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In an ideal world, Epicurean philosophy should be a ground to experiment with how to maximize the steadiness and self-sufficiency in pleasure that we can have, but this will require concrete experimentation, note-taking, and discussion of the effects of the experiments in light of our sources. Maybe something for future Epicureans to consider.
Just responded with a like and a quote from Hiram's post to verify that the system is working like it should. 
The Continuous Pleasure Issue: I don't have time to track this down further but responding to Don Robertson allowed me to find this, near the section of Cicero that he quoted. This is Cicero relaying a much later argument, but it seems to me that this is one of the pieces in the puzzle of the meaning of PD4 and the issue of "I call you to continuous pleasure". The argument that pain can be managed is not intended to trivialize pain, but to respond to this argument - that the goal of life cannot be happiness if we can lose it:
Since, then, the whole sum of philosophy is directed to ensure living happily, and since men, from a desire of this one thing, have devoted themselves to this study; but different people make happiness of life to consist in different circumstances; you, for instance, place it in pleasure; and, in the same manner you, on the other hand, make all unhappiness to consist in pain: let us consider, in the first place, what sort of thing this happy life of yours is. But you will grant this, I think, that if there is really any such thing as happiness, it ought to be wholly in the power of a wise man to secure it; for, if a happy life can be lost, it cannot be happy. For who can feel confident that a thing will always remain firm and enduring in his case, which is in reality fleeting and perishable? But the man who distrusts the permanence of his good things, must necessarily fear that some day or other, when he has lost them, he will become miserable; and no man can be happy who is in fear about most important matters.
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Discussion of article You Have Been Deceived!:
Discussion of article Top Problematic Attitude and “Life Premise” Issues Made Worse By Stoicism and Cured by Epicurean Philosophy:
Discussion of article The Full Cup / Fullness of Pleasure Model:
"The belief that life itself is the greatest good conditions the whole ethical doctrine of Epicurus. He sees life as narrowly confined between the limits of birth and death. Soul and body are born together and perish together. Metrodorus gave telling expression in figurative language to this melancholy belief, Vatican Saying 30: "The potion mixed at birth for all of us is a draught of death." There was for Epicureans no pre-existence, as Plato believed, and no afterlife, as the majority of mankind believed. Epicurus himself expressed the thought with stark directness, Vatican Saying 14: "We are born once and we cannot be born twice but to all eternity must be no more." Thus the supreme values must be sought between the limits of birth and death. The specific teaching that life itself is the greatest good is to be drawn from Vatican Saying 42: "The same span of time includes both beginning and termination of the greatest good." If this seems to be a dark saying, the obscurity is dispelled by viewing it as merely a denial of belief in either pre-existence or the afterlife. As Horace wrote, concluding Epistle i.16 with stinging abruptness, "Death is the tape-line that ends the race of life." Editors, however, misled by the summum bonum fallacy, equate "the greatest good" with pleasure and so are forced to emend. The change of a single letter does the trick but fundamental teaching is obliterated. While this quoted statement is first-hand evidence of the Epicurean attitude, the syllogistic approach is also known from an extant text, of which the significance has been overlooked. The major premise is the assumption that the greatest good must be associated with the most powerful emotions, that is, the worst of all fears and the greatest of all joys. Now the worst of all fears is that of a violent death and the greatest of all joys is escape from the same. The supporting text runs as follows: "That which occasions unsurpassable joy is the bare escape from some dreadful calamity; and this is the nature of 'good,' if one apprehend it rightly and then stand by his finding, and not go on walking round and round and harping uselessly on the meaning of 'good'." This passage marks the summary cutting of a Gordian knot, the meaning of "good," upon which Plato had harped so tediously. Epicurus finds a quick solution by appealing to the Feelings, that is to Nature, as the criterion; it is their verdict that the supreme good is life itself, because the strongest emotions are occasioned by the threat of losing it or the prospect of saving it.
"When once the summum bonum fallacy has been detected and the difference clearly discerned between the greatest good, which is life itself, and the end or telos, the next step is to apprehend clearly by what procedure the end or telos is identified as pleasure. The nature of this procedure and of the attitude which determined it was one thing in the time of Cicero and quite another in the time of Epicurus himself. In the space of the two centuries between these two men the study of formal logic had been forced into a dominating position in the curriculum through the aggressive genius of the Stoic Chrysippus, and after his time the incessant needling of Stoic adversaries had shaken the confidence of many Epicureans in the word of their founder. The faith of Epicurus himself had pinned itself upon Nature as the norm, not upon Reason. The faith of the Stoic, on the contrary, and of those Epicureans who wavered in their faith, while ostensibly pinned upon Reason, may more correctly be said to have been pinned upon argumentation and disputation. When Epicurus himself identified pleasure as "the end of Nature" he was setting Reason aside and recognizing Nature as the norm or as furnishing the norm. In this he was merely following a trend of his time. The brilliant Eudoxus, for example, who had preceded him by no great interval, also declared pleasure to be the good and he took his start from the observation that all creatures, whether rational or irrational, pursued it. Confirmation for the truth of this observation was found in the behavior of all creatures toward pain. If we may accept as authentic the tradition as reported by Aristotle, it would seem that Eudoxus thought of the pursuit of pleasure as comparable to the instinct of wild creatures to seek their proper food and to avoid the opposite. This demonstrates clearly the incipient tendency to recognize Nature as furnishing the norm. Thus the originality of Epicurus did not consist in recognizing Nature as furnishing the norm but in working out this principle to its utmost limit, which he did by setting up his Canon, each item of which, Sensations, Anticipations, and Feelings, was a separate appeal to the authority of Nature. In identifying pleasure as the end or telos it is both possible and probable that Epicurus was taking up a suggestion of Aristotle, who dropped the hint in this instance that the evidence drawn from the behavior of irrational creatures is superior in value to the evidence drawn from the behavior of rational creatures.6 At any rate the declaration of Epicurus, as reported by Cicero, runs as follows: "Every living creature, the moment it is born, reaches out for pleasure and rejoices in it as the highest good, shrinks from pain as the greatest evil, and, so far as it is able, averts it from itself." In the evaluation of this text the important words are "the moment it is born." By narrowing the field of observation to the newborn creature Epicurus was eliminating all differences between rational and irrational creatures. In infancy even the creatures that by courtesy we call rational are as yet irrational. By narrowing the field to the newborn Epicurus was also reducing animate life to its minimum value, because at the moment of birth even some of the senses have not yet begun to function. Consequently, as Cicero says in the same context, "since nothing is left of a human being when the senses are eliminated, the question, what is according to Nature or contrary to Nature, is of necessity being judged by Nature herself." It is doubtful whether any other item of Epicurean invention is the equal of this in logical acumen. Even if weight be allowed to the later objection of the Stoics that the behavior of the infant has its cause in what we now call the instinct of self-preservation, this interpretation would lead to the recognition of life as the greatest good, which was the doctrine of Epicurus, and it would still be left for pleasure and pain to function as the criteria. Incidentally, this appeal to the evidence afforded by the newly born exercised its effect upon the terminology of Epicurus. The infant, being still in a state of nature, is "not yet perverted." These words afford a hint of the perversion ascribed to the study of rhetoric, dialectic, and mathematics, which a lad was judged lucky to have escaped. As for Nature herself, she speaks through the newly born "undefiled and uncontaminated." Her word is "true philosophy," the vera ratio so often invoked by Lucretius."
Here's one of the clearest doctrines that upends the perspective that there is any standard higher than pleasure and pain - PD10 "If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky and death and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires (and of pains), we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full with pleasures from every source and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life."
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Cassius Amicus Now certainly "pleasure" and "pain" are numberless in type, and MENTAL pleasure can be counted as more intense than physical pleasure: Torquatus, from On Ends:
"(3) Regardless of this, we maintain that this does not preclude mental pleasures and pains from being much more intense than those of the body; since the body can feel only what is present to it at the moment, whereas the mind is also cognizant of the past and of the future. For, even granting that pain of body is equally painful, yet our sensation of pain can be enormously increased by the belief that some evil of unlimited magnitude and duration threatens to befall us hereafter. And the same consideration may be transferred to pleasure -- a pleasure is greater if not accompanied by any apprehension of evil. It therefore clearly appears that intense mental pleasure or distress contributes more to our happiness or misery than a bodily pleasure or pain of equal duration."
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Cassius Amicus But in the end the standard remains pleasure and pain as revealed to us through our natural faculties at particular times and places and circumstances, and not a "higher" preconceived single standard for all men and places and times, or an abstract ranking of activities or ideas according to a religion or a logical construct.
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Todd Gibson Cassius, do you mean to include ataraxia as a "higher preconceived single standard"? It seems to me that ataraxia is best classified as a sensation, which can produce pleasure. But there are other pleasures that are decidedly not tranquil. To refer to ataraxia as the ultimate end and non-different from pleasure seems like a mistake. Thoughts?
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Elli Pensa Todd hi ! You wrote : <<But there are other pleasures that are decidedly not tranquil".
IMO the only thing that brings non tranquil in our mind and soul is PAIN. What are those pleasures that are decidedly not tranquil ? Someone would say listening to music or reading a book or staring the sky. Ok then why the body (mind and soul) still are in motion and in function ? E.g when you reading a book won't you feel pleasure ? Why we have to be under the regime of dialectic method to place in categories the pleasure ? All pleasures are good. That's all.
Besides, we can't see any decidedly tranquility in the Nature...all are in motion and the Earth travel around, or "orbit", the Sun at a velocity of 29.8 km/sec.
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Elli Pensa And to not be confused ... IMO among these two situations of a behavior there is Pleasure.
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Cassius Amicus Todd Gibson: Yes I agree with you. I consider "ataraxia" to be an adverb describing a way in which pleasures are experienced, meaning that the particular state of experiencing pleasure at a particular moment is "without disturbance" or "smoothly." I do not consider "ataraxia" to be a separate pleasure in and of itself, and I do not consider it to be a word that standing alone should be used to constitute the Epicurean guide or goal of life. Dead bodies are also in a state of steadiness (at least for a while) but that would not be considered ataraxia because there is no particular experience going on in a dead body.
Now I don't doubt that non-Epicurean philosophers may abstract out the term "ataraxia" and attempt to hypothesize that it as an "ideal state" that exists "in the air," like the Stoics would identify a state of "virtue" as their goal. And in fact I think that is the basic problem - people are looking through Stoic eyes and expect to see a "state of perfection" or "salvation" as the Epicurean goal, since that is the approach of Stoicism and religion. They also wish to identify some "higher" or "more worthy" pleasure since their predisposition is to think that they can rank states of pleasure according to preconceived notions of which are "best." But I think Epicurus would analogize the issue of "ataraxia in the abstract" to something like color. For Epicureans "yellow" does not exist either as an ideal form or "intrinsically." Yellow does not exist apart from things that are yellow. But yellow can be ranked in terms of "purity" of yellow, and lack of mixture with other colors, with our description of certain things as "pure yellow" means that it is not mixed with another color (among numberless colors). In the same way our description of a thing as pleasurable means that it is not painful (among the two choices only of pleasure and pain) and our description of a particular moment as being "pure pleasure" ("aponia") means only that it is not mixed with pain. Yellow does not tell us WHAT the thing is that is yellow, and "pure pleasure" does not tell us WHAT pleasures are being experienced.
In the same way, the "smooth and tranquil experience" of pleasure does not exist apart from the experience of particular pleasures. The goal of pleasurable living is best experienced in a full and smooth and unbroken way, a descriptive analogy being as a jar or vessel filled with liquid (pleasure) neither jostled and spilling from the top (which would be the disturbance which we seek to avoid in the term "ataraxia") nor under-filled through asceticism or error or pain of any kind (underfilling means that pain is present since there are only two basic experiences, pleasure and pain, and the vessel analogy is the total of our individual capacity for experiences of all kind). (See opening of DRN Book VI for one place this analogy appears.)
So in the Epicurean framework I do not see "tranquility / ataraxia" as the same thing as a life of pleasure (which is the true goal of life). And that is why I do not believe Cicero was being redundant in stating these two separately in the final words of the cite below:
Cicero, In defense of Publius Sestius, 10.23: “He {Publius Clodius} praised those most who are said to be above all others the teachers and eulogists of pleasure {the Epicureans}. … He added that these same men were quite right in saying that the wise do everything for their own interests; that no sane man should engage in public affairs; that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures. "
So I believe that a correct formulation of the Epicurean goal would be "a life crammed full of pleasures experienced without disturbance."
I have collected the Latin for that cite, and other cites which lead to a similar conclusion on this point here: http://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3…nXLizFft4dSkiVM
The Full Cup / Fullness of Pleasure Model
NEWEPICUREAN.COM
Cassius Amicus I edited my post above a couple of times to make it as precise as I can. In the process I added in reference to "aponia." If we were looking for words to use to summarize the Epicurean goal of life, then "aponia" (Absence of pain) would be AT LEAST as important as "ataraxia." But we rarely hear "aponia" used - and
I suspect a large part of the reason is that Stoic ears love the sound of "tranquility," but they don't even like to hear "pleasure" referred to by implication (since thinking about absence of pain leads inexorably to thinking about pleasure).
Cassius Amicus shared a link.
