Posts by Cassius

Quote from melkor

essentially an Epicurean ought not plug oneself into this machine that promises pleasure,

I think Melkor's summary is correct, but in reading it I think it's important to understand that we are making presumptions about the pleasure machine scenario that are very important. Is it inherent in the scenario that the issue with the pleasure machine is lack of variety? (IE, that there are pleasures we would want that the pleasure machine would not provide?)

If we presume that that is the case, then yes an Epicurean would not choose the pleasure machine.

However I do think we need to be careful to state that detail of reasoning, because if we agree that pleasure is at least somewhat subjective, then it might well be acceptable for an Epicurean to decide that the pleasures provided by the pleasure machine would provide him a better life than some other alternative, and choose the machine.

Stated differently, "if" we found that we derived great pleasure from staring at a candle, and "if" we could postulate that we had circumstances which allowed us to sustain that pleasure indefinitely, would Epicurus say that Nature requires or guides us to reject that option?

Remember PD10: "10. If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky, and death, and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires (and of pains), we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full, with pleasures from every source, and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life."

It seems to me that this is a reminder that our problem with being a worm or staring at a candle is not that being a scientist or an astronaut or a great artist provides "intrinsically" superior or more intense pleasure that is choiceworthy for everyone because of its superiority or intensity. It seems to me that as a practical matter, and from the "point of view of Nature," staring at a candle is not a human-sustainable lifestyle, while pursuing a career as a great artist or astronaut or scientist is or can be both intensely enjoyable and sustainable. So while I don't think we can say that the candle-starer is "objectively" wrong to pursue a life of that kind of pleasure, at least for myself I can and do state emphatically that a life of five years of being an astronaut is something I would choose over 50 years of staring at a candle.

But to repeat one more time, "IF" we stipulate that the person staring at a candle is indeed experiencing pleasure, then we may not personally be impressed, but there's still no god or realm of platonic forms justifying us in saying "that person isn't living right."

Quote from melkor

the resource for learning Tolkienian linguistics

Hey, that's what we're here for - Tolkienian linguistics!

This is the "Welcome" thread for Melkor so feel free to turn it into whatever you like!

Probably one thing it is definitely turning into is "How to pick your user name so you get the most enthusiastic welcome!"

Or a "Treasure hunt!"

Quote from Eugenios

Honestly, I interpreted "the best life (possible)" as simply an Epicurean one, one that applies the philosophy taught by Epicurus. That's the way to achieve "the best" of possible ways of living a human life.

Yes, no doubt that's the first part of the answer, then comes the harder part!

I will also go ahead and give my tentative answer to "how much time do we need to live the best life?"

Consistent with my comments in the last post I don't think that this question as a definite "objective" answer either. I do not think that Nature has established an set of definitions to which we can look for the "best life," but rather given Pleasure/feeling as a guide to do the best with which each individual is able to do.

I think it is pretty clear that it is more desirable in general to live a longer pleasurable life than a shorter pleasurable life, but since pleasure is inherently subjective (again, there is that issue) then there is no "objective" measure of "how much time do we need to live so that our life is complete."

So my general framework is to question whether these "matter of fact questions" such as "What is the best life?" " What is the complete life?" What is "the good?" would be something in which Epicurus would engage discussion without first laying the groundwork as to the limits of the usefulness of the discussion.

I don't mean my question to be a trick one, so I will go ahead and say that I think that the question "What is the best life?" may not be a valid question, in that the term "best life" is probably like the term "the good" in at least several respects:

(1) that whatever conceptual definition we give to it is inherently going to fall short of describing reality, just like math doesn't give a full description of reality, for which reason Epicurus was so suspicious of abstract logic,

and

(2) If we presume (we should not presume, this needs to be nailed down) that feeling (including Pleasure) is, at least within limits natural to a species, something that is inherently subjective, then "the best life" (which surely in Epicurean terms is also defined in terms of pleasure) is also going to be something that Epicurus would have viewed as inherently subjective.

So the term "best life" is going to have lots of aspects to consider before it can even be clearly discussed.

Quote from JJElbert

Banks kept a journal, and in one entry he records that a dinner guest was given the name of Epicurus on account of his enormous appetite.

That's certainly interesting though. So are you saying that this is a record of events in Bligh's ship, or in his presence, in which someone was given the name Epicurus? At least it indicates that he knew who Epicurus was.

Eugenios I think when this passage is discussed comments are often made to the effect that this passage means that a life of pleasure which is within reach of us is not inferior (at least, not necessarily inferior) to a life in which time is unlimited.

I think also this is one of those occasions when we have to be very careful about the meaning of the word "limit."

So when you say this I think you are precisely correct:

Quote from Eugenios

Pleasure remains pleasure, but, if we were ruled entirely by our σαρξ we would feel we deserve - indeed, are due! - infinite pleasure which entails the requirement that we need infinite time and must therefore see death as an evil.

