Posts by Cassius

Mike probably the more accurate way to put it is that these letters, plus others, and Jefferson's association with Frances Wright of A Few Days in Athens fame, shows that Jefferson understood the philosophical issues and embraced Epicurus, which is a pretty huge achievement for his time. But he was a politician more than philosopher and he kept these views largely private so there are definite limitations.

Donald's article correctly points out that Jefferson also appreciated some of the formulations of the Stoics, but what DR fails to appreciate or point out is that Jefferson did so while explicitly rejecting the core ideas of Stoicism.

To me that is consistent with a pattern I see in "modern Stoicism" to be very selective in embracing only a part of what true Stoicism was really all about. My view is that modern Stoicism is really hardly Stoicism at all, but rather a psychological therapy technique that uses the name of a philosophy to enhance its credibility.

That's why we see a steady flow of people who go looking for an alternative to religion on the internet, find Stoicism, but eventually recognize in Epicurus more of what they were looking for in the first place. Which is to a degree my own story too.

Great points Nate. I know in my own case that I have learned a tremendous amount from reading the non-Epicurean parts of both "On Ends" and "Diogenes Laertius" and I could kick myself around the block for thinking back in college that they were too hard, or irrelevant, and putting off reading them.

And there's no doubt in my mind that the Epicureans spent almost as much time reading the Platonic and Aristotelian material as they did reading their own material. They were reacting against the common teachings just as we have to do now. And just because we study the others, and pick up snappy lines from different places, doesn't make us less Epicurean.

I ran out of steam in looking for cites to Epicurean texts to relate to most of the "ten rules," but almost all of them can be related to Epicurean texts of one kind or another. Probably over time it's worth going back and supplementing my article with more examples.

Yes I agree that is definitely something to explore, and what immediately comes to mind are some of the sections in DeWitt where he refers to "human nature" as what is learning over time. For example:

I can't speak much about Montaigne, but in addition to being self-declared I would say that he next step in indicating how seriously someone takes Epicurus is whether they take the time to articulate Epicurean doctrine with any accuracy. In Jefferson's case, the letters cited above do indicate to me that he was serious about Epicurus. In the case of Montaigne (and many others of similar style) I am not aware that much can be documented in favor of their understanding of the full sweep of Epicurean physics, epistemology, and ethics, much beyond the fact that they spoke in general terms about pleasure and/or opposed standard religion in some often ambiguous sense.

Also as for digging too deeply into any individual's application of Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to their understanding of it, that's even more perilous. How people actually live rarely reflects closely on how they say they should live, although in Epicurus' own case the aspiration and the practice seems to have been closer than most.

well first and foremost as we know Jefferson was not involved in the constitutional convention and did not express particularly high regard for it, and took the position that it needed to be open to substantial revision with every generation. You may be talking about the Declaration (?) Which has some good material in it but definitely far from perfect either.

There is definitely a lot to be questioned about Jeffersons personal life but going too far in that direction is generally a tactic that gets us too much into ad hominem rather than focusing on the philosophy.

Donald Robertson to recently linked to an article he wrote and asked the question: "Was Thomas Jefferson more Stoic or Epicurean?" In answering "Epicurean" I will break down my response into three categories in order of importance:

(1) Be sure you understand what it means to be "Epicurean" and to be "Stoic."

The Stoic and Epicurean schools developed very clear doctrines that are totally incompatible, and for that reasons Stoics and Epicureans in the ancient world were bitter enemies of each others' views. Just scratching the surface, we can compare the big picture of both schools as follows:

In physics, Epicurus held that there area no supernatural gods or supernaturally imposed "order" or "fate," that the universe is eternal in time and boundless in space, and that the earth is not only not the center of attention for divine beings, but only one of countless locations in the universe where life thrives. In epistemology, Epicurus held that the senses, the feelings of pleasure and pain, and the intuitive faculty he called "anticipations" are the methods by which we determine all that is true to us. Epicurus specifically campaigned against abstract dialectical logic as misleading and unhelpful for determining a natural philosophy of life. In ethics, Epicurus taught that humans have agency to influence the outcome of their own lives, that pleasure is the goal of living, that the feelings of pleasure and pain are the guides which nature gave us for determining ethical decisions, and that the term "virtue" has no independent meaning other than as a description of tools which are useful for living pleasurably.

The Stoics could not have been more different or opposed to these Epicurean views.

In physics, the Stoics held that the universe was created by one or more divine beings who impose order on the entire universe and "fate" on the lives of humanity, and that the earth and humanity are essentially the center of the universe and the focus of the gods' attention and manipulation. In epistemology, the Stoics took Plato to new extremes and held that abstract dialectical logic alone is the key to understanding the divine nature of the universe, and that the senses are deceptive and lures to unworthy living. In ethics, the Stoics taught that the goal of life should be to live virtuously, which essentially means in conformity with the will of the gods, who dictate the outcome through fate, that pleasure is destructive, that emotion is to be suppressed in favor of reason, and that virtue has independent existence and is its own reward -- and that in fact to seek a reward for living virtuously would be by definition un-virtuous.

The ancient Stoics and Epicureans realized that there was no middle ground between these two positions, and the deeper you study the two schools the more clearly you can understand why they reached that conclusion, despite what muddy thinkers like Marcus Aurelius centuries after the schools were formed would have you believe.

(2) Thomas Jefferson wrote clearly and forcefully in favor of Epicurus and against Stoicism.