55 mins
Elli's post on the response given by Richard Dawkins to the Cardinal on the goal of life takes me back to what I think is one of the most clear and explicit statements of the goal of life that is contained in any reliable ancient Epicurean text. It comes through Torquatus in Cicero's On Ends, but I see no reason to doubt that Cicero took it straight from an authoritative Epicurean source because it is so bold and so uncompromising.
Any doubts that the goal is defined by the word "pleasure" can be erased by checking the side-by-side Latin at the link below. Even this translator, clear as he is, wants to waffle in the last sentence, but check it out - the last passage is "it must therefore be admitted that the Chief Good is to live 'agreeably'" but the Latin is "fatendum est summum esse bonum iucunde vivere" with the key word being "iucunde." Check the link to the Latin translation - iucunde means "pleasantly - delightfully" (link to translation also included). Anyone who waffles on the core point that the goal of life is to live pleasantly is not only wasting their life while they waffle, they aren't speaking Epicurean philosophy:
Torquatus: "The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain. What possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain. He will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement.”
“Suppose on the other hand a person crushed beneath the heaviest load of mental and of bodily anguish to which humanity is liable. Grant him no prospect of ultimate relief in view; let him neither have nor hope to have a gleam of pleasure. Can one describe or imagine a more pitiable state? If then a life full of pain is the thing most to be avoided, it follows that to live in pain is the highest evil; and this position implies that a life of pleasure is the ultimate good. In fact, the mind possesses nothing in itself upon which it can rest as final. Every fear, every sorrow can be traced back to pain -- there is no other thing besides pain which is of its own nature capable of causing either anxiety or distress.
“Pleasure and pain moreover supply the motives of pleasure and of the principles of desire and of avoidance, and the springs of conduct generally. This being so, it clearly follows that actions are right and praiseworthy only as being a means to the attainment of a life of pleasure. But that which is not itself a means to anything else, but to which all else is a means, is what the Greeks term the Telos, the highest, ultimate or final Good. It must therefore be admitted that the Chief Good is to live agreeably.
https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=https%…OsGJVkA&s=1
http://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3…FsKtqRg&s=1
Cicero, Marcus Tullius, On Ends - De Finibus Bonorum Et Malorum
Cassius Amicus
I also think this is where the Epicurean view of the gods and the concept of divinity meshes with the Epicurean view of the goal of life. "Gods" seem to be by definition beings who have achieved the ability, in reality and in actuality, to exist in this constant state of joy defined as - "the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain." Our goal set by nature (the goal of all living things) is to do whatever we can to duplicate that state of constant pleasurable living, within the limits and to the best of our respective capacities and circumstances.
In the world of science fiction it has been suggested to generations of fans that beings which do not have emotion (e.g., Vulcans) should be accepted (or at least entertained) to be superior to humans that do. In the world of Ayn Rand / Objectivism, much ink has been spilled on one of Rand's more famous slogans: "Emotions are not tools of cognition." Whether or not Rand correctly traces her argument to Arisotle, it seems that this issue goes back to Greece and was a key aspect of the Epicurean canon. If indeed "feelings / passions / emotions" are the proper name of the second leg of the Epicurean canon of how we ascertain truth, then we have a huge divergence of opinion which students of Epicurus ought to explore. This is a topic for articles, series of articles, books, series of books, etc., and probably ought to be one of the most commonly discussed issues. I don't believe anyone would suggest that we *always* "trust our feelings" anymore than we *always* trust what we see or hear. Lucretius preserved a lot of discussion about how we test what we observe from the five senses. We need to reconstruct (the hedonic calculus?) how Epicurus would advise that we observe what we gather from our feelings. The raw material is there for us to package this into a whole that is much more coherent than wikipedia and the like.
Cassius Amicus shared a link.
December 31, 2016 at 7:58am
I noticed that Matt Jackson posted on his timeline a quote attributed to Democritus: "Medicine heals diseases of the body, wisdom frees the soul from passions" and that reminds me of several things I'd like to study more:
(1) I see that this quote appears among an interesting collection of quotes from pre-Socratic philosophers here: http://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3…ek9NP3A&s=1
(2) But the real reason I post this is that the use of the English word "passions" here troubles me. Is it an accurate translation? If so, is this statement consistent with Epicurus? What Greek word is being translated as "passions" here and what exactly is the definition? Is the meaning intended to be "excessive" feeling? It seems to me that "passion" in common use is ambiguous, and could be used either to refer either to "all" emotion/feeling/pleasure/pain or only "some" emotions/feelings...." - presumably "excessive" or "out of control"? And what is the relationship of "passion" to pleasure and pain? Is "passion" a global term that includes all pleasure and pain?
The passages I keep going back to for answers on how these terms were used in the Epicurean context are from Diogenes Laertius in his chapter ten:
Yonge has this translation: "Now in the canon, Epicurus says that the criteria of truth are the senses, the preconceptions, and the passions." Also: "They say that there are two passions, pleasure and pain, that affect everything alive."
https://archive.org/…/The_Lives_and_Opinions_of_Eminent_Phi…
Bailey: "Thus in the Canon Epicurus says that the tests of truth are the sensations and concepts and the feelings." Also:
"The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature...." https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=https%…DC4W-wQ&s=1
Hicks translates this as "There are two states of feeling, pleasure and pain...." and "Now in The Canon Epicurus affirms that our sensations and preconceptions and our feelings are the standards of truth." https://en.wikisource.org/…/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Phi…/Book_X
What is the Greek being translated here? Is Yonge correct that Epicurus was using "passions" as the global term to describe the entire faculty of perceiving pleasure and pain? Bailey's use of the word "concepts" seems dangerous confusing to me, so his choice of "feelings" might be similarly off. Hicks is better with preconceptions but he also uses feelings, and "feelings" might be the least precise word of all.
So in sum I think it's important to be clear what we think is being meant in the Democritus quote. If we consider it to mean that wisdom frees the soul from pleasure and pain, or the entire third leg of the Epicurean Canon, then that would be pure Stoicism and far from Epicurus.
What do you think?
Note: Another way of stating the wider question is this: What one single word is best used as the collective term for the third leg of the canon? The first two are pretty easy but what about the third?
1) "The five senses" or / "sensations"
2) "Anticipations" or "preconceptions"
3) "Passions"? "Feelings"? What is the Greek, and the English translation, of the one single word that Epicurus used to refer to the faculty of pleasure and pain?
Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers Index
Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, by Kathleen Freeman, [1948], full text etext at sacred-texts.com
SACRED-TEXTS.COM
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Cassius Amicus For my American friends I should have illustrated this post with a hit song from my area of the country: "I **feel** good! 
is this what wisdom frees the soul from? https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=https%…amp;h=TAQEkrDuH
James Brown - I Feel Good
LYRICS Wo! I feel good, I knew that I would now I feel good, I knew that I would now…
YOUTUBE.COM
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Matt Jackson
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Matt Jackson In my opinion, in the 21st century "passion" is not a great word to use as it might have multiple meanings. My interpretation of Democritus is that passion would mean possibly "fantasies" and "anxieties", both are destructive if not remedied, to keep him in line with his Naturalism and atomism.
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Matt Jackson I would love to know what the original word was.
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Mish Taylor the word 'perception' for 3/ ?
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Matt Jackson My general thought is that passion is from the Latin for suffering. As in "Passion of the Christ". So in this case wisdom serves to relieve suffering caused by the ignorance of the Natural world. I'm thinking that the translator used "passion " in this way, especially if he had a strong connection to Christian terminology.
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Matt Jackson Passion here may refer to "passionem" :...See More
Online Etymology Dictionary
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Cassius Amicus Interesting observation. In that definition passionem is almost entire something negative (suffering). But I don't get the impression that in english it is used that way generally - here the connotation is more "strong feeling of any kind" (at least I think it is.....)
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Cassius Amicus at least "passionate love" seems to be in common usage, and I don't think the intended implication is "suffering"
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Matt Jackson I'm just thinking that when this quote was translated, the Biblical term was the one used. Suffering as in the physical and mental suffering of Jesus.
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Matt Jackson Where are all the Greek speakers??
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Cassius Amicus Matt Jackson Yes but do we know *when* it was translated? The link on the page in the first post only appears to go back to a book in the in 1940s
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Matt Jackson I don't. But my guess is it is a late 19th to early 20th century translation. A perfect example is the GRS Mead translation of the Corpus Hermeticum, its full of anachronistic wording to sound high-minded and legitimate . It's also unreadable. Lol
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Matt Jackson Unreadable in more than one way.
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Cassius Amicus You guys are exactly on my train of thought but I don't think we can trust any single translation, and as far as I know (and I know nothing) Democritus may have intended something entirely different, and some friendly stoic translator forced the meaning to fit his preconceptions, because of course everyone (every stoic, that is) knows that passion is a bad thing (sarcasm). So with Democritus I don't know if the quote is "correct" (and I am skeptical, if he was indeed the "laughing philosopher"). Nor do I know which of the translatons of DL I quoted is correct, if any. I think we have to compare, look for the greek words (and latin if used by a reputable Epicurean like Lucretius) and then do our best to figure out what has the highest probability of being the original meaning. Only THEN can we really start to form our own opinion of whether the writer was "correct"
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Cassius Amicus At least with Diogenes Laertius we have the greek to work with. Gosh only knows where to find the quote from Democritus in Greek to know which word he used....
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Noks Huffine The removal of disease results in a healthy body, the removal of negative thoughts and feelings results in a happy mind.
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Cassius Amicus replied · 1 Reply
Noks Huffine DL 9.9.45 is right on this topic of course "(Democritus believes) the end of action is tranquillity, which is not identical with pleasure, as some by a false interpretation have understood, but a state in which the soul continues calm and strong, undis...See More
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Matt Jackson It's the anachronistic English translation that is causing me to have passion. Haha
Unlike · Reply · 2 · December 31, 2016 at 11:41am
Haris Dimitriadis The word passions needs special care because its meaning has been influenced by the definition of the soul that Plato gave. He imagined the soul as a chariot in which, logic-wisdom was the driver, and the two horses were the feelings and the desires. The feelings were obedient to the driver's instructions, and they contributed to the driver's guides to take under control the second horse, which was expressing the desires=passions of the body. To Plato the material body was the source of unhappiness and this was referred by him as the tomb of the mind. So to Plato passions reflected the desires of the body, which by nature are difficult to get hold on to.
As regards then Democritus saying is risky to interpret it according to the platonian terminology because they had different views. They both lived in the same time period but Democritus was about 30 years older. Plato by his influence managed to distort the initial meaning of the word passion and hence makes difficult for us to know what Deemocritus meant exactly by the saying.
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Those are exactly the kinds of concerns I had in mind. In order to even begin to dig further we would presumably need the greek version of the fragment, and then compare the word choice to the word choice in Diogenes Laertius, who is himself giving his own summary and apparently not a direct quote.
But rather than the end of the question I still think we are at the beginning. In discussing Epicurus we really need a firm statement of the "name" of the third leg of the canon as Epicurus used the term. Other than the two statements in DL I quoted I am not sure there is a direct statment in the core texts we have of the name of this third leg. I personally refer to it as "the faculty of pleasure and pain" but I am not at all sure that that is the best wording. "pleasure" or "pain" alone do not seem appropriate, and "feelings" and "passions" have all the limitations we are noting. It seems clear that this third leg is also a something we commonly think of as a "sensation" but that too is not a satisfactory word.
As I think of final remarks to close out 2016 I think this issue is one that would really help to make progress on in 2017. Greater clarity on this central point would be critically helpful - and ought to be doable if we are going to represent that we have a good understanding of Epicurean doctrine. ...
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Haris Dimitriadis The three legs are: The senses, the feelings and the anticipations.
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Cassius Amicus Also, it seems to have been a critical point of discussion to point out that there are only two of this "faculty" (1 pleasure and 2 pain), as the fact that there are only two seems to be there reason that the absence of one is the measure of the other....See More
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Cassius Amicus In our usage today the suggestion that "there are only two feelings, pleasure and pain" would seem very awkward and counterintuitive, so we have work to do in making this topic more understandable.
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Haris Dimitriadis The way that our mind functions is related to risk. When the mind perceives a risk it creates the emotion of pain, while in normal conditions the emotion of pleasure. The first emotion sets off the defensive or combating mechanism of fight or flight wh...See More
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Matt Jackson In my opinion, passion is being used in the Biblical sense. For physical and mental suffering. My sense is that the translator had this meaning in his consciousness. Although this is only my opinion.
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Haris Dimitriadis Not at all. By passions plato means the desires of the body, which is exactly what religions preach.
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Matt Jackson Passion is an awful vague term. I'm going to have to save your response to Cassius, with the Greek equivalents for my personal study.
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Haris Dimitriadis Coming back to Cassius on the meaning of the passions, may I add that Epicurus refrains from using this word, and instead he uses the word ''hedone', pleasure, and ''epithemia'', desire. He also uses the word ''aisthanomai'', feel. So it is quite natural to interpret pleasure and pain as feelings. It seems that Epicurus meant to avoid the platonian distortion of the word passion, which had an older origin.
Unlike · Reply · 3 · December 31, 2016 at 12:50pm
Cassius Amicus Haris do you remember a reference where ''aisthanomai'' is used? (Would be interesting to see it used in way that would not be related to physical touching) Does not "pathe / pathos" or something like that fit in here too?
