Posts by Cassius

Bailey: 30. Wherever, in the case of desires which are physical, but do not lead to a sense of pain if they are not fulfilled, the effort is intense, such pleasures are due to idle imagination; and it is not owing to their own nature that they fail to be dispelled, but owing to the empty imaginings of the man.

**EΝ AΙΣ TΩΝ ΦΥΣΙΚΩΝ EΠΙΘΜΙΩΝ ****ΜΗ EΠ AΛΓΟΥΝ ****ΔE**

**EΠAΝAΓΟΥΣΩΝ ****EAΝ ΜΗ ΣΥΝTEΛEΣΘΩΣΙΝ ΥΠAΡΧEΙ ****Η**

**ΣΠΟΥΔΗ ΣΥΝTΟΝΟΣ ****ΠAΡA ΚEΝΗΝ ΔΟΞAΝ ****AΥTAΙ**

**ΓΙΝΟΝTAΙ ****ΚAΙ ΟΥ ΠAΡA TΗΝ EAΥTΩΝ ΦΥΣΙΝ ****ΟΥ**

**ΔΙAΧEΟΝTAΙ ****AΛΛA ΠAΡA TΗΝ TΟΥ AΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ**

**ΚEΝΟΔΟΞΙAΝ. **

“When those natural desires, which do not lead to pain if they are not satisfied, are violent and insistent, it is a proof that there is an admixture of vain opinion in them; for then energy does not arise from their own nature, but from the vain opinions of men.” Yonge (1853)

“Some natural desires, again, entail no pain when not gratified, though the objects are vehemently pursued. These desires also are due to groundless opinion, and when they are not got rid of, it is not because of their own nature, but because of the man's groundless opinion.” Hicks (1910)

“Those natural desires which entail no pain when not gratified, though their objects are vehemently pursued, are also due to illusory opinion; and when they are not got rid of, it is not because of their own nature, but because of the man's illusory opinion.” Hicks (1925)

“Wherever in the case of desires which are physical, but do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not fulfilled, the effort is intense, such pleasures are due to idle imagination, and it is not owing to their own nature that they fail to be dispelled, but owing to the empty imaginings of the man.” Bailey (1926)

“Among the bodily desires, those rest on empty opinion that are eagerly pursued although if unsatisfied they bring no pain. That they are not got rid of is because of man's empty opinion, not because of their own nature.” Geer (1964)

“Whenever intense passion is present in natural desires which do not lead to pain if they are unfulfilled, these have their origin in empty opinion; and the reason for their persistence is not their own nature but the empty opinion of the person.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“If there is intense striving after those physical desires that do not lead to pain if unfulfilled, this is because they arise from idle opinion; they fail to be dispelled, not because of their own nature but because of the vain fancies of humankind.” O'Connor (1993)

“Among natural desires, those which do not lead to a feeling of pain if not fulfilled and about which there is an intense effort, these are produced by a groundless opinion and they fail to be dissolved not because of their own nature but because of the groundless opinions of mankind.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Those natural desires which create no pain when unfulfilled, though pursued with an intense effort, are also due to baseless opinion; and if they are not dispelled, it is not because of their own nature, but because of human vanity.” Anderson (2004)

“Certain natural desires, which do not reduce one to pain if they are not satisfied, have, nevertheless, a commensurate inherent need for satisfaction. Such desires are born, indeed, of empty belief: the reason they are not defused is not to be traced to their intrinsic nature but to the person's vacuity.” Makridis (2005)

“Among natural desires, those that do not bring pain when unfulfilled and that require intense exertion arise from groundless opinion; and such desires fail to be stamped out not by nature but because of the groundless opinions of humankind.” Saint-Andre

“If interest is intense in the case of those natural desires that do not lead to physical pain when they are not satisfied, then such desires are generated by idle fancy, and it is not because of their own nature that they are not dissipated but because of the person's own senseless whims.” Strodach (2012)

“Natural desires that afford no pain if they are not indulged, though they are eagerly pursued, arise from groundless opinion; and when they are not dispelled it is not because of their own nature but because of the man's groundless opinion.” Mensch (2018)

“Among natural desires that do not lead to bodily pain if they are not fulfilled, those that possess sustained intensity arise from empty belief, and their persistence is due not to their own nature but rather to the person's empty belief.” White (2021)

Bailey: 29. Among desires, some are natural (and necessary, some natural) but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary, but due to idle imagination.

**TΩΝ EΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ ****AΙ ΜEΝ EΙΣΙ ΦΥΣΙΚAΙ ****[ΚAΙ AΝAΓΚAΙAΙ·**** AΙ**

**ΔE ΦΥΣΙΚAΙ] **** KAI ΟΥΚ AΝAΓΚAΙAΙ ****AΙ ΔE ΟΥTE ΦΥΣΙΚAΙ**

**ΟΥTE AΝAΓΚAΙAΙ ****AΛΛA ΠAΡA ΚEΝΗΝ ΔΟΞAΝ ΓΙΝΟΜEΝAΙ. **

“Of the desires, some are natural and necessary, some natural, but not necessary, and some are neither natural nor necessary, but owe their existence to vain opinions.” Yonge (1853)

“Of our desires, some are natural and necessary; others are natural, but not necessary; others, again, are neither natural nor necessary, but are due to groundless opinion.” Hicks (1910)

“Of our desires some are natural and necessary; others are natural, but not necessary; others, again, are neither natural nor necessary, but are due to illusory opinion.” Hicks (1925)

“Among desires some are natural (and necessary, some natural) but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary, but due to idle imagination. ” Bailey (1926)

“Of the desires some are natural and necessary; some are natural but not necessary; and others are neither natural nor necessary.” DeWitt, St. Paul and Epicurus 18 (1954)

“Of the desires, some are natural (and necessary; some are natural) but not necessary; and others are neither natural nor necessary but arise from empty opinion.” Geer (1964)

“Of the desires some are natural and necessary while others are natural but unnecessary. And there are desires that are neither natural nor necessary but arise from idle opinion.” O'Connor (1993)

“Of desires, some are natural and necessary, some natural and not necessary, and some neither natural nor necessary but occurring as a result of a groundless opinion.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Among desires some are natural and necessary, some natural but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary, but due to baseless opinion.” Anderson (2004)

“Of desires, some are natural and (necessary; some are natural and) not necessary; some are neither natural nor necessary and are only created by empty belief.” Makridis (2005)

“Among desires, some are natural and necessary, some are natural and unnecessary, and some are unnatural and unnecessary (arising instead from groundless opinion).” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Some desires are ( 1 ) natural and necessary, others (2) natural but not necessary, still others (3 ) neither natural nor necessary but generated by senseless whims.” Strodach (2012)

“Some of our desires are natural and necessary; others are natural but unnecessary; still others are neither natural nor necessary, but arise from unwarranted opinion.” Mensch (2018)

“Some desires are natural and [necessary, some natural and] unnecessary, and some neither natural or necessary, arising instead from empty belief.” White (2021)

Essential Epicurus (Eugene O'Connor): 28. The same knowledge that makes one confident that nothing dreadful is eternal or long-lasting also recognizes, in the face of these limited evils, the security afforded by friendship.

