Oscar I am am very interested in anything you would suggest!
Before I made the first set of suggestions I should have gone back and studied the format of the music, because now I am remembering that it seems many of the gifts were very short "five golden rings" (?) and I wasn't remembering accurately how the lines fit together to go with the flow.
If you are so inclined any ideas that you have would be welcome. I do think that using this a a memory device would be very useful.
This is a subject that has come up before and I will probably move this to the ethics subforum later. I see an issue here on the question of how we describe the sum of our experience at any one moment, in which I think there is an issues that (1) our experience at any one moment probably contains all sorts of feelings, mental and physical, but which obviously can't be focused on at one time, and how this relates to (2) pleasure and pain being distinct feelings that never blend together to form a third type of feeling.
This comes up today because I see a facebook comment from Mike Anyayahan and I composed this comment about it. I'll post it here as a general comment to see what people think about this:
Mike: I saw you posted this on your timeline: "Mental pleasure exists only when you have peace of mind. Peace of mind exists only when you have no more fears and worries. Fears and worries exist only if you are still wanting. You are still wanting only when you have no limit in what you want."
I think I see a thread of thought there which might be worth discussing -- the "only" part. I think it is correct Epicurean thought to point out that pleasure and pain are separate feelings and do not blend together. However it is probably also true that we experience many different types of feelings at different times, and even at the same time in different parts of our experience, so I would think it is possible to experience some feelings of mental pleasure while also having a concern that there are worries that need to be addressed (which I think is probably what peace of mind involves). So I would question the "only." Also, the last two sentences might be read to mean that wants should be extinguished, which I don't think would be a correct Epicurean statement.
And factually, it is probably not true that "you are still wanting only when you have no limit to what you want" is it? I am thinking there that the "limit to what you want" is a conceptual point of view that is highly useful for us to think about in debating the nature of pleasure. However as far as day to day life goes I think you can probably be a good Epicurean, acknowledging that pleasure has a limit (as discussed by PD3, Elayne, and elsewhere in this thread), and still feeling hungry when you have not eaten all day.
These comments are largely nitpicks but I think what you are writing is intended to be seen as a general statement of a "rule." So I am thinking that some of the points could probably be tightened up to be more accurate to the Epicurean viewpoint (which I am presuming is your goal there).
This reminds me that I am aware that Diskin Clay, to mention one commentator, came up with a different version of the twelve than did DeWiit. I will paste here the clips that i have on that and also upload the full article. Clay's version does not make the point stated by DeWitt in his number 4.
I have personally been disposed to reject Mr. Clay's version because he counts ten principles of physics, and then to round out the twelve ( a number I understand was referenced as a book title in Diogenes Laertius) he considers the first two of the PD's (about gods and death) to be the last two of the twelve. That does not sound convincing to me. I could see a stretched argument that PD1 might have some physics implication, but not PD2. This material will help in analysing the DeWitt material however.
Also, I remember some commentator somewhere saying that Clay's version was "more careful" than that of DeWitt. However as I read back over these I think Dewitt was probably correct in thinking that the twelve principles were very specifically related to the nature of the atoms, from which the more sweeping principles arise, but are not specifically stated as among the fundamentals themselves. It seems to me that Clay is mixing axioms (nothing comes into being or goes out of being) with conclusions (the universe is as it always was and will be). I think DeWitt is probably correct that all 12 would have been more like axioms than conclusions.
(On a personal note I should say I have a high regard for Diskin Clay because shortly after I starting studying Epicurus I wrote him a letter - maybe about 2011; obviously before he died - and he was gracious enough to write me a nice note in response, so I will always be appreciative of that.)
Here is the full article from which these two pages come:
Ok I did not remember this exactly as I find it now:
Footnote 8 is to Diogenes Laertius 10.40-41 which may not be of much help.
Thanks Oscar!
on this one -
"Atoms in a body can be more than one type" to "atom's types are plenty"
I was afraid I was already getting to far away from what appears to be the point:
PN 04 "Solid bodies are either compounds or simple."