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Haris Dimitriadis The word aisthanomai, feel, has the same origin, to asthesis, sense. So, senses and feelings in greeg have the same root..aisth..
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Haris Dimitriadis Also aisthemata, feelings and aisthesis, sense.
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Matt Jackson Do we have original and extant sources for Democritus around?
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Haris Dimitriadis We have no original fragments from Democritus. All sources are indirect.
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Cassius Amicus Matt Jackson If so i am not aware. With the large Section in Diogenes Laertius on democtrius we have the loeb edition which has the greek...
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Cassius Amicus Here's one link to an older edition of the side-by-side version https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=https%…amp;h=YAQH21DFt
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Haris Dimitriadis He uses indirect speech. I can't see any original text of Democritus.
Unlike · Reply · 2 · December 31, 2016 at 1:11pm
Matt Jackson I'm very passionate about this. Sorry...I guess I share Democritus' humor.
Unlike · Reply · 3 · December 31, 2016 at 4:35pm · Edited
Haris Dimitriadis Democritus was great. They managed to vanish all his writings. No surprise. The same they did with Epicurus.
Unlike · Reply · 3 · December 31, 2016 at 1:20pm
Matt Jackson It definitely makes me want to research his works further. Is Diogenes Laertius the only source?
Unlike · Reply · 2 · December 31, 2016 at 1:29pm
Haris Dimitriadis There are books on Democritus which refer to various scattered sources. There is no other source as detailed as D.L.
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Cassius Amicus Great find by Noks Huffine which I did not see earlier in the DL quote, which is in full here at this link. The full paragraph starts with a reference to necessity, another area in which Epicurus agreed with Democritus. While he may have had his physics right, and may have like to laugh, he may have been more in line with the (later) stoics in terms of Fate and repression of emotion.
45. All things happen by virtue of necessity, the vortex being the cause of the creation of all things, and this he calls necessity. The end of action is tranquillity, which is not identical with pleasure, as some by a false interpretation have understood, but a state in which the soul continues calm and strong, undisturbed by any fear or superstition or any other emotion. This he calls well-being and many other names. The qualities of things exist merely by convention; in nature there is nothing but atoms and void space. These, then, are his opinions.
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Lives of the Eminent Philosophers/Book IX - Wikisource, the free online library
1. Heraclitus, son of Bloson or, according to some, of Heracon, was a native of Ephesus. He flourished in the 69th Olympiad.[1] He was lofty-minded beyond all other men,[2] and over-weening, as is clear from his book in which he says: "Much learning does not teach understanding; else would it have t...
EN.WIKISOURCE.ORG
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Amrinder Singh If we go back to the drawing board and look at what is happening in terms of physical processes in the body, the closest word would be sensation for the 2nd leg of Canon as it is something that arises in us (output) and the word feeling has many different meanings for different people and situations(too vague). Sensation is fairly neutral and if we couple this with pain and pleasure it gives a very narrow and precise definition of the process occurring in one’s body. The use of the word sensation for senses would be incorrect because senses are inputs and sensation is the output. Therefore the three legs IMO would be
1.Senses-Vision,Touch,Hearing,Smell,Taste (Input)
2. Sensations - pain/pleasure (output)
3. Anticipations/Mental Conceptions (output)
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Amrinder Singh Some discussion re the 3rd point (anticipations/conceptions) posted earlier on another forum :http://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3…amp;h=UAQHj9Jz8
Thoughts on Anticipations - EpicureanFriends
EPICUREANFRIENDS.COM
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Haris Dimitriadis Thanjs Amrindet. Excellent arguments.
Unlike · Reply · 3 · December 31, 2016 at 6:01pm
Cassius Amicus Amrinder Singh you are definitely hitting points I would like to see discussed much more deeply. One of those points which you email raises is whether to classify the three legs as inputs or outputs. However I personally tend to consider all three as equivalents in the form of faculties or mechanisms and depending on exactly what we are talking about and describing, I am not sure whether the three legs constitute inputs or outputs, or whether the three legs are "mechanisms" or "faculties' (or some other word) that have both inputs AND outputs, but are not themselves either one....
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Amrinder Singh The idea of input/output was only to clarify the points I was making and is not a definitive claim in terms of their comprehensive nature. I agree with your assessment to refer them as "mechanisms" or "faculties' for reference purposes.
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Matt Jackson I just collected every available scrap of Democritean information on the web. I'll delve into this later tomorrow.
Unlike · Reply · 3 · December 31, 2016 at 11:05pm
Cassius Amicus Let me add a few more summary comments here:
In sum, I do not think we are clear on how all these three words interrelate: "Emotion" 'feeling' "passion" (I say "We" but at the very least I will say "I know I am not personally")...See More
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Cassius Amicus And as a subset of this issue, I get the impression that "strong emotions" may be nearer the center of the issue. In Epicurus i would think "strong emotions" are good/desirable so long as they are pleasurable, while in Stoic and other viewpoints all strong emotions are bad/undesirable by definition.
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I am afraid that I don't have time at the moment to post separately on this, or carry forward the discussion now, but I want to post this as a marker that at some point in the future we could have a good discussion on "rights." Hiram's post reminds me that the issue of vegetarianism is closely related to the debate about "Animal Rights." Due to PD32 and the other Epicurean doctrines on justice, I suspect Epicurus would argue that "Animal Rights" do not "exist" except to the extent we choose to adopt and enforce them.
And I bet you know what's coming next: The same reasoning would lead one to question the common interpretation not only of "animal rights" but also "human rights" and any other kind of "rights" apart from the choice of those involved to adopt them. I have frequently heard it argued in the law that "civil right" is a valid concept, but only to the extent that a "civil right" is something that is validated / vindicated by a civil government. On a desert island, this argument goes, there are no such things as "civil rights" or any other kind of "rights." Of course the issues that we place under the head of "human rights" are among the most important to us of all, and demand our most urgent attention and action to defend them. And yet we ought to be clear what it is we are talking about when we talk about them. As commonly used "rights" is a word often used to imply that there is some outside / superior force that defends and protects them from infringement, and in the Epicurean world view there is no such force, at least in our personal cases as individuals.
I don't recall that anything in Epicurean philosophy supports the existence of any theory of that kind of "rights" whatsoever - even the commonly used term "natural rights." Given the Epicurean view of the nature of the universe, there is no vindicating force that "comes to the rescue" of "rights" of any kind when they are threatened. It is only the action of living beings in defense of their own interests that is ever active to defend any construction of "rights" of any kind.
I know this is a huge subject and demands its own thread at some point - butHiram Crespo's introduction of the topic through "Animal Rights" would be a great place to start. I suspect the two topics are closely related and the analysis of both would be pretty much the same.
There are many who lurk who don't get a chance to do much extra reading. For their benefit let me drop back to the most fundamental observations of Epicurus about the nature of the universe. These serve as the essential basis for every statement on how to live that Epicurus ever wrote, and without them what he wrote cannot be understood or properly applied. Anyone can say something like "don't fear death," but unless you understand "WHY NOT" then you're really wasting your time.
Here are the twelve fundamental observations about the nature of the universe taken from the core Epicurean texts as organized by Norman Dewitt. After each one I have noted at least one primary implication. Each one has *many* implications, so I hope in the comments readers will add others:
1. Matter is uncreatable. << Meaning that at NO point did any supernatural force create the universe. The universe operates by natural principles, and by natural principles alone.
2. Matter is indestructible. << Meaning that the universe as a whole is always going to be here, and it isn't going to mutate into "heaven" at the whim of any god. And nothing other than matter IS indestructible. There is no realm of "ideal forms" of which what we see around us is a poor reflection. What we see is what we get.
3. The universe consists of solid bodies and void. << Meaning that there is no supernatural spirit, no divine fire, no First Cause, no Prime Mover - just elemental matter that operates according to its own properties.
4. Solid bodies are either compounds or simple. << Meaning that what we see around us is a combination of elemental matter and void, and that the properties of what we see derive from those combinations, and not from the whim either of a supernatural god or some whim that we ourselves wish to see. Nature is king, queen, and all that there is.
5. The multitude of atoms is infinite. << Meaning that we here on Earth don't sit here at the center of the universe with everything revolving around us, and God nodding approvingly on the "outside." There is no "outside" the universe.
6. The void is infinite in extent. << Meaning that just as there is no limit to matter there is no limit to the void. The universe is limitless in extent and the Earth is not some playground of the gods.
7. The atoms are always in motion. << Meaning that change is the only constant, and that only a fool who ignores nature would think that he or she can come to rest in the arms of God or in "heaven," or be punished in "hell." So long as we live motion is constant around us and in us, and it is up to us to manage our lives according to Nature; after that our consciousness comes to an end along with the other qualities of the atoms which combined to become our bodies and minds.
8. The speed of atomic motion is uniform. << Meaning that at the level of the ultimate essence of the universe everything is moving according to its own properties, whether we can see and observe it or not.
9. Motion is linear in space, vibratory in compounds. << Meaning again that regardless of what we can see with our eyes, at the atomic level motion is constant even in those combinations of matter that appear to us to be at rest.
10. Atoms are capable of swerving slightly at any point in space or time. << Meaning that our minds are not billiard balls where all our decisions and actions have been predetermined with mathemetical precision and no alteration from the beginning of time, which the Determinists and the followers of Fate would have us believe; it is possible for human beings to have real effect on the course of their lives.
11. Atoms are characterized by three qualities: weight, shape and size. << Meaning that the atoms have properties which we can discover and on which we can rely to predict the nature of the atoms and the combinations they form, which means that we have the ability to explore nature through science and improve our lives with the knowledge we gain.
12. The number of the different shapes is not infinite, merely innumerable. << Meaning that there are limits to the properties of matter which gives rise to the combined bodies that exist in our own experience, and that as a result we can observe Nature and derive ideas about how Nature operates that will assist us in living - we are not faced with a chaotic and random universe in which no knowledge is possible, as alleged by the skeptics.
In this brief list about the NATURE of the universe we ought to be able to see the germ of all that Epicurus derived about HOW TO LIVE in the universe. If we keep these in mind then it is much less likely that we will fall prey to skepticism, stoicism, religion, and the other "isms" which call us away from reality and how to live in it.
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Kieren Moore Re #10, this does not seem to imply that we can 'influence ourselves'/that we have 'free will' ... How would 'Random' swerves give us 'free will', exactly? And what determines the outcome of these 'random' events ... ??
Like · Reply · October 11, 2016 at 10:21pm
Cassius Amicus Kieren there's no way to answer that "exactly." As I understand the point, it is a logical deduction that if all atoms do move mechanically and without exception, then free will is an impossibility. Many people want to dispute it, but many take the common sense position that we can choose among options in many aspects of life, and so there must be an exception to strict mechanical movement. The best analysis I have seen of this is in AA Long's "Chance and Natural Law in Epicureanism." The most detailed explanation left in the texts is in Lucretius Book 2 (Bailey): "Once again, if every motion is always linked on, and the new always arises from the old in order determined, nor by swerving do the first-beginnings make a certain start of movement to break through the decrees of fate, so that cause may not follow cause from infinite time; whence comes this free will for living things all over the earth, whence, I ask, is it wrested from fate, this will whereby we move forward, where pleasure leads each one of us, and swerve likewise in our motions neither at determined times nor in a determined direction of place, but just where our mind has carried us? For without doubt it is his own will which gives to each one a start for this movement, and from the will the motions pass flooding through the limbs. Do you not see too how, when the barriers are flung open, yet for an instant of time the eager might of the horses cannot burst out so suddenly as their mind itself desires? For the whole store of matter throughout the whole body must be roused to movement, that then aroused through every limb it may strain and follow the eager longing of the mind; so that you see a start of movement is brought to pass from the heart, and comes forth first of all from the will of the mind, and then afterwards is spread through all the body and limbs. Nor is it the same as when we move forward impelled by a blow from the strong might and strong constraint of another. For then it is clear to see that all the matter of the body moves and is hurried on against our will, until the will has reined it back throughout the limbs. Do you not then now see that, albeit a force outside pushes many men and constrains them often to go forward against their will and to be hurried away headlong, yet there is something in our breast, which can fight against it and withstand it? And at its bidding too the store of matter is constrained now and then to turn throughout the limbs and members, and, when pushed forward, is reined back and comes to rest again. Wherefore in the seeds too you must needs allow likewise that there is another cause of motion besides blows and weights, whence comes this power born in us, since we see that nothing can come to pass from nothing. For weight prevents all things coming to pass by blows, as by some force without. But that the very mind feels not some necessity within in doing all things, and is not constrained like a conquered thing to bear and suffer, this is brought about by the tiny swerve of the first-beginnings in no determined direction of place and at no determined time."
Like · Reply · 1 · October 12, 2016 at 7:10am
Facebook User We can also ask what we mean by free will in real practical terms. If it means freedom to choose our actions, behaviors and beliefs then we have it (Even though behavior/belief conditioning of most people might make it seem harder to achieve, the capacity is there nonetheless to challenge and remove those constraints) Free will will be constrained by the limits of human qualities/variables set by nature. We cannot exercise our free will to not eat food indefinitely for example if we want to stay alive. But using these examples outside the natural constrains to proclaim that we do not have free will will be linguistic trickery.
