Posts by Cassius

I do not think this is a correct interpretation of what Epicurus was getting at here, and as an example, I would cite Hiram's picture of the dove being eaten by the Hawk. Sometimes struggle IS necessary, and that's obvious, and it's obvious that Epicurus would have understood that too, so an extreme application of this cannot have been his intent.

The picture Hiram posted of a scene he saw in Chicago:

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Just for the record this is what I posted about that picture:

I saw this post from Hiram about him coming across a hawk eating a dove, and think it has a great Epicurean message. Anyone familiar with Lucretius knows that there are many references to the dangers posed from wild animals, and that we need to take appropriate steps to avoid those dangers. Despite our representation of doves as symbols of peace, Nature doesn't allow doves to live continually unmolested from danger, and Nature doesn't allow us to exist perpetually in Stoic-like continual meditation, confident that mind control techniques alone can secure our happiness. Intelligent action of all kinds is required to live a successful Epicurean life.

Lucretius Book 5: "But if you think that the deeds of Hercules excel this, you will be carried still further adrift from true reasoning. For what harm to us now were the great gaping jaws of the old Nemean lion and the bristling boar of Arcadia? Or what could the bull of Crete do, or the curse of Lerna, the hydra with its pallisade of poisonous snakes? what the triple-breasted might of threefold Geryon? [How could those birds] have done us such great hurt, who dwelt in the Stymphalian [fen], or the horses of Diomede the Thracian, breathing fire from their nostrils near the coasts of the Bistones and Ismara? Or the guardian of the glowing golden apples of Hesperus’s daughters, the dragon, fierce, with fiery glance, with his vast body twined around the tree-trunk, yea, what harm could he have done beside the Atlantic shore and the grim tracts of ocean, where none of us draws near nor barbarian dares to venture? And all other monsters of this sort which were destroyed, had they not been vanquished, what hurt, pray, could they have done alive? Not a jot, I trow: the earth even now teems in such abundance with wild beasts, and is filled with trembling terrors throughout forests and mighty mountains and deep woods; but for the most part we have power to shun those spots."

Lucretius Book 6: ... He taught what misfortunes commonly attend human life, whether they flow from the laws of nature or from chance, whether from necessity or by accident; and by what means we are to oppose those evils, and strive against them.

And thus enters her Utilitarianism, which has no justification in Epicurean texts:

This is probably accurate, because Wilson's vision of Epicureanism IS largely Buddhism!

See this IMMEDIATELY reminds me of why I find Nussbaum so objectionable. What I commented on above is EXACTLY what she is doing - playing God:

Quote from Hiram

that people can not be trusted with moral relativism. I’m not sure where I stand with that.

I still haven't read the article but if it says that, Hiram, I think we have to end up with Joshua. From a philosophical perspective I think we are first trying to be right / accurate, and only after that consider what pleases us personally. The idea that it is up to us to "trust the people," as if we have right to decide for them what is correct, jumps out at me as a major problem.

Of course we aren't going to always like what the people decide, and so we have to take steps to defend ourselves / take precautions against that, but if we start off by not accepting the truth of whatever is true then we can hardly have any credibility on anything else.

Thanks for posting that Hiram! I haven't read the article yet - going there now. As to this:

Quote from JJElbert

No, I'm afraid we must have recourse to the only certain end, which is pleasure;

I think that is completely correct.

What that formulation always causes me to ask myself is this: Is what we are really saying that "the only certain standard is feeling" -- and is that not the case because ultimately we are saying that abstractions are abstractions, but the ultimate thing that is real to us is "sensation" (feeling)?

I think that is probably the ultimate implication, but we have so few texts left, and so much bad thinking to unlearn, that it helps to talk about it.

Or to ask that question another way, are not these guys who extol "Ataraxia" as the ultimate life essentially ruling out (and looking down on) the choice to be an astronaut as a career? Or really, pursuing any hobby or lifestyle or choice that entails significant risk? I think that's the logical conclusion demanded by their train of thought, and I can't imagine that Epicurus would have agreed with that. The whole train of thought seems to me like a negligent (or more likely intentional) bastardization of what Epicurus taught.