I need to look back at the intent of that one, which seems to be separate and distinct from
PN 12 - "The number of the different shapes is not infinite, merely innumerable."
In other words, it may be that 4 is making such a different point than 12 that it might not be appropriate simply to say "there are lots of different types of atoms. Without going back to DeWitt as I type this, I seem to remember that he was thinking that it was important to Lucretius / Epicurus to note the existence of heaps of atoms of the same type, such as "pure gold" or anything else composed of a single element. Now offhand I can't think of what the significance of that would be, but I'll go back to dewitt and see what I can find, and also compare the letter to Herodotus and try to find the section in Lucretius that would involve this issue.
I definitely remember reading the part about why the atoms can't be infinite in shape - because we know that the shapes don't get large enough for us to observe a single atom -- eveything that rises to what we see (is this the meaning of the "shores of light phrase"?) can be split, so i think that's the observation that proves the rule that a single atom itself never rises to the size of being visible.
But following on our recent conversation about how Epicurus was intent on his anti-Platonism, there may be a reason why it would be important to note that a visible body may be composed of atoms of only a single type.
Anyone have any ideas?
Note: It's possible that DeWitt has this wrong, since his is a reconstruction, but again I need to check the text.....
OK Friends, this is both a promise and a threat. 
Unless I get some creative assistance with this, you are eventually going to hear me sing this, and I promise that would be painful. I am sure some of you can do much better, and have better suggestions for rewording / rephrasing, before we get to that point.
However, this is a starting point, based on Norman DeWitt's reconstruction of Epicurus Twelve Fundamentals of Nature. Of course the final product must be something that can be sung to "the twelve days of Christmas" keeping as close to the fundamental points made by Epicurus as possible. Obviously also in this project a singer would really have to be flexible in singing the words at a pace that would fit the music.
Here is my first effort. If I can get some help we will spread credit (or blame) around appropriately! ---->
On the first day of class Epicurus taught to me:
Nothing can be made from no-thing.
On the second day of class Epicurus taught to me:
No thing can be split to nothing, and
Nothing can be made from no-thing.
On the third day of class Epicurus taught to me:
Every thing is made of atoms and void,
No thing can be split to nothing, and
Nothing can be made from no-thing.
On the fourth day of class Epicurus taught to me:
Atoms in a body can be more than one type,
Every thing is made of atoms and void,
No thing can be split to nothing, and
Nothing can be made from no-thing.
On the fifth day of class Epicurus taught to me:
There's no limit to the number of atoms,
Atoms in a body can be more than one type,
Every thing is made of atoms and void,
No thing can be split to nothing, and
Nothing can be made from no-thing.
On the sixth day of class Epicurus taught to me:
There's no limit to the size of the void,
There's no limit to the number of atoms,
Atoms in a body can be more than one type,
Every thing is made of atoms and void,
No thing can be split to nothing, and
Nothing can be made from no-thing.
On the seventh day of class Epicurus taught to me:
The atoms are always in motion,
There's no limit to the size of the void,
There's no limit to the number of atoms,
Atoms in a body can be more than one type,
Every thing is made of atoms and void,
No thing can be split to nothing, and
Nothing can be made from no-thing.
On the eighth day of class Epicurus taught to me:
The speed of all the atoms is the same,
The atoms are always in motion,
There's no limit to the size of the void,
There's no limit to the number of atoms,
Atoms in a body can be more than one type,
Every thing is made of atoms and void,
No thing can be split to nothing, and
Nothing can be made from no-thing.
On the ninth day of class Epicurus taught to me:
The atoms move in lines and also bounce,
The speed of all the atoms is the same,
The atoms are always in motion,
There's no limit to the size of the void,
There's no limit to the number of atoms,
Atoms in a body can be more than one type,
Every thing is made of atoms and void,
No thing can be split to nothing, and
Nothing can be made from no-thing.