**Η AΥTΗ ΓΝΩΜΗ ΘAΡΡEΙΝ ****TE EΠΟΙΗΣEΝ ****ΥΠEΡ TΟΥ ΜΗΘEΝ**

**AΙΩΝΙΟΝ ****EΙΝAΙ ΔEΙΝΟΝ Μ**

**ΗΔE ΠΟΛΥΧΡΟΝΙΟΝ ****ΚAΙ TΗΝ EΝ**

**AΥTΟΙΣ TΟΙΣ ΩΡΙΣΜEΝΟΙΣ AΣΦAΛEΙAΝ ΦΙΛΙAΣ ΜAΛΙΣTA**

**ΚATEΙΔE ΣΥΝTEΛΟΥΜEΝΗΝ. **

“The same opinion encourages man to trust that no evil will be everlasting, or even of long duration; as it sees that, in the space of life allotted to us, the protection of friendship is most sure and trustworthy.” Yonge (1853)

“The same conviction, which inspires confidence that nothing we have to fear is eternal or even of long duration, also enables us to see that even in our limited life nothing enhances our security so much as friendship.” Hicks (1910)

“The same conviction which inspires confidence that nothing we have to fear is eternal or even of long duration, also enables us to see that even in our limited conditions of life nothing enhances our security so much as friendship.” Hicks (1925)

“The same conviction which has given us confidence that there is nothing terrible that lasts for ever or even for long, has also seen the protection of friendship most fully completed in the limited evils of this life.” Bailey (1926)

“The same argument that assures us of nothing terrible lasting forever or even very long discerns the protection furnished by friendship in this brief life of ours as being the most dependable of all." DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 293-294 (1954)

“The same conviction that makes us feel confident of nothing terrible being either eternal or even of long duration discerns the assurance of safety within the narrow limits of this life itself as being most perfectly effected by friendship." DeWitt, St. Paul and Epicurus 188 (1954)

“The same wisdom that permits us to be confident that no evil is eternal or even of long duration also recognizes that in our limited state the security that can be most perfectly gained is that of friendship.” Geer (1964)

“Confidence that nothing terrible lasts for ever or even for a long time is produced by the same judgment that also achieves the insight that friendship's security within those very limitations is perfectly complete.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 126 (1987)

“The same knowledge that makes one confident that nothing dreadful is eternal or long-lasting, also recognizes in the face of these limited evils the security afforded by friendship.” O'Connor (1993)

“The same understanding produces confidence about there being nothing terrible which is eternal or [even] long-lasting and has also realized that security amid even these limited [bad things] is most easily achieved through friendship.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“The same conviction which inspires confidence that nothing terrible lasts forever, or even for long, also enables us to see that in the midst of life's limited evils, nothing enhances our security so much as friendship.” Anderson (2004)

“The same (judgment) which enables us to wax confident in contemplating that no dreadful thing is eternal, or even of long duration, also knows well that, in these our constrained circumstances, security depends on having friends more than on anything else.” Makridis (2005)

“The same judgment produces confidence that dreadful things are not everlasting, and that security amidst the limited number of dreadful things is most easily achieved through friendship.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“It is the same judgment that has made us feel confident that nothing fearful is of long duration or everlasting, and that has seen personal security during our limited span of life most nearly perfected by friendship.” Strodach (2012)

“The same attitude that inspires confidence that nothing we dread is eternal or even long-lasting also enables us to see that even in our limited conditions of life nothing affords us greater security than friendship.” Mensch (2018)

“The same insight that made us confident that nothing terrible is either everlasting or long-lasting also noticed security within these boundaries resulting especially in friendship.” White (2021)

Bailey: 27. Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, far the greatest is the possession of friendship.

**ΩΝ Η ΣΟΦΙA ΠAΡAΣΚEΥAΖETAΙ ****EΙΣ TΗΝ TΟΥ ΟΛΟΥ ΒΙΟΥ**

**ΜAΚAΡΙΟTΗTA ****ΠΟΛΥ ΜEΓΙΣTΟΝ ****EΣTΙΝ Η TΗΣ ΦΙΛΙAΣ**

**ΚTΗΣΙΣ. **

“Of all the things which wisdom provides for the happiness of the whole life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship.” Yonge (1853)

“Of all the means which are procured by wisdom to insure happiness throughout the whole of life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friends.” Hicks (1910)

“Of all the means which are procured by wisdom to ensure happiness throughout the whole of life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friends.” Hicks (1925)

“Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, far the greatest is the possession of friendship.” Bailey (1926)

“Of all the preparations that wisdom makes for the blessedness of the perfect life by far the most precious is the acquisition of friendship.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 190 (1954)

“Of all the preparations which wisdom makes for the blessedness of the complete life by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship." DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 308 (1954)

“Of all the preparations that wisdom makes for the blessedness of the perfect life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship." DeWitt, St. Paul and Epicurus, 188 (1954)

“Of the things that wisdom prepares for insuring lifelong happiness, by far the greatest is the possession of friends.” Geer (1964)

“Of the things wisdom acquires for the blessedness of life as a whole, far the greatest is the possession of friendship.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 126 (1987)

“Of all the things which wisdom provides for living one's entire life in happiness, the greatest by far is the possession of friendship.” O'Connor (1993)

“Of the things which wisdom provides for the blessedness of one's whole life, by far the greatest is the possession of friendship.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Of all things that wisdom provides for living one's entire life in happiness, the greatest by far is the possession of friendship.” Anderson (2004)

“Of all those things by means of which wisdom can procure blessed bliss to last for an entire life, by far the greatest is the acquisition of friends.” Makridis (2005)

“Of all the things that wisdom provides for the complete happiness of one's entire life, by far the greatest is friendship.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Of all the things that wisdom provides for the happiness of the whole man, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship.” Strodach (2012)

“Of the things wisdom contributes to happiness over the course of one's life, the greatest by far is friendship.” Mensch (2018)

“Of all that wisdom provides for a whole life of bliss, by far the greatest is the possession of friendship.” White (2021)

Bailey: 26. Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled when the object is hard to procure, or they seem likely to produce harm.

**TΩΝ EΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ ****ΟΣAΙ ΜΗ EΠ AΛΓΟΥΝ EΠAΝAΓΟΥΣΙΝ ****EAΝ**

**ΜΗ ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΣΙΝ ****ΟΥΚ EΙΣΙΝ AΝAΓΚAΙAΙ ****AΛΛ' **

**EΥΔΙAΧΥTΟΝ ****TΗΝ ΟΡEΞΙΝ EΧΟΥΣΙΝ ****ΟTAΝ ΔΥΣΠΟΡΙΣTΩΝ**

**[ῌ] Η ΒΛAΒΗΣ AΠEΡΓAΣTΙΚAΙ ΔΟΞΩΣΙΝ ****EΙΝAΙ. **

“All desires that lead to no pain when they remain ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.” Yonge (1853)

“Some desires lead to no pain when they remain ungratified. All such desires are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.” Hicks (1910)

“All such desires as lead to no pain when they remain ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.” Hicks (1925)

“Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled, when the object is hard to procure or they seem likely to produce harm.” Bailey (1926)

“Those desires that do not bring pain if they are not satisfied are not necessary; and they are easily thrust aside whenever to satisfy them appears difficult or likely to cause injury.” Geer (1964)

“Those desires that do not lead to pain, if they are not fulfilled, are not necessary. They involve a longing that is easily dispelled, whenever it is difficult to fulfill the desires or they appear likely to lead to harm.” O'Connor (1993)

“The desires which do not bring a feeling of pain when not fulfilled are not necessary; but the desire for them is easy to dispel when they seem to be hard to achieve or to produce harm.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“All desires which create no pain when unfulfilled are not necessary; such desires may easily be dispelled when they are seen as difficult to fulfill or likely to produce harm.” Anderson (2004)

“Of desires, those which do not bring one to pain if they remain unfulfilled are not necessary; such desires are actually accompanied by appetites that are easily defused: indeed, [this is evidently what happens] when it is thought difficult to find the means to satisfy [unnecessary desires] or when the desires themselves are thought to be productive of harm.” Makridis (2005)

“The desires that do not bring pain when they go unfulfilled are not necessary; indeed they are easy to reject if they are hard to achieve or if they seem to produce harm.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“All desires that do not lead to physical pain if not satisfied are unnecessary, and involve cravings that are easily resolved when they appear to entail harm or when the object of desire is hard to get.” Strodach (2012)

“All desires that do not lead to pain when unfulfilled are unnecessary, and such cravings are easily dissolved when the desired objects are hard to procure or are thought to do harm.” Mensch (2018)

“Any desires that do not lead to bodily pain if they are not fulfilled are not necessary; rather, the motivation they supply is readily dispelled whenever we believe they are difficult to satisfy or liable to result in harm.” White (2021)

Bailey: 25. If on each occasion, instead of referring your actions to the end of nature, you turn to some other, nearer, standard, when you are making a choice or an avoidance, your actions will not be consistent with your principles.

