Posts by Cassius

If you've ever asked yourself why Epicurus recommends at the end of the letter to Pythocles that we should give ourselves to a "study of the beginnings, and of infinity and of things that are akin to them," take a look at video at the link I will post in the first comment below and see if you have a ready response to the seductive infinity-based argument for the existence of a supernatural god made by "VenomFangX." This kind of glib argument for the existence of god is difficult to refute unless you have considered these principles before. I am not sure myself I could type it up quickly and easily, but the exercise gives me a greater appreciation of why Epicurus rejected the doctrine of infinite divisibilty (see letter to Herodotus around line 56 for one direct reference).

A seductive argument for the existence of god based on "infinity":

1) He accepts that it is correct to hold that nothing comes from nothing (the Epicurean position).

2) 1:30 He says that the universe cannot always have existed because we cannot apply properties of infinity to the universe.

3)1:49 Matter time and space cannot be eternal/infinite

4) Time is the measure of changes in matter, and therefore nothing could ever happen if an infinite time happened before any event. Can't have an infinite amount of finite things.

5) 3:00 Could there be an infinite amount of changes between two events? No.

6) Therefore time must be finite.

7) 3:32. You cannot have an infinite amount of finite things because infinite divisibility can never be reached. That proves there is only a finite amount of matter.

8)Therefore matter and time are finite and that means that they were created and that means that space cannot be infinite because space is only the measure of the distance between matter and if matter ceased to exist there would be a vacuum so there would be no space.

9) 4:30 Therefore since matter is finite then space is finite before there is only a finite distance between the two furthest pieces of matter in all reality.

10) Therefore matter and time and space are not infinite and therefore they are not eternal, That means they had a beginning.

11) 4:50 Whatever created them therefore existed without matter, time and space. Something without time is therefore an eternal NOW and unchanging, and that is why the Bible says that God never changes. To god the past present and future are all one.

12)5:30 If you exist without matter then you are immaterial and without space so you are omnipresent.

13)5:55 Something that is eternal, omnipresent, and immaterial are the attributes of God.

Does anyone have a PDF facsimile of an old/ancient Greek manuscript of Book 10 of Diogenes Laertius? I would like to see how the Principal Doctrines are formatted at the end. I get the impression from my reading that the division into 40 dates no more than a few hundred years at most, and maybe less than that. One of the standard references I use, by Charles Yonge, divides them up into 43 instead of 40, and I'd like to check this against the oldest available facsimile to see if there is any foundation for a division at all, or whether the "Authorized Maxims" were originally just in letter/narrative format. For example, this Greek / Latin edition from 1739 uses numbering, but it goes to 44 and thus appears closer to the Yonge format than to the modern "standard" format.

https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001844364

This is a link to the page where the Principal Doctrines start. It does look like the Greek side is divided into sections but with letters rather than numbers.

https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001844364

This version has PD6 broken down into two separate Maxims, so that "no pleasure is intrinsically bad..." is PD8 rather than PD7

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.…q=1311;size=125

One more comparison: the "modern" 20 starting with the flesh perceiving that pleasure is unlimited and going all the way through "as if it fell short of the best life" is broken down into two separate passages https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.…q=1315;size=125

We support friends not by lamentation, but taking care of them.

translated by Takis Panagiotopoulos.

LXVI.(66) Συμπαθῶμεν τοῖς φίλοις οὐ θρηνοῦντες ἀλλὰ φροντίζοντες.

Discussion of the meme

One more comment I'd like to preserve here is the observation that the scheme of dividing the Doctrines up into 40 separate items does not seem to go back to the ancient world, and was added somewhere along the way. If the doctrines were written more in "letter" form, with no intent that each of the 40 stand alone, then it would make sense to read six and seven together (as Elli points out). Also, I think I have seen it argued that Epicurus and Lucretius sometimes used the writing device of repetition - saying the same thing several times in different ways in quick succession - for purposes of emphasis and clarity. Maybe what we have as PD 6 is just a warm-up for the main point, which is in PD 7, and the thoughts were never intended by Epicurus to be separated but to be one long flowing single thought.

I am informed by Elli P. that there are serious issues with the standard English translation of PD6. The versions we most commonly see are:

Bailey: "To secure protection from men anything is a natural good, by which you may be able to attain this end." (note the strangely-placed comma)

Hicks/Loeb: "In order to obtain security from other men any means whatsoever of procuring this was a natural good."

But Hicks notes a problem:

Elli cites this version of the ancient Greek text by Archontia Liontaki, who is a philologist οf the ancient and new Greek language, and a member of the current Garden of Epicurus in Athens :

VI. 6 Ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθόν͵ ἐξ ὧν ἄν ποτε τοῦτο οἷός τ΄ ᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι.

And this is Liontaki's translation from the ancient to new Greek:

VI.(6) Με σκοπό την απόκτηση ασφάλειας απέναντι στους ανθρώπους, υπήρχε (πάντα) το φυσικό αγαθό της κυριαρχίας και της βασιλείας, μέσω των οποίων (κάποιος) μπορούσε κάποτε να το καταφέρει αυτό.

Elli translates this new Greek into English as follows:

VI. (6) In order to obtain security from other people, there was (always) the natural good of sovereignty and kingship, through which (someone) once could have accomplished this.

Elli also notes that Eric Anderson translates:

PD 6 That natural benefit of kingship and high office is (and only is) the degree to which they provide security from other men.

What a tangled web.

If specific words such as kingship are there, it would seem they should be included. But some of the best academic minds of the 20th century decided that they had good reason for leaving it out. I would think a fair discussion of which translation is best would have to discuss why Bailey / Bignone / Usener came to the conclusion they did, even if in the end it was wrong. No doubt they had a reason, and they were not just being sloppy. Just saying "they were wrong" doesn't seem like the best approach, or else we call into question everything else they decided (which probably should be done, but can't practically be attempted without a strong foundation).

