Posts by Cassius

What I keep running into is the two extremes - some people want to define free will as "there are absolutely no limits on anything I want to do" which is obviously untrue.

Then there is "there is absolutely nothing I can choose for myself" even whether i pick salt or pepper, and that seems to me to be equally absurd.

It seems obvious to me that the common sense position is similar to what you have listed - some things are in our control, some things out,

Good breakdown Maciej. Everything in that list seems eminently sensible to me, and it is frustrating that people with other agendas seem to want to insist on definitions of "Free will" that no one in their right mind, on either side of the debate, should consider to be reasonable.

An excellent catch Maciej! The entire topic of "images" gets far too little attention in our online discussions, and it definitely relates to "free will." I think somewhere (maybe more than one place) Cicero ridicules the Epicurean treatment of images. Found one here:

CICERO TO C. CASSIUS LONGINUS (AT BRUNDISIUM), January 45 BC

I think you must be a little ashamed at this being the third letter inflicted on you before I have a page or a syllable from you. But I will not press you: I shall expect, or rather exact, a longer letter. For my part, if I had a messenger always at hand, I should write even three an hour. For somehow it makes you seem almost present when I write anything to you, and that not “by way of phantoms of images,” as your new friends express it, who hold that “mental pictures” are caused by what Catius called “spectres”—for I must remind you that Catius Insuber the Epicurean, lately dead, calls “spectres” what the famous Gargettius, and before him Democritus, used to call “images.”

Well, even if my eyes were capable of being struck by these “spectres,” because they spontaneously run in upon them at your will, I do not see how the mind can be struck. You will be obliged to explain it to me, when you return safe and sound, whether the “spectre” of you is at my command, so as to occur to me as soon as I have taken the fancy to think about you; and not only about you, who are in my heart’s core, but supposing I begin thinking about the island of Britain—will its image fly at once into my mind? But of this later on.

Maciej do you have an opinion on what Epicurus was saying about free will here? (Bailey translation):

"He understands that the limit of good things is easy to fulfil and easy to attain, whereas the course of ills is either short in time or slight in pain; he laughs at (destiny), whom some have introduced as the mistress of all things. (He thinks that with us lies the chief power in determining events, some of which happen by necessity) and some by chance, and some are within our control; for while necessity cannot be called to account, he sees that chance is inconstant, but that which is in our control is subject to no master, and to it are naturally attached praise and blame. For, indeed, it were better to follow the myths about the gods than to become a slave to the destiny of the natural philosophers: for the former suggests a hope of placating the gods by worship, whereas the latter involves a necessity which knows no placation. As to chance, he does not regard it as a god as most men do (for in a god’s acts there is no disorder), nor as an uncertain cause (of all things) for he does not believe that good and evil are given by chance to man for the framing of a blessed life, but that opportunities for great good and great evil are afforded by it. He therefore thinks it better to be unfortunate in reasonable action than to prosper in unreason. For it is better in a man’s actions that what is well chosen (should fail, rather than that what is ill chosen) should be successful owing to chance."

Text is here: https://archive.org/stream/Epicuru…ge/n89/mode/2up

This is a hot topic that flares up regularly. If anyone has anything to offer on this to get the ball rolling, please go ahead. Otherwise at some point I'll find a way to phrase the question so we can at least get the ball rolling. The key passages are at the end of the Letter to Menoeceus, one of more Vatican Sayings, and this from Lucretius: (Martin Ferguson Smith, the best and most recent translator, from Lucretius Book 2):

"Moreover, if all movements are invariably interlinked, if new movement arises from the old in unalterable succession, if there is no atomic swerve to initiate movement that can annul the decrees of destiny and prevent the existence of an endless chain of causation, what is the source of this free will possessed by living creatures all over the earth? What, I ask, is the source of this power of will wrested from destiny, which enables each of us to advance where pleasure leads us, and to alter our movements not at a fixed time or place, but at the direction of our own [260] minds? For undoubtedly in each case it is the individual will that gives the initial impulse to such actions and channels the movements through the limbs.

Have you not observed too that, at the very moment when the starting gates are opened,16 the horses, despite their strength and impatience, cannot burst forward as suddenly as their minds desire? The reason is that the whole mass of matter throughout the whole body must be actuated: only when the whole frame has been actuated can it respond with energy to the eagerness of the mind. So you can see that the initial movement is produced by the mind: it originates from the act of mental [270] will, and is then diffused through every part of the body."

Hiram I checked your page but didn't see a direct quote from Oinoanda that we are in control of our mental disposition. If you know of such a passage that would be relevant to the "free will" debate.

I think we are still some distance even from framing the question clearly as to what we are talking about. I think we all agree that pleasures from different activities differ from each other in many respects, yet in other respects they share similarities. If we regard there to be a single faculty of pleasure, then anything that faculty tells us is pleasurable is makes it pleasurable, even if it also has many distinct characteristics which allow us to identify it separate from other pleasures. Just like "yellow" does not exist separate and distinct from things that are yellow, "pleasure" does not exist separate and distinct from things we find pleasurable. I think we are agreed at least on that (?)

Elli when you have time would you comment on the Greek that is being translated as "condensed" in PD9?

My first reaction to that is that I would want to dig into the Greek to see how the translators come up with "condensed" as the best translation in the first place. Using the definition you suggest would certainly lead to your conclusion that pleasures are qualitatively different, but it seems to me that your definition presumes that result (cannot be properly added to themselves because they are qualitatively different), and so I would still have to question why that result should be presumed. If I could go back in time I would take up the study of ancient Greek instead of just a little Latin.

What do you take "condensed" to mean?