Happy 20th to you guys too! Hiram at some point I'll probably move the posts in this thread about the Tsouna essay and make another thread under the Anticipations subforum so we can find these posts in the future. This essay is in important one that we'll keep coming back to.

Also: (1) We have a series of prior posts on the Tsouna essay which can be found here: The Anticipations There's a lot in that essay so it's difficult to summarize it without reading it in full - and as you noted it is long.

(2) I scanned your latest commentary on it that you wrote in this latest post, and I think I generally agree where you are coming from in your criticism and your conclusions. But to be even more clear, if I remember correctly, the controversy boils down to a difference of opinion between Tsouna and David Sedley, who she references in the article. I also seem to remember thinking that the real issue is also linked to whether to consider anticipations in any way "intuitive," which is the description DeWitt gives. There's a lot to unpack here and too much to cover without rereading the essay in detail. But DeWitt's warnings about converting anticipations into meaning nothing more than "concepts" are I think in line with your conclusions in your post. I am not comfortable that Tsouna shares that opinion, though, so I think readers need to be cautioned that her approach and analysis is likely in conflict with DeWitt and probably at least some of Sedley's work too.

And all this is related to the issue of whether there are FOUR criteria of truth, as Laertius says that "the Epicureans generally" (as opposed to Epicurus himself) held to be the case. I consider that to be probably the most dangerous aspect of all of this, and I agree with DeWitt that it is obvious why Epicurus held only three criteria, while the "other Epicureans" added the fourth. In order to eventually come up with a comprehensive view of anticipations I think those issues which DeWitt highlights need to be included in the analysis, and as I recall Tsouna fails to mention DeWitt or his views at all. (I need to check and will revise this if needed.)

Ok. Since that's a link to your own post, Hiram, I think we can presume that you agree with it. And with the title being "Happy Twentieth" that also gives us the subject. So in this case we'll waive the "no links only" rule, though even a short comment is always welcome.

Wow there is a lot of good stuff in that speech on exactly the point you say Nate! Now there is also a lot of "politics" that I think would be beyond the scope and interest our our Epicurean studies to explore, but you are very right to cite the key points that you did. I especially like this one:

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. So it is not surprising that some would have us stay where we are a little longer to rest, to wait. But [...] this [...] was not built by those who waited and rested and wished to look behind them [but] by those who moved forward - and so will space.

That seems to me to circle around the great debate we need to have in Epicurean phiosophy - whether life is ONLY about resting (as some advocate) or whether action (pleasurable action) is at least as important as rest. Both "rest" and "action" can be pleasurable, so we need both, but to imply that "action" is somehow non-Epicurean is the road back into the cave.

I haven't had a chance to watch this yet but thanks Nate! I will! Thanks!

Nate that is a very interesting point of reference. Do you have a place where you refer to that speech in writing, or do you watch it on youtube. If you have a preferred place to review it let me know as I would like to go back and check it out. Not sure I have heard anything but the shortest of quotes from it (is that where he said "before this decade is out.... put a man on the moon and return him safely to the earth...." ?

Here's another particular important passage that has always to me had a troublesome translation, from Book 4. Munro and Bailey seem fairly understandable, but awkward. Humphries (as we referenced before) seems to go over the top with his "idiotic" comment.

But maybe the most difficult of the phrasing is the reference to "false senses" at the end of the line. "False senses" or any phrase similar to that jumps out at me as a huge red flag of possible confusion. Once again it seems to me that the Daniel Browne translator feels the same concern I do, and his "false representation of the senses" gives us a limiting word that helps explain that it is not the senses that are false, but our conclusions based on them. And to me that is a HUGE point of clarification which even Munro, who I think is the considerably more sympathetic to Epicurus than Bailey or Humphries, fails to make. So my practice nowadays is to compare any translation that I find to any degree questionable against the Daniel Browne version.