Which brings up another topic- many of the ancient texts are translated in very "stilted" and unwieldy English, which is probably not necessarily the way it would be translated by a scholar starting from scratch today. And so we are left with texts written in very hard-to-read fashion that are not necessarily the most accurate in communicating the message intended. We desperately need a full rewrite done by someone who is both (1) competent, and (2) friendly to Epicurus, so as to avoid contamination from Stoic/Platonist preconceptions.

Elli tells me that such a work is being planned by leaders of the Athenian Garden of Epicurus. As I find out more I will update that information here.

Discussion of article Epicurean v Stoic - A Comparison Chart With Citations:

Quote

A work in progress summarizing the key differences between Epicurean and Stoic Philosophies

Also in regard to Forum purpose and standards, here is a video which lists the general Epicurean viewpoint on a series of important issues. A text version is below:

A PDF version of this printed list is available by clicking the graphic below.

Major Characteristics of the Epicurean View of Life

The ancient Epicurean viewpoint emphasizes the following:

1 - A Universe that operates by and contains only Natural, not supernatural, forces.

2 - A Universe with nothing divine, mystical, or imaginary outside it, but only a reality within it that is endless in extent.

3 - A Universe neither created by gods nor springing into existence at a single moment in time, but eternal, with nothing coming from or going to nothing.

4 - A Universe where the only eternal things are the ultimate particles which comprise it, with no eternal Platonic forms, Aristotelian essences, or rationalistic ideals constituting a "higher truth."

5 - A Universe neither ordered nor chaotic, but operating on Natural principles derived from the properties of the ultimate particles and the qualities that emerge from their movements and combinations.

6 - A Universe which contains life that is neither mystical nor unique to Earth, but plentiful throughout eternal time and boundless space.

7 - A Universe in which individual consciousness exists to experience Pleasure and Pain only for a single lifetime, not before birth or after death.

_____

8 - Knowledge that is based on observation through natural faculties, not abstract logic or rationalism.

9 - Knowledge that embraces emotions as things to be felt, not suppressed.

10 - Knowledge that holds with confidence that facts which are based on clear evidence are true, rejecting both radical skepticism and belief that is contrary to or without evidence.

_____

11 - Ethics holding that the goal of life is Pleasure, not virtue or religious piety.

12 - Ethics holding virtue, wisdom, and friendship to be valuable tools for producing Pleasure, but not ends in themselves.

13 - Ethics in which desires are evaluated as to whether they are natural or necessary, not so as to choose only what is necessary or to reduce desires to a minimum, but so that those desires which are chosen will maximize Pleasure and minimize Pain.

14 - Ethics in which the goal of life is to fill experience with Pleasures and to reduce Pains to a minimum, not to set up paradoxical abstractions such as "detachment" or "tranquility" or "absence of pain" in the place of Pleasure as ordinarily understood.

15 - Ethics based on achieving Pleasure within a society of friends, protected and separated from enemies, with political involvement, whether of engagement or withdrawal, chosen or avoided according to its efficacy in achieving Pleasurable living.

16 - Ethics based on embracing free will as core to human existence, rejecting both determinism and wishful thinking that all things are possible.

17 - Ethics in which the decision to engage in sexual love is evaluated - as are all choices and avoidances - according to the total amount of Pleasure and Pain the choice will bring, not as an illusory ideal to be pursued under the intoxication of the moment.

18 - Ethics which does not seek for “meaning” in false religion or idealism, but in living for the goal of experiencing the most Pleasure and the least Pain that our personal circumstances will allow.

19 - Ethics in which "Pleasure" as a thing to be pursued means the experience of any number and combination of mental and physical feelings which to us are pleasurable, and "Pain" as a thing to be avoided means the experience of any number and combination of mental and physical feelings which to us are painful.

20 - Ethics in which "Pleasure" describes the highest goal for each living being, which cannot be improved upon, because Pleasure is the only faculty given by Nature through which we know what to choose, and the highest experience of Pleasure any being is capable of achieving is the complete filling of its experience with Pleasures, undiluted with any mixture of Pains.

21 - Ethics in which in Pains are sometime chosen and Pleasures are sometimes avoided, but for no other purpose than the achievement of the greater pleasure or lesser pain arising from that particular choice or avoidance.

22 - Ethics in which there is no such thing as absolute justice that applies to all people at all times at all places, only relationships which change according to circumstance so as to obtain the most pleasure and the least pain for those who are part of the agreement.

This is an excellent book and well worth being part of a core Epicurean library.

Happy Twentieth of November!

This upcoming week in the United States is one of the primary times that family and friends travel to be with one another and celebrate the things which they most value in their lives. Unfortunately this exercise is bundled with “Thanks-giving” to supposed Judeo/Christian/Islamic divinities (or Stoic “Providence”) which created this world and the good things that exist in it – while most frequently being exempted from responsibility for the bad things).

It is virtually impossible for us to escape completely from this cultural corruption, but here is a reminder from Cicero through Velleius, in addressing Lucilius the Stoic, that there was once an Epicurean time when an alternative cultural worldview existed, and the eternality of the universe as a whole was recognized:

“If your Providence, Lucilius, is the same as Plato’s God, I ask you, as before, who were the assistants, what were the engines, what was the plan and preparation of the whole work? If it is not the same, then why did she make the world mortal, and not everlasting, like Plato’s God? But I would demand of you both, why these world-builders started up so suddenly, and lay dormant for so many ages? For we are not to conclude that, if there was no world, there were therefore no ages. I do not now speak of such ages as are finished by a certain number of days and nights in annual courses. For I acknowledge that those could not be without the revolution of the world, as there was a certain eternity from infinite time, not measured by any circumscription of seasons. But how that was in space we cannot understand, because we cannot possibly have even the slightest idea of time before time was. I desire, therefore, to know, Balbus, why this Providence of yours was idle for such an immense space of time? Did she avoid labor? But that could have no effect on the Deity; nor could there be any labor, since all Nature, air, fire, earth, and water would obey the divine essence. What was it that incited the Deity to act the part of an ædile, to illuminate and decorate the world? If it was in order that God might be the better accommodated in his habitation, then he must have been dwelling an infinite length of time before in darkness as in a dungeon. But do we imagine that he was afterward delighted with that variety with which we see the heaven and earth adorned? What entertainment could that be to the Deity? If it was any, he would not have been without it so long.”

