Posts by Cassius

Here is the page at Perseus which has this text:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…9%3Asection%3D2

[2] Pansam nostrum secunda voluntate hominum paludatum ex urbe exisse cum ipsius causa gaudeo tum me hercule etiam omnium nostrorum ; spero enim homines intellecturos quanto sit omnibus odio crudelitas et quanto amori probitas et clementia, atque ea, quae maxime mali petant et concupiscant, ad bonos pervenire. difficile est enim persuadere hominibus τὸ καλὸν δι᾽ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν? esse ; ἡδονὴν vero et ἀταραξίαν virtute, iustitia, τῷ καλῷ parari et verum et probabile est ; ipse enim Epicurus, a quo omnes Catii et Amafinii, mali verborum interpretes, proficiscuntur, dicit : οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ἄνευ τοῦ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ζῆν.

[3] itaque et Pansa, qui ἡδονὴν sequitur, virtutem retinet, et ii, qui a vobis φιλήδονοι vocantur, sunt φιλόκαλοι et φιλοδίκαιοι omnisque virtutes et colunt et retinent. itaque Sulla, cuius iudicium probare debemus, cum dissentire philosophos videret, non quaesiit quid bonum esset sed omnia bona coemit. cuius ego mortem forti me hercules animo tuli. nec tamen Caesar diutius nos eum desiderare patietur ; nam habet damnatos quos pro illo nobis restituat, nec ipse sectorem desiderabit, cum filium viderit.

Links to translations of each word:

[2] Pansam nostrum secunda voluntate hominum paludatum ex urbe exisse cumipsius causa gaudeo tum me hercule etiam omnium nostrorum ; spero enimhomines intellecturos quanto sit omnibus odio crudelitas et quanto amoriprobitas et clementia, atque ea, quae maxime mali petant et concupiscant, adbonos pervenire. difficile est enim persuadere hominibus τὸ καλὸν δι᾽ αὑτὸαἱρετὸν? esse ; ἡδονὴν vero et ἀταραξίαν virtute, iustitia, τῷ καλῷ parari et verumet probabile est ; ipse enim Epicurus, a quo omnes Catii et Amafinii, maliverborum interpretes, proficiscuntur, dicit : οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ἄνευ τοῦ καλῶς καὶδικαίως ζῆν.

[3] itaque et Pansa, qui ἡδονὴν sequitur, virtutem retinet, et ii, qui a vobisφιλήδονοι vocantur, sunt φιλόκαλοι et φιλοδίκαιοι omnisque virtutes et colunt etretinent. itaque Sulla, cuius iudicium probare debemus, cum dissentirephilosophos videret, non quaesiit quid bonum esset sed omnia bona coemit. cuiusego mortem forti me hercules animo tuli. nec tamen Caesar diutius nos eumdesiderare patietur ; nam habet damnatos quos pro illo nobis restituat, nec ipsesectorem desiderabit, cum filium viderit.

https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/gallery/in…-word-choice%2F

This is the page to check for live video is this one for the Symposium. Takis, the computer contact, is here: https://www.facebook.com/takis.panagiotopoulos.9

Thank you Christos_Yapijakis . I am posting this public thread here, and on Facebook, for anyone who wants to discuss the Symposium. I will be looking for a video link too.

Christos_Yapijakis just posted this on my timeline. Takis tells me the video will be streamed from the Symposium Facebook page.

Everything is ready for the 8th Panhellenic Symposium of Epicurean Philosophy,

Hopefully, my good friend, you will be able to watch the event live!

This year, one of the major sessions will be:

2. EPICUREAN THERAPY OF PSYCHE

Epicurean psychotherapy with frank criticism

Philodemus “On anger”

Lack of freedom of the dependent person and the epicurean liberation of his mind

Control of stress and Epicurean philosophy

I will cover the first topic and the last topic will be covered by internationally reknown Prof. George Chrousos (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_P._Chrousos), who has discovered most of the neurobiological mechanisms of stress.

The session and the Symposium was publicised by Greek media in health news (!):

http://health.in.gr/news/various/article/?aid=1500196584

Please feel free to send this message to our Epicurean friends all over the world.

Hopefully, in the future we will meet in an International Symposium of Epicurean Philosophy...

Friendship dances around the globe! Be prudent and live happily!

Since we have mentioned a couple of difficult passages in this thread, we shouldn't forget this one:

"For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure."

My own preferred interpretation of this is that it goes along with the rest of the quantitative analysis, and means that when our total experience is completely filled with pleasures, then we have no need of any MORE pleasures, because our experience is already filled with pleasure and therefore we need not look for any MORE - we could not even process any more if it were available. But many a time I have seen this passage used to argue that the first sentence in the passage means that "absence of pain" is the true goal, and that "pleasure" is not really needed at all -- all we really need is "absence of pain."

We don't have Epicurus or authoritative Epicureans around today to explain these issues to us, so we have to think about how we resolve these apparent contradictions.

Elevic wrote at Facebook:

This post is not strictly about Epicurean philosophy but reading philosophy in general.

This talk about dialectic might seem superfluous and pedantic nitpicking ( I feel this too, sometimes), but this is part of the territory.

I learned from a certain author that we should first understand what an author meant in their terms and propositions before we judge their writings.

Anyone not versed in philosophy might get impressed with the word dialectic as just a fancy word for conversation. I don't think there should be a problem if we stipulate to use it as such. However, it's a technical term in many philosophies, as Elli stated. It has several baggages, if we're not careful.

(That philosophers tend to use certain terms differently and carefully should be apparent.)

Consider this proposition: Pleasure is the beginning and end of life. That's Epicurean philosophy in a nutshell.

But this begs the question of what pleasure is or not.

In this group, we'll often see Cassius, Elli et all discuss this to great lengths - often citing writings from friends and foe.

Why? Pleasure is central to Epicurean philosophy. More often than not, people misunderstand it, or misrepresent the pursuit of pleasure as something evil (what I really hate about Christianity).

Sometimes, an article will be discussed. It's easy to take the valuable aspect and translate into Epicurean terms, but those more versed could sense where the nuance is off.

Some philosophers are tough to read because they demand that you be able to follow extended chains of reasoning. Others, especially contemporary Continental writers are rather obscure. You don't seem to get where to start and you're unable to discern if it's worth the trouble.

That's what I find attractive with Epicurean philosophy. Its ideas are simple yet profound!

Nevertheless, even though Epicurean philosophy is so much accessible than a lot of garbage out there, it doesn't mean there are no nuances or details worth discussing or debating.

Prior to joining this group, I was only aware about Lucretius and the letters of Epicurus.

What I admire about Cassius is that he's versed with other ancient writers/writings that contextualize a lot of the discussion about Epicurus.

Having said that, I would like to consider myself as still a child in my understanding of Epicurean philosophy.

It's **deceptively simple**.

suppose you throw out

pleasure = absence of pain.

Cassius would write that this misrepresents how Epicurus understood pleasure.

Nuances and small differences that imply larger differences in later understanding.

Hence, this is why we have extensive discussions of this or that.

Cassius in Reply:

Elevic's summary is in my view very accurate. Especially since this is a thread for newcomers, I need to repeat the point Elevic raises, because in the middle of the letter to Meneoceus Epicurus clearly says "By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul." That sentence must mean something, and no fan of Epicurus can consider it to misrepresent Epicurean philosophy.

The choice is whether to take that sentence as something that can be lifted out of context and interpreted in the way an average person unfamiliar with other Epicurean terms and premises would interpret it, or whether we insist on remembering the prior definitions and premises which Epicurus had stated in other equally or even more fundamental letters, and also earlier in the letter to Menoeceus itself.

This should not be controversial. We do the same thing every day and without controversy as we interpret the earlier line " For there are gods, and the knowledge of them is manifest." That sentence does not mean that supernatural gods such as Yahweh or Allah exist, nor does it mean that knowledge of gods is easy to come by. We know from other clear Epicurean texts that it is impossible for gods to be Supernatural, and that the nature of gods is not to interfere with other beings, as Yahweh and Allah and others are alleged to do. The letter was written to someone already familiar with Epicurean philosophy, and like him we too understand that "for there are gods" does not mean what the non-Epicurean ear would immediately conclude.

In the case of "by pleasure we mean the absence of pain" there is also a context which cannot be ignored without reversing the meaning of the philosophy. An Epicurean like Menoeceus would clearly know that Epicurus had held that in the category of feelings there are only two options, pleasure and pain. (We know this both from the letter to Herodotus and from Diogenes Laertius.) When the quantity of anything that is measured is composed of only two things that vary in quantity, the quantity of one is going to be equal to the absence of the other as a matter of course. This exact point is stated with more precision in PD3 as "The limit of quantity of pleasures is the removal of all that is painful." (Bailey translation) Further context is provided earlier in the letter to Menoeceus itself, where it is stated that "all good and evil consist in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation" (again Bailey). We know that pleasure is the good because Epicurus says "pleasure is the first good and natural to us" in the same letter. Therefore pleasure has the positive definition of a matter of sensation, and we cannot rationally suppose that it is sufficient to define pleasure in every respect as "absence of pain." The respect in which Epicurus is defining pleasure to be absence of pain is in that of measurement of quantity, not in any other respect. Any normal person knows without elaborate explanation, and simply by observation, that in many very important respects (like whether we desire it or not!) the experience of pleasure is as different as can be from the experience of pain.

One of the fascinating aspects going on here is that there are many people who will argue with great force that "absence of pain" must be interpreted as something other than ordinary pleasure. Like Cicero, they argue that whatever else this passage may mean, it certainly means that "absence of pain" is an experience of pleasure different from the normal bodily and mental pleasures which ordinary people can understand. They argue that Epicurus intended to mean that there are pleasures of "rest" that are superior to the normal everyday pleasures of life, and that these pleasures of "rest," which we can dress up in a dramatic Greek word ("katastematic") are the true goal of Epicurean philosophy.

CIcero explicitly, and a passage in Diogenes Laertius implicitly, have provided generations of commentators with a basis for arguing that Epicurus was pointing to a passive and quietest experience that is "higher" than pleasure itself and far beyond the even the most joyful and delightful experiences of life revealed to us through the senses. That is largely why people of ascetic/stoic disposition can see in Epicurus a kindred spirit, and why some people can expound at great length on Epicurean philosophy without ever mentioning "pleasure" at all!

We are now 2000+ years down the road of this being the dominant interpretation of Epicurean philosophy. Today, however, at least for a brief period of freedom of discussion via the internet, it is possible to consider that the Ciceronian interpretation may be negligently or even intentionally incorrect.

And there is much more going on than I included above. Because once we identify the conflicts inherent in the Ciceronian interpretation, we should ask "Why was Epicurus concerned to make a point about the quantity of pleasure?"

The answer to that, in my view, can only be found by digging into the Platonic/Aristotelian orthodoxy that was popular when Epicurus was alive. That requires digging into Plato's Gorgias, Pratagorus, and especially Philebus (as well as some Aristotle) to recognize that prior philosophers had argued that pleasure could not be "the good" because no quantity could be identified as the highest possible pleasure. They had reasoned since it was impossible to define a "highest degree of pleasure" (We all want "more," don't we?) that it is therefore necessary to look for "the good" in something besides pleasure itself. (And what did they nominate to replace pleasure? In general, they nominated reason/logic/wisdom, which they argued was necessary in order for us to identify the proper role of pleasure in life.)

Epicurus had to address arguments such as that, and so he responded that the highest and purest experience of pleasure ("maximum" or "limit" are other words to us) is that which we experience when our total experience is pure pleasure and contains no mixture of pain.

This answers the objection that pleasure has no limit, and identifies the greatest good with pleasure undiluted by pain as the definition of the highest and purest pleasure that can be experienced.

This observation refutes Plato and Aristotle when they argued that pleasure was not the highest good, just like the observation that gods are perfect refutes the common view of gods, and the observation that death is the absence of sensation refutes the view that the state of being dead is painful and to be feared.

Unless we know this background the "limit of quantity of pleasure" and the "absence of pain" arguments can seem meaningless, and in failing to understand the reason for them we become easy victims of negligent or intentional misrepresentation. A tremendous amount of research and writing needs to be done on these issues to explore them further. DeWitt, Gosling & Taylor, Nikolsky, and Wenham have started the process, and I hope all newcomers who come across this group will consider looking into these issues themselves and helping us dig into them more deeply.

If I were accumulating lists of examples of going to war for pleasure properly interpreted, I would have to include the examples used by Torquatus in "On Ends":

“This being the theory I hold, why need I be afraid of not being able to reconcile it with the case of the Torquati my ancestors? Your references to them just now were historically correct, and also showed your kind and friendly feeling towards me. But all the same I am not to be bribed by your flattery of my family, and you will not find me a less resolute opponent.”

“Tell me, pray, what explanation do you put upon their actions? Do you really believe that they charged an armed enemy, or treated their children, their own flesh and blood, so cruelly, without a thought for their own interest or advantage? Why, even wild animals do not act in that way -- they do not run amok so blindly that we cannot discern any purpose in their movements and their onslaughts. Can you then suppose that those heroic men performed their famous deeds without any motive at all?”

“What their motive was, I will consider in a moment: for the present I will confidently assert, that if they had a motive for those undoubtedly glorious exploits, that motive was not a love of virtue in and for itself.

“He wrested the necklet from his foe?” “Yes, and saved himself from death.” “But he braved great danger?” “Yes, before the eyes of an army.” “What did he get by it?” “Honour and esteem, the strongest guarantees of security in life. ”He sentenced his own son to death?” “If from no motive, I am sorry to be the descendant of anyone so savage and inhuman; but if his purpose was by inflicting pain upon himself to establish his authority as a commander, and to tighten the reins of discipline during a very serious war by holding over his army the fear of punishment, then his action aimed at ensuring the safety of his fellow-citizens, upon which he knew his own depended.”

And this is a principle of wide application. People of your school, and especially yourself, who are so diligent a student of history, have found a favourite field for the display of your eloquence in recalling the stories of brave and famous men of old, and in praising their actions, not on grounds that those actions were useful, but on account of the splendour of abstract moral worth. But all of this falls to the ground if the principle of selection that I have just mentioned be established -- the principle of forgoing pleasures for the purpose of getting greater pleasures, and enduring pains for the sake of escaping greater pains.”

I'll have to go with my interpretation of the exchange between Cassius Longinus and Cicero, where Cassius justified his actions in Epicurean terms. Certainly specific instances are always tricky, and in the case of the decision the Czechs made vs the Poles that is probably a good example of why one rule doesn't fit all situations. But when necessary to secure my peace and happiness, any action is justifiable and therefore even "virtuous."

The best article I have found on this topic is David Sedley's "Ethics of Brutus and Cassius: http://www.jstor.org/stable/301367?…an_tab_contents

I pasted excerpts from it here: http://newepicurean.com/a-brief-good-w…-of-the-stoics/

including - “an Epicurean tenet already familiar to Cicero (Republic 1.10) that in exceptional crises the “no politics” rule might have to be suspended.” Sedley indicates that Seneca attributed this position to Epicurus himself.

So in your view even a defensive war is non-Epicurean?

Great post and great addition to the board Maciej - thank you very much!!!

One way of extending the discussion further, especially as it applies to one form of group action (defense), it would be interesting to put the shoe on the other foot and stipulate not that Pyrrhus was about to lead an expedition to conquer Italy, but that he were about to lead an expedition to defend against an invading Roman army. I would think that much of the reasoning would then be different, in that although the actions would be much the same (raising an army, deploying them in battle) would be much the same, but for an entirely different purpose.

And I would draw the conclusion from the occasional need to raise such an army and respond to such a threat that such actions would be blessed by Epicurus as eminently reasonable so as to procure safety and future pleasures.

Because if our goal is indeed to experience the pleasures that come from "drink[ing] bumpers and whil[ing] away the time with one another," then we must as necessary act forcefully to obtain that goal.

Would you agree, Maciej?

Here is a link to poll results over at the facebook group: https://www.facebook.com/groups/Epicure…63829863665968/

Maceij I have no idea what your personal circumstances are and how much time you have to devote to these conversations, but as far as I am aware the most well-developed and well-researched statement of the opinions I am inarticulately arguing is Chapter 19 of Gosling & Taylor's "The Greeks on Pleasure." If you do not have a copy of that, check here. And if you ever have time to read it and comment, I am sure your thoughts on it would be very instructive to me, even if you do not agree with it.

I don't dispute that comparing the change in condition constitutes a pleasure. But the tooth has no memory, and I think the pleasure comes from comparing the two conditions,m which is an active motion of my mind, and is just one of many pleasures my mind is capable of generating. The healthful functioning of any part of the body **can** certainly be pleasurable, such as my tongue generates when eating, but the healthful functioning of my toe in most cases gives me no sensation at all. If I choose to think about my health, and relish it, that is an active motion of my mind in actively generating a pleasing thought, just like my mind can actively generate all kinds of pleasurable emotions which are positive pleasures. The active functioning of my mind is not "absence of" anything.

Why don't you explain it to me, Maciej? My teeth that are not in pain do not produce to me any feeling at all. And when a toothache is heeled, I can say that I feel better than I did before in total, but the tooth that is no longer hurting produces no sensation to me at all. Is "no sensation to me at all" the highest pleasure?

Great essay Eric! and it is a good thing that we enjoy that debate because it never goes away. And maybe that's why Epicurus basically laughed at it with:

VS42 - The man who says that all things come to pass by necessity cannot criticize one who denies that all things come to pass by necessity: for he admits that this too happens of necessity.

Please click HERE to go right to the spot for the hypothetical.