But in this next sentence I think some people are going to think we are avoiding the real issue, and interpret it in ways that would vary widely (what is the BEST life?) and so additional clarity would be desirable.

Quote from Eugenios

However, our διάνοια allows us to make choices and rejections based on a goal of leading both the complete and the best life right here and right now.

What would you say to the question:

"Ok, I understand that you are telling me that I don't need to live an infinite time to live the best life. What are you telling me about how much time DO I need, and how am I to spend that time in order to reach that best life?"

I think that's good critical thinking, Samj. However there are so many variables that it's hard to say how determinative that would be.

One of the lines in the DeWitt book that has stuck with me the most was the opening (second line):

"At the very outset the reader should be prepared to think of him at one and the same time as the most revered and the most reviled of all founders of thought in the Graeco-Roman world."

I think that is still true today and was in Bligh's time too. It is dangerous to associate oneself publicly with the name Epicurus. At best Epicurus is considered an irresponsible partier by most people; at worst - if they know the truth - Epicurus is considered to be strongly anti-religious and to be condemned by any standard moralist or Christian.

Thus for example with Jefferson - were it not for his private letters, we would not have much way of guessing that he was explicitly a fan of Epicurus.

So while the presence of documented connections to Epicurus is the best possible evidence, I don't think we can be surprised that many people are going to keep their personal affection for Epicurus private.

I agree Joshua. This guy looks to me more like someone I want on my side in a fight, or don't want to meet in a dark alley. Could still be Epicurus though - If I were an artist I would prefer to depict him in his prime rather than elderly-looking, so that might explain this version.

Also, it seems to me that Marcus Aurelius is usually portrayed with actual "curls" rather than just wavy hair. This figure we are talking about comes pretty close to that, but I don't think the face and neck structure really looks like Aurelius.

1 - Never seen this one -- the person has significantly longer hair than Epicurus is generally portrayed: https://www.worthpoint.com/worthopedia/19…ouros-154876705

2 - Yes this one of Aurelius does remind me much more of the Bligh ring - http://www.thejewelleryeditor.com/images/the-top…-eventually-se/

3 - I can't shake the idea that this ring looks "stockier" and therefore in my mind more "vigorous" than Epicurus or a philosopher is generally portrayed, which is why I thought of Hercules, but don't know that Hercules was on any rings. Just seems to me given Joshua's notes that Bligh probably was more into military leaders or fighters than Epicurus, but very hard to say.

4 - As to this sentence "All this isn't to say that the museum doesn't know for a fact that the ring is Epicurus. They may very well have proof or more provenance that I haven't found." -- I see that the card says "thought to be" so that may be more of a hedge than is apparent.

Wow and I just got finished praising Eugenios' research, and now this! Very good thoughts all, Joshua.

Another name that flashed in my mind that MIGHT appeal to someone like Bligh was Hercules, but I am not sure how he is depicted. For some reason something about the appearance to me makes Aurelius seems less likely. Seems like I have heard of Hadrian rings - I wish we had access to an expert on Greek and Roman coins because that would probably help.

Eugenios you are clearly in another league in your research abilities - thank you! What is your view on the resemblance and whether that is intended to be Epicurus? I looked at it again and it still seems to me that the figure looks "stockier" than Epicurus is generally portrayed, but I am still on the fence. You?

I am pretty sure I at least glanced at "Upon the Gardens of Epicurus" and I remember not being particularly impressed. However that was in a phase when I was trying to identify and skim through material to organize for future readings, so I may have misread it -- would be happy to find that I did.

For some reason this calls to my mind how someone on facebook asked me if I had ever read "A Few Days In Athens." I thought at that point that I had identified most of the important material out there, so I was prepared to be disappointed once again, and then - pow - AFDIA turned out to be in my view phenomenally good.

I am sure there are many good works out there still to be identified.

Very interesting thank you! I wonder if others here think that is Epicurus. The neck seems a little thick, but it does give a pretty general sense of the other rings we have seen. Thank you!!!

To be sure I connect directly:

Quote from Eugenios

IF our "Choices and Rejections" make it possible for us to discern and decide which pleasures to choose and which pains to reject (and vice versa), is the "faculty" that *allows* us to make those choices and rejections (wisdom? prudence?) more important than the pleasures themselves? Or are the pleasures themselves (once they are chosen) that will lead to more pleasures the important part?

In other words: The Goal, the Telos, the Greatest Good is Pleasure; BUT the way to achieve the goal - the way to walk the path - is through the wisdom to make those choices and rejections. Pleasure = Goal; Wisdom (to make choices/rejections) = Instrumental Means... like Virtue is a Means to the Goal.

Have I answered my own question? Thoughts?