Unlike · Reply · 3 · October 12, 2016 at 8:15am · Edited
Cassius Amicus Very well stated Amrinder Singh! This is exactly the proper response to the position taken by Kieren in the comment that follows. Just because some things are out of our control does not mean that ALL things are out of our control.
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Kieren Moore I am a hard determinist ... It's not just strict mechanical movement, though that's part of it ... Your initial brain structure and early experiences were all determined by factors outside your control/choosing ... Your later 'choices' are a mere function of that brain, as shaped by influences/exposure to ideas beyond your control/choosing (early in life), are are therefore, arguably, not your choices either ... and the phrase "free will" is mere religious apologetic nonsense: "white noise" ...
Like · Reply · October 12, 2016 at 11:21am · Edited
Ron Warrick Since there is no proof that free will does not exist, and people are happier believing in a limited free will rather than in pure determinism, I plan to stick with it. If that is religious nonsense, so be it.
Like · Reply · February 20 at 11:21pm · Edited
Kieren Moore Since there is no proof that [Krishna] does not exist, and people are happier believing in [Krishna] rather than [not]{many would assert this, also}, I plan to stick with it. If that is religious nonsense, so be it.
Fine. Free country.
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Cassius Amicus Understood Kieren, and while I disagree I certainly respect your position - many others hold it too. There's no way to resolve the dispute here, but it's important for the purposes of our group to be clear about Epicurus' position, such as here from the letter to Menoeceus:
"Fate, which some introduce as sovereign over all things, he [the wise man] scorns, affirming rather that some things happen of necessity, others by chance, others through our own agency. For he sees that necessity destroys responsibility and that chance is inconstant; whereas our own actions are autonomous, and it is to them that praise and blame naturally attach. It were better, indeed, to accept the legends of the gods than to bow beneath that yoke of destiny which the natural philosophers have imposed. The one holds out some faint hope that we may escape if we honor the gods, while the necessity of the naturalists is deaf to all entreaties. Nor does he hold chance to be a god, as the world in general does, for in the acts of a god there is no disorder; nor to be a cause, though an uncertain one, for he believes that no good or evil is dispensed by chance to men so as to make life blessed, though it supplies the starting-point of great good and great evil. He believes that the misfortune of the wise is better than the prosperity of the fool. It is better, in short, that what is well judged in action should not owe its successful issue to the aid of chance."
Like · Reply · 2 · October 12, 2016 at 11:01am · Edited
Cassius Amicus And in perhaps the other most clear statement on this topic from Epicurus: "VS40. He who asserts that everything happens by necessity can hardly find fault with one who denies that everything happens by necessity; by his own theory this very argument is voiced by necessity."
Like · Reply · 2 · October 12, 2016 at 11:04am · Edited
Kieren Moore I (and others) draw a distinction between fate, and determinism ...
And I certainly don't "fault" anyone with a different opinion, either ... In fact, one of the best consequences of finding hard determinism convincing, is the outward compassion that comes with it (in my experience) - even if I am reluctant to let myself 'off the hook', as easily/quickly ... ?
I actually meant to add a question last time, along the lines of - does this disqualify me from being an Epicurean?!
Though, to answer my own question - there are things I take from Epicureanism, things I take from Stoicism, and lesser things from elsewhere ... As I've mentioned, I find more parallels between Stoicism and Epicureanism, than I do differences - and I consider them 'good friends/sparring partners', rather than 'opposing camps' ... ?
Like · Reply · October 12, 2016 at 11:28am
Cassius Amicus In as friendly a way as possible I think the answer is "yes" - You are not an Epicurean if you embrace hard determinism because clearly Epicurus took the opposite position. But that does not mean you are a bad person - it just means that Epicurus would say you are limiting the success you can have in achieving a pleasurable life if you decide that you are limited unnecessarily in the actions you can take to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. But since we would say you have free will over this decision then you are free to revise your opinion at any time this is a good example of a choice that Epicurus would say IS under your control.
Like · Reply · 1 · October 12, 2016 at 12:47pm · Edited
Hiram Crespo In past years, similar discussions on here yielded the following blog: https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=https%…itoZCYuD2OUgnHc
Man is What He Makes of What Life Gives Him
THEAUTARKIST.WORDPRESS.COM
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Cassius Amicus Clarification: I was in the middle of something else when I wrote that last post and I forgot to insert my standard disclaimer that neither I not anyone else in my view has the authority to say "who is an Epicurean" in the abstract. We can take positions on whether ideas or arguments are consistent with Epicurus or with the group purpose but this is not a membership organisation so my comment is oriented to whether determinism would be accepted by Epicurus and not whether a particular person would be....... If there were a membership organization with a litmus test then such questions would have to be answered, but that's not what this discussion group is about.
Like · Reply · 1 · October 12, 2016 at 1:27pm · Edited
Hiram Crespo And as far as what Epicurus had to say on the view that humans have an initial constitution, his 25th book On nature deals with moral development: https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3…hXhz2ivEq5uO_9o
Synopsis of Epicurus’ “On Nature”, Book 25: On Moral Development
SOCIETYOFEPICURUS.COM
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Chanelle Pingree I'm glad this popped up in my search engine! Thank you for the reference. I needed it, as the book is starting out strong with the atom and void. This simplified reference is very useful for a newbie like me. I will be referring back to it often. Thanks, Cassius!
Unlike · Reply · 3 · February 20 at 6:04pm
Cassius Amicus You are welcome, Chanelle! Also, I think I can offer a little more:
As you say, the book lays it on deep on atoms and void, and you may get even more confused when you get to the parts on 'images.'
Just remember that the purpose of the atom and void discussion is to show you how the universe can and does operate through natural principles, on its own, and without the creation or intervention of any supernatural gods. It also innoculates you against not only religion but also against "idealism" of the Platonic and Aristotelian varieties. By focusing on "nothing exists eternally except atoms and void' (and the "eternally" is key) it becomes nonsensical to postulate that "ideal forms" exist eternally somewhere out there (Plato) or that eternal "essences" exist within things which endow them with some mystical nature that we can label into categories (Aristotle). These are the key proponents of otherworldly arguments of all kinds (including the argument that there is an absolute "virtue"), and so the atom and void discussion, once understood and followed to its logical conclusion, makes those positions impossible to believe..
As for "images" I think even fewer people get through that part than the atoms and void. When you get there, remember that nothing else in the book matters if we can't establish with confidence that some things are true and some things are false. Lucretius does not spend much time formally discussing the three legs of the canon, but he does spend a lot of time on the five senses and how that leg of the canon is essential to determining anything with confidence. And in order to have confidence in the senses we must know how they operate, and that they do not operate magically directed by gods or ideals or by essences. Rather, they operate by contact with this up close (touching tasting) and further away (seeing, hearing, smelling) because there is flowing through the "air" around us atoms which move from them to us (and vice versa). Epicurus described the movement of these atoms as "images" carrying information about the things around us that our senses can then pick up and process.
It is important to consider how these images operate because we know that the information they carry (not a good way to say it, but shorthand) can get distorted as is travels toward us, and that's why things at a distance look blurry, smaller, etc. In other words, Epicurus knows the obvious truth that just because we perceive something in a certain way (color, size, etc) we don't know for sure at first glance that our conclusion about the thing is accurate. We have to account for distortions of space and intervening interference in order to process the sensations we receive and assemble them into a conclusion in which we can have confidence.
That's why the discussion about images (chapter 5 I think) is so important - we know mistakes are possible, so we have to be confident that we can study the senses and process the information properly so as to make good judgments and correct the errors that occur.
Many modern commentators seem to dismiss all this as quaint irrelevance and antiquated because they don't address why all this is important (and frequently they are total skeptics themselves and don't care to address with sympathy anyone who claims that knowledge is possible.)
So let us know if any questions.
Like · Reply · 4 · February 20 at 9:42pm · Edited
Eric Reynolds I'm late to this discussion but was fascinated by the free will question. I know it's a centuries old debate and I admit to not being fully versed in its nuances. So forgive this probably simplistic question.
I think of free will as the ability to make choices. I appreciate that the phrase “free will” is potentially loaded with religious overtones so I am just thinking of it in terms of the ability to assess information and make selections about it being correct, valuable, etc.
While I certainly see the logic of the view that if the universe is mechanical such that one thing determines another, and if we are products of that universe, then we must be determined and everything we do or think is therefore determined. It makes sense. But this is where I stumble.
If I am a scientist wanting to validate or invalidate a hypothesis, I have test it and assess the results of the experiment. If I have no free will, then whatever assessment I make is determined so I cannot actually know if it’s correct. Since I had no choice in my conclusion, how can I know that conclusion is right? I suppose one can say that logical deduction itself is what tells be something is correct or not, but how do I know logic is correct. I’m still faced with the same problem.
I know there are whole books out there that refute the notion of free will. But I still get stuck on this point. How can I have any knowledge if I cannot make any choices about what is true or false?
Unlike · Reply · 2 · February 21 at 7:48am · Edited
Cassius Amicus The texts are clear that Epicurus held that it was important to affirm that within natural limits we have the power to make choices that affect our futures. So of course what you are asking is "how do I know this to be true?"("if I am a scientist wanting to validate or invalidate a hypothesis.)
As you said there are tremendous numbers of arguments that can be employed on both sides, but here is the way I look at it - I first go back to the issue of knowledge, and to the Epicurean framework for determining truth based on the senses, anticipations, and pain and pleasure. Using those faculties, we observe that it appears to us that we (and other higher animals) can choose all sorts of things. This ability appears validated by the senses (and by the other legs too, I think) and so we have a starting point that we are observing something that is firmly established by all the sensory evidence available to us.
To me, the issue then goes back to one of the core issues that separates the Epicurean canon and the Platonic/Aristotelian worship of reason as above the senses. Sure it is possible to assert premises and theories that everything is just an illusion and we are just robots with all our thoughts predetermined. We can assert that with our "logic" but do we have any proof of it through the senses and through observation?
Whenever clear and firm evidence of the senses establishes something (and all human experience establishes that we have at least limited free will) then if we are devoted to "true reason" (reason which is based on evidence) it is a fallacy to seriously entertain a logical theory which is not only based on no evidence, but contradicts all the firm evidence of our experience. To do so would be to "reject any single sensation" (actually it would be to reject multitudes of sensations) which is pointed out as fallacious in PD24.
PD24: "If you reject any single sensation and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion as to the appearance awaiting confirmation and that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will confound all other sensations as well with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgment. And if among the mental images created by your opinion you affirm both that which awaits confirmation and that which does not, you will not escape error, since you will have preserved the whole cause of doubt in every judgment between what is right and what is wrong."
Once we throw out the observations/sensations that we have at least limited free will, then we have committed the error of PD24 because we are elevating abstract logic over the observable facts of reality. Logic without facts to support it is fantasy, but some people still insist on dignifying that sort of fantasy (elaborate constructs which are self-consistent but not verified by reality) with the name "logic."
This is a very complicated subject, and much more needs to be said on it, but in closing this post I would cite the following section from Lucretius Book 2, where you see Lucretius responding to the deterministic argument by deducing free will from his observation of the horse. The point is that he is meeting the argument by OBSERVATION, not by accepting the unverifiable premises of the deterministic argument:
"Once again, if every motion is always linked on, and the new always arises from the old in order determined, nor by swerving do the first-beginnings make a certain start of movement to break through the decrees of fate, so that cause may not follow cause from infinite time; whence comes this free will for living things all over the earth, whence, I ask, is it wrested from fate, this will whereby we move forward, where pleasure leads each one of us, and swerve likewise in our motions neither at determined times nor in a determined direction of place, but just where our mind has carried us? For without doubt it is his own will which gives to each one a start for this movement, and from the will the motions pass flooding through the limbs. Do you not see too how, when the barriers are flung open, yet for an instant of time the eager might of the horses cannot burst out so suddenly as their mind itself desires?"
Also, as a final point, check this reference from Lucretius Book 1. The point here is that unless we have confidence in the clear evidence of our senses, it is useless to attempt to "reason":
"But now, to weave again at the web, which is the task of my discourse, all nature then, as it is of itself, is built of these two things: for there are bodies and the void, in which they are placed and where they move hither and thither. For that body exists is declared by the feeling which all share alike; and ***unless faith in this feeling be firmly grounded at once and prevail, there will be naught to which we can make appeal about things hidden, so as to prove aught by the reasoning of the mind***. "
Like · Reply · 5 · February 21 at 8:40am · Edited
Neo Anderthal This comment would make an excellent article/separate post as it contains the core idea of Epicurus regarding observation of nature.
Like · Reply · 1 · February 21 at 6:37pm
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Kieren Moore Psychology not only confirms how easily mislead/mistaken our senses/perceptions can be, it also lends much support to the deterministic web of genetics (nature), developmental (nurture), psychological, environmental, social and cultural influences that determine who we are ... though I suspect there is a placebo-like effect (a very real thing) to believing in a greater/lesser (ie at least some) notion of free will.
Of course - beliefs have very real effects upon our thoughts, and therefore our neural pathways and actions ... but none of that is to say that the belief is therefore true (untrue beliefs have just as much real effect in this way, as we know all-too-well ...)
Like · Reply · February 21 at 9:49am
Eric Reynolds Thanks Kieren. I'm still stuck though. How can psychologists make that conclusion about sensory errors, or "lend support to the deterministic web" if they are not free to decide whether their evidence is correct?