**EΙ ΜΗ ΠAΡA ΠAΝTA ΚAΙΡΟΝ EΠAΝΟΙΣEΙΣ EΚAΣTΟΝ ****TΩΝ*

**ΠΡATTΟΜEΝΩΝ ****EΠΙ TΟ TEΛΟΣ ****TΗΣ ΦΥΣEΩΣ ****AΛΛA**

**ΠΡΟΚATAΣTΡEΨEΙΣ ****EΙTE ΦΥΓΗΝ ****EΙ TE ΔΙΩΞΙΝ**

**ΠΟΙΟΥΜEΝΟΣ ****EΙΣ AΛΛΟ TΙ ΟΥΚ EΣΟΝTAΙ ΣΟΙ TΟΙΣ ΛΟΓΟΙΣ**

**AΙ ΠΡAΞEΙΣ AΚΟΛΟΥΘΟΙ. **

“If, on every occasion, we do not refer every one of our actions to the chief end of nature, if we turn aside from that to seek or avoid some other object, there will be a want of agreement between our words and our actions.” Yonge (1853)

“If you do not on every separate occasion refer each of your actions to the chief end of nature, but if instead of this in the act of choice or avoidance you swerve aside to some other end, your acts will not be consistent with your theories.” Hicks (1910)

“If you do not on every separate occasion refer each of your actions to the end prescribed by nature, but instead of this in the act of choice or avoidance swerve aside to some other end, your acts will not be consistent with your theories.” Hicks (1925)

“If on each occasion instead of referring your actions to the end of nature, you turn to some other nearer standard when you are making a choice or an avoidance, your actions will not be consistent with your principles.” Bailey (1926)

“If you do not at all times refer each of your actions to the natural end, but fall short of this and turn aside to something else in choosing and avoiding, your deeds will not agree with your words.” Geer (1964)

“If you fail to refer each of your actions on every occasion to nature's end, and stop short at something else in choosing or avoiding, your actions will not be consequential upon your theories.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 116 (1987)

“If you do not on every occasion refer each of your actions to the end ordained by nature, but instead stop short at something else when considering whether to go after something or avoid it, your actions will not be in keeping with the principles you profess.” O'Connor (1993)

“If you do not, on every occasion, refer each of your actions to the goal of nature, but instead turn prematurely to some other [criterion] in avoiding or pursuing [things], your actions will not be consistent with your reasoning.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“If you do not reconcile your behavior with the goal of nature, but instead use some other criterion in matters of choice and avoidance, then there will be a confict between theory and practice.” Anderson (2004)

“If you don't judge every one of your actions by reference to the end and goal dictated by nature, in accordance also with the proper natural timing for each action, but, instead, second guessing [nature,] you veer off ahead of time attempting either to pursue or to fee [goals,] then your acts will not be turning out to be consistent with your rationalizations.” Makridis (2005)

“If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the natural goal of life, but instead turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then your thoughts and your actions will not be in harmony.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“If at any time you fail to refer each of your acts to nature's standard, and turn off instead in some other direction when making a choice to avoid or pursue, your actions will not be consistent with your creed.” Strodach (2012)

“If on every occasion you do not refer each of your actions to the goal of nature, but instead divert your attention in the act of choice or avoidance toward something else, your actions will not accord with your theories.” Mensch (2018)

“If you're not on every occasion referring each thing you do back to our nature's end, and if you're instead of proceeding directly to something else when you make a decision to avoid or pursue something, then your actions will not be consistent with your reasons.” White (2021)

Alternate Translations

Bailey: 24. If you reject any single sensation, and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion, as to the appearance awaiting confirmation, and that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will confound all other sensations, as well, with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgment. And if among the mental images created by your opinion you affirm both that which awaits confirmation, and that which does not, you will not escape error, since you will have preserved the whole cause of doubt in every judgment between what is right and what is wrong.

Ι TΙΝ EΚΒAΛEΙΣ ****AΠΛΩΣ AΙΣΘΗΣΙΝ ****ΚAΙ ΜΗ ΔΙAΙΡΗΣEΙΣ ****TΟ**

**ΔΟΞAΖΟΜEΝΟΝ ****ΚAΙ TΟ ΠΡΟΣΜEΝΟΝ ****ΚAΙ TΟ ΠAΡΟΝ ΗΔΗ**

**ΚATA TΗΝ AΙΣΘΗΣΙΝ ****ΚAΙ TA ΠAΘΗ ****ΚAΙ ΠAΣAΝ**

**ΦAΝTAΣTΙΚΗΝ EΠΙΒΟΛΗΝ ****TΗΣ ΔΙAΝΟΙAΣ ΣΥΝTAΡAΞEΙΣ**

**ΚAΙ TAΣ ΛΟΙΠAΣ AΙΣΘΗΣEΙΣ Tῌ ΜATAΙῼ ΔΟΞῌ ****ΩΣTE TΟ**

**ΚΡΙTΗΡΙΟΝ ****AΠAΝ EΚΒAΛEΙΣ·**** EΙ ΔE ΒEΒAΙΩΣEΙΣ ****ΚAΙ TΟ**

**ΠΡΟΣΜEΝΟΝ ****AΠAΝ EΝ TAΙΣ ΔΟΞAΣTΙΚAΙΣ EΝΝΟΙAΙΣ ****ΚAΙ**

**TΟ ΜΗ TΗΝ EΠΙΜAΡTΥΡΗΣΙΝ ****ΟΥΚ EΚΛEΙΨEΙΣ ****TΟ**

**ΔΙEΨEΥΣΜEΝΟΝ ****ΩΣT' ANῌPHKΩΣ EΣῌ ΠAΣAΝ**

**AΜΦΙΣΒΗTΗΣΙΝ ****KAI ΠAΣAΝ ΚΡΙΣΙΝ ****TΟΥ ΟΡΘΩΣ ****Η ΜΗ**

**ΟΡΘΩΣ. **

“If you simply discard a sense, and do not distinguish between the different elements of the judgment, so as to know on the one hand, the opinion which goes beyond the actual sensation, or, on the other, the actual and immediate notion, the affections, and all the conceptions of the mind which arise from the observable representation; you will be imputing trouble into the other senses, and destroying in that quarter every species of criterion. But if you allow equal authority to the ideas, which being only an opinion, require to be verified, and to those which bear about them an immediate certainty, you will not escape error; for you will be confounding doubtful opinions with those which are not doubtful, and true judgments with those of a different character.” Yonge (1853)

“If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to discriminate between that which is matter of opinion and awaits further confirmation and that which is already present, whether in sensation or in feeling or in any mental apprehension, you will throw into confusion even the rest of your sensations by your groundless belief, so as to reject the truth altogether. If you hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation in ideas based on opinion, as well as that which does not, you will not escape error, as you will be taking sides in every question involving truth and error.” Hicks (1910)

“If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to discriminate with respect to that which awaits confirmation between matter of opinion and that which is already present, whether in sensation or in feelings or in any presentative perception of the mind, you will throw into confusion even the rest of your sensations by your groundless belief and so you will be rejecting the standard of truth altogether. If in your ideas based upon opinion you hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation as well as that which does not, you will not escape error, as you will be maintaining complete ambiguity whenever it is a case of judging between right and wrong opinion.” Hicks (1925)