Like Marcus Aurelius, Thomas Jefferson was both a practical man and a politician, and Jefferson was willing to state publicly things that he saw as true regardless of who may have said them first. Unlike Marcus Aurelius, Thomas Jefferson was not a muddy thinker, and in his private correspondence he was very clear as to his own views. What follows is an assortment of those statements. In reading them, remember that both Cicero and the Stoics saw themselves as continuances and extensions of the Platonic line, so that every time Jefferson attacks Cicero or Plato, he is attacking the Stoics as well by implication:

Jefferson to William Short, 1819:

As you say of yourself, I too am an Epicurean. I consider the genuine (not the imputed) doctrines of Epicurus as containing everything rational in moral philosophy which Greece and Rome have left us. Epictetus indeed, has given us what was good of the stoics; all beyond, of their dogmas, being hypocrisy and grimace. Their great crime was in their calumnies of Epicurus and misrepresentations of his doctrines; in which we lament to see the candid character of Cicero engaging as an accomplice. Diffuse, vapid, rhetorical, but enchanting. His prototype Plato, eloquent as himself, dealing out mysticisms incomprehensible to the human mind, has been deified by certain sects usurping the name of Christians; because, in his foggy conceptions, they found a basis of impenetrable darkness whereon to rear fabrications as delirious, of their own invention. These they fathered blasphemously on him who they claimed as their founder, but who would disclaim them with the indignation which their caricatures of his religion so justly excite. Of Socrates we have nothing genuine but in the Memorabilia of Xenophon; for Plato makes him one of his Collocutors merely to cover his own whimsies under the mantle of his name; a liberty of which we are told Socrates himself complained. Seneca is indeed a fine moralist, disguising his work at times with some Stoicisms, and affecting too much of antithesis and point, yet giving us on the whole a great deal of sound and practical morality....

I take the liberty of observing that you are not a true disciple of our master Epicurus, in indulging the indolence to which you say you are yielding. One of his canons, you know, was that “that indulgence which prevents a greater pleasure, or produces a greater pain, is to be avoided.” Your love of repose will lead, in its progress, to a suspension of healthy exercise, a relaxation of mind, an indifference to everything around you, and finally to a debility of body, and hebetude of mind, the farthest of all things from the happiness which the well-regulated indulgences of Epicurus ensure; fortitude, you know is one of his four cardinal virtues. That teaches us to meet and surmount difficulties; not to fly from them, like cowards; and to fly, too, in vain, for they will meet and arrest us at every turn of our road.

(There is much more in this letter, including an outline of Epicurean thought, that illustrates how closely Jefferson had studied Epicurus.)

Jefferson to John Adams 1814:

Having more leisure there than here for reading, I amused myself with reading seriously Plato’s Republic. I am wrong, however, in calling it amusement, for it was the heaviest task-work I ever went through. I had occasionally before taken up some of his other works, but scarcely ever had patience to go through a whole dialogue. While wading through the whimsies, the puerilities, and unintelligible jargon of this work, I laid it down often to ask myself how it could have been, that the world should have so long consented to give reputation to such nonsense as this? How the soi-disant Christian world, indeed, should have done it, is a piece of historical curiosity. But how could the Roman good sense do it? And particularly, how could Cicero bestow such eulogies on Plato! Although Cicero did not wield the dense logic of Demosthenes, yet he was able, learned, laborious, practised in the business of the world, and honest. He could not be the dupe of mere style, of which he was himself the first master in the world. With the moderns, I think, it is rather a matter of fashion and authority. Education is chiefly in the hands of persons who, from their profession, have an interest in the reputation and the dreams of Plato. They give the tone while at school, and few in their after years have occasion to revise their college opinions. But fashion and authority apart, and bringing Plato to the test of reason, take from him his sophisms, futilities and incomprehensibilities, and what remains? In truth, he is one of the race of genuine sophists, who has escaped the oblivion of his brethren, first, by the elegance of his diction, but chiefly, by the adoption and incorporation of his whimsies into the body of artificial Christianity. His foggy mind is forever presenting the semblances of objects which, half seen through a mist, can be defined neither in form nor dimensions. Yet this, which should have consigned him to early oblivion, really procured him immortality of fame and reverence.

Jefferson to John Adams, 1820:

But enough of criticism: let me turn to your puzzling letter of May 12. on matter, spirit, motion etc. It’s crowd of scepticisms kept me from sleep. I read it, and laid it down: read it, and laid it down, again and again: and to give rest to my mind, I was obliged to recur ultimately to my habitual anodyne, ‘I feel: therefore I exist.’ I feel bodies which are not myself: there are other existencies then. I call them matter. I feel them changing place. This gives me motion. Where there is an absence of matter, I call it void, or nothing, or immaterial space. On the basis of sensation, of matter and motion, we may erect the fabric of all the certainties we can have or need. I can conceive thought to be an action of a particular organisation of matter, formed for that purpose by it’s creator, as well as that attraction in an action of matter, or magnetism of loadstone. When he who denies to the Creator the power of endowing matter with the mode of action called thinking shall shew how he could endow the Sun with the mode of action called attraction, which reins the planets in the tract of their orbits, or how an absence of matter can have a will, and, by that will, put matter into motion, then the materialist may be lawfully required to explain the process by which matter exercises the faculty of thinking. When once we quit the basis of sensation, all is in the wind. To talk of immaterial existences is to talk of nothings. To say that the human soul, angels, god, are immaterial, is to say they are nothings, or that there is no god, no angels, no soul. I cannot reason otherwise: but I believe I am supported in my creed of materialism by Locke, Tracy, and Stewart.