Like · Reply · February 21 at 9:58am
Kieren Moore The scientific method is the best we have (at least, in my view and those of many, many others ... ?). It's the best we can do, to mitigate against the sensory and perceptual biases/mistakes we are liable to making. Now, psychology is often referred to as something of a 'soft science', not least because the subject matter (human brains/CNS, and sometimes adjunct systems eg enteric, effectively) is anything but homogenous between individual subjects/'samples' (when compared with the matter studied by chemists, etc), the web of variables is difficult to control/influence (and in many cases, would be unethical to do so, even where/if we could - see eg the Stanford Prison Experiment, which would be unlikely to get ethics approval these days!).
We can only study/examine *anything* through the schema of human experience, though - so, whilst I take your (possibly mischievous ?) point, and it is a valid one - we have no choice but to struggle to understand things from within our humanity ... ... the more we do so, however, the more 'tinted glasses' we find ourselves wearing, and can thereafter adjust for in our perception/thinking ... eg 'fundamental attribution error' and 'self-serving bias', not to even touch on biological, social, cultural, etc factors ...
Like · Reply · February 21 at 10:14am
Kieren Moore To perhaps answer that more directly, it is reason/logic that leads us to the scientific method, which leads us (in combination with the former) to other conclusions. Then, one should also remember that such scientific conclusions are tentative (always subject to falsification (Popper)), and that that goes for everything (even including scientific theories and facts; though these carry impressive amounts of supporting evidence, with no reliable evidence against them).
Like · Reply · February 21 at 10:19am
Kieren Moore Or, even more directly(?perhaps), you're not - whether you accept the scientific method (or something else, eg faith?!) will be determined by the myriad factors mentioned above (though I'd strongly suspect developmental/environmental/social/cultural influences to weigh heavily here ... though [fluid] intelligence ("gf"), which seems largely genetic/biological, may have a substantial influence (as may [crystallised] intelligence (gc), but that is effectively developmental/environmental/social/cultural again, as (relevantly) here, that would be your accumulated/comparative learning/knowledge of/about various epistemological alternatives, including the scientific method). There is much peer-reviewed evidence to support the idea that our first 7 years are sensitive (if not critical) periods for the development if many of our personality traits and schema for perceiving the world, and most of us have little say in what influences we are exposed to during those formative years (and the 'choices' 'we make' thereafter are heavily influenced - if not completely determined ... - by the effects of those influences on us [ie, our neural/CNS/associated biology ... (unless you want to hypothesise/assert "souls", or some such ... ?)]
Like · Reply · February 21 at 10:34am · Edited
Eric Reynolds I am not being mischievous. It's a sincere question and I apologize if I'm coming across as a smartass. I agree with everything you say about the value of the scientific method, the ability of the human mind to make mistakes, tentative conclusions etc. But the claim being made is that there is NO free will at all. This means we cannot know if our conclusions are correct since our assessments were determined. The same goes for reason/logic. How do we know it is correct? How do we distinguish true from false? There has to be some form of free will in order to assess whether logic is correct or not. Remember, I'm defining free will as the ability to make choices, in this case to make decisions about scientific evidence. Yes, we contend with a host of influences that lurk in the psyche. And no, I am not inserting the notion of a "soul". I do not actually understand how our free will came to be. But at this point, I personally accept that it's real.
Like · Reply · February 21 at 10:58am
Kieren Moore No, not at all - I was joking "?"
How does whether our assessment was determined or not, affect (determine? ?) whether that assessment is correct or not? Why would it need to be free (or not) to be (more/completely) correct?
Like · Reply · February 21 at 11:10am
Kieren Moore In questions/discussions such as yours/these, "choices" is a very loaded word ... ?
Like · Reply · February 21 at 11:12am
Kieren Moore That's fine - I'm not looking to 'convert' anyone; just (re)stating my view/reading on it, as best I can ... and, as discussed, it may well/arguably has (positive) utility, whether 'true'/an actual thing, or not ...
But many phenomena with an up/light side, have a corollary down/dark side ...
Just as your belief in free will may somehow enable you to do things you otherwise couldn't/wouldn't have (?), does it not also mean you hold others at greater fault if they (don't) do something you think they should(n't) have ... ?
And which is more important to you - whether it's true, or whether it has utility for you (with or without some negative/associated trade-off re your perception/attitude towards others and their (in)actions ...)
Seems there may be some parallels there with the 'fundamental attribution error' and flip-side 'self-serving bias' I mentioned earlier ... ... in respect of which, note that these are (often unhealthy, in that they are based on false/exaggerated impressions/attributions) coping/defence mechanisms, which have utility for us (make us feel good/better about ourselves, and hence naturally appeal to us ... [which, in itself, is cause for suspicion! ?])
Like · Reply · February 21 at 11:23am
Jason Baker "Seems there may be some parallels there with the 'fundamental attribution error' and flip-side 'self-serving bias' I mentioned earlier ... ... in respect of which, note that these are (often unhealthy, in that they are based on false/exaggerated impressions/attributions) coping/defence mechanisms, which have utility for us (make us feel good/better about ourselves, and hence naturally appeal to us ... [which, in itself, is cause for suspicion! ?])"
You're a big fan of trotting out fundamental attribution errors and the self-serving bias aren't you Kieren?
The whole point of science is to feel good/better about ourselves. We study to understand nature in order to more accurately predict the future in order to build a bulwark against suffering, that is to say, to ensure our current and future pleasure. Why do you work out?
Everything is done for pleasure, there's nothing suspicious about it. When someone says pleasure isn't the aim, /that/ is suspicious. Your determinism seems like a zero-sum game, everyone is a winner or loser in the cosmic game of dice. O Fortuna!
I totally understand denigrating Libertarian Free Will, but it doesn't follow that strict determinism is the answer.
Like · Reply · February 21 at 12:38pm · Edited
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Cassius Amicus "Psychology not only confirms how easily mislead/mistaken our senses/perceptions can be..." << Do we need to psychology to tell us that we need glasses to read street signs while driving?
"...social and cultural influences that determine who we are.." <<Nobody denies that those things INFLUENCE "who we are" but nobody can tell me that those things REQUIRE me to get out of bed at 8:00 AM rather than 8:05 AM
"a placebo-like effect (a very real thing) to believing in a greater/lesser (ie at least some) notion of free will." <<< So it is good for us to study nature and live successfully because of a "placebo effect"? "Achieving pleasurable living" is a much less dismissive and more accurate description.
"none of that is to say that the belief is therefore true" << And thus you are going to go down the road of saying that no truth and no knowledge is possible? Why did you bother to post if you thought that was the case? Are you going to say you HAD to post because you were predetermined to do so?
"He who asserts that everything happens by necessity can hardly find fault with one who denies that everything happens by necessity; by his own theory this very argument is voiced by necessity."
Like · Reply · 2 · February 21 at 11:02am
Elli Pensa
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Cassius Amicus "We can only study/examine *anything* through the schema of human experience, though - so, whilst I take your (possibly mischievous ?) point, and it is a valid one - we have no choice but to struggle to understand things from within our humanity ."
K...See More
Like · Reply · 2 · February 21 at 11:05am
Cassius Amicus And let's not forget: "Necessity is an evil; but there is no necessity for continuing to live with necessity." Vatican Saying 9
Like · Reply · 2 · February 21 at 11:08am · Edited
Elli Pensa
Like · Reply · February 21 at 11:20am
Elli Pensa Wait a minute, what is going on here ? Psychiatry is a science of medicine that we the people think and demanding to heal the persons. Of what I read here from the comments by mister Moore it makes me sick. That is a good criterion to run away from any therapist saying to you that you are a well-tuned robot determined machine.
Like · Reply · 1 · February 21 at 11:21am · Edited
Kieren Moore I'm not really a fan of psychiatry - they don't really understand how/why many of the drugs that seem to work, actually 'work' ... for some people ... Though many perceive/attribute improvement in mood etc to them, so more power to them ...
Like · Reply · February 21 at 11:40am
Elli Pensa You say I am not a fan of psychiatry, because they do not know how the drugs seem to work. And somewhere else you said that you trust the science. But how you trust the science if the science does not know this or does not understand that.? But really what exaclty you do know or you do not know ?
All these arguments you make is to contradict them for the sake of the contradiction, just for taking seriously your first argument that the free will does not exist.? I think is better for you to admitt now that "one thing you know that you don't know anything".
hmm here you are, a Sceptic, the worse kind of a person for making any philosophical or other argument to draw any conclusion false or right on every issue.
Finally the only thing that I read from your comments is that you make the persons to not feel safe, tranquil and pleased never...thus, thanks for you participation.
Like · Reply · February 21 at 12:33pm
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Cassius Amicus Kieren Moore It appears I need to me more direct. What interest do you have in Epicurean philosophy? If you are simply looking for opportunities to contradict Epicurus and advocate hard determinism then there are plenty of places on Facebook to do that. Please identify your interest before you proceed further as there people in this thread with a sincere interest in Epicurus and you are not going to hijack it for anti-Epicurean advocacy.
Like · Reply · 2 · February 21 at 11:21am
Kieren Moore Whoa ... I have interest in all philosophy. I'm only back on this particular post because I was tagged/replied to today on an earlier comment. I didn't decide to come here and advocate for anything, per se - just discussing the topic from another point of view, which happens to be a field of current further study for me. That's all. And responding to questions that were directed specifically to me (the answers to which obviously represent my own views only). That, and it's a most pleasurable topic to discuss, I think. But if you'd prefer it, I'll stop. I mostly lurk to learn more about the Epicurean perspective on whatever is brought up from time-to-time.
Like · Reply · February 21 at 11:35am
Cassius Amicus Kieran I recognize that the thread was reactivated so your comment is understood and accepted. However please also understand that we have a group "purpose" that we need to enforce as well. Unfortunately life is short and resources are limited and if we are going to be successful in reaching goals we have to act to keep discussions in line with the goal....
Like · Reply · 2 · February 21 at 12:30pm · Edited
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Luciano Throne On the stoic side "emotions and desires are to be supressed".
Emotions should not be supressed, nor the stoic individual should be unemotional. What Stoicism intends is to control PASSION, the degenerate form of EMOTIONS. The idea isn't not to feel, it is to maintain control on feelings to the point where these do not affect our power of choice and action, as you must act upon reason. For example I get slapped in the face. The passional response would be to enter a wrathful state, and from that point striking back, under the controls of my feelings. On the other hand, the stoic approach would be to "feel" everything you ought to feel, and elaborate a response (either walk away or slap back, whatever it may be) under the operation of reason.
Like · Reply · February 21 at 9:31pm
Elli Pensa Luciano Throne Yes, the emotions of the stoics are supressed by the too much "reason". All your teachers are teaching the "apathy" and we know what this greek word denotes. In your example there is the evidence how much supressed you felt to react on a slap in the face.
Because, according to your example there is no much need of reason to understand that to get slapped in the face provoked to you PAIN and your cheek was getting red. Usually a slap in the face was came from your parents, and it was an action of punishment (in which I do not agree with these parental actions of violence of course) to understand maybe that you were a naughty boy.
But in a situation of a danger in a street e.g. a thief that wants to steal you something, and he probably would give you a fist and not a slap in the face, in this situation also there is not much need of reason to realize that you should give to him whatever he wants, because he is like a "hungry beast". In another situation if you get slapped in the face by your wife, there is no need of reason too, because is better to change your wife and find someone else. So simple are the things, I suppose.
Like · Reply · February 22 at 2:38am
Cassius Amicus Luciano Throne "Emotions should not be suppressed nor should the stoic person be unemotional." Citation please?
Like · Reply · 1 · February 22 at 3:05am
Luciano Throne Cassius Amicus Elli Pensa "To be free of passion yet full of love", "To show intuitive simpathy for friends, tolerance to amateurs and sloppy thinkers" (both Meditations, 1.9). Also Stoics encouraged actively engaging on the matters of public affair and social matters, even tho I do not have a quote for that atm; all this and more clearly can't exist without emotion. It's an over-simplification and a reductive statement to say that "emotions should be supressed/opressed/repressed" according to the Stoics. Just tryna make it clear since it's one of the biggest "complaints" of the stoic community, the biggest misleading fact about stoicism: that the individual should not feel.
Like · Reply · February 22 at 8:08am
Elli Pensa Luciano Throne "Sympathy", under the regime of your principles that are DUTY and FATE is not a FRANK sympathy. It is a forced sympathy. It is just a convienient sympathy to accept comforting all the reality of the world that you can't stand no way. Sy...See More
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Cassius Amicus Of course the first cite we get is a muddy statement from Marcus Aurelius..... "Passion" is not" love"? I suppose we're talking about "platonic love" ....
Like · Reply · February 22 at 8:11am
Luciano Throne Emotions are healthy and normal; but they turn into passions when they choose and act for you. When they posess you, it's time for you to take control back. Also I find it rude to propose an activity like this (asking proof of something anyone with minimum contact to stoic philosophy would know), and to disregard the evidence given in such a manner; so if you don't like Marcus Aurelius or the evidence presented is a whole other thing, stoics have something to adress the "unemotion" thing. This is not me trying stoicism to overlap epicureanism or whatever. You asked us to contribute, I can do it from the stoic side as I've read much more than epicureanism but I really don't find your reaction constructive, sorry.