The following is a hypothetical that should assist us in thinking about several important issues, including the nature of pleasure, its relationship to "absence of pain," and our comfort level with describing pleasure as "absence of pain." The question is set up by a short two minute movie clip - the final scene of the 1936 British HG Wells movie "Things to Come." What happens previously in the movie is not important to the hypothetical. By the end of the movie, the script has systematically eliminated almost every issue of social conflict imaginable. Both characters in the clip are from the same society, same economic and social background, have no religious position, and have very little at issue between them except the question raised in this sequence. In siding with one over the other there are no political, social, economic, or religious implications to your choice.

One character in the clip is named John Cabal - he is the taller, darkheaded man on the left who speaks first. The other character is Pippa Passworthy - he is on the right and speaks second. Both Cabal and Passworthy are leaders of their society, set somewhere far in the future. Both have just watched their children - Passworthy's son and Cabal's daughter - launched in a risky space shot toward the moon, from which they may very possibly die in the effort, and not return.

Both of the children enthusiastically wanted to go, but among the fathers there is disagreement. One argues that what has happened is good; the other argues that what has happened is bad. After watching the clip, please select which of the four responses most closely mirrors your thoughts. There are no wrong answers. Let's presume several important things: (1) Both Cabal and Passworthy are extreme and dramatized examples of their relative positions. Epicurus would endorse neither character in full - both would fall short of what Epicurus would recommend. (2) The four poll options are worded also so as to eliminate extremes as to the meaning of "absence of pain." Given adequate explanation, each option is fully defensible under Epicurean philosophy.

The hypothetical question ("Which Shall It Be?) is to be answered by choosing only one selection. Which of these four options most closely reflects your own viewpoint about pleasure, absence of pain, and which character you more closely identify with from this clip?

If possible, please explain your answer in the comments afterwards. Say what you selected, and why. But please select only one answer:

Just to continue while I am thinking about it, I perceive you embrace this formulation because you are Ok that what it really means is "when I am without pain I need no more pleasure because I am already in the highest state of pleasure possible" --- and so you interpret this passage as a full and complete endorsement of pleasure as the goal of life, Correct?

OK you have quoted a section of the letter to Menoeceus. And you are saying that not only is "freedom from pain" a good life, it is the best possible life.

What does it mean to you? What does the normal person interpret this to mean? How are you actually spending your time?

(Originally posted at Facebook) People, it's time to come to grips with controversies on a deeper level. We've been at work in this group for over four years, and yet never have we examined at close range the arguments arrayed against Epicurus in Book 2 of Cicero's "On Ends." Unsurprisingly enough, those arguments turn on criticism of Epicurus' definition of pleasure, and on the idea (asserted by Cicero) that Epicurus held painlessness to be identical to pleasure (an idea which in fact was held by an earlier philosopher):

Well,” I replied, “either Epicurus does not know what pleasure is, or the rest of mankind all the world over do not.” “How so?” he asked. “Because the universal opinion is that pleasure is a sensation actively stimulating the percipient sense and diffusing over it a certain agreeable feeling.” “What then?” he replied; “does not Epicurus recognize pleasure in your sense?” “Not always,” said I; “now and then, I admit, he recognizes it only too fully; for he solemnly avows that he cannot even understand what Good there can be or where it can be found, apart from that which is derived from food and drink, the delight of the ears, and the grosser forms of gratification.....

“Do you remember, then,” I said, “what Hieronymus of Rhodes pronounces to be the Chief Good, the standard as he conceives it to which all other things should be referred?” “I remember,” said he, “that he considers the End to be freedom from pain.” “Well,” said I, “what is the same philosopher’s view about pleasure?” “He thinks that pleasure is not desirable in itself.” “Then in his opinion to feel pleasure is a different thing from not feeling pain?” “Yes,” he said, “and there he is seriously mistaken, since, as I have just shown, the complete removal of pain is the limit of the increase of pleasure.” “Oh,” I said, “as for the formula ‘freedom from pain,’ I will consider its meaning later on; but unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that ‘freedom from pain’ does not mean the same as ‘pleasure.’"

And later in Book 2, Cicero summarizes his argument this way: ""If pain is an evil, to be without this evil is not enough to constitute the Good Life."

Is Cicero right or wrong? On this last question, I think most people will agree with Cicero. I agree with him myself! If we can't articulate a convincing response to Cicero's criticisms - and a better one than Torquatus offered in the passages that followed - then we haven't begun to understand Epicurean philosophy. And if so, then our arguments don't deserve to be any better respected than those of Torquatus - a version of Epicurus painted by the hand of Cicero for the purpose of knocking them down.

Anyone want to take a hand at answering this first criticism of Cicero?