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Munro:

And if reason shall be unable to explain away the cause why things which close at hand were square, at a distance looked round, it yet is better, if you are at a loss for the reason, to state erroneously the causes of each shape than to let slip from your grasp on any side things manifest and ruin the groundwork of belief and wrench up all the foundations on which rest life and existence. For not only would all reason give way, life itself would at once fall to the ground, unless you choose to trust the senses and shun precipices and all things else of this sort that are to be avoided, and to pursue the opposite things. All that host of words then be sure is quite unmeaning which has been drawn out in array against the senses. Once more, as in a building, if the rule first applied is wry, and the square is untrue and swerves from its straight lines, and if there is the slightest hitch in any part of the level, all the construction must be faulty, all must be wry, crooked, sloping, leaning forwards, leaning backwards, without symmetry, so that some parts seem ready to fall, others do fall, ruined all by the first erroneous measurements; so too all reason of things must needs prove to you distorted and false, which is founded on false senses.

Bailey:

Therefore, whatever they have perceived on each occasion, is true. And if reason is unable to unravel the cause, why those things which close at hand were square, are seen round from a distance, still it is better through lack of reasoning to be at fault in accounting for the causes of either shape, rather than to let things clear seen slip abroad from your grasp, and to assail the grounds of belief, and to pluck up the whole foundations on which life and existence rest. For not only would all reasoning fall away; life itself too would collapse straightway, unless you chose to trust the senses, and avoid headlong spots and all other things of this kind which must be shunned, and to make for what is opposite to these. Know, then, that all this is but an empty store of words, which has been drawn up and arrayed against the senses. Again, just as in a building, if the first ruler is awry, and if the square is wrong and out of the straight lines, if the level sags a whit in any place, it must needs be that the whole structure will be made faulty and crooked, all awry, bulging, leaning forwards or backwards, and out of harmony, so that some parts seem already to long to fall, or do fall, all betrayed by the first wrong measurements; even so then your reasoning of things must be awry and false, which all springs from false senses.

Humphries:
And if your reasoning faculties can find

No explanation why a thing looks square

When seen close up, and round when farther off,

Even so, it might be better for a man

Who lacks the power of reason, to give out

Some idiotic theory, than to drop

All hold of basic principles, break down

Every foundation, tear apart the frame

That holds our lives, our welfare. All is lost

Not only reason, but our very life,

Unless we have the courage and the nerve

To trust the senses,

If a building

Were planned by someone with a crooked ruler

Or an inaccurate square, or spirit-level

A little out of true, the edifice,

In consequence, would be a frightful mess,

Warped, wobbly, wish-wash, weak and wavering,

Waiting a welter of complete collapse -

So let your rule of reason never be

Distorted by the fallacies of sense

Lest all your logic prove a road to ruin.

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So here again I like Browne, which seems to me at least a little more clear:

And though reason is not able to assign a cause why an object that is really four-square when near, should appear round when seen at a distance; yet, if we cannot explain this difficulty, it is better to give any solution, even a false one, than to deliver up all Certainty out of our power, to break in upon our first principle of belief, and tear up all foundations upon which our life and security depend. For not only all reason must be overthrown, but life itself must be immediately extinguished, unless you give credit to your senses. These direct you to fly from a precipice and other evils of this sort which are to be avoided, and to pursue what tends to your security. All therefore is nothing more than an empty parade of words that can be offered against the certainty of sense.

Lastly, as in a building, if the principle rule of the artificer be not true, if his line be not exact, or his level bear in to the least to either side, every thing must needs be wrong and crooked, the whole fabric must be ill-shaped, declining, hanging over, leaning and irregular, so that some parts will seem ready to fall and tumble down, because the whole was at first disordered by false principles. So the reason of things must of necessity be wrong and false which is founded upon a false representation of the senses.

Quote from JJElbert

He explains the substitution of Superstition for religio in a footnote, but I don't think it adequate.

Yes I have that version too, and yes I have always thought that "superstition" was a copout.

I don't think i have ever read the Stallings version, and I don't think i have a copy. I've eventually come to the view that for me there's probably not a single "best" version, and what makes the most sense is to be sure to check a literal one (Martin Ferguson Smith, or Bailey, or Munro) and then compare the other editions to see which option seems most consistent with what seems to be the main thrust of the philosophy. I've grown particularly pleased with the 1734 "Daniel Brown" edition due to some of its editorial decisions.