On the tenth day of class Epicurus taught to me:
Atoms can swerve at any point or time,
The atoms move in lines and also bounce,
The speed of all the atoms is the same,
The atoms are always in motion,
There's no limit to the size of the void,
There's no limit to the number of atoms,
Atoms in a body can be more than one type,
Every thing is made of atoms and void,
No thing can be split to nothing, and
Nothing can be made from no-thing.
On the eleventh day of class Epicurus taught to me:
Atoms have a weight a shape and size,
Atoms can swerve at any point or time,
The atoms move in lines and also bounce,
The speed of all the atoms is the same,
The atoms are always in motion,
There's no limit to the size of the void,
There's no limit to the number of atoms,
Atoms in a body can be more than one type,
Every thing is made of atoms and void,
No thing can be split to nothing, and
Nothing can be made from no-thing.
On the twelfth day of class Epicurus taught to me:
The atom shapes are not numbered nor in-fi-nite,
Atoms have a weight a shape and size,
Atoms can swerve at any point or time,
The atoms move in lines and also bounce,
The speed of all the atoms is the same,
The atoms are always in motion,
There's no limit to the size of the void,
There's no limit to the number of atoms,
Atoms in a body can be more than one type,
Every thing is made of atoms and void,
No thing can be split to nothing, and
Nothing can be made from no-thing.
Can anyone offer assistance or suggestions?
(No, "forget the project" isn't acceptable, and won't save you in the end, because I intend to incorporate some form of this into eventual podcasting to go through these hugely important aspects of Epicurean philosophy.)
You got me going Oscar I have another example:
I also think that something that keeps rearing its head is that we are going to have to follow DeWitt's lead and pursue our understanding of Epicurus as a supreme anti-Platonist.
What I am referring to here is that although it seems clear that Epicurus himself detested logic games and the dialectical method, it seems clear that he decided that he needed to confront the Platonic arguments by developing responses that beat Plato at his own game -- using logic to show the shortcomings of logic. So even though he detested it, Epicurus engaged in logical warfare himself, and for better or worse much of what we have in the surviving texts in Epicurus' own hand was that part of his writing - where he was laying down the logical premises which Epicureans could study and learn and apply to defeat the logicians at their own game.
I think that is primarily what is involved in probably the most contentious issue facing us all - coming to an understanding of the "absence of pain" discussion in the letter to Menoeceus.
As you know I have come to the conclusion that this discussion is primarily aimed at the logical arguments against pleasure that were advanced in places like Plato's Philebus. Unfortunately the letter to Menoeceus is so short and gives so little background that this connection is not at all clear from the surviving text, and since we today are not immersed in logical arguments about "limits" and "purity" and "highest good" -- the normal person is going to interpret these passages without that context -- and without that context, taking the passages on their own in their current English translation forms -- then they can be read to be totally contradictory to much of the rest of the philosophy, for reasons we have discussed at length elsewhere.
So my point here is that what likely happened in the centuries after Epicurus is that the Epicureans were constantly confronted with logic game attacks by stoics and platonists, and it appears that some of them lost their nerve and attempted to compromise. Even today we face a powerful tendency to consider "logic" and "reason" to be unimpeachable references, from being taught to revere Mr. Spock and in 1000 other examples.
And the flip side is that we are taught to deprecate "feeling" / "emotion" as something to be suppressed and/or ignored and/or always to be distrusted.
So my point in this post is that even though I think we are clear that Epicurus' ultimate point is that "feeling" is the guide of life, we're still going to have to recognize that much that we have in the surviving texts constitutes "logic games" that were made necessary by the hostile environment in which the Epicureans (and we) live.
And that's huge part of the reconstruction battle that DeWitt trailblazed for us, but in which there still tremendous work to be done.
Something else that is probably clear because it come up regularly that bears repeating here.
I personally think that everyone should work to apply Epicurean principles to every aspect of their life, and that includes career, places to live, even politics.
And I think there is a time and place for that, for example my frequent example of citing Robert Hanrott. He has his application and he is stating it clearly.
