Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

And I think I see your perspective on those last points. So then which comes first: The realization that pleasure is worthy of pursuit? Or the realization that there's no afterlife and it's acceptable to then pursue pleasure in the here and now? Or do they arise together? Or do we build each up as on the "Canon, Physics, Ethics" tripod? If this, then that. This isn't a criticism of your points. I'm just working through how we arrive at answers to those questions you posed. This is why I think it's important to see Epicurus's context and thought process in opposing the Cyrenaics and what they disagreed with in his philosophy. How did we get where we are?

To address this specifically I would say this:

I don't think that we can understand the nature of pleasure without first having a basic understanding that the universe is natural and not supernatural, and I don't think we can understand that without a basic framework of knowledge in which we accept that it is correct to have confidence in certain conclusions, even though we will never have all of the detailed evidence we would like to have. Both of those concerns can be addressed with some basic Epicurean arguments as to the physics and to the senses and the role of reason. Once you are then clear that there is no possibility of a supernatural god or an absolute virtue, then it becomes clear that feeling (pleasure) is the appropriate guide of life. I think they all go hand in hand, with the best approach being what I gather Epicurus held about being clear and being quick to make the important points at first (rather than hiding the point like Socrates). Then the details are expanded in outline form to the extent that the individual person has time and inclination to pursue them.

Those are great points and questions Don.

You know what explains and motivates some of my most recent thinking, and these comments?

I always seem to come back in my mind to the concern that I think Epicurus intended his philosophy for pretty much EVERYONE who has any brainpower whatsoever. I think it's inherent in the "outline" model that he referred to explicitly that we ought to concentrate most of our time and effort on the "big picture" items that are the most significant to us as real people living real lives, and that we aren't just "academics" pursuing knowledge for the sake of knowledge.

That means that I think it's kind of a trap - a type that Cicero and other anti-Epicurean philosophers intentionally laid and set - for us to be so fascinated by the details that we fail to accept and apply the immediate issues of most profound significance. I enjoy it is as much as anybody else, but so long as we act like we are college students in an advanced philosophy class, the human world spins by outside the windows in total unawareness or even hostility toward what we are discussing inside. And we miss the experiences and the accomplishments that we ought to achieve were we fully engaged in the world.

Maybe I think that this is one of the real purposes of the academic viewpoint that wisdom or scholarship itself is the highest kind of life. Maybe I think that we're in a matrix of the sort that Marx accused religion of being - the "opiate of the people." Maybe the endless debates over word structures and points that are of less significance, and which are almost impossible to resolve, is the "opiate of the educated" which keeps US in our box and away from full engagement with the world.

So I always come back in the end to the idea that we should be asking "what are the most important points?" and "how do we convey these to other people who should be our friends?" and "how do we therefore begin again what the ancient Epicureans were in the process of doing before their world was overwhelmed with totalitarian monotheist religion?"

I think that discussing and debating the details that we are doing now is a critical part of the process, so we can in fact understand how to describe the major outline. But unless we find the time and the energy and the organization to do both at the same time, we're still trapped in that Platonic cave because we're not translating our findings into action. It's as if we are so mesmerized by "knowledge" or "science" - which are themselves "unlimited" and can never be fully achieved in a human lifetime, that we forget the fundamental point that we have to use our limited lifespans as productively as possible.

I suspect both the ancient Epicureans and the Cyreniacs would agree on that point, and that they would tell us something like:

"Look at the world around you! PUT ASIDE the details such as whether memories are pleasant for the time being. Your life is short, you are surrounded by people who are actively working to suppress you and your friends and your views of the universe and the true end of life. How do you expect to live pleasantly if you don't accept that reality and form a plan to deal with it? Just don't sit around thinking and debating about details - ACT on the main points -- like we did!"

Episode 23 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available:

Quote from Don

which suggests to me that DL was either positively inclined toward Epicurus or was at least not hostile

Right - I agree with that -- but positively inclined in a way that for example James Warren might be -- because he sees Epicurus through a lens of post and non-Epicurean thought, as perhaps the best of the group, but part of the group, and not as a revolutionary against the group.