Jefferson to Maria Cosway, 1786 (written as an address responding to an advocate of the "Head" / Logic):

Let the gloomy monk, sequestered from the world, seek unsocial pleasures in the bottom of his cell! Let the sublimated philosopher grasp visionary happiness while pursuing phantoms dressed in the garb of truth! Their supreme wisdom is supreme folly; & they mistake for happiness the mere absence of pain. Had they ever felt the solid pleasure of one generous spasm of the heart, they would exchange for it all the frigid speculations of their lives, which you have been vaunting in such elevated terms. Believe me then my friend, that that is a miserable arithmetic which, could estimate friendship at nothing, or at less than nothing. Respect for you has induced me to enter into this discussion, & to hear principles uttered which I detest & abjure. Respect for myself now obliges me to recall you into the proper limits of your office. When nature assigned us the same habitation, she gave us over it a divided empire. To you she allotted the field of science; to me that of morals. When the circle is to be squared, or the orbit of a comet to be traced; when the arch of greatest strength, or the solid of least resistance is to be investigated, take up the problem; it is yours; nature has given me no cognizance of it. In like manner, in denying to you the feelings of sympathy, of benevolence, of gratitude, of justice, of love, of friendship, she has excluded you from their controul. To these she has adapted the mechanism of the heart. Morals were too essential to the happiness of man to be risked on the incertain combinations of the head. She laid their foundation therefore in sentiment, not in science. That she gave to all, as necessary to all: this to a few only, as sufficing with a few. I know indeed that you pretend authority to the sovereign controul of our conduct in all its parts: & a respect for your grave saws & maxims, a desire to do what is right, has sometimes induced me to conform to your counsels.

A few facts however which I can readily recall to your memory, will suffice to prove to you that nature has not organized you for our moral direction. When the poor wearied souldier whom we overtook at Chickahomony with his pack on his back, begged us to let him get up behind our chariot, you began to calculate that the road was full of souldiers, & that if all should be taken up our horses would fail in their journey. We drove on therefore. But soon becoming sensible you had made me do wrong, that tho we cannot relieve all the distressed we should relieve as many as we can, I turned about to take up the souldier; but he had entered a bye path, & was no more to be found; & from that moment to this I could never find him out to ask his forgiveness. Again, when the poor woman came to ask a charity in Philadelphia, you whispered that she looked like a drunkard, & that half a dollar was enough to give her for the ale-house. Those who want the dispositions to give, easily find reasons why they ought not to give. When I sought her out afterwards, & did what I should have done at first, you know that she employed the money immediately towards placing her child at school. If our country, when pressed with wrongs at the point of the bayonet, had been governed by its heads instead of its hearts, where should we have been now? Hanging on a gallows as high as Hamans. You began to calculate & to compare wealth and numbers: we threw up a few pulsations of our warmest blood; we supplied enthusiasm against wealth and numbers; we put our existence to the hazard when the hazard seemed against us, and we saved our country: justifying at the same time the ways of Providence, whose precept is to do always what is right, and leave the issue to him. In short, my friend, as far as my recollection serves me, I do not know that I ever did a good thing on your suggestion, or a dirty one without it. I do forever then disclaim your interference in my province. Fill papers as you please with triangles & squares: try how many ways you can hang & combine them together. I shall never envy nor controul your sublime delights. But leave me to decide when & where friendships are to be contracted.

Additional detail can be found in Jefferson documents collected at http://www.newepicurean.com/jefferson.

(3) Analyzing the "Rules of Life," to the extent a Stoic said any of them they are commonplace truisms that even a Stoic could not get wrong.

If after reading the above, especially Jefferson's Head and Heart letter, you are still tempted to think that Jefferson was in any substantial way a Stoic, let's look at the list of "ten rules" and quickly comment on each. Over time we can come back and address each in more detail, but for now:

1. Never put off till tomorrow what you can do to-day. << This is a commonplace observation equally supportable by any of several Epicurean doctrines, such as Vatican Saying 10, "Remember that you are mortal, and have a limited time to live, and have devoted yourself to discussions on Nature for all time and eternity, and have seen “things that are now and are to come and have been,” and Vatican Saying 14: "14. We are born once and cannot be born twice, but for all time must be no more. But you, who are not master of tomorrow, postpone your happiness. Life is wasted in procrastination, and each one of us dies while occupied."
2. Never trouble another for what you can do yourself. << Another commonplace observation that is not intrinsically Stoic, but is stated in such Epicurean doctrines as Vatican Saying 45. "The study of nature does not make men productive of boasting or bragging, nor apt to display that culture which is the object of rivalry with the many, but high-spirited and self-sufficient, taking pride in the good things of their own minds and not of their circumstances."
3. Never spend your money before you have it. << A commonplace observation not intrinsically Stoic at all.
4. Never buy what you do not want, because it is cheap; it will be dear to you. << A commonplace observation not intrinsically Stoic at all.
5. Pride costs us more than hunger, thirst and cold. << A commonplace observation not intrinsically Stoic at all.
6. We never repent of having eaten too little. << A commonplace observation not intrinsically Stoic at all. There is plenty of Epicurean advice about accustoming oneself to doing without when necessary: "And again independence of desire we think a great good — not that we may at all times enjoy but a few things, but that, if we do not possess many, we may enjoy the few in the genuine persuasion that those have the sweetest enjoy luxury pleasure in luxury who least need it....To grow accustomed therefore to simple and not luxurious diet gives us health to the full, and makes a man alert for the needful employments of life, and when after long intervals we approach luxuries disposes us better towards them, and fits us to be fearless of fortune."
7. Nothing is troublesome that we do willingly. << A commonplace observation, and to the extent this statement implies agency or "free will," it is not Stoic
8. How much pain have cost us the evils which have never happened! << A commonplace observation not intrinsically Stoic at all.
9. Take things always by their smooth handle. << A common sense observation not intrinsically Stoic.
10. When angry, count ten, before you speak; if very angry, an hundred. << Simple common sense and not intrinsically Stoic at all.