My strategic concern is that in this forum, and in the projects that I am trying to invest most of my time in, I don't want to scare away anyone of any political persuasion by having them read something and think that Epicurean philosophy is left, right, center, or non-aligned. There's a time and a place for all of those, and I how those will develop and flower separately.
But I am really impressed with what DeWitt accomplished in making headway in recreating and explaining the core philosophy without getting into day to day divisive issues, and I think there's a lot more work to be done with that kind of approach. That's where I want to see Epicureanfriends.com and my other work go. Others will go in other directions regionally and by interest group, and at some point I may join in with some of that. But hot-button social issues create too much opportunity for misunderstanding.
It's kind of like Lucretius warning his readers not to dismiss the theory too quickly before understanding it. There will be plenty of time to disagree on applications after we understand the core points, but if we don't understand the core points first we'll never have a basis for getting off the ground in the first place.
Oscar:
You are right to see a major distinction in our approaches, but I think there may be more to it rather than taking a position on how much Epicurean philosophy might have changed over the centuries in the ancient world.
For example, when Charles says this:
However, given the history of the philosophy, it most definitely grew within the following centuries after his death, we see this with Lucretius and the elaboration of the idea of the Atomic Swerve (Clinamen),
(Caution: in this post I am talking exclusively about your question of Hiram's approach vs mine. I cite Charles only because he happened to make this comment here and it's a good example of the type question that sometimes arises. I have seen some people take the position that Lucretius was deviating from Epicurus in many major fundamental ways and that's not what Charles is asserting, but some scholars apparently do.)
I take the position that there is no good reason to think that Lucretius deviated from Epicurus at all, and that the swerve and all other detail in the poem are mostly and probably totally just detail from Epicurus' "On Nature" that we lost from not having Epicurus' own work. And given Lucretius's own statements about his "reverence" and fidelity to Epicurus, there's every reason to think that he did everything he could to remain closely on track.
Now I am not so sure that the same could be said about Philodemus, but again his texts are much more fragmentary and "reconstructed" than Lucretius, so I always give him the benefit of the doubt as well, and look first to translation / reconstruction issues before I conclude that Philodemus intentionally deviated.
In addition, I think that there is good evidence in Diogenes Laertius and Cicero that later Epicureans compromised with stoics and other attackers on at least (1) the nature of the origin of friendship and (2) whether the canon has three legs or four, which is related to the Epicurean position on logic and reason.
I believe Dewitt covers both of these, and I consider both deviations from Epicurus to have been major undermining of the philosophy and contributing to its downfall.
Now the point I want to be clear on is that no doubt there were SCIENTIFIC discoveries of "facts" that would lead to modification of the probabilities Epicurus selected, such as the size of the sun, but I see absolutely no reason to think that any new scientific discoveries to this very day undermine Epicurus' *approach* to science, and how to deal with questions that arise when we have less than desirable amounts of evidence.
The divergence that you see between Hiram and myself is I think largely the result of Hiram using sources which are fragmentary, not well vetted, and largely speculative, to modify positions that are well established in the core texts and by the physics. For example that CAN BE NO absolute justice, and anytime Hiram (or Catherine Wilson, or me, or anyone else) implies that all Epicurean would reach the same moral or ethical or justice positions, then we are deviating from the core of the philosophy. I am sure that I fail to be sufficiently on guard and that I occasionally slip. but I perceive that others (let's use Robert Hanrott's blog, for example) simply make no effort to keep to the core position that a certain set of political views are their own, and cannot be asserted as universal using Epicurean philosophy as justification.
So getting back to your original question as to seeing Epicurean philosophy as a "conversation among friends" --- as to the core philosophy I absolutely do not see it that way at all. Certainly there WILL be conversation among friends as to APPLICATION of the philosophy, but the core itself is relatively simple, relatively clear, and being a set of premises about the way nature works is no going to be expected to be the subject of revision. This aspect may well explain any issues that arise from Philodemus -- he may have been extemporizing on his own, or doing his best to extend Epicurean principles to new fields, but I would bet my life that in doing so he made the same point I am making here - that application varies by circumstance, and does not constitute a change in the core philosophy.