Like · Reply · February 22 at 8:36am
Luciano Throne Also it's pretty undeniable the fact that "emotions should be supressed" it's an over-simplifying statement, sounds almost biased and trying to convince me. Even if it was true, it is never that simple, cmon guys its philosophy not math, what we today learn and absorb from these men are intrerpretations and constructions based on interpretations based on sources so.. chill u know
Like · Reply · February 22 at 8:39am
Hiram Crespo Luciano Throne i once read about a father who lost his son and reacted with complete indifference, being praised as a model of Stoic behavior. I forget his name. Is this not canon stoicism?
Unlike · Reply · 3 · February 22 at 8:54am
Cassius Amicus Marcus Aurelius was a synthesizer and not a founder of the Stoic School. Chrysippus, Zeno, Epictetus, etc are the real authorities and there are many cites that Elli and others have provided showing the stoic war on emotion. This one cite is muddy at best and doesnt at all override the founders.
Like · Reply · 1 · February 22 at 9:01am
Cassius Amicus Where is the Stoic equivalent to Epicurus saying that the wise man "....will be more susceptible of emotion than other men: that will be no hindrance to his wisdom. "
Like · Reply · 2 · February 22 at 9:03am
Several recent emails from a reader have reminded me that physics /science is an important part of Epicurean philosophy. Epicurus did not just presume that "living pleasurably" should be the goal of life, he went back to the basics to establish that the universe operates by natural (non-supernatural) means, and that pleasure is therefore the faculty given us by nature to serve as the basis for our choices. He then emphasized, in his letter to Herodotus and to Pythocles, how important it is to understand scientific basics so that we have confidence in these conclusions.
The ending of the letter to Pythocles is a good place to nail this down:
All this, Pythocles, you should keep in mind; for then you will escape a long way from myth, and you will be able to view in their connection the instances which are similar to these. But above all give yourself up to the study of first principles and of infinity and of kindred subjects, and further of the standards and of the feelings and of the end for which we choose between them. For to study these subjects together will easily enable you to understand the causes of the particular phenomena. And those who have not fully accepted this, in proportion as they have not done so, will be ill acquainted with these very subjects, nor have they secured the end for which they ought to be studied.
What brings this to mind are several emails from a reader (A. Singh) who tells me of his interest in astronomy, and forwarded to me several papers that he had produced on areas of interest to him. I have linked those three papers below, and also copied here a number of links to Youtube videos with demonstrations of electrical and magnetic effects which support them:
Stellar Metamorphasis * Demystifying Black Holes * Nuclear Fusion Processes In Stars
Supporting video:
Can Crushing Via Electricity
Electrical Pinch Effect
Induction Heating - A Quick Demonstration
These Hearts Are On Fire
Pinch Effect Interaction
Thanks very much to Mr. Singh for these papers and the permission to link to them.
On the same topic, I should remind everyone that Alexander Rios has a separate Facebook page "Epicurean Touchpoints" where he focuses on links of interest to science topics relevant to Epicurean philosophy. I encourage everyone to "like" that page to be sure to get Alexander's posts in case they are not cross-posted to the main Epicurean philosophy group.
Thanks again for this important reminder that not only do we wish to live pleasurably, as much as anything else we need to have confidence that living pleasurably is our appropriate goal in life, and the key to that investigation is the study of Nature.
Let's close with this reminder from Lucretius Book 1 (Munro translation):
Wherefore we must well grasp the principle of things above, the principle by which the courses of the sun and moon go on, the force by which every thing on earth proceeds, but above all we must find out by keen reason what the soul and the nature of the mind consist of, and what thing it is-which meets us when awake and frightens our minds, if we are under the influence of disease; meets and frightens us too when we are buried in sleep; so that we seem to ‘see and hear speaking to us face to face them who are dead, whose bones earth holds in its embrace. ... This terror then and darkness of mind must be dispelled not by the rays of the sun and glittering shafts of day, but by the aspect and the law of nature; the warp of whose design we shall begin with this first principle, nothing is ever gotten out of nothing by divine power.
September 13 at 12:46am
"Flattery." Akin to "cookery." That's what we're doing, according to Socrates/Plato. We've touched on Philebus before, but the name "Callicles" from "Gorgias" is going to start appearing here regularly. Here is one source from which we can link as we discss a text which it is likely every ancient Epicurean had to be prepared to respond - Plato's attack on pleasure as the good: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Gorgias
There are many arguments against pleasure here which deserve to be laid out one by one, and Callicles' errors in giving in to Socrates dissected and refuted.
Just one excerpt of ***many*** that we need t examine, all of which set up arguments to which Epicurus had to respond and which provide context to Epicurean texts which are otherwise obscure:
"Socrates Then pleasure, like everything else, is to be sought for the sake of that which is good, and not that which is good for the sake of pleasure?
Callicles To be sure.
Socrates But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are evil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail?
Callicles He must have art.
Socrates Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and Polus; I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were some processes which aim only at pleasure, and know nothing of a better and worse, and there are other processes which know good and evil. And I considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but only an experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with pleasure, and that the art of medicine was of the class which is concerned with the good........."
September 13 at 10:51am
Here's a relatively minor point, but I think this illustrates how we can gain context for otherwise obscure Epicurean sayings by looking back at earlier arguments to which the Epicureans were likely responding. One such issue is whether it is best to present arguments in question/answer form or by extended narrative. Here's Vatican saying 26 for the Epicurean side:
"26. One must presume that long and short arguments contribute to the same end."
Taken by itself this doesn't have much meaning, til we see that Cicero touches on the same issue in "On Ends":
TORQUATUS: "Very well then," said he, "this is what I will do, I will expound a single topic, and that the most important. Natural Philosophy we will postpone; though I will undertake to prove to you both your swerve of the atoms and size of the sun, and also that very many errors of Democritus were criticized and corrected by Epicurus. But on the present occasion I will speak about pleasure; not that I have anything original to contribute, yet I am confident that what I say will command even your acceptance."
CICERO: "Be assured," I said, "that I shall not be obstinate, but will gladly own myself convinced if you can prove your case to my satisfaction."
TORQUATUS: "I shall do so," he rejoined, "provided you are as fair-minded as you promise. But I prefer to employ continuous discourse rather than question and answer."
CICERO: "As you please," said I. So he began.
And here it is traceable back to Plato in Gorgias (where it's mentioned several times):
"SOCRATES: And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias, as we are at present doing, and reserve for another occasion the longer mode of speech which Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise, and answer shortly the questions which are asked of you?
GORGIAS: Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do my best to make them as short as possible; for a part of my profession is that I can be as short as any one.
SOCRATES: That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method now, and the longer one at some other time."
It's possible that VS 26 is not a reference to dialectic, but it seems to me it probably is. Regardless, it is interesting to think about why Socrates so preferred the dialectic method, and why the Epicureans preferred the "continuous discourse" method.
Sarcasm alert! Cicero's commentary on the Stoics' terminology of some things as "preferred":
"As I understand, [the Stoics] will accuse the ancients of certain grave errors in other matters, which that ardent seeker after truth [Zeno] found himself quite unable to tolerate. What, [Zeno] asked, could have been more insufferably foolish and perverse than to take good health, freedom from all pain, or soundness of eyesight and of the other senses, and class them as goods, instead of saying that there was nothing whatever to choose between these things and their opposites? According to [Zeno], all these things which the ancients called good, were not good, but 'preferred'; and so also with bodily excellences, it was foolish of the ancients to call them 'desirable for their own sakes'; they were not 'desirable' but 'worth taking'; and in short, speaking generally, a life bountifully supplied with all the other things in accordance with nature, in addition to virtue, was not 'more desirable,' but only 'more worth taking' than a life of virtue and virtue alone; and although virtue of itself can render life as happy as it is possible for it to be, yet there are some things that Wise Men lack at the very moment of supreme happiness; and accordingly they do their best to protect themselves from pain, disease and infirmity."
What acuteness of intellect! What a satisfactory reason for the creation of a new philosophy!"
Cicero, On Ends, Book 4
A key difference that separates Epicurean philosophy from Stoicism and other Greek philosophies is the identification of pleasure as the goal of life. Too many people abstract this word pleasure to the ambiguous word "happiness," which allows them to presume that all philosophies have the same goal. It is essential to see that this is not so. Here is Cicero revealing that the Stoics choose to ignore the body, and to elevate the "intellect" to all that matters. In so doing the Stoics conclude that the happy life entails nothing but "morality of life," and all joy in life, and all other emotion, is swept away in an impossible dream:
Cicero: "Now then let us call upon your [Stoic] leaders, or better upon yourself [Cato] (for who is more qualified to speak for your school?) to explain this: how in the world do you contrive, starting from the same first principles, to reach the conclusion that the Chief Good is morality of life? — for that is equivalent to your 'life in agreement with virtue' or 'life in harmony with nature.' By what means or at what point did you suddenly discard the body, and all those things which are in accordance with nature but out of our control, and lastly duty itself?
My question then is, how comes it that so many things that Nature strongly recommends have been suddenly abandoned by Wisdom? Even if we were not seeking the Chief Good of man but of some living creature that consisted solely of a mind (let us allow ourselves to imagine such a creature, in order to facilitate our discovery of the truth), even so that mind would not accept this End of yours. For such a being would ask for health and freedom from pain, and would also desire its own preservation, and set up as its End to live according to nature, which means, as I said, to possess either all or most and the most important of the things which are in accordance with nature.
In fact you may construct a living creature of any sort you like, but even if it be devoid of a body like our imaginary being, nevertheless its mind will be bound to possess certain attributes analogous to those of the body, and consequently it will be impossible to set up for it an end of Goods on any other lines than those which I have laid down. Chrysippus, on the other hand, in his survey of the different species of living things states that in some the body is the principal part, in others the mind, while there are some that are equally endowed in respect of either; and then he proceeds to discuss what constitutes the ultimate good proper to each species.
Man he so classified as to make the mind the principal part in him; and yet he so defined man's End as to make it appear, not that he is principally mind, but that he consists of nothing else. But the only case in which it would be correct to place the Chief Good in virtue alone is if there existed a creature consisting solely of pure intellect, with the further proviso that this intellect possessed nothing of its own that was in accordance with nature, as bodily health is. But it is impossible even to imagine a self-consistent picture of what such a creature would be like."
Cicero, On Ends, Book 4
Cassius Amicus
September 14 at 6:05pm
In Stoicism there are many dangerous parallels to Christianity and other monotheistic religions, one of which is the condemnation of all who have not achieved perfection or salvation as they define it. In the following excerpt we see Cicero condemning this core doctrine of Stoicism by addressing Cato, the arch-Stoic:
"But proceed further; for we now come to the doctrine, of which you [Cato] gave such a masterly summary, that all men's folly, injustice and other vices are alike and all sins are equal; and that those who by nature and training have made considerable progress towards virtue, unless they have actually attained to it, are utterly miserable, and there is nothing whatever to choose between their existence and that of the wickedest of mankind, so that the great and famous Plato, supposing he was not a Wise Man, lived a no better and no happier life than any unprincipled scoundrel.
And this, if you please, is your revised and corrected version of the old philosophy, a version that could not possibly be produced in public life, in the law-courts, in the senate! For who could tolerate such a way of speaking in one who claimed to be an authority on wise and moral conduct? Who would allow him to alter the names of things, and while really holding the same opinions as everyone else, to impose different names on things to which he attaches the same meanings as other people, just altering the terms while leaving the ideas themselves untouched? Could an advocate wind up his defense of a client by declaring that exile and confiscation of property are not evils? that they are 'to be rejected,' but not 'to be shunned'? that it is not a judge's duty to show mercy? Or supposing him to be addressing a meeting of the people; Hannibal is at the gates and has flung a javelin over the city walls; could he say that captivity, enslavement, death, loss of country are no evils? Could the senate, decreeing a triumph to Africanus, use the formula, 'whereas by reason of his valour,' or 'good fortune,' if no one but the Wise Man can truly be said to possess either valour or good fortune?
What sort of philosophy then is this, which speaks the ordinary language in public, but in its treatises employs an idiom of its own? and that though the doctrines which the Stoics express in their own peculiar terms contain no actual novelty the ideas remain the same, though clothed in another dress. Why, what difference does it make whether you call wealth, power, health 'goods,' or 'things preferred,' when he who calls them goods assigns no more value to them than you who style exactly the same things 'preferred'?
This is why so eminent and high-minded an authority as Panaetius, a worthy member of the famous circle of Scipio and Laelius, in his epistle to Quintus Tubero on the endurance of pain, has nowhere made what ought to have been his most effective point, if it could be shown to be true, namely that pain is not an evil; instead he defines its nature and properties, estimates the degree of its divergence from nature, and lastly prescribes the method by which it is to be endured.
So that by his vote, seeing that he was a Stoic, your terminological fatuities seem to me to stand condemned."
