Posts by Cassius

As you can tell in my responses I am looking to link this back to the existing context of discussion of pleasure at the time of Epicurus. I need to reread Gosling & Taylor / Greeks on Pleasure for more detail on all this. If you are aware of other good references please let me know. Time is always short but I need to assemble a list of at least the arguments that were current - I set up a forum to work on cataloging them here: Arguments Against Pleasure By Other Philosophers At The Time of Epicurus (It's going to take me years to make any progress, I'm afraid - time is so short.)

Tell me what you think, Maciej! I appreciate the opportunity to exchange ideas with you on these issues, whether or not we agree. This is a very difficult passage and I am sure I have not caught all the subtleties, and in fact I could easily be completely wrong!

"do you agree that epicurus's conclusion in pd9 is that pleasures differ?"

I better try to be very precise in understanding your question.

If you are asking "is the point of PD9 that pleasures differ" I would answer: No not really, or at least not fully. I think Epicurus held that pleasures are the same in many respects (they all feel pleasurable; all come to us through the same faculty); but certainly Epicurus would say also that we have no trouble distinguishing the difference between the pleasure of eating and the pleasure of sex.

I think we have to presume common sense always, and that Epicurus would respond as anyone would that the pleasure of sex differs in some ways from the pleasure of eating, but that there are still a great many important similarities, the most important of which is that they are reported to us as pleasures by our faculty of pleasure.

Does that respond to your question?

A Discussion of the relevance of PD9 to the katastematic / kinetic distinction is here.

Good question Maciej and I would like to get input from others on this as I admit this is hard to figure out. Here is my first effort:

I think this is another example of a doctrine that taken on its own is bewildering, but which is the kind of thing Epicurus liked to do to refute and inoculate against Platonic and other attacks on pleasure. Here, the false idea to be beaten back is that some pleasures are more worthy to be chosen than others by some outside standard of virtue, worth, nobility, or whatever. Divisions of pleasure ranked by worthiness or any standard other than pleasure itself would be fatal to Epicurean doctrine, just as believing in supernatural gods would be fatal and is inoculated against in PD1 and fearing death would be fatal and is inoculated against in PD2.

Epicurus's position was pleasure is whatever we feel to be pleasing, and there is no other criteria for judging a pleasure worthy other than the experience of pleasure itself, and the effect of a particular pleasure in leading in the future to resulting future pleasures or resulting pains. I *think* that is the sense in which DeWitt refers to the "unity of pleasure." Pleasure may differ in intensity and type and length, but it all still falls under the category of pleasure.

The way Epicurus is proving this here is to suggest the hypothetical of comparing the pleasure of eating to the pleasure of sex. If the pleasure of eating and the pleasure of sex were both hypothetically able to(1) fill the whole feeling experience of the person and (2) exist for the same length of time (I presume that is what "alike condensed in duration" means) then the experience of the pleasure of eating and the pleasure of sex would be the same for us.

If we understand that pleasure is pleasure then we aren't going to fall for the trap (and it is a trap) of thinking that some pleasures are more "worthy" than others. The trap is that if there are some pleasures that are "higher" by some standard other than pleasure, then knowledge of that standard, which is outside of pleasure, is essential. If that is the case, then the argument "pleasure is the guide / is "the good" is blown up - the highest good must be "pleasure + wisdom" or "pleasure + intelligence" or whatever. If Pleasure is the highest calling we have, then there cannot be something else which is not a part of pleasure itself which is required in order to constitute the highest and best life. That's why Epicurus insisted that all the virtues, including wisdom, prudence, etc, are simply instruments for the achievement of pleasure, and nothing more. Their existence and labeling as virtuous is dependent solely on the fact that they are tools for achieving pleasure.

I am also toying with the idea that a less important part of the context might also be to show that it is not appropriate to regret that one pleasure can't consume our entire life. The fact that pleasures can't extend to fill the whole feeling experience of the person, and that they don't consume our experience over an extended time, is what allows for variation. We know that once full, pleasure can not grow any greater in extent, it can only vary. But on the other hand, while variation may not increase the extent of pure pleasure, there's nothing wrong with variation in and of itself. In fact in general, other things being equal, it is more desirable to live two years rather than one year, with the variation in pleasure that the extra year entails. To restate that, I think Epicurus had to admit, and did state in the letter to Menoeceus, that life is desirable and so it is desirable to experience variation even for someone whose daily life is full of pleasure. So the doctrine may also be an endorsement of variation, since Nature has made it that a single pleasure cannot be expanded to fill our entire experience.

For purposes of finding this in the future we are talking about PD 9 and I will link this to that forum.

From page 235 of "Epicurus and His Philosophy"

This is the discussion thread associated with the article "Objection Your Honor!  Attorney Cicero Is Mischaracterizing the Testimony To Mislead The Jury!  The Evidence Is Clear: Not Only Is "Ataraxia" Not The Highest Pleasure - Ataraxia Alone Is Not A Pleasure At All!"

The article "Major Issues in Understanding Epicurean Philosophy" is the subject of a pinned post in the General Discussion forum. Comments about that article can be posted there, or threads to discuss detailed aspects can be started in this sub-forum.