Give me evidence of a life after death or a supernatural god and I will be the first to convert to that religion -- but the foundation of the philosophy, which is not open to change, is that there is absolutely no reason to expect that to happen, and so there is no reason to "keep an open mind" toward assertions of that kind, and every reason to guard against compromise and thereby undermining the confidence that we want to have in order to live as happily as possible.
So in sum I see the difference between my approach and Hiram's as both substantive on the issue of staying true to the core (which is that there is no absolute ethics) and procedural (on the question of how to deal with unclear and fragmentary texts, which is the subject addressed in Elayne's recent post.
I am writing this fairly quickly so I may have to revise and extend if I have forgotten something obvious -- and it's really in THAT regard that I see the proper application of "conversation among friends." That's the way I see my discussions with Hiram, with whom I have worked cordially for a long time. We all make mistakes and have different viewpoints, can remain friends as long as we proceed in good faith, but that doesn't mean that after time and reflection and examination of the question that "any position we prefer" is an acceptable basis for goal of a particular group. That's where it makes sense to particularize the goal is writing so that everyone is clear and can decide whether they are in or out on any particular project.
We probably need a separate forum on theories about the mechanics of evolution. I will set one up and link here. This comes to my mind because there are no doubt lots of interesting theories on how far things go by "chance" combination until something else kicks in. For example a 1969 Dodge Charger, or a Great Pyrenees dog, doesnt just spring out of the ground by chance. Something happens at early stages without any guidance at all, and then at some point (in at least some parts of evolution) intelligent selection takes over. I am by no means up to date on all the various theories about how gradual things are, or how "leaps" take place, but I bet over time some people will want to post about things like that.
Edit: Well duh, that's exactly where we are, aren't we? I was thinking we were in one of Charles' threads on pas Epicureans but i see we are in exaclty the right place. Although, if someone expands to far on the mechanics of evolution, it would be a good idea to start a separate thread in this same forum.
I agree with at least one premise of Oscar's question, that labelling interpretations requires definitions. It really doesn't help anything to come up with categories that don't have an accepted definition without explaining what you mean them to be. In the Epicurean texts I am aware of, there is only a series of statements about the nature of gods. Any categories of "interpretations" are our own, at best, and don't have established definitions.
Welcome @Tapeinos Mathitis ! Thanks for joining us! When you get a chance, please tell us about yourself and your background in Epicurean philosophy.
It would be particularly helpful if you could tell us (1) how you found this forum, and (2) how much background reading you have done in Epicurus. As an aid in the latter, we have prepared the following list of core reading.
We look forward to talking with you!
----------------------- Epicurean Works I Have Read ---------------------------------
1 The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.
2 "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt
3 "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius
4 Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
5 Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
6 The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
7 "A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
8 Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus (3) Others?
9 Plato's Philebus
10 Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
11 "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.
Looks like Mother Jones pursuing the same idea as the New York times in March of 2019:
Silicon Valley, Big Tech, And Stoicism
Also:
Doesn't sound like the author really understands his subject -- this quote indicates that he basically approaches issues from a Platonist / idealist perspective, and he should probably be embracing Stoicism due to the idealism Stoicism actually represents (that is when Stoicism is not wallowing in its self-pity, acceptance of fate, and inaction):
In an era of massive inequality, it was only a matter of time before someone found a way to rebrand the oligarchs’ retreat from their social obligations as timeless, hard-edged virtue.
One last edit: after thinking further I bet the author more accurately could be pegged as following Cicero's critique of the Stoics in "On Ends" (which is a work that ought to make clear that Cicero was not a Stoic himself.)
For example from page 19 of "Epicurus and His Philosophy":
Mike: This point (about Epicurus rejecting Platonic ideals) is something that I rarely see raised in most general commentaries, because they are so fixated on making Epicurus out to be a stoic by pounding their version of "absence of pain" as the only thing they maintain is important about Epicurus.