Quote from Don

My impression had always been that DL is basically a compiler, pulling in anecdotes that interest him from disparate source

Right I agree with that too, but compiling by means of a framework of analysis that is not Epicurean, and therefore tends to distort what he is reporting. Again I point to the Nikolsky analysis of the "Division of Carneades" which appears to influence the active/static analysis. This isn't something that we would be free from ourselves - we have our sensitivities and our training today and we too look for things that we think ourselves to be most important, and tend to analyze that way. It's a natural issue.

I don't really disagree with most of the last paragraph either, except that I think in my own situation the answers to the questions I listed are of the most extreme practical importance to how to apply pleasure. If there is an afterlife, if there is a supernatural god, if there is absolute virtue, etc, then the game of pleasure totally changes. We would then look to those other factors to determine how we should evaluate and pursue pleasure, and probably reach totally different conclusions than we would under and Epicurean framework.

The more I read this Aristippus material, and our discussion of it, the more concerned I am about relying on the face value of Diogenes Laertius' interpretations.

Even if we are not seeing the result of DL forcing things into anachronistic / stoic-influenced boxes, as per the criticism in the Nikolosky article, to which they do not belong, I think there is a worse problem.

The fact that both the Cyreniacs and Epicurus identified pleasure rather than wisdom or virtue or holiness as the goal of life is the real point of overwhelming significance. It is the elephant in the room against which all other details fade almost into insignificance.

While the additional details are interesting for us to know, they should not be allowed to take our eye off the main focus and things that ought to always be the main focus. For example, what did the Cyreniacs hold about:

1 = is there an afterlife?

2 = is there a supernatural creator / ruler?

3 = is there an absolute virtue?

4 = what did they teach about the senses and the nature of "truth" and "knowledge" and platonic forms or essences?

5 = is the universe infinite and eternal, is the earth at the center of it, is there life elsewhere including higher beings?

Yes the goal of pleasure would be right up there near the top of this list, and the answers to some of these may exist still, but the answers to these questions will have at least as much practical impact on general view of life and ways to pursue pleasure as will issues such as whether memories are pleasurable.

Of course this is "the Greeks on Pleasure" so the focus is naturally on pleasure, but its still necessary to keep perspective and realize that anyone who dethrones virtue and reason and religion as the goal of life and replaces them with pleasure is already choosing for themselves probably the most critically important marker.

Quote from Godfrey

that he incorporated pleasure into the Canon and thereby made it a criterion rather than an abstraction.

Not only incorporated it, but by doing so gave it an elevated position that most people think should be occupied to "logic" and that seems to be only slightly less irritating to the academics than dethroning "god" is to the religionists!

It would be worth thinking about how "liberty" might be evaluated by Epicurus given his views on justice. I don't immediately have an Epicurean text reference but surely the Epicureans would have been aware of one of the most memorable Socratic passages on "liberty":

Nay,” replied Aristippus, “for my part I am no candidate for slavery; but there is, as I hold, a middle path in which I am fain to walk. That way leads neither through rule nor slavery, but through liberty, which is the royal road to happiness.”

which is followed by:

“Ah,” said Socrates, “if only that path can avoid the world as well as rule and slavery, there may be something in what you say. But, since you are in the world, if you intend neither to rule nor to be ruled, and do not choose to truckle to the rulers

— I think you must see that the stronger have a way of making the weaker rue their lot both in public and in private life, and treating them like slaves. You cannot be unaware that where some have sown and planted, others cut their corn and fell their trees, and in all manner of ways harass the weaker if they refuse to bow down, until they are persuaded to accept slavery as an escape from war with the stronger. So, too, in private life do not brave and mighty men enslave and plunder the cowardly and feeble folk?”

“Yes, but my plan for avoiding such treatment is this. I do not shut myself up in the four corners of a community, but am a stranger in every land.”

“A very cunning trick, that!” cried Socrates, “for ever since the death of Sinis and Sceiron and Procrustes¹ no one injures strangers! And yet nowadays those who take a hand in the affairs of their homeland pass laws to protect themselves from injury, get friends to help them over and above those whom nature has given them, encompass their cities with fortresses, get themselves weapons to ward off the workers of mischief; and besides all this seek to make allies in other lands; and in spite of all these precautions, they are still wronged.