Excerpt from Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods

Yes – let’s be thankful this week, and every week, to those who left us a legacy from the Epicurean school to which we can continue to for the path for spending our lives happily.

________

As Seneca recorded: Sic fac omnia tamquam spectet Epicurus! So do all things as though watching were Epicurus!

And as Philodemus wrote: “I will be faithful to Epicurus, according to whom it has been my choice to live.”

Additional discussion of this post and other Epicurean ideas can be found at the Epicurean Philosophy Facebook Group and EpicureanFriends.com

Bailey: 2. Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us.

Alternate Translations and Notes:

Ο ΘAΝATΟΣ ΟΥΔEΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΗΜAΣ· TΟ ΓAΡ ΔΙAΛΥΘEΝ AΝAΙΣΘΗTEΙ TΟ Δ' AΝAΙΣΘΗTΟΥΝ ΟΥΔEΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΗΜAΣ.

“Death is nothing to us; for that which is dissolved is devoid of sensation, and that which is devoid of sensation is nothing to us.” Yonge (1853)

“Death is nothing to us. That into which dissolution brings us has no feeling or consciousness, and what has no consciousness is nothing to us.” Wallace, Epicureanism 110 (1880)

“Death is nothing to us; for the body, when it has been resolved into its elements, has no feeling, and that which has no feeling is nothing to us.” Hicks (1910)

“Death is nothing to us; for that which is dissolved is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us.” Bailey (1926)

“Death is nothing to us, because dissolution means unconsciousness and unconsciousness is nothing to us.” De Witt, St. Paul and Epicurus 187 (1954)

“Death is nothing to us; for what has been dissolved has no sensation, and what has no sensation is nothing to us.” Geer (1964)

“Death is nothing to us. For what has been dispersed has no sensation. And what has no sensation is nothing to us.” O'Connor (1993)

“Death is nothing to us. For what has been dissolved has no sense-experience, and what has no sense-experience is nothing to us.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Death is nothing to us, because a body that has been dispersed into elements experiences no sensations, and the absence of sensation is nothing to us.” Anderson (2004)

“Death is nothing to us. Because, what has been dissolved has no sense perception; and, according to us, what has no sense perception is nothing to worry about.” Makridis (2005)

“Death is nothing to us; for what has disintegrated lacks awareness, and what lacks awareness is nothing to us.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Death means nothing to us, because that which has been broken down into atoms has no sensation and that which has no sensation is no concern of ours.” Strodach (2012)

“Death is nothing to us. For what has been dissolved has no feeling; and what has no feeling is nothing to us.” Mensch (2018)

“Death is nothing to us; for what has been dissolved has no perception, and what has no perception is nothing to us.” White (2021)

2 Ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ· τὸ δ’ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

Don : Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved into its elements is without consciousness, and that which is without consciousness is nothing to us.

Saint-Andre translation: Death is nothing to us; for what has disintegrated lacks awareness, and what lacks awareness is nothing to us.

"As many as possess the power to procure complete immunity from their neighbours, these also live most pleasantly with one another, since they have the most certain pledge of security, and, after they have enjoyed the fullest intimacy, they do not lament the previous departure of a dead friend, as though he were to be pitied." Epicurus PD40 (Bailey)

**ΟΣΟΙ TΗΝ ΔΥΝAΜΙΝ ****EΣΧΟΝ TΟΥ TΟ ΘAΡΡEΙΝ ΜAΛΙΣTA ****EΚ**

**TΩΝ ΟΜΟΡΡΟΥΝTΩΝ ΠAΡAΣΚEΥAΣAΣΘAΙ ****ΟΥTΟΙ ΚAΙ**

**EΒΙΩΣAΝ ****ΜET' AΛΛΗΛΩΝ ΗΔΙΣTA ****TΟ ΒEΒAΙΟTATΟΝ**

**ΠΙΣTΩΜA EΧΟΝTEΣ ****ΚAΙ ΠΛΗΡEΣTATΗΝ ΟΙΚEΙΟTΗTA**

**AΠΟΛAΒΟΝTEΣ ****ΟΥΚ ΩΔΥΡAΝTΟ ****ΩΣ ΠΡΟΣ EΛEΟΝ ****TΗΝ TΟΥ**

**TEΛEΥTΗΣAΝTΟΣ ΠΡΟΚATAΣTΡΟΦΗΝ. **

“The happiest men are they who have arrived at the point of having nothing to fear from those who surround them. Such men live with one another most agreeably, having the firmest grounds of confidence in one another, enjoying the advantages of friendship in all their fullness, and not lamenting as a pitiable circumstance, the premature death of their friends.” Yonge (1853)

“Those who could best insure the confidence that they would be safe from their neighbours, being thus in possession of the surest guarantee, passed the most agreeable life in each other's society, and their enjoyment of the fullest intimacy was such that, if one of them died before his time, the survivors did not lament his death as if it called for pity.” Hicks (1910)

“Those who were best able to provide themselves with the means of security against their neighbours, being thus in possession of the surest guarantee, passed the most agreeable life in each other's society; and their enjoyment of the fullest intimacy was such that, if one of them died before his time, the survivors did not lament his death as if it called for commiseration.” Hicks (1925)

“As many as possess the power to procure complete immunity from their neighbours, these also live most pleasantly with one another, since they have the most certain pledge of security, and after they have enjoyed the fullest intimacy, they do not lament the previous departure of a dead friend, as though he were to be pitied.” Bailey (1926)

“All those who have best succeeded in building up the ability to feel secure from the attacks of those around them have lived the happiest lives with one another, as having the firmest faith.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 304 (1954)

“Those who were best able to prepare security for themselves in relation to their neighbors lived most pleasantly with their neighbors since they had the most perfect assurance; and enjoying the most complete intimacy, they did not lament the death of one who died before his time as if it were an occasion for sorrow.” Geer (1964)

“Those who had the power to eliminate all fear of their neighbours lived together accordingly in the most pleasurable way, through having the firmest pledge of security, and after enjoying the fullest intimacy, they did not grieve over someone's untimely death as if it called for commiseration.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 126 (1987)

“Those who possess the power of securing themselves completely from their neighbors, live most happily with one another, since they have this constant assurance.