Cassius Amicus
September 17 at 8:47pm
In one of the nearby threads there is an ongoing discussion of "absence of pain." Thanks to Eric Sherman I was recently rereading Cicero's On Ends, and there is a passage there that those interested in this topic ought to know about. In this criticism of Epicurus by Cicero I think we can see that there is more going on than what meets the eye when people pull out a line that is translated as "By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul" and elevate it to imply that the ordinary definition of pleasure has been eradicated. Had this been true, Cicero could not have written the following (note particularly **as he in fact does**):
Cicero: "Had Epicurus cleared up the meaning of pleasure, he would not have fallen into such confusion. Either he would have upheld pleasure in the same sense as Aristippus, that is, an agreeable and delightful excitation of the sense, which is what even dumb cattle, if they could speak, would call pleasure; or, if he preferred to use an idiom of his own, instead of speaking the language of the Danaans one and all, men of Mycenae, Scions of Athens, and the rest of the Greeks invoked in these anapaests, he might have confined the name of pleasure to this state of freedom from pain, and despised pleasure as Aristippus understands it; or else, if he approved of both sorts of pleasure, as in fact he does, then he ought to combine together pleasure and absence of pain, and profess two ultimate Goods. Many distinguished philosophers have as a matter of fact thus interpreted the ultimate good as composite. For instance, Aristotle combined the exercise of virtue with well-being lasting throughout a complete lifetime; Callipho united pleasure with moral worth; Diodorus to moral worth added freedom from pain. Epicurus would have followed their example, had he coupled the view we are now discussing, which as it is belongs to Hieronymus, with the old doctrine of Aristippus. For there is a real difference of opinion between them, and accordingly each sets up his own separate End; and as both speak unimpeachable Greek, Aristippus, who calls pleasure the Chief Good, does not count absence of pain as pleasure, while Hieronymus, who makes the Chief Good absence of pain, never employs the name pleasure to denote this negation of pain, and in fact does not reckon pleasure among things desirable at all."
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Whether or not you agree with my "full cup" argument as presented on mynewepicurean.com page, it is clear from this passage that Cicero understood Epicurus to have embraced pleasure as ordinarily understood by all men, including Aristippus. It's a very important point also to see that Epicurus had rejected the position of Hieronymus, who according to Cicero had in fact erected "absence of pain" as the goal and specifically rejected ordinary pleasure in so doing. This passage shows that Epicurus would have been fully aware of this different arguments, and he clearly rejected the archtypical "absence of pain" argument, or Cicero would have explained how Epicurus and Hieronymus were the same.
So while we have to make an educated guess at the truth, in the absence of Epicurus' own words explaining this, whatever theory we follow cannot eject "ordinary pleasure" from the good / end of life, or else we end up embracing Hieronymus, who Epicurus rejected.
Personally, I think the key to unlocking this is to realize that Epicurus was dealing with an existing battlefield of ideas that included not only Hieronymus and Aristippus but Plato and others who employed the "limits" argument to argue that pleasure could not be the goal of life as it (in their view) has no limit. In order to meet this argument, Epicurus had to show that pleasure *does* have a limit, so he pointed out that the pleasures of life cannot be increased beyond our capacity to experience them, and our capacity to experience more pleasure is gone when we fill our experience with pleasure and succeed in ejecting all pain from our experience. There's nothing extraordinary about this state of pure pleasure that results - no new or unusual type of pleasure is involved - but being able to identify this theoretical state as possible essential for meeting the Platonic argument that the highest good must have a limit. {Note: In Epicurean theory this state is not only possible, but actual -- at least for "gods." One way of stating our goal in life is that we work toward the goal of becoming "gods among men."}
It seems to me that is why the "absence of pain" passage is there, and this also explains the similar reference that we have no need of [further] pleasure when all pain has been eliminated.
But I readily confess that the letter to Menoecus can appear to us to be confusing. But I also suggest that the letter as written was *not* confusing to Menoeceus, because any student of Epicurus in 300 BC would have been fully familiar with the existing anti-pleasure majority position. Any educated Epicurean reading the letter would instantly have understood it as a complete refutation of the anti-pleasure/pain position, and an explanation of why the other philosophers were wrong. Our disability is that we no longer have the instant recognition of the anti-pleasure arguments. But that is something that those of us in this group and elsewhere who support Epicurean philosophy can work to remedy.
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8Elli Pensa, Haris Dimitriadis and 6 others
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Eric Sherman "The pleasure we pursue is not that kind alone which directly affects our physical being with a delightful feeling,—a positively agreeable perception of the senses; on the contrary, the greatest pleasure according to us is that which is experienced as a result of the complete removal of pain. When we are released from pain, the mere sensation of complete emancipation and relief from uneasiness is in itself a source of gratification. But everything that causes gratification is a pleasure (just as everything that causes annoyance is a pain). Therefore the complete removal of pain has correctly been termed a pleasure. For example, when hunger and thirst are banished by food and drink, the mere fact of getting rid of uneasiness brings a resultant pleasure in its train. So generally, the removal of pain causes pleasure to take its place. Epicurus consequently maintained that there is no such thing as a neutral state of feeling intermediate between pleasure and pain; for the state supposed by some thinkers to be neutral, being characterized as it is by entire absence of pain, is itself, he held, a pleasure, and, what is more, a pleasure of the highest order. A man who is conscious of his condition at all must necessarily feel either pleasure or pain. But complete absence of pain Epicurus considers to be the limit and highest point of pleasure; beyond this point pleasure may vary in kind, but it cannot vary in intensity or degree."
-Torquatus
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Cassius Amicus Yes, that's the passage in issue. No doubt it was written by Epicurus for an important purpose, but that purpose could not reasonably have been to upend and invert everything else he had previously taught about pleasure. Just like a contract in a court of law, or interpretation of a statute, if there is a way to harmonize the totality to give effect to every provision of what is written, that is the way to the preferred conclusion - at least as long as we think that the writer was a consistent thinker!
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Cassius Amicus And that is exactly what Cicero, lawyer that he is, refuses to do - which is the technique of a lawyer seeking victory over his opponent, not someone who is trying to harmonize words that may seem to conflict, but do not in fact conflict when read in a certain way.
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Eric Sherman So are you arguing that the pleasure in which Epicurus promoted was something more or different than absence of emotional and physical pain? If so how is pleasure different and why is it important and can you show me textual evidence please.
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Ekshesh Bekele Pleasure is not the abscence of pain. However, absence of pain is the highest limit of pleasure.
Unlike · Reply · 1 · September 17 at 9:31pm
Ekshesh Bekele In my understanding of Epicurus
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Eric Sherman I'm sorry that just doesn't make sense to me.
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Eric Sherman I'd also like to point out that pleasure as I understand Epicurus is predominantly absence of EMOTIONAL Pain. It's apparent that tetrapharmakon is about easing all forms of anxiety-gods, death, sustenance and pain
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Ekshesh Bekele I meant that there are different forms of pleasure. To say pleasure is the absence of pain would mean there aren't other forms of pleasure that aren't the absence of pain, which would be false. The distinguishing characteristic of pleasure as an absence of pain is that it doesn't get better than that.
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Cassius Amicus I agree with this statement largely, but the "it" in "it doesn't get any better than that" still leaves a little wiggle room for ambiguity."
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Eric Sherman Right, but I'd like to see where Epicurus defines it as such
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Eric Sherman I think I have far weightier evidence
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Ekshesh Bekele When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or willful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sexual lust, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul.
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Ekshesh Bekele " By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul."
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Eric Sherman Yes and even more that it is sober reasoning that BANISHES beliefs that cause anxiety !
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Eric Sherman What are those false beliefs? Superstitions, religion, Malevolent and intervening gods, that life and basic goods are hard to procure and that pain is difficult to bear.
Unlike · Reply · 1 · September 17 at 9:56pm · Edited
Cassius Amicus I think this is well stated Ekshesh Bekele: "I meant that there are different forms of pleasure. To say pleasure is the absence of pain would mean there aren't other forms of pleasure that aren't the absence of pain, which would be false." Even in philosophy classes the "replenishment theory is acknowledged to be incomplete. Were we in pain from not smelling a rose before we smelled the rose? Was that smelling not a substantive pleasure? Yes, removal of pain is pleasurable, and provides space for pleasure as we ordinarily understand all its mental and physical variations, to fill in. But just like matter and void are opposites with real properties of their own, pleasure has a real existence with real positive properties, and these are not described by saying "absence of pain" any more than matter is sufficiently described as "absence of void."
Also, Eric, while mental pleasures and pains are held to be more intense than physical ones, I think there is no reason to think that Epicurus was focused on one at the expense of the other
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Cassius Amicus Eric what is a positive description of what you think is being described as "absence of pain." in this case, simply saying "that's pleasure" would be thought by most people (in my view) to be playing a word game, so what positive substantive definition would you give of that experience?
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Eric Sherman I'm not disagreeing that pleasure is varied and positive. I'm just arguing that Epicurus defined it as an absence of emotional pain. I'd like to see textual evidence that Epicurus meant something more than what he said
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Ilkka Vuoristo Menoeceus 131:
"By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul."
Both the body and mind need to be pain-free for there to be a total lack of pain. If either one is in pain, the absence isn't complete.
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Elli Pensa Cassius, Ilkka, Hiram and friends, Epicurus is so clear to understand what he is saying and means in Menoeceus 131 : <<When we say that pleasure is the goal of life we mean ..."AND TO NOT" [=in greek he uses the word "μήτε" ] ACHING THE BODY “AND ΤΟ ΝΟ...See MoreSee Translation
Unlike · Reply · 1 · September 18 at 1:52am · Edited
Elli Pensa Yes, Epicurus tried to give a description what is "pleasure", because it is well known this word , as the goal of life, WAS, IS AND WILL BE misinterpreted and misunderstood TOTALLY. I am sorry but we realize Epicurus was forced to describe the BIG PIC...See More
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Ekshesh Bekele I believe part of the reason absence of pain was very important for Epicurus was that it set the limit to the good we called "pleasure." If pleasure was just some positive thing, then adding more pleasure would always be possible, but by saying pleasure is the absence of pain it is implied that the limit exists. And during that time the great good was expected to have some limit.
Unlike · Reply · 2 · September 17 at 10:07pm
Cassius Amicus “It is observed too that in his treatise On the Ethical End he writes in these terms : “I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, of sex, of sound, and the pleasures of beautiful form.”
– Diogenes Laertius, Book X
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Eric Sherman That's fine. I find that acceptable. We can say that Epicurus defined pleasure as an absence of emotional and physical pain and additive and positive experiences mitigated by hedonic calculus
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Cassius Amicus Well Eric here I think Ekshesh is focusing on a distinction that is very important. "Absence of ..." is not a susbstantive description of anything - it is a "limit" of something, but it is not a description of anything. So I cannot say that i agree that pleasure IS an "absence of pain" in any respect but in that of "measurement." Measurement of quantity or quality is of course significant, but it is far from a complete description of the thing being measured.
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Cassius Amicus So in the end if someone is going to suggest that "pleasure" means something that we all experience ordinarily through our mind and senses, and that all of us recognize, then I would really like to know how that experience is to be defined. Because any description I can think of about a mental or physical state , even "wellbeing" is something I would say, well OK that is what everyone understands by pleasure and you are saying nothing new. It's only if someone could describe something totally out of the ordinary that we can't all immediately understand through experience that I would say would be cause for acknowledging that something unusual is being discussed.
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Cassius Amicus And what really is at stake here, as I think many of us realize, is that stoicism and other philosophies are accused (rightly or wrongly) of seeking to suppress all emotion. And Epicurus is said to specifically have stated that the wise man feels emotion MORE deeply than others, not less, which is not tranqiility in the stoic sense..
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Eric Sherman The experience is defined by tranquility
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Eric Sherman And I acquiesce that there are additive pleasures
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Eric Sherman You would be in gross error to not understand that much of Epicurus is helping mankind be freed from anxieties
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Cassius Amicus Oh I completely agree with that! I do agree that banishing anxiety is one of the huge aspects of the philosophy which is made necessary by many reasons, not the least of which is false religion and other philosophies. We are totally agreed there!
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Eric Sherman Cassius Amicus tranquility is the absence of mental pain
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Eric Sherman If we agree there id be happy
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Eric Sherman I just feel that both Stoics and Epicureans seem to dismiss or minimize this to detriment
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Cassius Amicus Eric Sherman I am not so sure of that Why do you believe it is so? Cannot an ocean be both powerful and calm at the same time?
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Eric Sherman You're not sure that Epicurus has anxieties in mind in much of what he addresses???
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Cassius Amicus While we are discussing let me emphasize that I do consider calmness to be desirable! I am just not sure of all of the implications when people use the word tranqility, as that sounds too much like getting hit with a tranquilizer dart for me!
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Eric Sherman No no I understand your concern...
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Eric Sherman Epicurus again in his tetrapharmakon **IS** addressing anxieties and is aiming at peace of mind/tranquility/ataraxia
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Cassius Amicus Yes I agree that relief from anxiety is a key goal, but I worry that relief from anxiety should never be read to be a complete statement of the goal, because I do believe life requires exertion to attain pleasure in the short time we are alive
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Eric Sherman Fair enough. I believe my reformulation in an earlier point entails both our concerns
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Cassius Amicus Also while we are discussing this I need to emphasize that I acknowledge that there are many people in many situations for whom unloading mental anxieties is such an immense task that it seems like all that is needed, and I greatly sympathize and understand that - been there myself.
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Cassius Amicus Without necessarily tagging anyone as the problem (well ok, I will tag many religions, but just not call any philosopher's names) I just always want to be aware of the ongoing campaign against pleasure as something that is dirty and disreputable and against gods will. That is a huge issue that will not go away as long as we live, unfortunately.....