But you, with none of these advantages, spend much time on the open road, where so many come to harm; and into whatever city you enter, you rank below all its citizens, and are one of those specially marked down for attack by intending wrongdoers; and yet, because you are a stranger, do you expect to escape injury? What gives you confidence? Is it that the cities by proclamation guarantee your safety in your coming and going? Or is it the thought that no master would find you worth having among his slaves? For who would care to have a man in his house who wants to do no work and has a weakness for high living?

[Note: this would probably be a good thread to let grow long and detailed, rather than splitting out the details such as our discussion on the Cyreniacs. The book is devoted to them all, so we can raise initial discussions about the chapters here, and then branch off to different threads or forums later as needed. This thread / book is probably the most comprehensive treatment of the whole subject of pleasure so this thread can be a long one.]

More comments:

9- "He laid down as the end the smooth motion resulting in sensation."

This is such a brief statement and I have to question whether there are subtleties that don't come through:

1. So "the end" is what is being discussed? Is this the same as the "highest good" or what Torquatus describes in "On Ends" as "We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else."
2. If so, where is the word "pleasure" in this formulation?
3. Why the word "sensation" rather than pleasure?
4. Is this a statement that pleasure IS a sensation, specifically the sensation of smooth motion?
5. Is this a way of getting around the problem of defining what specific pleasure is being discussed, which is a stumbling block in so many ways (ie, when people here "pleasure" they seem to immediately think of particular pleasures rather than the abstraction of "the feeling of pleasure" or "pleasure.")

10 - I come back to this passage as having profound implications: "They alsohold that there is a difference between "end" and"happiness." Our end is particular pleasure, whereas happiness is the sum total of all particular pleasures, in which are included both past and future pleasures."

11 - "Nor again do they admit that pleasure is derived from the memory or expectation of good, which was a doctrine of Epicurus. For they assert that the movement affecting the mind is exhausted in course of time." <<< Seems clear to me that there is more going on here than meets the eye!

12 - "Hence, although pleasure is in itself desirable, yet they hold that the things which are productive of certain

pleasures are often of a painful nature, the very opposite of pleasure; so that to accumulate the pleasures which are productive of happiness appears to them a most irksome business." << This seems to me like an uncharitable characterization. I also question the "of a painful nature" - A thing having a "nature" of pleasure?

13 -"They affirm that mental affections can be known, but not the objects from which they come; and

they abandoned the study of nature because of its apparent uncertainty, but fastened on logical inquiries because of their utility." <<< What do we know about the Cyreniacs and atomism? Were they essentially Platonists in physics? If so then that has huge implications.

14 -- "Further that the wiseman really exists." << This has got to be an example of something that was referring to an existing argument which makes no sense without the context.

15 - "They also disallow the claims of the senses, because they do not lead to accurate knowledge. Whatever appears rational should be done." << This does not sound promising at all.

Comments on The DL Book X:

1 - Hmm I do not know that I have read that discourse in Xenophon.... Looks to be here: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…1%3Asection%3D1 Edit: Yes I have read it because it leads to this memorable text on "liberty": "Liberty" - As discussed by Socrates and Aristippus

2 - There is so much "Wit" being reported that there's very little time for the "hard philosophy" - but he does get there in the end.

3 - "They laid down that there are two states, pleasure and pain, the former a smooth,the latter a rough motion, and that pleasure does not differ from pleasure nor is one pleasure more pleasant than another." << It's pretty much my view that this is EXACTLY what Epicurus taught and explains some of the issues about condensing and other aspects of pleasure. Which would have a lot of implications about how we discuss "measuring" pleasure. But still yet I don't think that means there is no difference whatsoever in being pleased with building a rocket to fly to the moon vs eating an ice cream cone.

4 - "However, the bodily pleasure which is the end is, according to Panaetius in his workOn the Sects, not the

settled pleasure following the removal of pains, or the sort of freedom from discomfort which Epicurus
accepts and maintains to be the end." << I do not and can not accept this as a complete and accurate statement of Epicurean doctrine, so this is an example of questioning how far we should go in accepting DL's view of anything.