And after partaking of the fullest intimacy, they do not mourn a friend who dies before they do, as though they were need for pity.” O'Connor (1993)

“All those who had the power to acquire the greatest confidence from [the threats posed by] their neighbours also thereby lived together most pleasantly with the surest guarantee; and since they enjoyed the fullest sense of belonging they did not grieve the early death of the departed, as though it called for pity.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“The happiest men are those who enjoy the condition of having nothing to fear from those who surround them. Such men live among one another most agreeably, having the firmest grounds for confidence in one another, enjoying the benefits of friendship in all their fullness, and they do not mourn a friend who dies before they do, as if there was a need for pity.” Anderson (2004)

“Those who had the greatest ability to prepare defenses against their neighbors, so they could face up to them, were the ones who lived with each most pleasantly—since they had the most certain guarantee [that they were in no danger in any respect.] And, given that they had once enjoyed the most complete intimacy, they would not lament or cry for mercy if one suffered a premature demise.” Makridis (2005)

“All those who have the power to obtain the greatest confidence from their neighbors also live with each other most enjoyably in the most steadfast trust; and experiencing the strongest fellowship they do not lament as pitiful the untimely end of those who pass away.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“All who have the capacity to gain security, especially from those who live around them, live a most agreeable life together, since they have the firm assurance of friendship; and after enjoying their comradeship to the full they do not bewail the early demise of a departed friend as if it were a pitiable thing.” Strodach (2012)

“All who could best obtain security against their neighbors, and thereby possessed the surest guarantee, lived most pleasantly with one another; and since they enjoyed the fullest intimacy they did not lament, as something to be pitied, the death of a member of their circle who predeceased them.” Mensch (2018)

“All who acquired the ability to provide themselves the most reliable confidence in their neighbors thereby lived together most pleasantly, most secure in [their] mutual trust, and by forming the closest affiliation they never mourned in sorrow over anyone's untimely demise.” White (2021)

Alternate Translations

Bailey: 38. Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just have been shown not to accord with the general concept, in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, they were just at the time, when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer of advantage.

**EΝΘA ΜΗ ΚAΙΝΩΝ ΓEΝΟΜEΝΩΝ TΩΝ ΠEΡΙEΣTΩTΩΝ**

**ΠΡAΓΜATΩΝ AΝEΦAΝΗ ****ΜΗ AΡΜΟTTΟΝTA ****EΙΣ TΗΝ**

**ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΝ ****TA ΝΟΜΙΣΘEΝTA ΔΙΚAΙA ****EΠ AΥTΩΝ TΩΝ EΡΓΩΝ**

**ΟΥΚ ΗΝ TAΥTA ΔΙΚAΙA·**** EΝΘA ΔE ΚAΙΝΩΝ ΓEΝΟΜEΝΩΝ**

**TΩΝ ΠΡAΓΜATΩΝ ΟΥΚETΙ ΣΥΝEΦEΡE ****TA AΥTA ΔΙΚAΙA**

**ΚEΙΜEΝA ****EΝTAΥΘA ΔΗ TΟTE ΜEΝ ΗΝ ΔΙΚAΙA ****ΟTE**

**ΣYΝEΦEΡEΝ ****EΙΣ TΗΝ ΠΡΟΣ AΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙAΝ ****TΩΝ**

**ΣΥΜΠΟΛΙTEΥΟΜEΝΩΝ ****ΥΣTEΡΟΝ Δ ΟΥΚ ΗΝ ETΙ ΔΙΚAΙA ****ΟTE**

**ΜΗ ΣΥΝEΦEΡEΝ. **

“When, without any fresh circumstances arising a thing which has been declared just in practice does not agree with the impressions of reason, that is a proof that the thing was not really just. In the same way, when in consequence of new circumstances, a thing which has been pronounced just does not any longer appear to agree with utility, the thing which was just, inasmuch as it was useful to the social relations and intercourse of mankind, ceases to be just the moment when it ceases to be useful.” Yonge (1853)

“Where without any change in circumstances the conventional laws when judged by their consequences were seen not to correspond with the notion of justice, such laws were not really just; but wherever the laws have ceased to be expedient in consequence of a change in circumstances, in that case the laws were for the time being just, when they were expedient for the mutual intercourse of the citizens, and ceased subsequently to be just when they ceased to be expedient.” Hicks (1910)

“Where without any change in circumstances the conventional laws, when judged by their consequences, were seen not to correspond with the notion of justice, such laws were not really just ; but wherever the laws have ceased to be expedient in consequence of a change in circumstances, in that case the laws were for the time being just when they were expedient for the mutual intercourse of the citizens, and subsequently ceased to be just when they ceased to be expedient.” Hicks (1929)

“Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just, have been shown not to accord with the general concept in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, there they were just at the time when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer advantage.” Bailey (1926)

“If, although no new circumstances have arisen, those things that were commonly held just in these matters did not in their actual effects correspond with that conception, they were not just. Whenever, as a result of new circumstances, the same things that had been regarded as just were no longer useful, they were just at the time when they were useful for the relations of citizens to each other; but afterwards, when they were no longer useful, they were no longer just.” Geer (1964)

“Where actions that were considered just are shown not to ft the concept (of justice) in actual practice—provided circumstances are not altered—they are not just. But where, once events have changed, the same actions once held to just are no longer advantageous, they were just at the time when they brought advantage to citizens'

dealings with one another; but later they were no longer just, when they brought no advantage.” O'Connor (1993)