On the other hand, DeWitt hits this anti-Platonism issue early and often in his book, which is why I recommend it to people so strongly. Had I not come across DeWitt's book and his explanation of the real and sweeping significance of Epicurus I would have spent the last ten years very differently, and this forum would not exist.
..and yet people who rely on the popular Catherine Wilson style commentaries will never even hear the name "Norman DeWitt" because he is effectively blacklisted in most all the modern academic articles and popular books.
and that deserves a: 
As I understood it, the primacy of existence only means that every essence is just an illusion.
Although "illusion" probably works, would it be also proper to say that "essence" is simply a construct of the human mind, and has no independent existence apart from being a human construction?
I think that is the position I sense Epicurus to be taking, and the position I view as correct -- whether or not the "Existentialists" would agree is another question I suppose.
Interesting comment from Wikipedia that Socrates was himself not impressed with "essentialism." My understanding of Aristotle echo's Dawkins comments - that Aristotle merely transferred the location of the ideal "essence" from the Plato's otherworldly realm of ideas into *this* world - postulating, for example, that there is an "essence" of yellow in all yellow things. And that this view is a major target of the portions of the Epicurean texts which attack the idea that qualities of objects arise from anything permanent within them. (This is also mentioned in Frances Wright's "A Few Days In Athens" as to color, if I recall.)
Elli is there not some controversy as to whether the Philodemus who wrote those love poems is the same person as the Philosopher? I presume they are the same person but it seems I have read that somewhere - maybe not. I do remember that one or more of the poems has some clear Epicurean references so presumably it's the same person.
But there seems to me to be a *lot* of uncertainty about the Philodemus material. It may appear that he was a less orthodox Epicurean than Lucretius, but my position would be that we just have to be very careful reaching broad conclusions from fragmentary reconstructed texts. So I guess my view is that I don't think I am ready to criticize Philodemus, but I am *very* skeptical of the fragmentary reconstructions, and I personally would never accept something that appears to deviate from a logical extension of a more reliable text. And what I mean is that I would not accept it as reliably established as being what Philodemus meant to convey.
And that's my real issue with so much of the Philodemus material that Hiram quotes -- it's just not based on as reliable a foundation as are the more established texts, so any apparent deviations are more likely to be the result of translator speculation or bias as it is from Philodemus himself. If Philodemus had a reputation in the ancient world for deviating from Epicurus in specific areas then that would give us more to go on, but if that exists I am not aware of it.
This Richard Dawkins article is what comes to mind lately when I hear the word "essence" used in a philosophic sense:
https://www.edge.org/response-detail/25366
Opening paragraph:
Essentialism
Essentialism—what I’ve called "the tyranny of the discontinuous mind"—stems from Plato, with his characteristically Greek geometer’s view of things. For Plato, a circle, or a right triangle, were ideal forms, definable mathematically but never realised in practice. A circle drawn in the sand was an imperfect approximation to the ideal Platonic circle hanging in some abstract space. That works for geometric shapes like circles, but essentialism has been applied to living things and Ernst Mayr blamed this for humanity’s late discovery of evolution—as late as the nineteenth century. If, like Aristotle, you treat all flesh-and-blood rabbits as imperfect approximations to an ideal Platonic rabbit, it won’t occur to you that rabbits might have evolved from a non-rabbit ancestor, and might evolve into a non-rabbit descendant. If you think, following the dictionary definition of essentialism, that the essence of rabbitness is "prior to" the existence of rabbits (whatever "prior to" might mean, and that’s a nonsense in itself) evolution is not an idea that will spring readily to your mind, and you may resist when somebody else suggests it.
In that last paragraph, "existence" is an easier word to grasp than "essence," with "essence" carrying a lot more controversial implication, I would expect, as in some contexts I gather "essence" is comparable to a platonic form, which Epicurus would/did reject. I gather that there is an Aristotelian sense of "essence" that Epicurus also rejected.