“If you reject any single sensation and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion as to the appearance awaiting confirmation and that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will confound all other sensations as well with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgments. And if among the mental images created by your opinions you affirm both that which awaits confirmation and that which does not, you will not escape error, since you will have preserved the whole cause of doubt in every judgment between what is right and what is wrong.” Bailey (1926)

“If you reject any sensations, and if you fail to distinguish between conjecture based upon that which awaits confirmation and evidence given by the senses, by the feelings, and by the mental examinations of confirmed concepts, you will confuse the other sensations with unfounded conjecture and thus destroy the whole basis for judgment. If among all opinions you accept as equally valid both those that await confirmation and those that have been confirmed, you will not free yourself from error, since you will have preserved all the uncertainty about every judgment of what is true and what is not true.” Geer (1964)

“(1) If you are going to reject any sensation absolutely, and not distinguish opinions reliant on evidence yet awaited from what is already present through sensation, through feelings, and through every focusing of thought into an impression, you will confound all your other sensations with empty opinion and consequently reject the criterion in its entirety. (2) And if you are going to treat as established both all the evidence yet awaited in your conjectural conceptions, and that which has failed to [earn] attestation, you will not exclude falsehood, so that you will have removed all debate and all discrimination between correct and incorrect.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 87 (1987)

“If you reject any sensation that you do not distinguish between the opinion based on what awaits confirmation and evidence already available based on the senses, the feelings, and every intuitive faculty of the mind, you will send the remaining sensations into a turmoil with your foolish opinions, thus driving out every standard for judging. And if, among the perceptions based on opinion, you affirm both that which awaits confirmation and that which does not, you will fail to escape from error, since you will have retained every ground for dispute in judgment concerning right and wrong.” O'Connor (1993)

“If you reject unqualifiedly any sense-perception and do not distinguish the opinion about what awaits confirmation, and what is already present in the sense-perception, and the feelings, and every application of the intellect to presentations, you will also disturb the rest of your sense-perceptions with your pointless opinion; as a result you will reject every criterion. If, on the other hand, in your conceptions formed by opinion, you affirm everything that awaits confirmation as well as what does not, you will not avoid falsehood, so that you will be in the position of maintaining every disputable point in every decision about what is and is not correct.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“If you arbitrarily reject any one sensory experience and fail to differentiate between an opinion awaiting confirmation and what is already perceived by the senses, feelings, and every intuitive faculty of mind, you will impute trouble to all other sensory experiences, thereby rejecting every criterion. And if you concurrently affirm what awaits confirmation as well as actual sensory experience, you will still blunder, because you will foster equal reasons to doubt the truth and falsehood of everything.” Anderson (2004)

“If you expel each and every sensation without qualification, and fail to draw [fitting] distinctions applying to what is opined [about sensations] as between what is present already and what is anticipated; or if you fail to draw distinctions applying to what is opined [about sensations] as to whether such opinions are according to sense perception, the passions, or some other imaginary twist of mind: you will, then, confound also the rest of your sensations [in addition to the ones you are trying to expel directly] because of this ineffective way of judging, so that you will also have expelled all criteria for judging what is true and what is false.” Makridis (2005)

“If you reject a perception outright and do not distinguish between your opinion about what will happen after, what came before, your feelings, and all the layers of imagination involved in your thoughts, then you will throw your other perceptions into confusion because of your trifling opinions; as a result, you will reject the very criterion of truth. And if when forming concepts from your opinions you treat as confirmed everything that will happen and what you do not witness thereafter, then you will not avoid what is false, so that you will remove all argument and all judgment about what is and is not correct.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“If you summarily rule out any single sensation and do not make a distinction between the element of belief that is superimposed on a percept that awaits verification and what is actually present in sensation or in the feelings or some percept of the mind itself, you will cast doubt on all other sensations by your unfounded interpretation and consequently abandon all the criteria of truth. On the other hand, in cases of interpreted data, if you accept as true those that need verification as well as those that do not, you will still be in error, since the whole question at issue in every judgment of what is true or not true will be left intact.” Strodach (2012)

“If you reject any sensation absolutely, and do not distinguish between an opinion that awaits confirmation and a present reality (whether of sensation, feeling, or perception), you will also throw your other sensations into confusion with your groundless belief, and in doing so will be rejecting altogether the criterion. But if, when assessing opinions, you affirm as true everything that awaits confirmation as well as that which does not, [. . .] you will not escape error; for you will be preserving complete uncertainty in every judgment between right and wrong opinion.” Mensch (2018)

“If you're going to reject any particular sense-perception outright and not distinguish beliefs about anything deferred from what is already present in sense-perception or feelings or any presentational application of thought, then you're going to throw the rest of your sense-perceptions into turmoil too by this pointless belief, an you'll end up rejecting every standard. On the other hand, if you're going to affirm not only whatever is deferred in your concepts and beliefs but also what [has] no attestation, then you will not evade falsehood, and you will find yourself upholding every challenge on every decision about what is correct or incorrect.” White (2021)

Bailey: 23. If you fight against all sensations, you will have no standard by which to judge even those of them which you say are false.

**EΙ ΜAΧῌ ΠAΣAΙΣ ****TAΙΣ AΙΣΘΗΣEΣΙΝ ****ΟΥΧ EΞEΙΣ ****ΟΥΔ AΣ AΝ**

**ΦῌΣ ****AΥTΩΝ ΔΙEΨEΥΣΘAΙ ****ΠΡΟΣ TΙ ΠΟΙΟΥΜEΝΟΣ ****TΗΝ**

**AΓΩΓΗΝ ΚΡΙΝῌΣ. **

“If you resist all the senses, you will not even have anything left to which you can refer, or by which you may be able to judge of the falsehood of the senses which you condemn.” Yonge (1853)

“If you fight against all your sensations you will have no standard to which to refer, and thus no means of judging even those sensations which you pronounce false.” Hicks (1910)

“If you fight against all your sensations, you will have no standard to which to refer, and thus no means of judging even those judgments which you pronounce false.” Hicks (1925)

“If you fight against all sensations, you will have no standard by which to judge even those of them which you say are false.” Bailey (1926)

“If you are going to make war on all the sensations, you will not even have a standard by reference to which you shall judge those of them which you say are deceptive.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 140-141 (1954)

“If you struggle against all your sensations, you will have no standard of comparison by which to measure even the sensations you judge false.” Geer (1964)

“If you fight against all sensations, you will not have a standard against which to judge even those of them you say are mistaken.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 80 (1987)

“If you do battle with all your sensations, you will be unable to form a standard for judging even which of them you judge to be false.” O'Connor (1993)

“If you quarrel with all your sense-perceptions you will have nothing to refer to in judging even those sense-perceptions which you claim are false.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“If you argue against all your sensations, you will then have no criterion to declare any of them false.” Anderson (2004)

“If you wage battle against all the sensations, [not only will you lose those you are directly fighting against but, also] you won't even have those sensations left, by reference to which alone you could claim to have won your case.” Makridis (2005)

“If you fight against all your perceptions, you will have nothing to refer to in judging those which you declare to be false.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“If you reject all sensations, you will not have any point of reference by which to judge even the ones you claim are false.” Strodach (2012)

“If you fight against all your sensations, you will not have a standard by which to judge the ones that you claim are false.” Mensch (2018)

“If you battle against all sense-perceptions, you will not have any basis for assessing even those you claim are false.” White (2021)

Alternate Translations

Bailey: 21. He who has learned the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain due to want, and makes the whole of life complete, is easy to obtain, so that there is no need of actions which involve competition.