5 - They also hold that there is a difference between "end" and "happiness." Our end is particular pleasure, whereas happiness is the sum total of all particular pleasures, in which are included both past and future pleasures." < That sounds to me 100% consistent with Epicurus and consistent with his care as to abstractions in the canon of truth.

6 "Particular pleasure is desirable for its own sake,whereas happiness is desirable not for its own sake but for the sake of particular pleasures." << Probably the same point as 5, profoundly important, and I think Epicurus agreed with it and this is why it is so dangerous to talk about "happiness" as the goal of life.

7 - "Pleasure is good even if it proceed from the most unseemly conduct, as Hippobotus says in his work

On the Sects." << Obviously true and consistent with Epicurus' position.

8 -"The removal of pain, however, which is put forward in Epicurus,seems to them not to be pleasure at all, any more than the absence of pleasure is pain. For both pleasure and pain they hold to consist in motion,whereas absence of plea sure like absence of pain is not motion, since painlessness is the condition of one who is, as it were, asleep." << I think this is another example of DL misinterpreting Epicurus and pulling a logical argument out of context. I think that in fact this is a correct statement of the general rule as understood by normal people, and that Epicurus in fact agreed with it. The issue is that Epicurus was willing to dive into the logical arguments of Plato et al and deal with them by means of other logical arguments, which logical arguments are by nature limited to their context and cannot be lifted from that context without misunderstanding them. In fact DL has already reported that the Cyreniacs held that "They laid down that there are two states, pleasure and pain, the former a smooth,the latter a rough motion..." Does that not compel the logical conclusion embraced by Epicurus, which is helpful in dealing with logical arguments against pleasure being the ultimate guide? In fact, since the Cyreniacs held that there are only two states of feeling, I bet Aristippus did the same thing if we had his full writings, and not just his quips. It may be that Aristippus had less patience with diving into the Platonic word games than had Epicurus, or just that it appears that way due to the texts that survive to us.

Wow there is lots more and I am out of time for now.

So I am thinking of this in terms of it being a "winner gets to write the history" problem.

Any advocate of pleasure has a legitimate and important question to answer in deciding how to weigh "time"
into the equation. Is it generally better for pleasure to be longer in time? Probably yes. Is it ALWAYS a requirement or a standard that the longest pleasure is the best pleasure? Probably no.

So the Cyreniacs point out that all we really have is the present, and that it makes sense to prioritize the present.

So Epicurus points out that we most of the time have a reasonable expectation of life over time, so it makes sense to focus on making sure our pleasant pleasures do not create future pain that offsets and "outweighs" our pleasant pleasures.

Both are legitimate positions that have an important role in debating specific logical issues in regard to pleasure, and they do not necessarily conflict with each other.

But because the anti-pleasure zealots won the competition and their textbooks survived, these points are pulled out of context and caricatured to make them appear to be the central thrust of their respective philosophies:

The Cyeniacs are ridiculed for ignoring future consequences of their actions in a way that is easily caricatured as an "eat drink and be merry for tomorrow we die" position which is probably not an accurate reflection of what they taught.

The Epicureans are ridiculed for taking a "simple pleasures are always better" approach that is easily caricatured as a "better a hundred years as a sheep than a day as a lion" position which is also probably not an accurate reflection of what they taught.

One thing I do assert as true as of my experience in having lived to June, 2020: There is absolutely nothing in world history that should be taken at face value. Virtually everything that is written or discussed "today" has been distorted and misrepresented to serve the interests of the "winners" in the competitions of the "past." So we have to work very hard to drill down if we are going to uncover the truth about what people in the past really thought, or people in the present really think.

1 - Thank you Godfrey!

2 - "Cyrenaics were radical hedonists, taking the pleasure of the moment to be more important than the pleasantest life."

I know this is the standard interpretation, and I have no textual evidence to dispute it, but this has always struck me as being something to be cautious about. On its face it seems so short-sighted that I can't imagine an intelligent person advocating it as it superficially appears. It's almost as if - even if this formulation is accurate - they must have had some other additional doctrine that explains why this formulation doesn't really mean exactly what it seems to us. Also, given the opposition that Epicurus encountered even during his own time, one would think that these guys must have encountered the same opposition (or worse) and perhaps we are missing their replies. Add to the what we see in our own time about the pressures to conform to majority viewpoints, and the absolute intensity of force of those who want to beat down any suggestion that "pleasure" can legitimately be

But I say all that not having studied the topic extensively, plus realizing that the texts are probably mostly lost.

