to understand how to spend my life."

And Epicurus has the answer that "time" or "duration" is not at all the overriding factor in making your choices. You can in fact live like "a god among men" not only because you not afraid of death, but because you are confident that you are able to obtain whatever is the greatest pleasure for you in the time that you have.

Ha --- I am trying to move the discussion beyond "Fear" which is not at all the only thing I think Epicurus was concerned about

If we're looking for practical analysis to drive our choices and avoidances, we need a clear picture of the role that time/duration plays in that analysis. Because it surely plays some, or Epicurus would not have mentioned it in PD09.

Surely most everyone will agree that duration plays some role in deciding what to pursue and what to avoid, right?

Well, if so, we need an analysis of that decision which does not end with "duration of time makes NO difference" - because I can certainly tell the difference between a minute and a year. And not simply because I am afraid of opportunities lost.

Quote from Don

My interpretation of this whole concept is that it is specifically the fear of death that makes us unable to take pleasure in the life we have here and now.

While I think that is very important and very true, there's also the separate question of the benefit of duration which I don't think is answered by the issue of fear.

It's a legitimate question to ask, separate and apart from fear of loss: Does longer length of time necessarily make something preferable?

Again, Don thank you because that article leads to finding what Sedley and Long say on this. Unfortunately Mitsis disagrees with Long and Sedley and finds their argument deficient.

So once again I find myself disagreeing with those who disagree with Sedley Here is Mitsis's summary of the Long and Sedley position - for example even in the first sentence here - I would say Mitsis is wrong in saying that duration is "unimportant." So Mitsis is defending CIcero's view and Sedley attacks Cicero:

Quote

In closing, I want to return briefly to Epicurus' claim about the unimportance of duration in rational assessments of the overall pleasantness of our lives (KD 19-21 ). Cicero takes Epicurus to be clearly (though wrongly) denying that pleasure is increased by duration (voluptatem crescere longinquitate) or rendered more valuable by its continuance (De Fin. ii 83). Recently, several scholars have resisted Cicero's interpretation because they take Epicurus to be claiming something much less bewildering about the role of duration in our evaluation of pleasures. Long and Sedley, for instance, argue that Epicurus does not mean to assert that time has no bearing at all in assessing quantities of pleasure. Rather, in their view, he is claiming that we can experience the same level of pleasure in a finite or infinite time.36 Pleasure is something with clear natural limits and we can reach these limits as soon as we understand them sufficiently. Epicurus is thus merely observing that we do not need an infinite amount of time to come to such an understanding; nor could any particular complete experience of pleasure reach more intense levels, even if we repeated it an infinite number of times.

On this interpretation, Epicurus must still admit that death can cut short and hence harm the happiness of mortals enjoying even these most complete levels of pleasure. He might therefore readily acknowledge that a long, happy life is preferable to a short, happy one. Long's and Sedley's reading has obvious attractions inasmuch as it leaves Epicurus with a much less paradoxical claim to defend

So Mitsis thinks that Epicurus would not say that if one has an option to choose between a long happy life and a short happy one he would choose the longer?

Sorry Phil, i have to go with Long and Sedley on that one!

I think Mitsis is flatly wrong in saying that duration is of no significance to happiness. The longer is not NECESSARILY greater, because there are other factors that can come into play (intensity and parts of the body) but that doesn't mean that time is irrelevant.

Yes, from the Mitsis article, this is what I want to argue against - specifically, the position such as taken by Furley that "no surviving Epicurean text offers a defense for this strongly counter-intuitive claim"

Quote

Notoriously, however, the Epicurean strongly denies that death in any way diminishes life's pleasures by cutting them short. To many, this has seemed merely perverse. David Furley, for example, dismisses this feature of Epicurus' theory as "dogma without argument" and denies that any surviving Epicurean text offers a defense for this strongly counter-intuitive claim.4 A related objection is raised by Cicero in De Finibus ii. Cicero complains that nothing, in fact, could be more at odds with Epicurus' own hedonism than the claim that death involves no loss or deprivation of hedonic goods (ii 87-88; cf. Plutarch, Non posse 1106bff.). If pleasurable states are what make us happy, Cicero insists, surely we will be happier if we can remain in these states longer. Thus, he wonders, how can death fail to be an evil for Epicureans, if it prevents them from being happy for a longer period of time?