“If objective circumstances have not changed and things believed to be just have been shown in actual practice not to be in accord with our basic grasp [of justice], then those things were not just. And if objective circumstances do change and the same things which had been just turn out to be no longer useful, then those things were just as long as they were useful for mutual associations of fellow citizens; but later, when they were not useful, they were no longer just.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Where, without any change in circumstances, things held to be just by law are revealed to be in conflict with the essence of justice, such laws were never really just. But wherever or whenever laws have ceased to be advantageous because of a change in circumstances, in that case or time the laws were just when they benefited human interaction, and ceased to be just only when they were no longer beneficial.” Anderson (2004)

“[This is what we must say] if we are not to perturb ourselves with hollow words but rather take our bearings from the truth about human affairs. In those instances, in which, without any new developments arising, it becomes evident that the accepted concepts of justice are not, after all, in harmony with concrete interests or exertions of human effort: we must, in such cases, admit that those concepts of justice have had nothing to do with justice to begin with. But, in those instances, in which novel developments make it disadvantageous to preserve the same [concepts of] justice: in such cases, we must say that the concepts of justice were true in the past, for as long as they were conducive to the mutual association of fellow citizens, but, subsequently, when they were no longer advantageous, they were no longer just to adhere to.” Makridis (2005)

“When circumstances have not changed and things that were thought to be just are shown to not be in accord with our basic grasp of justice, then those things were not just. But when circumstances do change and things that were just are no longer useful, then those things were just while they brought mutual advantage among companions sharing the same community; but when later they did not bring advantage, then they were not just.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“In cases where the surrounding conditions are not new and where laws regarded as just have been shown to be inconsistent with the conception of justice in their actual workings, such laws are unjust. Again, in cases where the circumstances are new and where the same laws, once deemed to be just, are no longer serviceable, the laws in this case were just as long as they were useful to the community of citizens, but later when they were no longer useful they became unjust.” Strodach (2012)

“Where without any change in circumstances the conventional laws were seen not to accord with the preconception when judged by their consequences, such laws were not just. But whenever, in changed circumstances, the existing laws have ceased to be expedient, then they were just when they benefited the mutual intercourse of fellow citizens, but were no longer just later on when they ceased to be expedient.” Mensch (2018)

“Where, even without any change in circumstances, it became obvious from actual practice that the established norms of justice did not align with the preconception [sc. of justice], then they were not just. But where the situation did change and the same norms established as just no longer promoted [sc. what they had previously: the community’s interactions], then in that case they were just for so long as they did promote the community of fellow citizens in their interactions, and later they were no longer just when they no longer promoted that.” White (2021)

Bailey: 37. Among actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved, on examination, to be of advantage, in the requirements of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man makes a law, and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice. And even if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is nonetheless just for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts.

**TΟ ΜEΝ EΠΙΜAΡTΥΡΟΥΜEΝΟΝ ****ΟTΙ ΣΥΜΦEΡEΙ ****EΝ TAΙΣ**

**ΧΡEΙAΙΣ ****TΗΣ ΠΡΟΣ AΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙAΣ ****EXEI TON TOY**

**ΔΙΚAΙΟΥ XARAKTHPA ****EAΝ TE TΟ AΥTΟ ΠAΣΙ ΓEΝΗTAΙ ****EAΝ**

**TE ΜΗ TΟ AΥTΟ· EAΝ ΔE ΝΟΜΟΝ ****ΘΗTAΙ TΙΣ ΜΗ AΠΟΒAΙΝῌ**

**ΔE ΚATA TΟ ΣΥΜΦEΡΟΝ ****TΗΣ ΠΡΟΣ AΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙAΣ**

**ΟΥΚETΙ ****TΟΥTΟ TΗΝ TΟΥ ΔΙΚAΙΟΥ ΦΥΣΙΝ ****EΧEΙ· ΚAΝ**

**ΜETAΠΙΠTῌ ****TΟ ΚATA TΟ ΔΙΚAΙΟΝ ΣΥΜΦEΡΟΝ ΧΡΟΝΟΝ ****ΔE**

**TΙΝA EΙΣ TΗΝ ΠΡΟΛΗΨΙΝ EΝAΡΜΟTTῌ ΟΥΔEΝ ****ΗTTΟΝ**

**EΚEΙΝΟΝ ****TΟΝ ΧΡΟΝΟΝ ****ΗΝ ΔΙΚAΙΟΝ ****TΟΙΣ ΜΗ ΦΩΝAΙΣ**

**ΚEΝAΙΣ ****EAΥTΟΥΣ ΣΥΝTAΡATTΟΥΣΙΝ ****AΛΛ' EΙΣ TA**

**ΠΡAΓΜATA ΒΛEΠΟΥΣΙΝ. **

“From the moment that a thing declared just by the law is generally recognized as useful for the mutual relations of men, it becomes really just, whether it is universally regarded as such or not. But if, on the contrary, a thing established by law is not really useful for social relations, then it is not just; and if that which was just, inasmuch as it was useful, loses this character, after having been for some time considered so, it is not less true that during that time it was really just, at least for those who do not perplex themselves about vain words, but who prefer in every case, examining and judging for themselves.” Yonge (1853)

“Whatever in conventional law is attested to be expedient in the needs arising out of mutual intercourse is by its nature just, whether the same for all or not, and in case any law is made and does not prove suitable to the expediency of mutual intercourse, then this is no longer just. And should the expediency which is expressed by the law vary and only for a time correspond with the notion of justice, nevertheless, for the time being, it was just, so long as we do not trouble ourselves about empty terms but look broadly at facts.” Hicks (1910)

“Among the things accounted just by conventional law, whatever in the needs of mutual intercourse is attested to be expedient, is thereby stamped as just, whether or not it be the same for all; and in case any law is made and does not prove suitable to the expediencies of mutual intercourse, then this is no longer just. And should the expediency which is expressed by the law vary and only for a time correspond with the prior conception, nevertheless for the time being it was just, so long as we do not trouble ourselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts.” Hicks (1925)