Maybe it would be useful to think about how Epicurus might make a point himself that could seem similar. For example:

Maybe even the concept of a "pleasant life" is so much of an abstraction as to be misleading to talk about as a single concept, just like it can be hazardous to talk about a single "greatest good?" Doesn't the letter to Menoeceus itself state that we choose the life not that is longest, but which is most pleasant, so is it not hazardous to consider time to be a controlling element?

Maybe they were arguing that all we really have is "now" so we must include in the "now" all our calculations about the future?

There's no doubt in my mind that Epicurus improved on Cyreniac doctrine, but there's a lot of doubt in my mind about really how bad or inadequate thinkers they were.

New graphic for this occasion:

Poster Elsewhere:

I tend to doubt claims of self-refuting arguments because, like here, they seem more semantic than anything. For instance, I've read from a number of determinists who'd admit at once they're not responsible for reasoning correctly, nor any non-determinist reasoning (so they think) incorrectly. Even if they were inconsistent though that wouldn't show determinism is false, just that a person is determined to act in one way. If they're a determinist, they might be inconsistent, as determined by necessity. The fact that certain views can't be lived out easily doesn't tell you much about if they're right or not.

Cassius:

Yes MC but therein is exactly the point - it is necessary to examine the foundations of what we think are right and what we think is wrong, and in the end there is no one who has an ultimate absolute claim to authority. The self-refuting argument may ultimately "prove" nothing from an "objective" point of view, but that is because there IS no "objective" point of view. The "self-refuting" argument is 100% satisfactory to me for that reason - because it tells me that the advocate of the argument is a manipulator and liar, and that I want nothing to do with him. It would be my view that the best friends I will have in life will also live to the same standard. That is the only standard of proof that I can ultimately have, or ultimately that I need. There IS no higher standard of proof than our own canonical faculties (senses, anticipations, feelings). The advocate of a self-refuting argument is leading you to mistrust and put aside those faculties.

As to Joshua's comment I need to check but what I am remembering is that the commentators think that Memmius eventually part some part of what was either Epicurus' home or garden (I gather these were actually two locations) and was going to demolish it, and that some Epicureans wanted to intervene to persuade Memmius not to do this. So I am thinking that the commentators think that there is no evidence that Lucretius was successful to the extent that he was hoping to "convert" Memmius, and that there is very little known that can be said good about Memmius. But I am working from memory and that may not be correct.

Great points. I am now beginning to focus myself on the second part of my post about what Lucretius would have expected Memmius to understand him to be saying. Sounds like Lucretius is contemplating that Memmius would be somehow involved in the events, which is good evidence against the "live in a cave" viewpoint, but it certainly doesn't seem clear to me what Lucretius is suggesting that Memmius do or not do, or whether Lucretius is registering approval or disapproval. Since he is writing this apparently in hope of patronage from Memmius in the future, I would not expect his reference to mean disapproval, and of course I am always going to take the position that Lucretius means what he says and is not guilty of saying just what he might think that Memmius would want to hear. So I would think that Lucretius must have had something particular in mind that he would expect to register in Memmius's response to what he had written.

Interesting to consider:

(1) Is Lucretius appealing figuratively, or literally, to the goddess of pleasure to bring peace to his world?

(2) Is Lucretius also saying that it is true and appropriate BOTH that (a) his own mind cannot work on the poem unburdened by distress, AND (b) that Memmius cannot fail but to participate in the actions of his time?

This is the Bailey translation: https://archive.org/stream/onnatur…age/28/mode/2up

Just checking in - any new progress?

As we discuss the swerve there is much of interest in this Sedley article on Determinism:

During the podcast, Martin and I in particular discuss Sedley's contention as to when the swerve was developed in Epicurus' thinking (early or later) as referenced here:

File

Sedley: "Epicurus' Refutation of Determinism"

1983 Paper which is the one of the best treatments of Epicurus' view of the Free Will / Agency / Determinism issue available.