**Ο TA ΠEΡATA ****TΟΥ ΒΙΟΥ ΚATEΙΔΩΣ ΟΙΔEΝ ****ΩΣ EΥΠΟΡΙΣTΟΝ**

**EΣTΙ TΟ [TΟ] AΛΓΟΥΝ ****ΚAT' EΝΔEΙAΝ EΞAΙΡΟΥΝ ****ΚAΙ TΟ**

**TΟΝ ΟΛΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ ΠAΝTEΛΗ ΚAΘΙΣTAΝ·**** ΩΣTE ΟΥΔEΝ**

**ΠΡΟΣΔEΙTAΙ ΠΡAΓΜATΩΝ AΓΩNAΣ ΚEΚTΗΜEΝΩΝ ****. **

“He who is acquainted with the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain which arises from want and which makes the whole of life perfect, is easily procurable; so that he has no need of those things which can only be attained with trouble.” Yonge (1853)

“He who understands the limits of life knows how easy it is to procure enough to remove the pain of want and make the whole of life complete and perfect. Hence he has no longer any need of things which are not to be won save by confict and struggle.” Hicks (1910)

“He who understands the limits of life knows how easy it is to procure enough to remove the pain of want and make the whole of life complete and perfect. Hence he has no longer any need of things which are not to be won save by labour and confict.” Hicks (1925)

“He who has learned the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain due to want and makes the whole of life complete is easy to obtain; so that there is no need of actions which involve competition.” Bailey (1926)

“The man who has discerned the limited needs of life is aware how easy of procurement is that which removes the pain arising from want and renders the whole life perfect, so that he feels no need of adding things that involve competition.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 186 (1954)

“The man who discerns the narrow limits of life's needs will understand how easy it is to procure what removes the discomfort arising from want, so that he feels no necessity of engaging in activities that involve competition." DeWitt, St. Paul and Epicurus 72 (1954)

“The man who understands the limits of living knows that it is easy to obtain that which removes the pain caused by want and that which perfects the whole life. Therefore, he has no need of things that involve struggle.” Geer (1964)

“He who knows the limits of life knows how easy it is to obtain that which removes pain caused by want and that which makes the whole of life complete. He therefore has no need for competitive involvements.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 150 (1987)

“He who understands the limits of life knows how easy it is to remove the pain that results from want and to make one's whole life complete. As a result, he does not need actions that bring strife in their wake.” O'Connor (1993)

“He who has learned the limits of life knows that it is easy to provide that which removes the feeling of pain owing to want and make one's whole life perfect. So there's no need for things which involve struggle.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“He who understands the limits of life knows that things which remove pain arising from need are easy to obtain, and furnish a complete and optimal life. Thus he no longer needs things that are troublesome to attain.” Anderson (2004)

“He who knows well the limits of living also knows that to remove pain caused by need is easy—resources for that are not lacking—so that one's entire life can be rendered complete and replete with all possible purposes. It follows that there is no need whatever of things unless they are won by noble struggle.” Makridis (2005)

“One who perceives the limits of life knows how easy it is to expel the pain produced by a lack of something and to make one's entire life complete; so that there is no need for the things that are achieved through struggle.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“One who understands the limits o f the good life knows that what eliminates the pains brought on by need and what makes the whole of life perfect is easily obtained, so that there is no need for enterprises that entail the struggle for success.” Strodach (2012)

“The man who has discerned the limits of life knows how easy it is to procure what is needed to remove the pain of want and make his whole life perfect; he therefore needs none of the things that cannot be acquired without a struggle.” Mensch (2018)

“The one who understands the limits of life knows that what removes pains caused by need and also what makes the whole life entirely complete are easily obtained; so he has no further need for any endeavors involving struggles.” White (2021)

Bailey: 20. The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited, and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits, and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time; but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short, in any way, of the best life.

**Η ΜEΝ ΣAΡΞ AΠEΛAΒE ****TA ΠEΡATA ****TΗΣ ΗΔΟΝΗΣ AΠEΙΡA**

**ΚAΙ AΠEΙΡΟΣ ****AΥTΗΝ ΧΡΟΝΟΣ APEΣKOI ****AN· Η ΔE ΔΙAΝΟΙA**

**TΟΥ TΗΣ ΣAΡΚΟΣ TEΛΟΥΣ ****ΚAΙ ΠEΡATΟΣ ΛAΒΟΥΣA ****TΟΝ**

**EΠΙΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΝ ****ΚAΙ TΟΥΣ ΥΠEΡ TΟΥ AΙΩΝΟΣ ΦΟΒΟΥΣ**

**EΚΛΥΣAΣA ****TΟΝ ΠAΝTEΛΗ ΒΙΟΝ ΠAΡEΣΚEΥAΣE ****ΚAΙ**

**ΟΥΘEΝ ****ETΙ TΟΥ AΠEΙΡΟΥ ΧΡΟΝΟΥ ΠΡΟΣEΔEΗΘΗ·**** [OY]** **MHN AΛΛ' ΟΥTE EΦΥΓE ****TΗΝ ΗΔΟΝΗΝ ****ΟΥΔ ΗΝΙΚA ****TΗΝ**

**EΞAΓΩΓΗΝ ****EΚ TΟΥ ΖΗΝ ****TA ΠΡAΓΜATA ΠAΡEΣΚEΥAΖEΝ**

**ΩΣ EΛΛEΙΠΟΥΣA ****TΙ TΟΥ AΡΙΣTΟΥ ΒΙΟΥ ΚATEΣTΡEΨEΝ. **

“The flesh sets no limits to pleasure, and therefore it yearns for an eternity of time. But reason, enabling us to conceive the end and dissolution of the body, and liberating us from the fears relative to eternity, procures for us all the happiness of which life is capable, so completely that we have no further occasion to include eternity in our desires. In this disposition of mind, man is happy even when his troubles engage him to quit life; and to die thus, is for him only to interrupt a life of happiness.” Yonge (1853)

“The flesh assumes the limits of pleasure to be infinite, and only infinite time would satisfy it. But the mind, grasping in thought what the end and limit of the flesh is, and banishing the terrors of futurity, procures a complete and perfect life and has no longer any need of infinite time. Nevertheless, it does not shun pleasure, and even in the hour of death, when ushered out of existence by circumstances, the mind does not fail to enjoy the best life.” Hicks (1910)

“The flesh receives as unlimited the limits of pleasure; and to provide it requires unlimited time. But the mind, grasping in thought what the end and limit of the flesh is, and banishing the terrors of futurity, procures a complete and perfect life, and has no longer any need of unlimited time. Nevertheless it does not shun pleasure, and even in the hour of death, when ushered out of existence by circumstances, the mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life.” Hicks (1925)

“The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time: but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short in any way of the best life.” Bailey (1926)

“It is the flesh that fnds the limits of pleasure boundless and infinite time would have been required to furnish it, but the intelligence, taking into the calculation the end and limit of the flesh and dispelling the fears about eternity, renders the whole life is perfect.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 225 (1954)

“The flesh believes that pleasure is limitless and that it requires unlimited time; but the mind, understanding the end and limit of the flesh and ridding itself of fears of the future, secures a complete life and has no longer any need for unlimited time. It does not, however, avoid pleasure; and when circumstances bring on the end of life, it does not depart as if it still lacked any portion of the good life.” Geer (1964)

“The flesh places the limits of pleasure at infnity, and needs an infinite time to bring it about. But the intellect, by making a rational calculation of the end and the limit which govern the flesh, and by dispelling the fears about eternity, brings about the complete life, so that we no longer need the infinite time. But neither does it shun pleasure, nor even when circumstances bring about our departure from life does it suppose, as it perishes, that it has in any way fallen short of the best life.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 150 (1987)