(4) Conclusion:

Thomas Jefferson fully understood the essential characteristics of Stoic and Epicurean philosophies, and he emphatically embraced Epicurus and condemned Stoicism and its variants.  You should too.

This is to start planning a special podcast episode devoted to the topic: Epicurus Against the Platonists and Aristotelians.

Please post ideas for organization and topics to cover initial thoughts are:

1. Introduction of panelists
2. Identify that Plato and Aristotle had some differences but were basically the same on most issues of relevance to this discussion.
3. Basic issues on which Platonists / Aristotelians and Epicureans disagree
   1. Physics / Nature of the Universe
   2. Epistemology
   3. Ethics
4. Examples where these arguments are featured:
   1. Frances Wright A Few Days in Athens, especially as to comments on Aristotle
   2. The statements of Thomas Jefferson condemning Plato
   3. Statements of Frederich Nietzsche (?)
5. Summary and conclusions
   1. Eclecticism / combination of the two is not the answer

Resources / references to use for the episode:

1. A Comparison Chart: Stoic vs. Epicurean Philosophy

This is to start planning a special podcast episode devoted to the topic: Epicurus Against the Stoics.

Please post ideas for organization and topics to cover initial thoughts are:

1. Introduction of panelists
2. Basic issues on which Stoics and Epicureans disagree
   1. Physics / Nature of the Universe
   2. Epistemology
   3. Ethics
3. Examples where these arguments are featured:
   1. Frances Wright A Few Days in Athens, especially the debate between Epicurus and Zeno
   2. The letter of Cosma Raimondi
   3. The statements of Thomas Jefferson condemning Stoicism
   4. The statements of Frederich Nietzsche condemning Stoicism
4. Summary and conclusions
   1. Eclecticism / combination of the two is not the answer

Resources / references to use for the episode:

1. A Comparison Chart: Stoic vs. Epicurean Philosophy

This is a very good article, and the information collected here on the last page is very useful. But good grief, what is that last sentence all about? It's as if the writer has been writing under the glowering scowl, not of the gods of heaven, but of the gods of the Academy, and she has to throw them a bone by suggesting that her findings indicate that Lucretius was not a good Epicurean! She is suggesting that it was a "doctrinal premise" of Epicurus that morals must be kept separate from physics? Or is it more likely that she recognizes that the Academic/orthodox interpretation of Lucretius is flawed, but doesn't want to buck the establishment too far? Possibly there is some mixture of the desire to suggest that Lucretius was not a "good Epicurean," that a lot of people seem to want to make, but I just don't see that at all, and that looks to me like just another effort to undermine the Epicurean message, rather than a point based on anything substantive.

Thanks to R.R. for bringing this to my attention. The article disagrees with Bailey and others who express or imply that Lucretius was only concerned about physics.

File

GRZELAK: The Presence of Ethical Teaching in De Rerum Natura of Lucretius

Highlighting the Ethical Aspects of Lucretius' poem

Cassius

February 7, 2020 at 7:05 AM

Wow that's great Michele. Looking forward to more news about that!

I just noted on another page that today is Elayne 's birthday. It's been little over a year since Elayne became an important part of our group. I want to both thank Elayne and encourage others to participate as well. It doesn't take years and years of intense study to appreciate Epicurus, just the time and effort to go back to the sources and think about things for yourself. Happy Birthday Elayne!

Below is the Wikipedia introduction to Epicurus as of 02/06/20. I will highlight in red, and add a footnote to each statement which I contend is in serious need of correction or amplification.

Quote

Epicurus (Ancient Greek: Ἐπίκουρος, romanized: Epíkouros;^[a] 341–270 BC) was an ancient Greek philosopher and sage[1] who founded Epicureanism, a highly influential school of philosophy. He was born on the Greek island of Samos to Athenian parents. Influenced by Democritus, Aristippus, Pyrrho,^[3] and possibly the Cynics, he turned against the Platonism of his day and established his own school, known as "the Garden", in Athens. Epicurus and his followers were known for eating simple meals and discussing a wide range of philosophical subjects.[2] He openly allowed women to join the school as a matter of policy. [3] Epicurus is said to have originally written over 300 works on various subjects, but the vast majority of these writings have been lost. Only three letters written by him—the Letters to Menoeceus, Pythocles, and Herodotus—and two collections of quotes—the Principle Doctrines and the Vatican Sayings [4]—have survived intact, along with a few fragments of his other writings. Most knowledge [5] of his teachings comes from later authors, particularly the biographer Diogenes Laërtius, the Epicurean Roman poet Lucretius and the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus, and with hostile but largely accurate accounts by the Pyrrhonist philosopher Sextus Empiricus, and the statesman and Academic Skeptic Cicero.