“Among some actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved on examination to be of advantage in the requirements of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man makes a law and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice. And if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is none the less just for that period in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds but look to the actual facts.” Bailey (1926)

“Among the things commonly held just, that which has proved itself useful in men's mutual relationship has the stamp of justice whether or not it be the same for all; if anyone makes a law and it does not prove useful in men's relationships with each other, it is no longer just in its essence. If, however, the law's usefulness in the matter of justice should change and it should meet men's expectations only for a short time, nonetheless during that short time it was just in the eyes of those who look simply at facts and do not confuse themselves with empty words.” Geer (1964)

“What is legally deemed to be just has its existence in the domain of justice whenever it is attested to be useful in the requirements of social relationships, whether or not it turns out to be the same for all. But if someone makes a law and it does not happen to accord with the utility of social relationships, it no longer has the nature of justice. And even if what is useful in the sphere of justice changes but fits the preconception for some time, it was no less just throughout that time for those who do not confuse themselves with empty utterances but simply look at the facts.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 125 (1987)

“Among the measures regarded as just, that which is proven to be beneficial in the business of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice whether it is the same for all or not. If someone makes a law which does not result in advantage for men's dealings with each other, it no longer has the nature of justice. Even if advantage in the matter of justice is variable but nonetheless conforms for a certain length of time to the common notion people have of it, no less for that period is it just in the opinion of those who do not confuse themselves with words but look straight at the facts.” O'Connor (1993)

“Of actions believed to be just, that whose usefulness in circumstances of mutual associations is supported by the testimony [of experience] has the attribute of serving as just whether it is the same for everyone or not. And if someone passes a law and it does not turn out to be in accord with what is useful in mutual associations, this no longer possesses the nature of justice. And if what is useful in the sense of being just changes, but for a while fts our basic grasp [of justice], nevertheless it was just for that length of time, [at least] for those who do not disturb themselves with empty words but simply look to the facts.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Among actions legally recognized as just, that which is confirmed by experience as mutually beneficial has the virtue of justice, whether it is the same for all peoples or not. But if a law is made which results in no such advantage, then it no longer carries the hallmark of justice. And if something that used to be mutually beneficial changes, though for some time it conformed to our concept of justice, it is still true that it really was just during that time – at least for those who do not fret about technicalities and instead prefer to examine and judge each case for themselves.” Anderson (2004)

“Among those things that are conventionally accepted as just, whatever is universally acknowledged to be conducive to the purpose of maintaining civic society is necessarily adjudged to be a patently just thing, whether it is the same for all people or not. But if one stipulates something as the law even though it is at cross purposes with the interest of maintaining civic society—such an ordinance does not partake of natural justice in any way. In addition, if and to the extent that the interests which are in accordance with natural justice prove variable, so that concepts of justice can remain harmonious with natural interests only for a certain period of time: we must say that such concepts of justice [though short lived] are no less just within their corresponding frames of time.” Makridis (2005)

“Among things that are thought to be just, that which has been witnessed to bring mutual advantage among companions has the nature of justice, whether or not it is the same for everyone. But if someone legislates something whose results are not in accord with what brings mutual advantage among companions, then it does not have the nature of justice. And if what brings advantage according to justice changes, but for some time fits our basic grasp of justice, then for that time it is just, at least to the person who is not confused by empty prattle but instead looks to the facts.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“In the case of actions that are legally regarded as just, those that are of tested utility in meeting the needs of human society have the hallmark of justice, whether they turn out to be equally just in all cases or not. On the other hand, if somebody lays down a law and it does not prove to be of advantage in human relations, then such a law no longer has the true character of justice. And even if the element of utility should undergo a change after harmonizing for a time with the conception of justice, the law was still just during that period, in the judgment of those who are not confused by meaningless words but who look at the actualities.” Strodach (2012)

“That which has been considered just by convention because it benefits our mutual intercourse is therefore stamped as just, whether or not it is so in all instances; and if a law is made and does not prove beneficial to our intercourse, then it is no longer just.

And if what the law considers expedient changes, and only corresponds for a time to the preconception, it was nonetheless just for that time, if we do not trouble ourselves about empty forms but simply examine the facts.” Mensch (2018)

“If established norms of justice are attested to promote the mutual interactions of a community, then it has the status of justice, whether it is the same for everyone or not the same. But if someone establishes a law and the result does not promote the community’s relations, then it no longer has the nature of justice. And if what does promote justice changes, then as long as it did align with the preconception [sc. of justice] for a time, it was no less just during that period of time, provided people do not get confused by distracting themselves with empty expressions and instead look at the actual facts.” White (2021)

Bailey: 36. In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all.

**ΚATA ΜEΝ [TΟ] ΚΟΙΝΟΝ ΠAΣΙ ****TΟ ΔΙΚAΙΟΝ ****TΟ AΥTΟ**

**ΣΥΜΦEΡΟΝ ****ΓAΡ TΙ ΗΝ EΝ Tῌ ΠΡΟΣ AΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙᾼ·**

**ΚATA ΔE TΟ ΙΔΙΟΝ ΧΩΡAΣ ****ΚAΙ ΟΣΩΝ ΔΗ ΠΟTE AΙTΙΩΝ ****ΟΥ**

**ΠAΣΙ ΣΥΝEΠETAΙ ****TΟ AΥTΟ ΔΙΚAΙΟΝ ****EΙΝAΙ. **

“In a general point of view, justice is the same thing to every one; for there is something advantageous in mutual society. Nevertheless, the difference of place, and diverse other circumstances, make justice vary.” Yonge (1853)

“Taken generally, justice is the same for all, but in its application to particular cases of territory or the like, it varies under different circumstances.” Hicks (1910)