“The flesh considers the limits of pleasure to be boundless, and only infinite time makes it possible. But the mind, having gained a reasonable understanding of the end and limit of the flesh, and having expelled fears about eternity furnishes the complete life, and we no longer has any need for time without end. But the mind does not fee from pleasure nor, when circumstances bring about the departure from life, does it take its leave as though falling short somehow of the best life.” O'Connor (1993)

“The flesh took the limits of pleasure to be unlimited, and [only] an unlimited time would have provided it. But the intellect, reasoning out the goal and limit of the flesh and dissolving the fears of eternity, provided us with the perfect way of life and had no further need of unlimited time. But it [the intellect] did not fee pleasure, and even when circumstances caused an exit from life it did not die as though it were lacking any aspect of the best life.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Bodily pleasure seems unlimited, and to provide it would require unlimited time. But the mind, recognizing the limits of the body, and dismissing apprehensions about eternity, furnishes a complete and optimal life, so we no longer have any need of unlimited time. Nevertheless, the mind does not shun pleasure; moreover, when the end of life approaches, it does not feel remorse, as if it fell short in any way from living the best life possible.” Anderson (2004)

“The body picks out the end points of pleasure as lying beyond any limit, and marks the time needed to procure this [pleasure] as being unlimited. But the mind, grasping the fnal goal and terminating limits of the body by means of comprehending judgment, and obliterating the dread of an eternal afterlife, makes possible a life that reaches all goals within itself and has no need whatever of infinite time. But it should not [be thought] that the mind fees from pleasure—not even at that moment when circumstances bring about the extraction from this life—or that it destroys the pleasures as if they were unworthy of the best life.” Makridis (2005)

“The flesh assumes that the limits of joy are infinite, and that infinite joy can be produced only through infinite time. But the mind, thinking through the goal and limits of the flesh and dissolving fears about eternity, produces a complete way of life and therefore has no need of infinite time; yet the mind does not fee from joy, nor when events cause it to exit from life does it look back as if it has missed any aspect of the best life.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“The body takes the limits of pleasure to be infinite, and infinite time would provide such pleasure. But the mind has provided us with the complete life by a rational examination of the body's goal and limitations and by dispelling our fears about a life after death; and so we no longer need unlimited time. On the other hand, it does not avoid pleasure, nor, when conditions occasion our departure from life, does it come to the end in a manner that would suggest that it had fallen short in any way of the best possible existence.” Strodach (2012)

“The flesh receives the limits of pleasure as if they were unlimited; and an unlimited time is required to provide it. But the mind, grasping in thought the end and limit of the flesh, and ridding itself of fears of eternity, fashions a perfect life and no longer requires unlimited time. Yet it does not avoid pleasure; and even when circumstances bring life to an end, it dies having missed nothing of the best life.” Mensch (2018)

“The flesh assumed the limits of pleasure were endless, which an endless time provided. But thought, by making an appraisal of the end and limit for the flesh, and by dissolving fears about an afterlife, provided the perfect life, and we no longer have any need for endless time. Yet neither did thought spurn pleasure, nor when the situation provided an exit from life, did it depart in any way deprived of the best life.” White (2021)

Bailey: 19. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure.

Ο AΠEΙΡΟΣ ΧΡΟΝΟΣ ****ΙΣΗΝ EΧEΙ TΗΝ ΗΔΟΝΗΝ ****ΚAΙ Ο**

**ΠEΠEΡAΣΜEΝΟΣ ****EAΝ TΙΣ AΥTΗΣ TA ΠEΡATA**

**ΚATAΜETΡΗΣῌ Tῼ ΛΟΓΙΣΜῼ. **

“Infinite and fnite time both have equal pleasure, if any one measures its limits by reason.” Yonge (1853)

“Infinite time and fnite time hold an equal amount of pleasure, if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason.” Hicks (1910)

“Unlimited time and limited time afford an equal amount of pleasure, if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason.” Hicks (1925)

“Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures by reason the limits of pleasure.” Bailey (1926)

“Infinite time and fnite time are characterized by equal pleasure, if one measures the limits of pleasure by reason.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 229 (1954)

“Time that is unlimited and time that is limited afford equal pleasure if one measures pleasure's extent by reason.” Geer (1964)

“Infinite time and fnite time contain equal pleasure, if one measures the limits of pleasure by reasoning.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 150 (1987)

“Infinite time contains the same amount of pleasure as fnite time, if one measures the limits of pleasure by reason.” O'Connor (1993)

“Unlimited time and limited time contain equal [amounts of] pleasure, if one measures its limits by reasoning.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Infinite and fnite time afford equal pleasure, if one measures its limits by reason.” Anderson (2004)

“Time without limit affords the same amount of pleasure as does limited time—if one measures the limits of pleasure precisely and by using reasoned judgment.” Makridis (2005)

“Finite time and infinite time contain the same amount of joy, if its limits are measured out through reasoning.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than does fnite time, if one determines the limits of pleasure rationally.” Strodach (2012)

“Limited and unlimited time furnish an equal amount of pleasure if the limits of pleasure are measured by reason.” Mensch (2018)

“Endless time and a limited time afford equal pleasure, if you measure out the limits of pleasure by reasoning.” White (2021)

**Ο ΔΙΚAΙΟΣ ATAΡAΚTΟTATΟΣ ****Ο Δ' AΔΙΚΟΣ ΠΛEΙΣTΗΣ**

**TAΡAΧΗΣ ΓΗΜΩΝ. **

“The just man is the freest of all men from disquietude; but the unjust man is a perpetual prey to it.” Yonge (1853)

“The just man enjoys the greatest peace of mind, while the unjust is full of the utmost disquietude.” Hicks (1925)

“The just man is most free from trouble, the unjust most full of trouble.” Bailey (1926)

“The just man is least disturbed; the unjust man is filled with the greatest turmoil.” Geer (1964)

“The just [life] is most free from disturbance, but the unjust life is full of the greatest disturbance.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 125 (1987)

“The just man is the most free of perturbation, while the unjust man is full of the greatest disturbance.” O'Connor (1993)

“The just life is most free from disturbance, but the unjust life is full of the greatest disturbance.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“The just man is the freest of anyone from anxiety; but the unjust man is perpetually haunted by it.” Anderson (2004)

“The just person is the most imperturbable; but the unjust is filled with ample distress.” Makridis (2005)

“One who acts aright is utterly steady and serene, whereas one who goes astray is full of trouble and confusion.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“The just man is the least disturbed by passion, the unjust man the most highly disturbed.” Strodach (2012)

“The just man is utterly imperturbable, while the unjust is full of the utmost perturbation.” Mensch (2018)

“The just one has the very least turmoil, but the unjust one teems with the very most.” White (2021)

Alternate Translations

Bailey: 15. The wealth demanded by nature is both limited and easily procured; that demanded by idle imaginings stretches on to infinity.