For Epicurus, the purpose of philosophy was to help people attain a happy, tranquil life characterized by ataraxia (peace and freedom from fear) and aponia (the absence of pain) [6]. He advocated that people were best able to pursue philosophy by living a self-sufficient life surrounded by friends.[7]. He taught that the root of all human neurosis is death denial and the tendency for human beings to assume that death will be horrific and painful, which he claimed causes unnecessary anxiety, selfish self-protective behaviors, and hypocrisy. [8] According to Epicurus, death is the end of both the body and the soul and therefore should not be feared. Epicurus taught that although the gods [9] exist, they have no involvement in human affairs. He taught that people should behave ethically not because the gods punish or reward people for their actions, but because amoral behavior will burden them with guilt and prevent them from attaining ataraxia. [10]

Like Aristotle, Epicurus was an empiricist, meaning he believed that the senses are the only reliable source of knowledge about the world. [11] He derived much of his physics and cosmology from the earlier philosopher Democritus (c. 460–c. 370 BC). Like Democritus, Epicurus taught that the universe is infinite and eternal and that all matter is made up of extremely tiny, invisible particles known as atoms. All occurrences in the natural world are ultimately the result of atoms moving and interacting in empty space. Epicurus deviated from Democritus in his teaching of atomic "swerve", which holds that atoms may deviate from their expected course, thus permitting humans to possess free will in an otherwise deterministic universe.

[1] Calling Epicurus a "sage" adds nothing useful, but injects confusion, suggesting that this term denotes some status that is important the reader should know about, which is not correct. Epicurus was a philosopher and founder of a school that was called after his name, nothing more or less. The description of "sage" at the wikipedia link just adds to the confusion by saying that a sage "is someone who has attained wisdom." The goal of life that Epicurus identified was pleasure, not wisdom; wisdom is a tool for achieving pleasure, not a goal in itself. [Torquatus in On Ends: So also Wisdom, which must be considered as the art of living, if it effected no result would not be desired; but as it is, it is desired, because it is the artificer that procures and produces pleasure.]

[2] Eating simple meals and discussing a wide variety of philosophical subject is what they were known for? Ridiculous! Epicurus was known for rejecting both supernatural religion and Platonic rationalism / idealism, and replacing them with an understanding of the universe as eternal, boundless, uncreated, and based entirely on natural principals, an ethics based on the Natural faculty of feeling of pleasure and pain, and an epistemology grounded on reliance on the senses rather than logical abstractions. As for eating simple meals, VS63. Frugality too has a limit, and the man who disregards it is like him who errs through excess.

[3] This statement is pandering to political correctness rather than beginning with information about Epicurus that is truly important. Epicurus also philosophized with slaves, but at the same time Epicurus held slaves of his own and did not free them in his will. Epicurus rejected the contention that there are any "absolute" standards of justice that apply to all people at all times and all places. Issues of political and social reform are not the starting point for understanding Epicurus, but downstream results that follow naturally from the basic fundamentals of his philosophy. [PD33. Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed. PD34. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape those appointed to punish such actions. PD36. In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all.]

[4] The authenticity of the Principal Doctrines as a genuine collection of quotes assembled by either Epicurus himself, or the early Epicureans, is well attested by the survival of the biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. The source of the "Vatican Sayings" collection is not known, but appears to be a far later collection of quotations assembled by an unknown collector, for an unknown purpose, using unknown standards of collection. It is true that they appear to be authentic, but their collection in this list probably deserves no more deference than any collection of Epicurean quotes made by anyone else in the past or present. As the Epicurus Wiki notes: The Vatican Sayings are a collection of maxims attributed (not always correctly) to Epicurus. The collection, dubbed “The Sayings of Epicurus” – or alternatively, “The Voice of Epicurus,” was rediscovered in 1888 within a fourteenth-century Vatican manuscript which also contained Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations, Epictetus’ Manual, and similar works. We have no information regarding when or by whom the Vatican collection was made.Several of the Sayings are identical with some of the Principal Doctrines. Some defy certain translation, and others are certainly not by Epicurus (refer to the analysis section for each individual maxim).

[5] It is true that the writings referenced here provide important details, but the core letters of Epicurus and the information recorded by Diogenes Laertius contain a wide range of core information from which virtually all essential elements of the philosophy can be reconstructed. Other than details about the Epicurean view of "gods," the material preserved by Diogenes Laertius provides a reliable standard by which the writings of later commentators can be judged. In addition, the poem of Lucretius appears to be almost totally a "rewrite" in poem form of Epicurus' "On Nature," so when combined with Diogenes Laertius, and the material preserved in the inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda, we have a reliable core of material that can be relied on for understanding the fundamentals of Epicurean philosophy.

[6] "For Epicurus, the purpose of philosophy was to help people attain a happy, tranquil life characterized by ataraxia (peace and freedom from fear) and aponia (the absence of pain). " Written in this manner this sentence is significantly misleading. Epicurus was very clear that the goal of life is pleasure, which goes hand in hand with avoidance of pain, because these two feelings (pleasure and pain) are the only things in life which are intrinsically desirable (and undesirable) in and of themselves. Epicurean doctrine is based on the fundamental premise that there are only two feelings - (1) pleasure and (2) pain - which means that the experience of one of these feelings means that you are not experiencing the other. From this perspective, the measure of the amount of pleasure you are experiencing at any one time can be referred to as "absence of pain" just as the amount of pain you are experiencing at any one time can be referred to as "absence of pleasure." While it is fair to say that Epicurus advocated a "happy" life, the word "happiness" is so controversial, standing alone, that it is necessary to specify that a life of happiness is a life of pleasure. [Note: Diogenes of Oinoanda: But since, as I say, the issue is not ‘what is the means of happiness?’ but ‘what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?’, I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end. Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point.] "Tranquillity," which is the meaning of "ataraxia" (literally, absence of disturbance) is an attribute of a life of pleasure, meaning that the pleasures of life are experienced without disturbance. As to the meaning of disturbance, "disturbance" is undesirable because it is painful, which means that "tranquility" is simply another way of saying "without pain" which is also the literal meaning of "aponia." This sentence as written therefore implies that the goal of life is something other than pleasure, which is not at all the case. The Epicurean goal can be understood very simply, and accurately, as a life of pleasure, with pleasure being widely understood as any type or combinations of feeling, both "mental" and "bodily" - any and all kinds of feeling - which are felt to be pleasurable rather than painful.