Cassius

June 3, 2020 at 8:40 AM

Welcome to Episode Twenty-Four of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

Before we start, here are three ground rules.

First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it, which may or may not agree with what you here about Epicurus at other places today.

Second: We aren't talking about Lucretius with the goal of promoting any modern political perspective. Epicurus must be understood on his own, and not in terms of competitive schools which may seem similar to Epicurus, but are fundamentally different and incompatible, such as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, and Marxism.

Third: The essential base of Epicurean philosophy is a fundamental view of the nature of the universe. When you read the words of Lucretius you will find that Epicurus did not teach the pursuit of virtue or of luxury or of simple living as ends in themselves, but rather the pursuit of pleasure. From this perspective it is feeling which is the guide to life, and not supernatural gods, idealism, or virtue ethics. And as important as anything else, Epicurus taught that there is no life after death, and that any happiness we will ever have must come in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Now let's join the discussion with today's text:

-------------------

Daniel Brown 1743 Edition:

But some object to this, fools as they are, and conceive that simple matter cannot of itself, without the assistance of the gods, act so agreeably to the advantage and convenience of mankind, as to change the seasons of the year, to produce the fruits, and do other things which Pleasure, the deity and great guide of life, persuades men to value and esteem. It could not induce us to propagate our race, by the blandishments of tender love, lest the species of mankind should be extinct, for whose sake they pretend the gods made all the beings of the world; but all conceits like these fall greatly from the dictates of true reason. For though I were entirely ignorant of the rise of things, yet from the very nature of the heavens, and the frame of many other bodies, I dare affirm and insist that the nature of the world was by no means created by the gods upon our account, it is so very faulty and imperfect; which, my Memmius, I shall fully explain. But now let us explain what remains to be said of motion.

And here, I think, is the proper place to prove to you that no being can be carried upwards or ascend by any innate virtue of its own, lest by observing the tendency of flame you should be led into a mistake. For flame, you know, is born upwards, as well when it begins to blaze as when it is increased by fuel; so the tender corn and lofty trees grow upwards. Nor when the flames aspire and reach the tops of houses, and catch the rafters and the beams with a fierce blaze, are you to suppose they do this by voluntary motion, and not compelled by force. 'Tis the same when the blood gushes from a vein, it spouts bounding upwards, and sprinkles all about the purple stream. Don't you observe likewise with what force the water throws up the beams and posts of wood? The more we plunge them in, and press them down with all our might, the more forcibly the stream spews them upwards, and sends them back; so that they rise and leap up at least half their thickness above the water.

And yet I think, we make no question that all things as they pass through empty void are carried naturally down below. So likewise the flame rises upwards, being forcibly pressed through the air, though its weight, by its natural gravity, endeavors to descend. Don't you see the nightly meteors of the sky flying aloft, and drawing after them long trains of flame, which way soever Nature yields a passage? Don't you see also the stars and fiery vapors fall downwards upon the Earth? The Sun too scatters from the tops of heaven his beams all round, and sows the fields with light: Its rays therefore are downward sent to us below. You see the lightning through opposing showers fly all about; the fires burst from clouds, now here now there engage, at length the burning vapor falls down upon the ground.

I desire you would attend closely upon this subject, and observe that bodies when they are carried downward through the void in a straight line, do at some time or other, but at no fixed and determinate time, and in some parts of the void likewise, but not in any one certain and determinate place of it, decline a little from the direct line by their own strength and power; so, nevertheless, that the direct motion can be said to be changed the least that can be imagined.

If the seeds did not decline in their descent, they would all fall downwards through the empty void, like drops of rain; there would be no blow, no stroke given by the seeds overtaking one another, and by consequence Nature could never have produced any thing.