For example this line has always bothered me from Book 2:

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Munro: "But if we see that these things are food for laughter and mere mockeries, and in good truth the fears of men and dogging cares dread not the clash of arms and cruel weapons, if unabashed they mix among kings and caesars and stand not in awe of the glitter from gold nor the brilliant sheen of the purple robe, how can you doubt that this is wholly the prerogative of reason, when the whole of life withal is a struggle in the dark?"

Bailey: "But if we see that these thoughts are mere mirth and mockery, and in very truth the fears of men and the cares that dog them fear not the clash of arms nor the weapons of war, but pass boldly among kings and lords of the world, nor dread the glitter that comes from gold nor the bright sheen of the purple robe, can you doubt that all such power belongs to reason alone, above all when the whole of life is but a struggle in darkness?

I have always been suspicious of those two on the grounds that I think Epicurus would have been very slow to praise "reason alone" given his views of the role of reason vs the senses. It might be explainable by concluding that Lucretius was referring to "true reason" in the sense of reason tied to the senses, but I think I recall reading that there are instances where he refers to "true reason" but this Latin doesn't include that modifer.

For that reason I prefer the Daniel Browne version:

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But if these things are vain and all grimace, and the truth is that nor the fears of men, nor following cares fly from the sound of alarms or cruel darts, but boldly force their way among the kings and mighty of the earth; nor do they homage pay to shining gold, nor the gay splendor of a purple robe. Do you doubt but all this stuff is want of sense, and all our life is groping in the dark?

I can't recall tonight that I have looked back to see what the Latin looks like, and I am not good enough at Latin to have a strong opinion, but the Daniel Browne translator seems to have my same concern and came up with wording that avoids implying that "logic" or "reason in the abstract" are the things to which to look for a final answer.

Yes Joshua we are going exactly in the same direction. Eating and drinking do produce life-sustaining results, and are at times (most times) pleasurable. But I think if we rigorously track down the WHY of everything we do, we always come back to "the feeling of pleasure" as the reward. Were it not ultimately for the feeling of pleasure, there would be no reason to do anything --- I doubt it is valid even to consider that without the feeling of pleasure we would be mechanisms or robots, because in order to exist I think it is implicit that those machines had intentional creators, the existence of which Epicurean physics would deny.

Although the opening of Lucretius can appear muddy due to the nature of "the gods" I think it's important and correct to lead off with a hymn to "pleasure" as the motivating force of all life.

Although it would be off course and a wide tangent to follow it now, I presume that given the eternal / infinite universe Epicurus would say that it is incorrect to talk about there ever being a "first" pleasure or a "first living thing" --- which I think makes for an interesting topic of conversation (maybe another thread) about the implications of that.

Do you have a copy of the Rolfe Humphries version in full? That's the first one that really hit home to me, as it is the one used in the Audible.com version.

As with all of them there are high spots and low spots, and I think the Humphries version sometimes plays too fast and loose with the meaning. One example that immediately comes to mind is that he made major changes to the famous line about evil being caused by religion which I didn't see any use in doing at all:

Munro: "So great the evils to which religion could prompt!"

Bailey: "Such evil deeds could religion prompt."

Browne: "such Scenes of villainy Religion could inspire!"

Humphries: "A mighty counselor, Religion stood With all that power for wickedness" <<<< That's just WEIRD!

Even the name of the book from "The Nature of Things" to "The Way Things Are" -

- I actually like that, and think it helps convey the intent, but wow that is some literary license!

I agree with all the comments and think that the basic thrust is a problem with definitions. We know what pleasure is because we feel it, but we don't know what "good" means because it is an abstraction. That means our definitions of "good" have to be very careful, and it may not be going too far to say that that was what Epicurus was warning against, and that "good" really has no "intrinsic" meaning at all. Does any abstraction have meaning other than what we say it means? But pleasure is not an abstraction - pleasure is a feeling which we don't require abstractions to perceive.