[7] "He advocated that people were best able to pursue philosophy by living a self-sufficient life surrounded by friends." This sentence is misleading because the goal of life for Epicurus was never "to pursue philosophy." The goal of life for Epicurus is to pursue pleasure, toward which philosophy is one of many tools that are helpful for the achievement of pleasurable living. Like "philosophy," "self-sufficiency" and "friends" are also characterized by Epicurus as important tools for living pleasurably. However Epicurus did not advocate the pursuit of any tool, even philosophy or friendship, as an end in itself, and he emphasized that because the goal of life is pleasure, each decision must be tested by the question posed in VS71: Every desire must be confronted by this question: What will happen to me if the object of my desire is accomplished, and what if it is not?

[8] It is true that Epicurus emphasized the importance of a proper understanding that we cease to exist at death, and that therefore there is no pain or pleasure, reward or punishment, in death. It is a significant overstatement to state that Epicurus held fear of death to be "the root of all human neurosis." Fear of death was not addressed in the first of the Epicurean ethical doctrines. The first Epicurean ethical doctrine was addressed to a proper understanding of "gods," and all Epicurean ethical doctrines were themselves preceded by Epicurean doctrines as to a proper understanding of nature (physics) and how to think (epistemology). Of the forty Epicurean Principle Doctrines, one (doctrine two) is addressed to the issue of fear of death.

[9] It is misleading in an initial summary to say that "the gods" exist without immediately explaining that Epicurean gods are not eternal, not omniscient, not omnipotent, did not create the universe, and are totally not supernatural. The attributes just stated are at least as significant, if not more significant, than the observation that Epicurean gods take no interest in and do not interfere in human affairs. An Epicurean is confident of the "non-intervention" position only because the Epicurean first understands the true nature of "the gods." Epicurus to Menoeceus: "First of all believe that god is a being immortal and blessed, even as the common idea of a god is engraved on men’s minds, and do not assign to him anything alien to his immortality or ill-suited to his blessedness: but believe about him everything that can uphold his blessedness and immortality. For gods there are, since the knowledge of them is by clear vision. But they are not such as the many believe them to be: for indeed they do not consistently represent them as they believe them to be. And the impious man is not he who popularly denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to the gods the beliefs of the many. For the statements of the many about the gods are not conceptions derived from sensation, but false suppositions, according to which the greatest misfortunes befall the wicked and the greatest blessings (the good) by the gift of the gods. For men being accustomed always to their own virtues welcome those like themselves, but regard all that is not of their nature as alien."

[10] This sentence is misleading because it is unclear on what is meant to "live ethically." Epicurus taught that the goal of life is to live pleasurably, and that whatever means are required to live pleasurably are appropriate, even if we consider them to be despicable or depraved. This means that the choice to take actions which are perceived by others to be painful to them must consider all consequences of our actions. If we inflict pain on others, we can expect to be the target of efforts to inflict pain on us in retribution, either by actions taken by those on whom we inflict pain, or by those in society who are entrusted with enforcing any laws that are violated. Ultimately, however, the test is one of whether the action practically leads to pleasurable living, not whether it violates some alleged absolute standard of ethical conduct: PD10. If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky, and death, and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires (and of pains), we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full, with pleasures from every source, and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life.

[11] This statement is seriously misleading. It is true that Epicurus held that the senses are of primary importance in the determination of those things which we hold to be true, but it is very overbroad to say that Epicurus held that "the senses are the only reliable source of knowledge about the world." The entire structure of Epicurean atomist physics is built on the foundation of "atoms" which cannot be seen, touched, tasted, heard, or smelled. The existence of atoms, and thereby the full sweep of Epicurean philosophy, is built on deductive reasoning applied to the evidence that we obtain through the senses. This issue is explained in full in Norman DeWitt's Chapter Eight. ["The criteria are three, but the prevailing custom is to reduce them to one by merging the Anticipations and Feelings with the Sensations. This error arises from classifying Epicurus as an empiricist, ascribing to him belief in the infallibility of sensation, and then employing this false assumption as a major premise."]

Yes I agree and I am ok of course with that interpretation. What I think as to be avoided is the implication that minimal amounts of food and water constitutes ALL anyone ever needs for a complete life. Epicurus himself did not live that way, and it would be ridiculous to assert that that was what he meant. But that is pretty much exactly the direction that significant numbers of writers seem to want to take the point, and that has to be guarded against.

Quote from Hiram

One of the possible things that comes to mind is that Epicurus has been cited as saying "I call you to constant pleasures", and that this line of reasoning is that passive and active pleasures both complete a lifestyle of constant pleasures. We can not be always active (or else we'd be exhausted) or constantly idle.

And yes, I am good with that too!

I was just reacting initially to your title of the thread, which appears to place this in the kinetic/katestematic opposition analysis, which per the cites stated here is very misleading and essentially unEpicurean. So taken out of that context, I don't have any problem at all with this last conclusion.

Taking that further, your analysis helps provide a good construction of VS11 which removes it as useful for the katastematic crowd, as long as people understand that background

So going back to this original statement, I agree that it "names a problem" but not one that is being addressed by "the kinetic/katastematic categories."

Quote from Hiram

I think VS 11 does seem to name a problem that is being addressed by the kinetic/katastematic categories of pleasures

As to those categories themselves, it's really hard for me to find a useful reason for Epicureans to refer to them (especially in intranslated Greek form), except to acknowledge that they were likely invented by pre-Epicurean enemies of pleasure of the good as an argument to undercut pleasure, for which Epicurus prepared an effective reply when he endorsed both and made clear that one does not have primacy over the other.

That's what I see in this statement from Diogenes Laertius - a medicinal response that innoculates against the false view that pleasures of "rest" are superior to pleasures of "action":

Epicurus differs from the Cyrenaics about pleasure. For they do not admit static pleasure, but only that which consists in motion. But Epicurus admits both kinds both in the soul and in the body, as he says in the work on Choice and Avoidance and in the book on The Ends of Life and in the first book On Lives and in the letter to his friends in Mytilene. Similarly, Diogenes in the 17th book of Miscellanies and Metrodorus in the Timocrates speak thus: ‘Pleasure can be thought of both as consisting in motion and as static.’ And Epicurus in the work on Choice speaks as follows: ‘Freedom from trouble in the mind and from pain in the body are static pleasures, but Joy and exultation are considered as active pleasures involving motion. '

And of course, to repeat Nikolsky's point, this is Diogenes Laertius, writing hundreds of years AFTER Epicurus, probably simply applying a rote formula which DL thought would be helpful to his readers of his own time, but which probably meant little more than a debating point to the Epicureans of Epicurus' time.

I think I want to really emphasize that last point, which is not mine but DeWitt's general argument. So much of Epicurus is really set of observations that innoculates the student against false ideas. Here, the innoculation is that once you realize that ALL pleasure is good, including both "active" and "resting" or any other categories you want to come up with, then you never get tempted to "Rank" those categories against each other, because you see that such categories are artificial and ultimately meaningless. Categorization like that is a trademark Aristotelian / Stoic / Platonic diversion, not something that is an inherent focus of Epicurean philosophy.

Even the "natural/necessary" distinction is ultimately nothing more than a rule of thumb and we don't have any significant examples of the Epicureans dwelling on it as as bright line test. Yes I know Torquatus praises it, and Epicurus cites it in the letter to Menoeceus, but if it were so critical there would be lots of examples of what activities fit in what categories, and there aren't such discussions -- for an obvious reason: context is king and what is "necessary" in one context is going to be absolutely "unnecessary" in another. The natural / necessary distinction is little more than a "rule of thumb" and as Torquatus explains, the principle behind the rule is nothing more than a call to evaluate how hard it is to achieve a particular pleasure in a particular context. And that in itself is nothing more than a call to examine the full consequences of any action action before you take it.

OK I am certainly fine, of course, to take whatever is good out of VS 11 and not construe it in any way other than consistent with Epicurus.

I construe it as pointing out that the majority of men, because they are lost in the darkness of false philosophy and false religion, mis-spend both their waking and their resting hours in ways that are other than pursuing pleasure. As for how to fix that, I see nothing really in VS 11 other than that observation. Of course even as a reminder of that observation, it is still very valuable, because it is consistent with many other observations in Epicurean philosophy, and is almost a directs statement from something out of any of several passages of Lucretius, which say approximately the same thing. The passages in Lucretius about "hearts in darkness" and the passage about the man who drives to his country estate as if to a fire, and then immediately back to his city house again, come to mind.

And I'm very glad we have it, even though we don't know who said it, for what purpose, in what context, or who recorded and preserved it in this list, or when or why. All of those observations about it are also true.

So how are you construing it?

Quote from Hiram

Why is this an established doctrine? Why would the Epicureans make this worthy of memorization?

Ok on this, point number one would be that we do not know that this was an "established doctrine" or that "The Epicureans made this worthy of memorization." This list is from the "Vatican Collection," the history of which is absolutely unknown as to who collected it or why. It is not in the list of the 40 Authorized Doctrines which would presumably be the list that people talk about as being memorized (also somewhat speculation). And to add to that, I've never seen any real documentation even of the Vatican list itself, in terms of where this original document now resides, what the Greek text was, etc. Hopefully it is out there somewhere but I've never been able to establish where -- maybe at some point we can find out and list that info here. But in the meantime, we really don't know who collected this list, what criteria they used, or why they collected it.

Quote from Hiram

The saying does not say or imply that abiding pleasures are "superior" to dynamic ones, or anything of that sort.

Yes I agree, this statement does not say that katastematic (the word I see used by the translators) pleasure is superior, so we must look to see if anyone of Epicurean credibility made that argument. That's where I see an absence of evidence.

Quote from Hiram

If this is being said by anyone, we should consider that a SEPARATE argument and put it in a thought bubble and address it separately, without losing the point being presented here, which is that there is a need to remedy both ethical problems.