Please note that the chart itself has links to a location to discuss each point of the chart. In many cases, those points are so important that they have their own forums devoted to their discussion, so if possible, please use the link under each item to go to the right place for posting.

But don't worry if you get lost in the links -- feel free to post here and we can move the thread to another place later if needed.

People reading this thread and thinking about their own outline might also find this chart helpful.

Here is an excerpt from an article that I otherwise (on other topics) find very unhelpful, but which takes a stab at this translation:

Purinton, Epicuris on The Telos, Phronesis, Vol. 38, No. 3 (1993), pp. 281-320

Here is another conclusion from the same source (Purinton) that seems equally absurd to me, and which also results from the fixation on katastematic as the goal. Purinton suggests that even though Epicurus held katastematic pleasure to be the primary aim, we do so "with the understanding that we will also sometimes enjoy kinetic pleasures as well." If you find this kind of conclusion satisfying then more power to you, but the better course in my view is to accept the clear meaning of the Lucretius passages which Purinton cites, follow Nikolsky, and reject the view that Epicurus considered the static/active distinction to be different types of pleasure. That way neither you nor Epicurus falls into the trap of hair-splitting like this:

What happens when you go down the path of separating static and active pleasure, and concluding that static pleasure is the goal of life? You end up concluding things that are totally counterintuitive like "Epicurus does not consider joy to be a kind of pleasure," as did Jeffrey S. Purinton, Phronesis, Vol. 38, No. 3 (1993), pp. 281-320:

It seems almost certain that this is going to be another case where we start with the general rule (that there IS no absolute rule that applies to everyone) and then analyse this as a case of particular importance because of the amount of pain and pleasure that can come from it. Surely it (hyper-romanticized love, anyway) also fits in a category such as "intoxication" which is often, but not always presumably, going to be a bad idea. But "marriage" doesn't have to be based on intoxication, and we'd have to know tons of variables to reach a specific conclusion in a particular case.

And we KNOW that Epicurus directed in his will that Metrodorus' daughter be married - there is even an academic article citing that point somewhere. So in this case it might be that all of them are erring in not making it clear that this too is a generalization rather than a rule. I would think that if possible to a good match, Epicurus would say that it is desirable, but to be cautious because of the risk.

Same thing with children, which might be even riskier, but has great rewards if done right. Probably need a separate thread on that at some point - years ago there was a long discussion of the relative merits and demerits of "childlessness"

Christos:

Elli indicates that you (and possibly others of the Athenian Garden) are working on an updated set of English translations of some of the core Epicurean texts (presumably at least the Principal Doctrines and the Vatican List?)

Could you let us know what you are doing in that regard and how the project is coming? We desperately need a reliable set of core texts from people we can trust.

I have set up a list of current translations that appear to be problems in English, and I would really like to see your project come to fruition.

Thanks!

Elli

I believe I have now finally arranged the boxes containing the lists of new posts in the way it probably should be:

1 - The first box shows the most recent threads from across all the forums.

2 - The second box shows the list of most-discussed threads from all the forums.

and then

3 - on the dashboard there is the "Recent Activity" box which contains most recent POSTS with an excerpt of what is said in each post.

The Home page is targeted to new and recent users; the Dashboard is targeted to regular users who want to skip the static (or should I say katastematic? ) content.

As always let me know if there are user comments and suggestions we need to consider.

One of the most troublesome translation issues is the passage in Diogenes Laertius in which Epicurus either advises "for" or "against" marriage, depending on the translator.

There is a maddening discrepancy in the various translations of Diogenes Laertius in the crucial “Wise Man” sequence. CD Yonge’s 1853 translation reports that Epicurus thought marriage to be a bad idea: “Marriage, they say, is never any good to a man, and we must be quite content if it does no harm; and the wise man will never marry or beget children, as Epicurus himself lays down in his Doubts and in his treatises on Nature. Still, under certain circumstances in his life he will forsake these rules and marry.”

The Loeb Classical Library version of the R.D. Hicks translation, which dates from 1931, concurs: “Nor, again, will the wise man marry and rear a family: so Epicurus says in the Problems and in the De Natura. Occasionally he may marry due to special circumstances in his life.”

But Cyril Bailey in his 1926 translation says the opposite: “Moreover, the wise man will marry and have children, as Epicurus says in the Problems and in the work On Nature. But he will marry according to the circumstances of his life.”

Is Bailey leading us into a trap with a problem translation? Or in this case does Bailey have the better view? We know that Epicurus provided in his will for the marriage of Metrodorus daughter, so I tend to think in this case Bailey is correct. I posted about this previously here.

Due to recent catches by Elli in problem translations of key Epicurean passages, I have set up a tablewhere I would like to compile a list of them, with a preferred translation and documentation of sources of the alternatives. I know we have discussed more than Vatican 35 and 66. If people here are aware of passages which they think are questionably translated it would be great if you could mention them so I could add them to this list and make it accessible.

I have a series of others I want to add to the list myself. One of the most troublesome is the passage in Diogenes Laertius in which Epicurus either advises "for" or "against" marriage, depending on the translator.