“Taken generally, justice is the same for all, to wit, something found expedient in mutual intercourse; but in its application to particular cases of locality or conditions of whatever kind, it varies under different circumstances.” Hicks (1925)

“In its general aspect justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another: but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country or any other circumstances the same things does not turn out to be just for all.” Bailey (1926)

“So far as the universal concept is concerned, Justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of advantage in the life they share with one another, but in respect of the particulars of place and all affecting circumstances whatsoever it does not follow that the same thing is just for all.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 296 (1954)

“In general, justice is the same for all, a thing found useful by men in their relations with each other; but it does not follow that it is the same for all in each individual place and circumstance.” Geer (1964)

“Taken generally, justice is the same for all, since it is something useful in people's social relationships. But in the light of what is peculiar to a region and to the whole range of determinants, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 125 (1987)

“Broadly considered, justice is the same for all, because it is a kind of mutual benefit in men's interactions with one another. But in individual countries and circumstances, justice turns out not to be the same for all.” O'Connor (1993)

“In general outline justice is the same for everyone; for it was something useful in mutual associations. But with respect to the peculiarities of a region or of other [relevant] causes, it does not follow that the same thing is just for everyone.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Justice is essentially the same for all peoples insofar as it benefits human interaction. But the details of how justice is applied in particular countries or circumstances may vary.” Anderson (2004)

“Generally speaking, justice is one and the same for all: i.e., justice is something or other that is to one's interest in mutual intercourse. But, speaking on a case-by-case basis, justice is not the same for all as it depends on [specific] regions and factors.” Makridis (2005)

“In general, justice is the same for all: what is mutually advantageous among companions. But with respect to the particulars of a place or other causes, it does not follow that the same thing is just for all.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“In its general meaning, justice is the same for all because of its utility in the relations of men to each other, but in its specifc application to countries and various other circumstances it does not follow that the same thing is just for all.” Strodach (2012)

“In general, justice is the same for everyone, namely something that facilitates mutual intercourse; but in light of the peculiarities of a region and all sorts of other causes, it does not follow that the same thing is just for everyone.” Mensch (2018)

“In general, what is just is the same for all: it was something that promotes relations within a community. But by differences in territory and any number of other causes, the same thing does not turn out just for all.” White (2021)

Bailey: 35. It is not possible for one who acts in secret contravention of the terms of the compact not to harm or be harmed to be confident that he will escape detection, even if, at present, he escapes a thousand times. For up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape.

**ΟΥΚ EΣTΙ TΟΝ ΛAΘΡᾼ ****TΙ KINOYNTA ΩΝ ΣΥΝEΘEΝTΟ ****ΠΡΟΣ**

**AΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ****EΙΣ TΟ ΜΗ ΒΛAΠTEΙΝ ΜΗΔE ΒΛAΠTEΣΘAΙ**

**ΠIΣTEΥEΙΝ ****ΟTΙ ΛΗΣEΙ ****ΚAΝ ΜΥΡΙAΚΙΣ ****EΠΙ TΟΥ ΠAΡΟΝTΟΣ**

**ΛAΘAΝῌ·**** ΜEΧΡΙ ΓAΡ ΚATAΣTΡΟΦΗΣ AΔΗΛΟΝ ****EΙ ΚAΙ**

**ΛΗΣEΙ. **

“It is not possible for a man who secretly does anything in contravention of the agreement which men have made with one another, to guard against doing, or sustaining mutual injury, to believe that he shall always escape notice, even if he has escaped notice already ten thousand times; for till his death, it is uncertain whether he will not be detected.” Yonge (1853)

“It is impossible for the man who secretly violates any article of the social compact to feel confident that he will remain undiscovered, even if he has already escaped ten thousand times; for until his death he is never sure he will not be detected.” Hicks (1910)

“It is impossible for the man who secretly violates any article of the social compact to feel confident that he will remain undiscovered, even if he has already escaped ten thousand times; for right on to the end of his life he is never sure he will not be detected.” Hicks (1925)

“It is not possible for one who acts in secret contravention of the terms of the compact not to harm or be harmed, to be confident that he will escape detection, even if at present he escapes a thousand times. For up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape.” Bailey (1926)

“It is impossible for the man who does one of those things which they have covenanted with one another not to do, in order to avoid injuring and being injured, to be confident he will escape, even though for the moment he shall escape numberless times, for till the end it will be uncertain if he will really escape." DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 297 (1954)

“If a man has secretly violated any of the terms of the mutual compact not to injure or be injured, he cannot feel confident that he will be undetected in the future even if he has escaped ten thousand times in the past; for until his death it will remain uncertain whether he will escape.” Geer (1964)

“No one who secretly infringes any of the terms of a mutual contract made with a view to not harming and not being harmed can be confident that he will escape detection even if he does so countless times. For right up to his death it is unclear whether he will actually escape.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 125 (1987)

“It is impossible for the one who commits some act in secret violation of the compacts made among men not to do harm or to be harmed, to remain confident that he will escape notice, even if for the present he escapes detection a thousand times. For right up to the day of his death, it remains unclear whether he will escape detection.” O'Connor (1993)

“It is impossible for someone who secretly does something which men agreed [not to do] in order to avoid harming one another or being harmed to be confident that he will escape detection, even if in current circumstances he escapes detection ten thousand times. For until his death it will be uncertain whether he will continue to escape detection.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“It is not possible for one who secretly violates the provisos of the agreement not to inflict nor allow harm to be confident that he won't get caught, even if he has gotten away with it a thousand times before. For up until the time of death, there is no certainty that he will indeed escape detection.” Anderson (2004)

“And it is not possible for someone to be confident that he will not be detected if one has acted surreptitiously in violating any one of the provisions of the social contract, which consists in [an agreement] to refrain from harming for the sake of avoiding harm for oneself; not even if one has escaped detection a myriad times until the present: for even to the moment of one's fnal demise, there can be no sure sign or assurance that one will continue to escape detection.” Makridis (2005)

“It is impossible to be confident that you will escape detection when secretly doing something contrary to an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed, even if currently you do so countless times; for until your death you will be uncertain that you have escaped detection.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“It is impossible for a person who underhandedly breaks the agreement not to harm or be harmed to feel sure that he will escape punishment, even though he manages to do so time after time; for up to the very end of his life he cannot be sure that he will actually escape.” Strodach (2012)

“It is not possible for the man who secretly violates the compact to prevent the inflicting or suffering of harm to feel sure that he will escape notice, even if he has already escaped ten thousand times. For right to the end it is not clear whether he will escape.” Mensch (2018)

“When someone secretly violates a mutual agreement not to harm or be harmed, it is not possible for him to be sure he won't be found out, even if he is not found out a thousand times so far; for up until his demise it is unsure whether he will eventually be found out.” White (2021)

Bailey: 34. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape those appointed to punish such actions.