But if any one should suppose that the heavier seeds, as they are carried by a swift motion through the void in a straight line, might overtake and fall from above upon the lighter, and so occasion those strokes which produce a genial motion by which things are formed, he is entirely out of the way, and wanders from the rule of true reason. Indeed, whatever falls downward through the water, or through the air, must necessarily have its speed hastened in proportion to its weight, and for this reason, because the body of water and the thin nature of the air cannot equally delay the progress of every thing that is to pass through it, but must be obliged to give way soonest to heavy bodies. But, on the contrary, mere empty space cannot oppose the passage of any thing in any manner, but must, as its nature requires, continue for ever to give way: Therefore all things must be carried with equal force through a void that cannot resist, though their several weights be unequal, so that the heavier bodies can never fall from above upon the lighter, nor occasion those blows which may change their motions, and by which all things are naturally produced.

It follows then that the seeds do every now and then decline a little from a direct line in their descent, though the least that can be imagined, lest we should think their motion were oblique, which the nature of things refutes. For we see this is plain and obvious, that bodies by their natural gravity do not obliquely descend, when they fall swiftly from above through a void, which you may discovery by your eyes. But that nothing declines in its descent ever so little from a direct line, who is so sharp-sighted as to distinguish?

Munro:

But some in opposition to this, ignorant of matter, believe that nature cannot without the providence of the gods, in such nice conformity to the ways of men, vary the seasons of the year and bring forth crops, ay and all the other things, which divine pleasure, the guide of life, prompts men to approach, escorting them in person and enticing them by her fondlings to continue their races through the arts of Venus, that mankind may not come to an end.Now when they suppose that the gods designed all things for the sake of men, they seem to me in all respects to have strayed most widely from true reason. For even if I did not know what first-beginnings are, yet this, judging by the very arrangements of heaven, I would venture to maintain, that the nature of the world has by no means been made for us by divine power: so great are the defects with which it stands encumbered. All which, Memmius, we will hereafter make clear to you: we will now go on to explain what remains to be told of motions.

Now methinks is the place herein to prove this point also, that no bodily thing can by its own power be borne upwards and travel upwards; that the bodies of flames may not in this manner lead you into error. For they are begotten with an upward tendency, and in the same direction receive increase, and goodly crops and trees grow upwards, though their weights, so far as in them is, all tend downwards. And when fires leap to the roofs of houses and with swift flame lick up rafters and beams, we are not to suppose that they do so spontaneously without a force pushing them up.Even thus blood discharged from our body spurts out and springs upon high and scatters gore about. See you not too with what force the liquid of water spits out logs and beams? The more deeply we have pushed them sheer down and have pressed them in, many of us together, with all our might and much painful effort, with the greater avidity it vomits them up and casts them forth, so that they rise and start out more than half their length.

And yet methinks we doubt not that these, so far as in them is, are all borne downwards through the empty void. In the same way flames also ought to be able, when squeezed out, to mount upward through the air, although their weights, so far as in them is, strive to draw them down. See you not too that the nightly meteors of heaven as they fly aloft draw after them long trails of flames in whatever direction nature has given them a passage? Do you not perceive stars and constellations fall to the earth? The sun also from the height of heaven sheds its heat on all sides and sows the fields with light; to the earth, therefore, as well, the sun’s heat tends. Lightnings also you see fly athwart the rains: now from this side now from that, fires burst from the clouds and rush about; the force of flame falls to the earth all round.

This point too, herein we wish you to apprehend: when bodies are borne downwards sheer through void by their own weights, at quite uncertain times and uncertain spots they push themselves a little from their course: you just and only just can call it a change of inclination.

If they were not used to swerve, they would all fall down, like drops of rain, through the deep void, and no clashing would have been begotten nor blow produced among the first beginnings: thus nature never would have produced aught. But if haply any one believes that heavier bodies, as they are carried more quickly sheer through space, can fall from above on the lighter and so beget blows able to produce begetting motions, he goes most widely astray from true reason. For whenever bodies fall through water and thin air, they must quicken their descents in proportion to their weights, because the body of water and subtle nature of air cannot retard everything in equal degree, but more readily give way, overpowered by the heavier: on the other hand empty void cannot offer resistance to anything in any direction at any time, but must, as its nature craves, continually give way; and for this reason all things must be moved and borne along with equal velocity though of unequal weights through the unresisting void.