The only people I am aware of who make such an argument, explicitly or implicitly, are those modern commentators (probably the majority of them) who are trying to bootstrap this to support the idea that "ataraxia" rather than "pleasure" is the goal of living. So to repeat I am not aware of any credible ancient Epicurean making that argument, which is the point made by Nikoslky and Gosling and Taylor in attacking that suggestion.

Quote from Hiram

I think VS 11 is pointing the finger at ailments / dis-eases that require medicin

Well yes ---- people who are engaged in stagnation or madness need to stop and do better - no doubt about that!

Quote from Hiram

"For most men rest is stagnation and activity is madness"? What teaching was being imparted? And WHY did this matter enough for our happiness that it needed to be included in the VS?

What teaching is being imparted? The observation that most men are hopelessly confused about how they should spend their time. Why was this statement preserved in the Vatican Sayings? Probably not much reason other than that it shows how radical Epicurus was in dismissing the lifestyles of so many people, because in pointing out the widespread nature of the error, he emphasizes that he has a better suggestion.

Quote from Hiram

The reason why this matters is that the doctrine is being offered here as an alternative to concrete ethical problems (boredom, stagnation, existential ennui, stress, madness, etc.).

Are you saying that some doctrine is being suggested here other than simply pointing out that most men waste both their free and their active time? Well if you are pointing to Epicurean philosophy as the therapy, then sure, but the issue of looking for a category of "resting pleasure" vs "active pleasure" is a prescription for undermining the entire philosophy, because pleasure is pleasure and the assertion that there is some intrinsic difference between the two types of pleasures is a direct road to Platonism, because such a distinction would require some authority higher than pleasure itself as a measure of choosing between the two. That's the entire point raised by Gosling and Taylor, Nikolsky, and Wenham in disputing that this category game has any Epicurean basis whatsoever.

But may the most important thing to observe here is that what you appear to be doing is looking to take this statement, isolated by someone whom we know not, nor for what purpose, to bootstrap an argument that katastematic pleasure is somehow the highest good of life. That is explicitly the argument of Okeefe and others who opine about "ataraxia" as if it is something different from pleasure.

So while I am not saying at all that VS11 is useless, I am pointing out that we have virtually no context for it. Without more context, it seems to me to make little sense to try to tease out of it support for a doctrine (katastematic pleasure as the true end) that would undermine the fundamental "unity of pleasure" ("Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good...")

Interesting question; here are my comments:

(1) For reference, the definitive disassembly of the katastematic/kinetic assertion is Boris Nikolsky's "Epicurus on Pleasure" (abstract below)

(2) I am not sure I really understand why you would take the phrase in the direction you are taking it: "VS 11 seems to be implying that philosophers should educate themselves to experience rest as pleasure rather than stagnation / ennui / boredom, and to experience action as pleasure rather than madness / stress."

Why not simply take it at face value? Which is something like "most people do not intelligently use either their periods of rest or their periods of activity in a way that maximizes their pleasure."

So maybe the way to pursue the question would be "In what way do the kinetic/katastematic categories relate to or help resolve the imprudent use of time?"

It seems to me that the main way in which the kinetic/katastematic distinction is used by those who promote them is to argue that "katastematic" (rest) pleasures are superior to pleasures of action. In fact the argument often goes so far as to allege that we should dispense entirely with pleasures of action, and that pleasures of action are only needed in order to bring about conditions satisfactory for the so-called "katastematic" pleasure. Those assertions seem to me to be both (1) incorrect, and (2) not at all what VS11 is saying, which is that most men would profit from more intelligent pursuit of BOTH action and rest.

So to restate that, if VS11 were intended as a statement of endorsement of the katastematic/kinetic distinction that some what to promote, it fails to promote that because it does not promote rest over action (it considers them equally).

It is probably presumable that Epicurus was aware that some philosophers were debating issues of rest and action long before his own time, as traced in the background given by Gosling & Taylor in their "Greeks on Pleasure." So in considering rest and action equally, if VS11 relates to the katastematic/kinetic distinction at all, it supports the argument of Nikolsky that the categories were largely irrelevant to Epicurus, and Epicurus never intended to promote one type of pleasure over the other. In fact, viewed that way, the most likely use of VS11 as written is to emphasize the equality of pleasures from rest and pleasures from action, not to promote pleasures of "rest" as superior.

In fact it's probably easier to construe this as an "attack on" or an "undermining of" the distinction than it is to use the reference in support of it. So from that point of view, maybe VS11 IS relevant to the katastematic/kinetic distinction.

And finally, asked another way, is there really any purpose in discussing katastematic/kinetic distinctions other than as a way to promote "pleasures of rest" as superior to any other kind? I really can't think of any other purpose behind the distinction, and that seems to be how it developed and how it is used both then and now. And since elevation of one type of pleasure as intrinsically superior to other types of pleasure would violate core Epicurean principles, I can see the possibility that the subject captured in VS11 came up in an Epicurean argument against that assertion (against the assertion of katastematic pleasure as intrinsically superior).

Welcome @Capri-Omni ! And thanks for joining us! When you get a chance, please tell us about yourself and your background in Epicurean philosophy.

It would be particularly helpful if you could tell us (1) how you found this forum, and (2) how much background reading you have done in Epicurus. As an aid in the latter, we have prepared the following list of core reading.

We look forward to talking with you!

----------------------- Epicurean Works I Have Read ---------------------------------

1 The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.

2 "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt

3 "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius

4 Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

5 Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

6 The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

7 "A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

8 Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus (3) Others?

9 Plato's Philebus

10 Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

11 "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.