There is a maddening discrepancy in the various translations of Diogenes Laertius in the crucial “Wise Man” sequence. CD Yonge’s 1853 translation reports that Epicurus thought marriage to be a bad idea: “Marriage, they say, is never any good to a man, and we must be quite content if it does no harm; and the wise man will never marry or beget children, as Epicurus himself lays down in his Doubts and in his treatises on Nature. Still, under certain circumstances in his life he will forsake these rules and marry.”

The Loeb Classical Library version of the R.D. Hicks translation, which dates from 1931, concurs: “Nor, again, will the wise man marry and rear a family: so Epicurus says in the Problems and in the De Natura. Occasionally he may marry due to special circumstances in his life.”

But Cyril Bailey in his 1926 translation says the opposite: “Moreover, the wise man will marry and have children, as Epicurus says in the Problems and in the work On Nature. But he will marry according to the circumstances of his life.”

Is Bailey leading us into a trap with a problem translation? Or in this case does Bailey have the better view?

If you have comments on this or other problem translations, please add them here. Commentary on the Marriage issue would be good to discuss here.

The Table Is Here at This Link:

I completely agree Eric. This one is not "crazy" but someone in control of the effect.

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By the way, I like your new profile picture of you being thoughtful. But I miss the one of the guy looking joyful, bordering on insane!

Very true!!

Elli has pointed out another problem with Bailey: https://www.facebook.com/groups/Epicure…55210121194609/

Let's see again another example of a translation in engllish for this E.saying LXVI.(66), which is a tiny sentence.

Ancient greek : Συμπαθῶμεν τοῖς φίλοις οὐ θρηνοῦντες ἀλλὰ φροντίζοντες.

New greek : Συμπαραστεκόμαστε στους φίλους όχι θρηνώντας αλλά φροντίζοντάς τους. (translation from ancient to newgreek is by Takis Panayiotopoulos, founding member in the Garden of Athens)

In english I found the following translations :

1) Let us show our feeling for our lost friends not by lamentation but by meditation. (website by Cassius Amicus)

2) We show our feeling for [deceased] friends, not by wailing, but by pleasant recollection. (translation by Erik Anderson)

3) We show our feeling for our friends' suffering, not with laments, but with thoughtful concern. (website hosted by Vincent Cook)

[Note]: I wonder who were those translators, who knew the ancient greek and english fluently, and found in the above ancient greek text the words such as : "lost", "deceased" and "suffering" friends, as well as where the translators found the words "meditation", "the pleasant recollection", and "the thoughtful concern"???!!!!

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My translation in english, according to the ancient greek that is translated in newgreek correctly, is : "We support (or stand by or help) the friends not by lamenting, but taking care of them".

On the greek word : "θρήνος", and in english "lament". In greek "θρήνος" [thrinos] means an intense and prolonged crying. General expression of intense sadness / pain. In the music is a song that expresses deep sadness. Often it concerns and the death of a man e.g. "the mother lament the loss of her child".

Since in the above E.saying there is no any mentioning for "dead" or "lost" friends, I would like to give an example of an experience in the real life : One of my near and dear friends get sick from cancer. He is inside a hospital or in his home, and when I visit him realizing his weakness and his future coming death, I go outside from his room or in front of him, and I'm crying with an intense and prolonged crying. I feel a deep sadness and a huge pain, but my friend did not die yet, and I ? What I’ am supposed to do, when he would ask me something to help him ? I will lament in front or behind him for his weakness and future coming death ?!

Cassius AmicusGroup Admin Elli you are providing more reasons why I push the Dewitt book and not the Bailey books (which I use only for translations, never for commentary.) DeWitt's translation is much closer to yours than to Bailey - this is page 327:

Panos Alexiou Elli I think the issue with 'thoughtful' creeping in there comes from the root of φροντίδα that is φρον- such as φρόνηση etc. For someone that is not native speaker it can seem like it's about thinking vs caring for.

Cassius Amicus So the original does not even refer to deceased / lost and that is added in?

Panos Alexiou Panos Alexiou There's nothing about dead or gone or anything. I think that crept in by the verb 'to mourn' that is not necessarily for someone that died."We console our friends not by mourning but by caring."Could be a concise and more accurate translation "

Panos Alexiou Panos Alexiou Even console is not a great word. Συμπαθώ is a word that means to share ones problems. So it's basically saying 'dont commiserate with friends, help them.

Cassius Amicus Those seem like a great suggestion Panos. This process shows again how it's important to have people with experience and not just "book learning" do the translating.

Panos Alexiou Commiserate with friends not with mourning but with caring.

Elli Pensa Yes Cassius, because Bailey et al, i.e. the academians, the feeling of a deep sadness is only when their friends have been lost and died !! When their friends got sick in hospitals or homes they just made some phone calls and that was allright with them. And often they give their money to buy flowers for their funeral. I know such kind of persons, I have seen many of them on how they react infront a serious sickness of a supposed friend or a neighbor ! I know how they keep their money inside their wallets or their bank accounts. I have seen them all, and I am so disgusted on this issue ! ?