Therefore heavier things will never be able to fall from above on lighter nor of themselves to beget blows sufficient to produce the varied motions by which nature carries on things. Wherefore again and again I say bodies must swerve a little; and an yet not more than the least possible; lest we be found to be imagining oblique motions and this the reality should refute.For this we see to be plain and evident, that weights, so far as in them is, cannot travel obliquely, when they fall from above, at least so far as you can perceive; but that nothing swerves in any case from the straight course, who is there that can perceive?

Bailey:

Yet a certain sect, against all this, ignorant [that the bodies] of matter [fly on of their own accord, unvanquished through the ages,] believe that nature cannot without the power of the gods, in ways so nicely tempered to the needs of men, change the seasons of the year, and create the crops, and all else besides, which divine pleasure wins men to approach, while she herself, the leader of life, leads on and entices them by the arts of Venus to renew their races, that the tribe of mankind may not perish. But when they suppose that the gods have appointed all things for the sake of men, they are seen in all things to fall exceeding far away from true reason. For however little I know what the first-beginnings of things are, yet this I would dare to affirm from the very workings of heaven, and to prove from many other things as well, that the nature of the world is by no means made by divine grace for us: so great are the flaws with which it stands beset. And this, Memmius, I will make clear to you hereafter. Now I will set forth what yet remains about the movements.

Now is the place, I trow, herein to prove this also to you, that no bodily thing can of its own force be carried upwards or move upwards; lest the bodies of flames give you the lie herein. For upwards indeed the smiling crops and trees are brought to birth, and take their increase, upwards too they grow, albeit all things of weight, as far as in them lies, are borne downwards. Nor when fires leap up to the roofs of houses, and with swift flame lick up beams and rafters, must we think that they do this of their own will, shot up without a driving force. Even as when blood shot out from our body spirts out leaping up on high, and scatters gore. Do you not see too with what force the moisture of water spews up beams and rafters? For the more we have pushed them straight down deep in the water, and with might and main have pressed them, striving with pain many together, the more eagerly does it spew them up and send them back, so that they rise more than half out of the water and leap up.

And yet we do not doubt, I trow, but that all these things, as far as in them lies, are borne downwards through the empty void. Just so, therefore, flames too must be able when squeezed out to press on upwards through the breezes of air, albeit their weights are fighting, as far as in them lies, to drag them downwards. And again, the nightly torches of the sky which fly on high, do you not see that they trail long tracts of flames behind towards whatever side nature has given them to travel? do you not descry stars and constellations falling to earth? The sun too from the height of heaven scatters its heat on every side, and sows the fields with his light; ’tis towards the earth then that the sun’s heat also tends. And you descry, too, thunderbolts flying crosswise through the rain; now from this side, now from that the fires burst from the clouds and rush together; the force of flame everywhere falls towards the earth.

Herein I would fain that you should learn this too, that when first-bodies are being carried downwards straight through the void by their own weight, at times quite undetermined and at undetermined spots they push a little from their path: yet only just so much as you could call a change of trend. But if they were not used to swerve, all things would fall downwards through the deep void like drops of rain, nor could collision come to be, nor a blow brought to pass for the first-beginnings: so nature would never have brought aught to being.

But if perchance any one believes that heavier bodies, because they are carried more quickly straight through the void, can fall from above on the lighter, and so bring about the blows which can give creative motions, he wanders far away from true reason. For all things that fall through the water and thin air, these things must needs quicken their fall in proportion to their weights, just because the body of water and the thin nature of air cannot check each thing equally, but give place more quickly when overcome by heavier bodies. But, on the other hand, the empty void cannot on any side, at any time, support anything, but rather, as its own nature desires, it continues to give place; wherefore all things must needs be borne on through the calm void, moving at equal rate with unequal weights.

The heavier will not then ever be able to fall on the lighter from above, nor of themselves bring about the blows, which make diverse the movements, by which nature carries things on. Wherefore, again and again, it must needs be that the first-bodies swerve a little; yet not more than the very least, lest we seem to be imagining a sideways movement, and the truth refute it. For this we see plain and evident, that bodies, as far as in them lies, cannot travel sideways, since they fall headlong from above, as far as you can descry. But that nothing at all swerves from the straight direction of its path, what sense is there which can descry?