As to the faculty that allows us to make these choices and avoidances, that is likely to be considered in Epicurean terms to be the "canon of truth," which in its three legs INCLUDES pleasure itself as one of the legs (feeling) along with the five senses and the anticipations.

Thus "the wisdom to make those choices and rejections" becomes intelligent application of the canon of truth, where "intelligent" means that we apply the three legs properly after learning how they operate, including through images, and the study of the three legs themselves.

I think you've pretty much answered your own questions properly. Wisdom is just like virtue, a tool toward the goal, which is made necessary due to human nature being what it is, which requires us to act in certain ways to pursue pleasure and avoid pain successfully.

Good way of asking the question. Well I think in answering that we have to consider this PD:

16. In but few things chance hinders a wise man, but the greatest and most important matters, reason has ordained, and throughout the whole period of life does and will ordain.

And as I understand it there are multiple / many references in Lucretius to "true reason."

So we are in no way at war with "reason" -- we are at war with TYPES of reason, and/or versions of abstract logic, which deprecate connections to the senses by saying that their results cannot be tested by the senses, or which are "true" despite what the senses can ever confirm. (And when we say senses we are also talking about observations of consequences, like wind against our skin, that we can observe either directly or with instruments, even though we cannot observe the thing itself.

So I think Epicurus makes clear that reason of a certain type is critical -- would that not be prudence too? And of course this is why DeWitt goes on and on about how ridiculous it is to consider Epicurus to be a strict empiricist, when so much of his philosophy is based on DEDUCTIVE reasoning.

The best extended discussion of this argument is probably the Torquatus dialogue, but we can never forget this too from Book Four:

(1743 version):

Many more things of this kind we observe and wonder at, which attempt to overthrow the certainty of our senses, but to no purpose - for things of this sort generally deceive us upon account of the judgment of the mind which we apply to them, and so we conclude we see things which we really do not; for nothing is more difficult than to distinguish things clear and plain from such as are doubtful, to which the mind is ready to add its assent, as it is inclined to believe everything imparted by the senses.

Lastly, if anyone thinks that he knows nothing, he cannot be sure that he knows this, when he confesses that he knows nothing at all. I shall avoid disputing with such a trifler, who perverts all things, and like a tumbler with his head prone to the earth, can go no otherwise than backwards.

And yet allow that he knows this, I would ask (since he had nothing before, to lead him into such a knowledge) from whence he had the notion what it was to know, or not to know; what was it that gave him an idea of Truth or Falsehood, and what taught him to distinguish between doubt and certainty?

You will find that knowledge of truth is originally derived from the senses, nor can the senses be contradicted, for whatever is able by the evidence of an opposite truth to convince the senses of falsehood, must be something of greater certainty than they. But what can deserve greater credit than the senses require from us? Will reason, derived from erring sense, claim the privilege to contradict it? Reason – that depends wholly upon the senses,which unless you allow to be true, all reason must be false. Can the ears correct the eyes? Or the touch the ears? Or will taste confute the touch? Or shall the nose or eyes convince the rest?

This, I think, cannot be, for every sense has a separate faculty of its own, each has its distinct powers; and therefore an object, soft or hard, hot or cold, must necessarily be distinguished as soft or hard, hot or cold, by one sense separately, that is, the touch. It is the sole province of another, the sight, to perceive the colors of things, and the several properties that belong to them. The taste has a distinct office. Odors particularly affect the smell, and sound the ears. And therefore it cannot be that one sense should correct another, nor can the same sense correct itself, since an equal credit ought to be given to each; and therefore whatever the senses at any time discover to us must be certain.

And though reason is not able to assign a cause why an object that is really four-square when near, should appear round when seen at a distance; yet, if we cannot explain this difficulty, it is better to give any solution, even a false one, than to deliver up all Certainty out of our power, to break in upon our first principle of belief, and tear up all foundations upon which our life and security depend. For not only all reason must be overthrown, but life itself must be immediately extinguished, unless you give credit to your senses. These direct you to fly from a precipice and other evils of this sort which are to be avoided, and to pursue what tends to your security. All therefore is nothing more than an empty parade of words that can be offered against the certainty of sense.

Lastly, as in a building, if the principle rule of the artificer be not true, if his line be not exact, or his level bear in to the least to either side, every thing must needs be wrong and crooked, the whole fabric must be ill-shaped, declining, hanging over, leaning and irregular, so that some parts will seem ready to fall and tumble down, because the whole was at first disordered by false principles. So the reason of things must of necessity be wrong and false which is founded upon a false representation of the senses.

I am sorry we haven't gotten more discussion on it, but we've been otherwise occupied I am afraid. I am hoping that one day soon we can prevail on Elli to do a media version of this or one of her other articles so we can hear her voice at least as we consider what she has to say