As you can tell in my responses I am looking to link this back to the existing context of discussion of pleasure at the time of Epicurus. I need to reread Gosling & Taylor / Greeks on Pleasure for more detail on all this. If you are aware of other good references please let me know. Time is always short but I need to assemble a list of at least the arguments that were current - I set up a forum to work on cataloging them here: Arguments Against Pleasure By Other Philosophers At The Time of Epicurus (It's going to take me years to make any progress, I'm afraid - time is so short.)

Tell me what you think, Maciej! I appreciate the opportunity to exchange ideas with you on these issues, whether or not we agree. This is a very difficult passage and I am sure I have not caught all the subtleties, and in fact I could easily be completely wrong!

"do you agree that epicurus's conclusion in pd9 is that pleasures differ?"

I better try to be very precise in understanding your question.

If you are asking "is the point of PD9 that pleasures differ" I would answer: No not really, or at least not fully. I think Epicurus held that pleasures are the same in many respects (they all feel pleasurable; all come to us through the same faculty); but certainly Epicurus would say also that we have no trouble distinguishing the difference between the pleasure of eating and the pleasure of sex.

I think we have to presume common sense always, and that Epicurus would respond as anyone would that the pleasure of sex differs in some ways from the pleasure of eating, but that there are still a great many important similarities, the most important of which is that they are reported to us as pleasures by our faculty of pleasure.

Does that respond to your question?

A Discussion of the relevance of PD9 to the katastematic / kinetic distinction is here.

Good question Maciej and I would like to get input from others on this as I admit this is hard to figure out. Here is my first effort:

I think this is another example of a doctrine that taken on its own is bewildering, but which is the kind of thing Epicurus liked to do to refute and inoculate against Platonic and other attacks on pleasure. Here, the false idea to be beaten back is that some pleasures are more worthy to be chosen than others by some outside standard of virtue, worth, nobility, or whatever. Divisions of pleasure ranked by worthiness or any standard other than pleasure itself would be fatal to Epicurean doctrine, just as believing in supernatural gods would be fatal and is inoculated against in PD1 and fearing death would be fatal and is inoculated against in PD2.

Epicurus's position was pleasure is whatever we feel to be pleasing, and there is no other criteria for judging a pleasure worthy other than the experience of pleasure itself, and the effect of a particular pleasure in leading in the future to resulting future pleasures or resulting pains. I *think* that is the sense in which DeWitt refers to the "unity of pleasure." Pleasure may differ in intensity and type and length, but it all still falls under the category of pleasure.

The way Epicurus is proving this here is to suggest the hypothetical of comparing the pleasure of eating to the pleasure of sex. If the pleasure of eating and the pleasure of sex were both hypothetically able to(1) fill the whole feeling experience of the person and (2) exist for the same length of time (I presume that is what "alike condensed in duration" means) then the experience of the pleasure of eating and the pleasure of sex would be the same for us.

If we understand that pleasure is pleasure then we aren't going to fall for the trap (and it is a trap) of thinking that some pleasures are more "worthy" than others. The trap is that if there are some pleasures that are "higher" by some standard other than pleasure, then knowledge of that standard, which is outside of pleasure, is essential. If that is the case, then the argument "pleasure is the guide / is "the good" is blown up - the highest good must be "pleasure + wisdom" or "pleasure + intelligence" or whatever. If Pleasure is the highest calling we have, then there cannot be something else which is not a part of pleasure itself which is required in order to constitute the highest and best life. That's why Epicurus insisted that all the virtues, including wisdom, prudence, etc, are simply instruments for the achievement of pleasure, and nothing more. Their existence and labeling as virtuous is dependent solely on the fact that they are tools for achieving pleasure.

I am also toying with the idea that a less important part of the context might also be to show that it is not appropriate to regret that one pleasure can't consume our entire life. The fact that pleasures can't extend to fill the whole feeling experience of the person, and that they don't consume our experience over an extended time, is what allows for variation. We know that once full, pleasure can not grow any greater in extent, it can only vary. But on the other hand, while variation may not increase the extent of pure pleasure, there's nothing wrong with variation in and of itself. In fact in general, other things being equal, it is more desirable to live two years rather than one year, with the variation in pleasure that the extra year entails. To restate that, I think Epicurus had to admit, and did state in the letter to Menoeceus, that life is desirable and so it is desirable to experience variation even for someone whose daily life is full of pleasure. So the doctrine may also be an endorsement of variation, since Nature has made it that a single pleasure cannot be expanded to fill our entire experience.

For purposes of finding this in the future we are talking about PD 9 and I will link this to that forum.

From page 235 of "Epicurus and His Philosophy"

This is the discussion thread associated with the article "Objection Your Honor!  Attorney Cicero Is Mischaracterizing the Testimony To Mislead The Jury!  The Evidence Is Clear: Not Only Is "Ataraxia" Not The Highest Pleasure - Ataraxia Alone Is Not A Pleasure At All!"

The article "Major Issues in Understanding Epicurean Philosophy" is the subject of a pinned post in the General Discussion forum. Comments about that article can be posted there, or threads to discuss detailed aspects can be started in this sub-forum.

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Here is an excerpt from an article that I otherwise (on other topics) find very unhelpful, but which takes a stab at this translation:

Purinton, Epicuris on The Telos, Phronesis, Vol. 38, No. 3 (1993), pp. 281-320

Here is another conclusion from the same source (Purinton) that seems equally absurd to me, and which also results from the fixation on katastematic as the goal. Purinton suggests that even though Epicurus held katastematic pleasure to be the primary aim, we do so "with the understanding that we will also sometimes enjoy kinetic pleasures as well." If you find this kind of conclusion satisfying then more power to you, but the better course in my view is to accept the clear meaning of the Lucretius passages which Purinton cites, follow Nikolsky, and reject the view that Epicurus considered the static/active distinction to be different types of pleasure. That way neither you nor Epicurus falls into the trap of hair-splitting like this: