Posts by Cassius

The short answer to the question is "No." That passage is not a description of "katastematic pleasure," whatever that is, because that term is not used by Epicurus. It is a combination of two things (1) the core position that because pleasure is the goal, we should not choose pleasures which bring more pain than they are worth, and (2) the core position that since all human experience is either pleasure or pain, the most desirable human experience is that which is "crammed full of pleasures" and from which all pains have thereby been crowded out and are absent.

The long answer is that given the monolithic acceptance of the Stoic-lite viewpoint in the literature of the last several hundred years, you aren't likely to accept the short answer unless you dig into the details presented in the articles I mention. Those articles cite the background in which the letter to Menoeceus was written, and the subsequent philosophic wars in which the K/K distinction was pushed.

The key aspect of the background of the letter was the philosophic war with Platonists as to whether Pleasure has a limit of quantity, found in Philebus, and Epicurus' response that the limit of pleasure is when experience is filled with nothing but pleasures. That is the meaning of PD3 as well, where the context of quantity is stated explicitly.

The key aspect of the subsequent philosophic war where the K/K distinction was considered important is traced by Nikolsky in his article where he cites the Division of Carneades for pushing this viewpoint. And you will see that the same "ordinary pleasures" conclusion is reached when you read the much more detailed treatment by Gosling and Taylor in The Greeks on Pleasure.

In addition, there is no evidence that Epicurus himself used the K/K distinction. The only time it is referenced in the bio of Diogenes Laertius (written hundreds of years after Epicurus) DL states that Epicurus endorsed *both* types. And many references in the other surviving texts show that Epicurean theory turns on the embrace of the experience of pleasure as ordinary people interpret it, not in setting up a new term ("katastematic" or "absence of pain") as some kind of mysterious new definition of pleasure as the goal of life. The bottom line is that Epicurus taught pleasure as we ordinarily understand it, including all forms of bodily and mental pleasures. If it is pleasure, it feels like pleasure, and anything which feels like pleasure is a part of the ordinary analysis of all experience being either pleasurable or painful.

I have collected the references in support of this analysis here: https://newepicurean.com/foundations-2/…pleasure-model/

I grant you that the position I am arguing is not the mainstream viewpoint. But it is also not something that I dreamed up myself, and it is supported by the authorities that I collect at the link above. As cited at my link, to research this issue, start with Boris Nikolsky's "Epicurus on Pleasure," which argues that the katastematic issue was not introduced by Epicurus and reflects a later Stoic-influenced viewpoint. Next, read the chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks on Pleasure," from which Nikolsky got the inspiration for his article. Add to that the Wentham article "Cicero's Interpretation of Katastematic Pleasure," which highlights how emphasis on katastematic pleasure contradicts other core aspects of Epicurean philosophy.

I'll close this post with two clearly-documented references that I believe to be totally irreconcilable with any idea that Epicurus pushed "absence of pain" as anything other than a statement of quantity. The statement of quantity is itself critically important as a refutation of the "no limit" argument, but it is not a description of the pleasures being experienced in the best life:

It is observed too that in his treatise On the Ethical End he [Epicurus] writes in these terms:

“I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, of sex, of sound, and the pleasures of beautiful form.”

– Diogenes Laertius, Book X

“He {Publius Clodius} praised those most who are said to be above all others the teachers and eulogists of pleasure {the Epicureans}. … He added that these same men were quite right in saying that the wise do everything for their own interests; that no sane man should engage in public affairs; that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures.
- Cicero, In Defense of Publius Sestius 10.23

Thanks again Samj! I am now wondering if she's holding this off the American market with the intent of releasing the book that has the September date on it. Not sure why that would be, though.

Public domain and available in full here: https://archive.org/details/Bailey…EpicurusCropped

Public domain and available in full here: https://archive.org/details/Epicur…ford1926_201309

As of 2019, this is probably the most scholarly and well-footnoted edition available. Written in prose with focus on fidelity to the original meaning rather than poetry.

These two books are combined in one thread because "The Art of Happiness" is substantially a re-issue of the older "Philosophy of Epicurus" which was issued by Northwestern University Press in 1963.

Just one perceptive observation after the other, all which ought to be to the embarrassment of "modern Epicureans" - this one on "free will":

"In the problem of liberty we find the ancient and modern Epicureans in total disagreement with each other. We know that Epicurus accepts free will and places, not only in man, but in nature and atoms a spontaneity, drawing from itself the principle of its action. On the contrary, Hobbes, Helvetius, d’Holbach, in a word, all the modern Epicureans without exception, reject this freedom and show themselves to be determinists, and at times, as is the case with Hobbes and La Mettrie, even excessively fatalist. We’re not going to examine here the absolute truth of these contrary doctrines, but we can ask which is most in conformity with Epicurean principles. One must recognize that belief in freedom is an anomaly in Epicurus’ system.

The latter, after having posed happiness as the goal, recognizes that tranquility of the soul is the necessary condition of this happiness, and he believes that the idea of a universal necessity dominating nature would be incompatible with the tranquility of the soul. According to him, as we know, there is something dark and troubling in the sentiment of fatalism; it is for this reason that he rejects it. And once he begins to reject it, with a remarkably logical spirit he casts it out from everywhere and places spontaneity in everything. What he hasn’t proved is that this spontaneity exists; he doesn’t even try to prove it. For him moral freedom is an obvious fact of consciousness. And man’s freedom being given, he deduces from it the spontaneity of nature. But he doesn’t think that only one of the following is true: either moral liberty is doubtful, and his system is enveloped in the same uncertainty, or it is certain and it is a new principle that must be taken into account.

If I am free I can found a morality on this and ignore the principle of interest. Duty can be deduced from the same idea of liberty without having to appeal to pleasure. It is understandable that a determinist could be a Utilitarian; but that a partisan of free will, who believes he feels in himself a certain amount of the absolute, a cause living and acting by itself, possessing intrinsic value and dignity should submit this to an external rule of action, turn it toward a foreign end and make of it an instrument of pleasure, this is a contradiction from which we were right to defend the modern Epicureans. On this point, in our time the Epicurean system has acquired new strength and homogeneity. Epicurus complained that the idea of universal determinism weighs on the human soul, for man suffers when he sacrifices to nature his full and complete independence. He forgot that morality, as much as any other science, can enter into this question of individual preferences. Science seeks, not what pleases intelligence or sensibility, but what is. It pursues not absolute happiness, that utopia of ancient Epicureanism, but relative happiness, compatible with reality, and it retreats before no truth, however difficult it might be."

Another perceptive but regrettable observation: "It is also for the same reason that modern Epicureanism has generally renounced the consolations that the Epicurean theory of death claimed to offer. Modern Utilitarians generally are more concerned with life than with death. According to them, morality has as its goal the regulating of our conduct while we are alive; its goal is not to modify our ideas on the subject of death: this is more a question for metaphysics or religion. "

Whether we agree with it or not (and I disagree with a lot of it) there is some very interesting material in that article. It definitely hits some major points and controversies.

This is a very interesting sentence, and I think a correct one:

Quote from Cassius

But let us understand each other, this is not a fundamental and primitive harmony: egoisms work together like pendulums, without mixing and without uniting, and the goal of morality is not the producing of this union, since it would be impossible.

Poster: "In fact, it believes, the individual pursues only his own pleasure". Is this true? I was under the impression that Epicurus was more utilitarian than that

Cassius:

Here's the full paragraph the poster is quoting from. Guyau writes from the position that Epicurean philosophy needed to "advance" from that viewpoint. In my view the statement of the original Epicurean position is correct, and changes are not advances but regression. The point that people want to ignore in Epicurean philosophy so that they can "advance" to something else is that only if you consider other people's pleasure and pain are you going to be successful in maximizing your own.

"This principle posed, Epicurus and his continuators conclude from it that pleasure being the sole end of beings, morality for each individual must be the art of procuring for oneself the greatest amount of personal pleasure. As a Utilitarian said, morality thus understood is nothing but the regularization of egoism. Hobbes before Spinoza attempted to construct a geometry of morals, Helvetius constructed a physics of morals, d’Holbach a physiology of morals. But under various names, Epicurean morality is, in summary, nothing but the search for personal interest; it rests on the confusion between fact and duty. In fact, it believes, the individual pursues only his own pleasure. By right it is also his pleasure he should pursue, whether this pleasure finds itself by chance in opposition with that of others or if it finds itself in harmony with it. But even so, all the Epicureans, even La Mettrie, are in agreement in committing the individual to not retreating into a foolish egoism. According to them, there is harmony in most cases between the pleasure of the individual and that of others. But let us understand each other, this is not a fundamental and primitive harmony: egoisms work together like pendulums, without mixing and without uniting, and the goal of morality is not the producing of this union, since it would be impossible. On this point Epicureanism has again advanced very little in France: D’Alembert, d’Holbach, and Volney at moments give us a presentiment of the contemporary English school, but they never fail to return to personal interest as a principle of all morality. In this there is a notable divergence between the Epicureans and the contemporary English school. This divergence grows from Bentham to Stuart Mill and especially to Mr. Spencer, with whose principles we can for the first time construct a nearly complete physics or physiology of morals. The English moralists still preserve personal pleasure as the sole lever capable of setting a being in motion. It is only that instead of positing this pleasure as the legitimate end of the moral being, they work with all their might at having it pursue the pleasure of others. Expressed in this way, their Utilitarianism seems at first glance to be of a manifest inconsistency, and we will elsewhere examine if it doesn’t contain, in fact, any inconsistency. Nevertheless, there is in this doctrine something profound that we must now bring to light. "

-----------------Cassius again:

"The English moralists still preserve personal pleasure as the sole lever capable of setting a being in motion. It is only that instead of positing this pleasure as the legitimate end of the moral being, they work with all their might at having it pursue the pleasure of others. "

<<< This is the source of the corruption in Epicurean philosophy, and again the writer appears to me to be correct in blaming it on the English.