**Ο TΗΣ ΦΥΣEΩΣ ΠΛΟΥTΟΣ ****ΚAΙ ΩΡΙΣTAΙ ****ΚAΙ EΥΠΟΡΙΣTΟΣ**

**EΣTΙΝ Ο ΔE TΩΝ ΚEΝΩΝ ΔΟΞΩΝ ****EΙΣ AΠEΙΡΟΝ EΚΠΙΠTEΙ. **

“The riches of nature are defined and easily procurable; but vain desires are insatiable.” Yonge (1853)

“Nature's wealth has its bounds and is easy to procure, but the wealth of vain fancies recedes to an infinite distance.” Hicks (1910)

“Nature's wealth at once has its bounds and is easy to procure; but the wealth of vain fancies recedes to an infinite distance.” Hicks (1925)

“The wealth demanded by nature is both limited and easily procured; that demanded by idle imaginings stretches on to infinity.” Bailey (1926)

“Natural wealth is limited and easily obtained; the wealth defined by vain fancies is always beyond reach.” Geer (1964)

“Nature's wealth is limited and easily obtained; the riches of idle fancies go on forever” O'Connor (1993)

“Natural wealth is both limited and easy to acquire. But wealth [as defined by] groundless opinions extends without limit.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Natural wealth is both limited and easily obtained, but vanity is insatiable.” Anderson (2004)

“The bounty of nature is not only easy to extract as a resource; it also has its own limits set [by nature] [so that one cannot run into excess insofar as he is attuned to nature;] but the opulence of hollow fancies plunges precipitously into a space that has no limits.” Makridis (2005)

“Natural wealth is both limited and easy to acquire, but the riches incited by groundless opinion have no end.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Nature's wealth is restricted and easily won, while that of empty convention runs on to infinity.” Strodach (2012)

“Nature's wealth is both limited and easy to procure; but the wealth of groundless opinions vanishes into thin air.” Mensch (2018)

“Nature’s wealth is both well-defined and readily obtained; but the wealth founded on empty beliefs is endlessly elusive.” White (2021)

14. The most unalloyed source of protection from men, which is secured to some extent by a certain force of expulsion, is in fact the immunity which results from a quiet life, and retirement from the world. (Bailey)

**TΗΣ AΣΦAΛEΙAΣ ****TΗΣ EΞ AΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ ΓEΝΟΜEΝΗΣ ****ΜEΧΡΙ**

**TΙΝΟΣ ΔΥΝAΜEΙ ****TINI EΞEΡEΙΣTΙΚῌ ****ΚAΙ EΥΠΟΡΙᾼ**

**EΙΛΙΚΡΙΝEΣTATΗ ΓΙΝETAΙ ****Η EΚ TΗΣ ΗΣΥΧΙAΣ ****ΚAΙ**

**EΚΧΩΡΗΣEΩΣ TΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ AΣΦAΛEΙA.**

“Irresistible power and great wealth may, up to a certain point, give us security as far as men are concerned; but the security of men in general depends upon the tranquility of their souls, and their freedom from ambition.” Yonge (1853)

“When tolerable security against our fellow-men is attained, then on a basis of power arises most genuine bliss, to wit, the security of a private life withdrawn from the multitude.” Hicks (1910)

“When tolerable security against our fellow-men is attained, then on a basis of power suffcient to afford support and of material prosperity arises in most genuine form the security of a quiet private life withdrawn from the multitude.” Hicks (1925)

“The most unalloyed source of protection from men, which is secured to some extent by a certain force of expulsion, is in fact the immunity which results from a quiet life and the retirement from the world.” Bailey (1926)

“Although safety from the attacks of men has been secured to a certain degree by dynastic protection and abundance of means, that which comes of the retired life and withdrawal from the multitude is the most unalloyed.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 189 (1954)

“Even though security from the injuries of men may have been established to a certain degree by dynastic protection, the most unalloyed feeling of security is to be found in the retired life and withdrawal from the multitude." DeWitt, St. Paul and Epicurus 188 (1954)

“When reasonable security from men has been attained, then the security that comes from peace of mind and withdrawal from the crowd is present, sufficient in strength and most unmixed in well-being.” Geer (1964)

“The most perfect means of securing safety from men, which arises, to some extent, from a certain power to expel, is the assurance that comes from quietude and withdrawal from the world.” O'Connor (1993)

“The purest security is that which comes from a quiet life and withdrawal from the many, although a certain degree of security from other men does come by means of the power to repel [attacks] and by means of prosperity.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Supreme power and great wealth may, to some degree, protect us from other men; but security in general depends upon peace of mind and social detachment.” Anderson (2004)

“Although safety from human beings may be secured, up to a point, by means of bountiful resources and power that can exempt one from [some risks;] yet, the most genuine safety comes from leading a tranquil private life and keeping aloof from the masses.” Makridis (2005)

“Although some measure of safety from other people is based in the power to fght them off and in abundant wealth, the purest security comes from solitude and breaking away from the herd.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“The simplest means of procuring protection from other men (which is gained to a certain extent by deterrent force) is the security of quiet solitude and withdrawal from the mass of people.” Strodach (2012)

“While some degree of security from other men can be attained on the basis of stable power and material prosperity, the purest security comes from tranquillity and from a life withdrawn from the many.” Mensch (2018)

“Although security on a human level is achieved up to a point by a power to resist and by prosperity, the security afforded by inner peace and withdrawing from the crowd is the purest.” White (2021)

Bailey: 13. There is no profit in securing protection in relation to men, if things above, and things beneath the earth, and indeed all in the boundless universe, remain matters of suspicion.

**ΟΥΘEΝ ΟΦEΛΟΣ ****ΗΝ TΗΝ ΚATA AΝΘΡΩΠΟΥΣ AΣΦAΛEΙAΝ**

**ΠAΡAΣΚEΥAΖEΣΘAΙ TΩΝ AΝΩΘEΝ ΥΠΟΠTΩΝ**

**ΚAΘEΣTΩTΩΝ ** ΚAΙ TΩΝ ΥΠΟ ΓΗΣ ΚAΙ AΠΛΩΣ *TΩΝ EΝ TΙ

**AΠEIPῼ.

“It would be no good for a man to secure himself safety as far as men are concerned, while in a state of apprehension as to all the heavenly bodies, and those under the earth, and in short, all those in the infinite.” Yonge (1853)

“There would be no advantage in providing security against our fellow-men so long as we were alarmed by occurrences over our heads or beneath the earth, or in general by whatever happens in the infinite void.” Hicks (1910)

“There would be no advantage in providing security against our fellow-men, so long as we were alarmed by occurrences over our heads or beneath the earth or in general by whatever happens in the boundless universe.” Hicks (1925)

“There is no profit in securing protection in relation to men, if things above and things beneath the earth and indeed all in the boundless universe remain matters of suspicion.” Bailey (1926)

“Nothing is gained by building up the feeling of security in our relations with men if the things above our heads and those beneath the earth and in general those in the unseen are matters of suspicion.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 305 (1954)

“It is of no avail to have established security in human relations if things above and in the earth beneath and those in the infinite universe in general are viewed with uncertainty." DeWitt, St. Paul and Epicurus 188 (1954)

“It is of no avail to prepare security against other men while things above us and beneath the earth and in the whole infinite universe in general are still dreaded.” Geer (1964)

“There is no benefit in creating security with respect to men while retaining worries about things up above, things beneath the earth, and generally things in the infinite.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 155 (1987)

“There is no benefit in securing protection from men if things above and beneath the earth and indeed all the limitless universe are made matters for suspicion.” O'Connor (1993)

“It is useless to obtain security from men while the things above and below the earth and, generally, the things in the unbounded remained as objects of suspicion.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“One gains nothing by securing protection from other men if he still has apprehensions about things above and beneath the earth and throughout the infinite universe.” Anderson (2004)

“There is generally no benefit in procuring safety and protection from other human beings when one lives constantly in frightful conjecture about what is over our heads and those that are under the earth and those that simply are, without qualifcation, in boundless space.” Makridis (2005)

“It is useless to be safe from other people while retaining suspicions about what is above and below the earth and in general about the infinite unknown.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“There is no advantage in gaining security with regard to other people if phenomena occurring above and beneath the earth—in a word, everything in the infinite universe—are objects of anxiety.” Strodach (2012)

“It would be useless to obtain security against our fellow men while things above and below the earth, and in the unlimited in general, continued to terrify us.” Mensch (2018)

“It was useless to establish security on a human level so long as things in the sky or below the earth and in general anything in the limitless [sc. universe] were a source of worry.” White (2021)

Bailey: 12. A man cannot dispel his fear about the most important matters if he does not know what is the nature of the universe, but suspects the truth of some mythical story. So that, without natural science, it is not possible to attain our pleasures unalloyed.