**Η AΔΙΚΙA ****ΟΥ ΚAΘ' EAΥTΗΝ ΚAΚΟΝ ****AΛΛ' EΝ Tῼ ΚATA TΗΝ**

**ΥΠΟΨΙAΝ ΦΟΒῼ ****EΙ ΜΗ ΛΗΣEΙ ****TΟΥΣ ΥΠEΡ TΩΝ TΟΙΟΥTΩΝ**

**EΦEΣTΗΚΟTAΣ ΚΟΛAΣTAΣ. **

“Injustice is not intrinsically bad; it has this character only because there is joined with it a fear of not escaping those who are appointed to punish actions of this character.” Yonge (1853)

“Injustice is not in itself an evil, but only in its consequence, viz., the terror which is excited by apprehension that those appointed to punish such offenses will discover the injustice.” Hicks (1910)

“Injustice is not in itself an evil, but only in its consequence, viz. the terror which is excited by apprehension that those appointed to punish such offences will discover the injustice.” Hicks (1925)

“Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape those appointed to punish such actions.” Bailey (1926)

“Wrong-doing is not an evil in and by itself; the evil lies in the uneasy feeling, amounting to fear, that he will not escape detection by those appointed for the punishment of such offenses.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 153 (1954)

“Injustice is not an evil in and by itself but the evil lies in the fear arising out of the uncertainty that he will not escape detection by those appointed for the punishment of such offenses.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 296 (1954)

“Violating the law is not an evil in itself but the evil lies in the uneasy feeling, of the nature of fear, that he may not escape detection by those appointed for the punishment of such offenses.” DeWitt, St. Paul and Epicurus, 122 (1954)

“Injustice is not evil in itself, but only in the fear and apprehension that one will not escape those who have been set up to punish the offense.” Geer (1964)

“Injustice is something bad not per se in the fear that arises from the suspicion that one will not escape the notice of those who have the authority to punish such things.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 125 (1987)

“Injustice is not in itself an evil, but only in its consequence, but in the fear and apprehension that one will not escape from those appointed to punish such actions.” O'Connor (1993)

“Injustice is not a bad thing in its own right, but [only] because of the fear produced by the suspicion that one will not escape the notice of those assigned to punish such actions.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the accompanying fear of being unable to escape those assigned to punish unjust acts.” Anderson (2004)

“Injustice is not a moral evil in itself: what is bad about injustice consists in the wearying apprehension that one might fail to escape detection by those who mete out punishments.” Makridis (2005)

“Injustice is not bad in itself, but only because of the fear caused by a suspicion that you will not avoid those who are appointed to punish wrongdoing.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Injustice is not an evil in itself. Its evil lies in the anxious fear that you will not elude those who have authority to punish such misdeeds.” Strodach (2012)

“Injustice is not bad in itself, but only because of the terror aroused by the suspicion that it will be detected by its punishers.” Mensch (2018)

“Injustice is a bad thing not in its own right but rather on account of the fear in worrying about being found out by those assigned to punish such things.” White (2021)

Bailey: 31. The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage, to restrain men from harming one another, and save them from being harmed.

**TΟ TΗΣ ΦΥΣEΩΣ ΔΙΚAΙΟΝ ****EΣTΙ ΣΥΜΒΟΛΟΝ ****TΟΥ**

**ΣΥΜΦEΡΟΝTΟΣ ****EΙΣ TΟ ΜΗ ΒΛAΠTEΙΝ AΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ΜΗΔE**

**ΒΛAΠTEΣΘAΙ. **

“Natural justice is a covenant of what is suitable for leading men to avoid injuring on another, and being injured.” Yonge (1853)

“Natural justice is a contract of expediency, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another.” Hicks (1910)

“Natural justice is a symbol or expression of expediency, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another.” Hicks (1925)

“The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage to restrain men from harming one another and save them from being harmed.” Bailey (1926)

“The justice of Nature is a covenant of advantage to the end that men shall not injure one another nor be injured.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 147 (1954)

“Natural justice is a compact resulting from expediency by which men seek to prevent one man from injuring others and to protect him from being injured by them.” Geer (1964)

“Nature's justice is a guarantee of utility with a view to not harming one another and not being harmed.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 125 (1987)

“Natural justice is a pledge guaranteeing mutual advantage, to prevent one from harming others and to keep oneself from being harmed.” O'Connor (1993)

“The justice of nature is a pledge of reciprocal usefulness, [i.e.,] neither to harm one another nor be harmed.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Natural justice is the advantage conferred by mutual agreements not to inflict nor allow harm.” Anderson (2004)

“Natural justice is an expression of the [natural] interest [everyone has] and consists in both: a) not causing harm to others, and b) not suffering harm for oneself.” Makridis (2005)

“Natural justice is a covenant for mutual benefit, to not harm one another or be harmed.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“The justice that seeks nature's goal is a utilitarian pledge of men not to harm each other or be harmed.” Strodach (2012)

“Natural justice is a pledge of the advantage associated with preventing men from harming or being harmed by one another.” Mensch (2018)

“Nature's justice is a token [or pledge] of something that promotes not harming one another or being harmed.” White (2021)