How many times has someone asked: "Do we know about "Such-And-Such Book" by "This or That" author?

I should have organized this better a long time ago, but better late than never. We need, and now have, a dedicated forum for discussing "modern" books, articles, and videos related to Epicurus.

So here's a place to post a thread on any book you'd like to discuss:

Library - "Modern" Books and Articles

Please start threads in the format: LastName (FirstName) - "TitleOfBook"

But don't worry about that too much as we can fix it so that the thread titles are uniform. If you can in the first post, please post a link to where a PDF of the book can be found (if available) or a link to where the video can be seen (such as at Youtube).

This book is being released approximately now, as this thread is being posted. However it is not in Amazon.com or BarnesandNoble.com as of this posting.

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Pleasure-Princ…=UTF8&qid=&sr=&

https://www.amazon.com/Epicurus-Pleas…sr=8-1-fkmrnull

Thanks to JAWS for this link: https://www.marxists.org/archive/guyau/1878/epicurus.htm

Final Paragraph:

"In summary, the Epicurean doctrines exercised an unquestionable influence on the development of human thought. In the natural sciences Democritus’ and Epicurus’ cosmological system appears to have triumphed in our time. In the moral and social sciences the doctrines derived from Epicureanism are also more powerful than they ever were. At this very moment the English school has brought forth, in the face of the Stoicism restored by Kant, an Epicureanism renewed by the facts of modern science. How many old ideas and rooted customs Epicureanism has contributed to ridding the moral domain of! In the same vein, we have seen that in the religious sphere Epicurus has labored, more than any other philosopher of antiquity, to liberate human thought from belief in the marvelous, the miraculous, and the providential. Well before the arrival of Christianity he had already attacked pagan religion and reduced it to impotence. Still today still it is the sprit of old Epicurus who, combined with new doctrines, works away at and undermines Christianity. Among the free-thinkers of today, how many merit the name of “Epicureans” in which the church and Jews included the free-thinkers of yesterday.”

I find it interesting to see how he stresses that the warping of Epicurus into contemporary views happened significantly due to British writers. (Which I don't consider to be a good thing!)

Ah I see! Maybe it would be helpful to add a link to the Italian version on your website, and that will help us see the original in the original context. So you'll put both Italian and English on your website? We can certainly point people to the translation here, with links, with pastes, or probably both!

Wow retired at 46 - that's great!

I have not read (or even heard of) the Preuss book. I see in its blurb on Amazon it states:

"the argument focuses on Epicurus' understanding of the nature of pleasure, and pain and on the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure."

Sounds like this is an example of how important it is whose views of Epicurean philosophy you read.

Based on DeWitt, Gosling & Taylor, Nikolsky, and others, I would argue that major emphasis on a "distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure" is not Epicurean at all, nor did Epicurus consider it to be an important distinction. I continue to observe that emphasis on that is a good indicator that someone will end up with a Stoicized version of Epicurus that in my view turns the philosophy upside down.

By no means do I expect everyone to agree with me on that, but I know that not everyone has even been exposed to this contrary argument, since the that position (the Preuss position, apparently) is what is primarily taught in all academic and internet discussion of Epicurus.

In my view the way to research the contrary argument, and to see how damaging the emphasis on kinetic-katastematic distinction can be, would probably be to start with Nikolsky's Epicurus on Pleasure (which argues that this was a later viewpoint well after Epicurus), followed by the chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks on Pleasure" (on which Nikolsky says he got his original inspiration). I would add to this the Wentham article (Cicero's Interpretation of Katastematic Pleasure). But likely none of this would even be considered of intense interest to someone who got his start with theDeWitt book on Epicurus, which hardly mentions those categories except to point out how - even if one considers the categories relevant - that Epicurean philosophy embraces both.

Also, I forgot but now came back to it ---

Here! I fixed it for you! --->

Philo I will be glad to do so as the thoughts occur to me. I also hope others will do so. Unfortunately I am so pressed for time that I am not able to launch into any particular item at the moment, but I do agree that each of the points you have raised is a critical one for discussion. You've obviously put a lot of time and thought into this document, and doing this kind of thing is a great exercise for anyone.

I haven't checked back but did you respond to my "Welcome" post about your background and interest in Epicurus? I don't ask those questions to pry, and I don't want you to divulge any personal information, but I think it is very helpful to discussion if we know something about "where a person has been" as an indication of "where they are now" and "where they are going."