**ΟΥΚ ΗΝ TΟ ΦΟΒΟΥΜEΝΟΝ ΛΥEΙΝ ****ΥΠEΡ TΩΝ ΚΥΡΙΩTATΩΝ**

**ΜΗ ΚATEΙΔΟTA ****TΙΣ Η TΟΥ ΣΥΜΠAΝTΟΣ ΦΥΣΙΣ ****AΛΛ**

**ΥΠΟΠTEΥΟMENON ****TΙ TΩΝ ΚATA TΟΥΣ ΜΥΘΟΥΣ·**** ΩΣTE ΟΥΚ**

**ΗΝ AΝEΥ ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙAΣ AΚEΡAΙΟΥΣ ****TAΣ ΗΔΟΝAΣ**

**AΠΟΛAΜΒAΝEΙΝ. **

“It would not be possible for a person to banish all fear about those things which are called most essential, unless he knew what is the nature of the universe, or if he had any idea that the fables told about it could be true; and therefore a person cannot enjoy unmixed pleasure without physiological knowledge.” Yonge (1853)

“It would be impossible to banish fear on matters of the highest importance if a man did not know the nature of the whole universe but lived in dread of what the legends tell us.

Hence, without the study of nature there was no enjoyment of unmixed pleasures.” Hicks (1910)

“It would be impossible to banish fear on matters of the highest importance, if a man did not know the nature of the whole universe, but lived in dread of what the legends tell us. Hence without the study of nature there was no enjoyment of unmixed pleasures.” Hicks (1925)

“A man cannot dispel his fear about the most important matters if he does not know what is the nature of the universe but suspects the truth of some mythical story. So that without natural science it is not possible to attain our pleasures unalloyed.” Bailey (1926)

“It is impossible for men to dispel the fear concerning things of supreme importance not understanding the nature of the whole universe but suspecting there may be some truth in the stories related in the myths. Consequently it is impossible without the knowledge of Nature to enjoy the pleasures unalloyed.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 305 (1954)

“It is not possible for one to rid himself of his fears about the most important things if he does not understand the nature of the universe but dreads some of the things he has learned in the myths. Therefore, it is not possible to gain unmixed happiness without natural science.” Geer (1964)

“There is no way to dispel the fear about matters of supreme importance, for someone who does not know what the nature of the universe is but retains some of the fears based on mythology. Hence without natural philosophy there is no way of securing the purity of our pleasures.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 155 (1987)

“It is impossible for anyone to dispel his fear over the most important matters, if he does not know what is the nature of the universe but instead suspects something that happens in myth. Therefore, it is impossible to obtain unmitigated pleasure without natural science.” O'Connor (1993)

“It is impossible for someone ignorant about the nature of the universe but still suspicious about the subjects of the myths to dissolve his feelings of fear about the most important matters. So it is impossible to receive unmixed pleasures without knowing natural science.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“One cannot rid himself of his primal fears if he does not understand the nature of the universe but instead suspects the truth of some mythical story. So without the study of nature, there can be no enjoyment of pure pleasure.” Anderson (2004)

“It is impossible to be released from fear about the most important things for one who, not having adequate knowledge as to what the nature of the whole is, is trying to second-guess this or that in accordance with the [traditional] fairy tales. Hence, it is impossible to enjoy the pleasures in full unless one has studied natural science.” Makridis (2005)

“It is impossible for someone who is completely ignorant about nature to wash away his fears about the most important matters if he retains some suspicions about the myths. So it is impossible to experience undiluted enjoyment without studying what is natural.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“It is impossible to get rid of our anxieties about essentials if we do not understand the nature of the universe and are apprehensive about some of the theological accounts. Hence it is impossible to enjoy our pleasures unadulterated without natural science.” Strodach (2012)

“It would not be possible to dispel fear about the most important matters if a man did not know the nature of the universe, but lived in dread of what the myths describe. Hence, it would be impossible without the study of nature to enjoy unmixed pleasures.” Mensch (2018)

“There was no way to release someone from fear about the most important things if he does not know the nature of the entirety [sc. universe] and if he is worried about any of the tales sung of old; and so there was no way to obtain unmixed pleasures without studying nature.” White (2021)

Bailey: 11. If we were not troubled by our suspicions of the phenomena of the sky, and about death, fearing that it concerns us, and also by our failure to grasp the limits of pains and desires, we should have no need of natural science.

**EΙ ΜΗΘEΝ ****ΗΜAΣ AΙ TΩΝ ΜETEΩΡΩΝ ΥΠΟΨΙAΙ ΗΝΩΧΛΟΥΝ**

**ΚAΙ AΙ ΠEΡΙ ΘAΝATΟΥ ****ΜΗ ΠΟTE ΠΡΟΣ ΗΜAΣ ῌ TΙ ETΙ TE TΟ**

**ΜΗ ΚATAΝΟEΙΝ ****TΟΥΣ ΟΡΟΥΣ TΩΝ AΛΓΗΔΟΝΩΝ ****ΚAΙ TΩΝ**

**EΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ ****ΟΥΚ AΝ ΠΡΟΣEΔEΟΜEΘA ΦΥΣΙΟΛΟΓΙAΣ. **

“If apprehensions relating to the heavenly bodies did not disturb us, and if the terrors of death have no concern with us, and if we had the courage to contemplate the boundaries of pain and of the desires, we should have no need of physiological studies.” Yonge (1853)

“If we had never been molested by alarms at celestial and atmospheric phenomena, nor by the misgiving that death somehow affects us, nor by neglect of the proper limits of pains and desires, we should have had no need to study natural science.” Hicks (1910)

“If we were not troubled by our suspicions of the phenomena of the sky and about death, fearing that it concerns us, and also by our failure to grasp the limits of pains and desires, we should have no need of natural science.” Bailey (1926)

“If our dread of the phenomena above us, our fear lest death concern us, and our inability to discern the limits of pains and desires were not vexations to us, we would have no need of the natural sciences.” Geer (1964)

“Were we not upset by the worries that celestial phenomena and death might matter to us, and also by failure to appreciate the limits of pains and desires, we would have no need for natural philosophy.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 155 (1987)

“If apprehensions about the heavens and our fear lest death concern us, as well as our failure to realize the limits of pains and desires, did not bother us, we would have no need of natural science.” O'Connor (1993)

“If our suspicions about heavenly phenomena and about death did not trouble us at all and were never anything to us, and, moreover, if not knowing the limits of pains and desires did not trouble us, then we would have no need of natural science.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“If we were never troubled by how phenomena in the sky or death might concern us, or by our failures to grasp the limits of pains and desires, we would have no need to study nature.” Anderson (2004)

“If we were never perturbed by frightful second-guessing of natural phenomena and death; if, adding to the above, we were never [beset by] failure to comprehend the proper limits of pains and pleasures: then, we would have no need of natural science.” Makridis (2005)

“If our suspicions about astronomical phenomena and about death were nothing to us and troubled us not at all, and if this were also the case regarding our ignorance about the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no need for studying what is natural.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“We would have no need for natural science unless we were worried by apprehensiveness regarding the heavenly bodies, by anxiety about the meaning of death, and also by our failure to understand the limitations of pain and desire.” Strodach (2012)

“If we were not harassed by apprehensions caused by celestial phenomena and by the fear that death somehow affects us, and by our failure to comprehend the limits of pains and desires, we would have no need for natural science.” Mensch (2018)

“If no worries about celestial things troubled us at all, or any about death possibly mattering for us, or again if we did not understand the boundaries of pain and desire, we would have no more need for the study of nature.” White (2021)