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Ekshesh Bekele I have 1 question thought. If the limit of pleasure is the absence of pain. If we have two people x and y. and both expereince no physical pain nor trouble of the soul, but y indulges in sex, listens to pleasurable music, eats tasty food, is it a folly to claim Y's life is more pleasurable than x's?
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Ilkka Vuoristo The absolute absence of pain cannot be more pain-free with additional pleasures. At that point the pleasures only vary. For example, person x will also eat food, and if it's nutritious it will be tasty.
Menoeceus 130: "Plain fare gives as much pleasure as a costly diet, when once the pain of want has been removed,[...]"
The goal of life is Happiness (painlessness), not ever increasing mountains of indulgent pleasures. Epicurus defined happiness as the lack of pain most likely because he saw that other hedonists were in fact _over_doing some pleasures. It's very easy to over-eat, for example, which will lead to obesity and metabolic syndrome (pain, in other words).
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Ekshesh Bekele Happiness is a tricky word here though. One could experience much pain and still claim to have lived a happy life, according to the Stoics at least. Would that be a happy life for Epicurus?
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Hiram Crespo Ekshesh Bekele, Epicurus was not a masochist. He was no Mother Theresa or John Paul II, who self-flaggelated because they thought pain was good. If Epicurus was unfairly attacked physically, he would have raised grievances and made real-world efforts to stop himself (and probably others) from unfairly suffering unnecessary physical attacks in the future.
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Ilkka Vuoristo In Epicurean Philosophy happiness is defined as painlessness in the body (aponia) and in the mind (ataraxia). So no "much pain" is not a state of happiness.
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Ekshesh Bekele I just wanted to make a distinction between happiness and pleasure. I bleieve pleasure involves direct experience by the senses and the mind more so than happiness does.
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Hiram Crespo Ekshesh Bekele here, under the "Ethics" section, you will see that we have been philosophizing about the distinctions between pleasure and happiness for more than 2,500 years, with many diverging opinionshttps://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=https%…P@@@h=IAQHraXMi
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Cassius Amicus A good question and this gets to the purity arguments. An experience of pure pleasure once pure can only be varied, but is not variation desirable when it is possible without pain? I think the answer here is related to how we would judge living 10 days as a "god among men" vs living 100 days. Given the choice I think it is clear that we would prefer to live 100 days, but the reason is not necessarily that the 100 days was "more pleasurable" in EVERY respect. The reason for the preference has to be carefully considered.
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Cassius Amicus This is an excellent question Ekshesh Bekele and I can't "remember that we have discussed it recently. I think I will tag some of our other regulars like Hiram Crespo and AH and Ilkka Vuoristo andElli Pensa to be sure they see this on and have a chance to comment if they like. "I have 1 question though. If the limit of pleasure is the absence of pain. If we have two people x and y. and both experience no physical pain nor trouble of the soul, but y indulges in sex, listens to pleasurable music, eats tasty food, is it a folly to claim Y's life is more pleasurable than x's?"
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Ronald Warrick OK, if a neutral state is the absence of both pain and pleasure, and Epicurus denies the possibility of such a state, then the mere absence of pain is not sufficient for pleasure. There must be actual positive pleasure. But it is also true that pleasure must follow from removal of pain, because, again, there is no neutral state. I think this becomes clear when we look at how we actually go about removing pain - by eating, by drinking, having sex, etc., positive pleasures all.
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Ilkka Vuoristo Menoeceus 128.
"He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life. For the end of all o...See More
Unlike · Reply · 3 · September 18 at 12:48am
Ronald Warrick I guess what we are both saying is that absence of pain and presence of pleasure are not a dichotomy. They go hand in hand. So to say that one or the other or both are THE goal is rather unnecessary. They are just two ways of describing the same phenomenon.
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AH Another way to understand this, "limit of pleasure is the absence of pain" bit is to get back to particle physics.
Analogy....See More
Unlike · Reply · 3 · September 18 at 6:05pm · Edited
Elli Pensa AH my friend, you left me astonished and speechless !
Can we assume that "the surface area" is our body and soul ?...See More
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AH Almost. Not exactly right. Lucretius spells it out correctly. I have to travel now. Will be back in five or six hours...
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AH The sensors are connected to the nervous system (the soul). The soul consists of the nerves and the brain (the mind). The sensors transmits images that are "true to proportion", and the brain receives those, interprets those, and adds biases (opinions) that have been naturally selected and/or learned and/or mis-learned.
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Cassius Amicus AH I agree that there is a good analogy here between pleasure/pain and the space relationship between bodies and void. However I suppose there are limits to the analogy in the same way that we see the trouble with saying that pleasure "is" the absence of pain - we are looking at pleasure and pain, and bodies and void, in only one respect, which I think is "quantity." Of course pleasure and pain and bodies and void (at least bodies) have many other qualities besides "quantity." Is that not the real problem we are running into, that "X is absence of Y" is in one respect only (quantity)? And that the stumbling block is that people are not recognizing that we are talking only in one respect, and not even attempting to give a full overview of the topic?
When we say the word "orange" in the context of describing the fruit, we know what we are talking about because we know the orange-colored fruit that grows on trees. But if we did not know what that fruit was, the word "orange" would tell us about it only in respect to its color, and leave us totally in the dark as to its other qualities.
That's what we seem to be doing here. Epicurus is concerned about quantity and quality because the existing philosophical discussion about the goal of life requires that discussion (the goal is thought to be something that cannot be increased or purified). And the "X is absence of Y" or "we only need X when Y is present" is terminology that derives from that quantity/quality context, presuming that we understand that the pleasures and pains involved are real and have many other attributes BESIDES their quantity and quality.
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AH I have to travel now. I will come back in about five hours.
In short I took a quantitative experiment/observe approach because Epicurus told us that was the method he used.
"Nature requires that we resolve all these matters by measuring and reasoning..."
Unlike · Reply · 2 · September 18 at 9:01am
Daniel Bachmann Thank you Cassius Amicus I only read the inital text you wrote and it is exactly what I believe too, that pleasure cannot just be confined to the absence of pain. I read the letter to Menoeceus many times and if I read the document as a whole, broadly costrued, without focussing on narrow literal interpretation of individual sentences I arrive at the same conclusions. If anybody is in doubt, just think about the welcome sign above the school which cleary states that here our greatest good is pleasure otherwise it would say the absence of pain is our greatest good.
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Eric Sherman 'Absence of pain' entails an absence of anxiety and if epicureans don't understand that most of Epicurus', Lucretius' and Lucians' attempts are exactly to free man of his anxieties then I fear that much here is of little value. Yes, active pleasures are also much of Epicureanism. I'm harping on this issue because it is so much of Epicurean that to not understand it is to not understand much of Epicurus' program
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Hiram Crespo I think part of the issue is that (in my view) philosophy requires certain training, and part of the idea is that we should TRAIN OUR MINDS to be in pleasant abiding when not experiencing active pleasures. A non Epicurean will most easily experience these as neutral states, but there is an art of living, a regimen, that we apply to being aware of katastematic pleasure. This includes the practice of gratitude and (controversially) may have included religious techniques in antiquity, because E said that through piety we can train ourselves to constantly experience "unalloyed, effortless pleasure"..
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Eric Sherman Why free man from death, religion, superstitions, and false beliefs --primarily what Epicurus, Lucretius and Lucian spend countless pages doing if it were not to free man of anxiety?
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Cassius Amicus And we would not have that either I don't understand why you think we cannot have both! ??
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Eric Sherman That 'mental training' in my view is to apply wisdom and sober reasoning to the things that cause man terror. Take Lucretius, what is his aim? To provide a natural account of phenomena that man is prone to supernaturalize which causes terror, angst, fear, control, etc.
Sober reasoning is not for itself. It is to provide mankind freedom from fear. Is that not pleasurable? It is.
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Elli Pensa to Epicurean PhilosophySeptember 18 at 2:23pm ·
So, send us some offering for the care of our SACRED BODY, on your own behalf and that of the children. (Epicurus)
===========================================
4: The Despisers of the Body - Thus spake Zarathustra, by Friedrich Nietzsche
To the despisers of the body I speak my word. I wish them neither to learn afresh, nor teach anew, but only to bid farewell to their own bodies, -- and thus become silent.
"Body am I, and soul" -- so says the child. And why should one not speak like children?
But the awakened one, the knowing one, says: "Body am I entirely, and nothing more; and soul is only the name of something about the body."
The body is a great wisdom, a plurality with one sense, a war and a peace, a flock and a shepherd.
An instrument of your body is also your small wisdom, my brother, which you call "mind"-- a little instrument and toy of your great wisdom.
"I," you say, and are proud of that word. But the greater thing -- in which you are unwilling to believe -- is your body with its great wisdom; that does not say "I," but does "I."
What the sense feels, what the mind knows, never has its end in itself. But sense and mind would rather persuade you that they are the end of all things: so vain are they.
Instruments and toys are sense and mind: behind them there is still the Self. The Self seeks with the eyes of the senses, it listens also with the ears of the mind.
Always the Self listens and seeks; it compares, masters, conquers, and destroys. It rules, and is also the mind's ruler.
Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, there is a mighty lord, an unknown sage -- it is called Self; it dwells in your body, it is your body.
There is more wisdom in your body than in your best wisdom. And who then knows why your body needs precisely your best wisdom?
Your Self laughs at your mind, and its bold leaps. "What are these leaps and flights of thought to me?" it says to itself. "A detour to my end. I hold the puppet-strings of the mind, and am the prompter of its notions."
The Self says to the mind: "Feel pain!" Then the mind suffers, and thinks how it may put an end to its suffering -- and that is why it is made to think.
The Self says to the mind: "Feel pleasure!" Then the mind is pleased, and thinks how it may be pleased again -- and that is why it is made to think.
I want to speak to the despisers of the body. Their contempt is caused by their respect. What is it that created respect and contempt and worth and will?
The creating Self created for itself respect and contempt, it created for itself pleasure and pain. The creative body created the mind as a hand for its will.
Even in your folly and contempt you each serve your Self, you despisers of the body. I tell you, your very Self wants to die, and turns away from life.
No longer can your Self do that which it desires most: -- create beyond itself. That is what it desires most; that is its fervent wish.
But it is now too late to do so: -- so your Self wishes to perish, you despisers of the body.
To perish -- so wishes your Self; and therefore you have become despisers of the body. For you can no longer create beyond yourselves.
And that is why you are angry with life and the earth. An unconscious envy is in the sidelong glance of your contempt.
I do not go your way, you despisers of the body! You are no bridges to the Overman!
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Elli Pensa Sober reasoning IS NOT A SITUATION TO EMPTY THE CUP OF PLEASURES!
Sober reasoning HAS FEELINGS too !
First the body feels and then the mind decides what the heck the body has felt....See More
Unlike · Reply · 2 · September 18 at 2:48pm
Ronald Warrick I believe it is well established that an anxious mind senses pain more intensely, to the point where a tranquil mind can tolerate much pain, as Epicurus did in his last days.
Unlike · Reply · 2 · September 18 at 3:05pm · Edited
Elli Pensa Ronald hi ! Please, do you agree with the above argument that there is any possibility to empty the cup of pleasures (feelings) ? Give me the meaning of the words "anxious mind" in accordance to this VS 33 "The flesh cries out to be saved from hunger, thirst, and cold. For if a man possess this safety and hope to possess it, he might rival even Zeus in bliss". I think also that in accordance to the algorithm of the desires by Epicurus the mind won't be so anxious for living.
You said, and I agree with you that "an anxious mind senses pain more intensely, to the point where a tranquil mind can tolerate much pain, as Epicurus did in his last days". But it is well established too that Epicurus tolerate much pain since he remembered the PLEASURABLE moments of the discussions that had had with his friends.
Our issue was to empty that cup, if I am not mistaken.
Cassius Amicus
September 20 at 11:11pm
Once again on PD3: "3. The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When such pleasure is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together."
It seems to me that the second sentence in particular, and in fact PD3 as a whole, are generally considered to be hard to understand. That is probably a factor in why there is a temptation to abbreviate it as "what's good is easy to get" which may be true but seems off from the point in issue.
But consider whether this excerpt from Gorgias may explain the point in issue:
SOCRATES: There is pleasure in drinking?
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: When you are thirsty?
SOCRATES: And in pain?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Do you see the inference:—that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part, whether of the soul or the body?—which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this true?
CALLICLES: It is.
SOCRATES: You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time?
CALLICLES: Yes, I did.
SOCRATES: But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have pleasure?
CALLICLES: Clearly.
SOCRATES: Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant....
Referring back to PD3, does not "when such pleasure is present...there is no pain...." explicitly answer Socrates objection by pointing out when the vessel is full of pleasure, and all pain has been ejected, pleasure and pain are at that point NOT simultaneous?
And does this not explain and constitute an explicit statement that the highest good is to have the vessel totally filled with pleasure and completely emptied of pain, because at that point the experience is totally pure and unadulterated, which is a requirement for anything to be considered the highest good?
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Cassius Amicus I suppose one can be VERY thirsty, and drink a little, still want a lot more. Socrates will use that to say that the person is both thirsty and feeling relief at the same time, and that because he has set up a series of definitions that says good and bad cannot coexist as a mixture, the pleasure of drinking (and pleasure itself) cannot be "the good."' So the issue of how to respond to these dialectal games is unfortunately important.
