Posts by Cassius

No one is saying that absence of pain or absence of disturbance are irrelevant. The issue is the clear, correct, and well-articulated identity of the goal of life to avoid confusion for those who study Epicurus:

I will start then in the manner approved by the author of the system himself, by settling what are the essence and qualities of the thing that is the object of our inquiry; not that I suppose you to be ignorant of it, but because this is the logical method of procedure. We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, pain the Chief Evil. This he sets out to prove as follows: Every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in it as the Chief Good, while it recoils from pain as the Chief Evil, and so far as possible avoids it. This it does as long as it remains unperverted, at the prompting of Nature's own unbiased and honest verdict.

So to be clear, Hiram, you agree that "pleasure," and not "ataraxia," is the goal of life articulated by Epicurus?

So Hiram, do you contend that "ataraxia" was the goal of life for Epicurus rather than pleasure?

Quote from Hiram

For the record, this is Cassius' view and is not shared by all. The sources that use ataraxia include Letter to Menoeceus:

There is no doubt that the term ataraxia is used occasionally and in certain contexts; that is not the issue. The issue is whether we should draw the conclusion that "ataraxia" is correctly identified as equivalent to a specific type of pleasure, or as a unique "highest pleasure," which I contend is not the case, nor do those cites establish that point. The goal of life stated over and over again by Epicurus and others is pleasure, not "ataraxia." Pleasure is the overriding ultimate term, ataraxia is a subordinate concept just like aponia.

This is true even in the letter to Menoeceus - all of these references here are to "pleasure," not to "ataraxia":

"And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good. And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided."

This is a stub to be rewritten into a long article. For the time being:

1. I am convinced that if a young person and/or someone who knows very little about Epicurus first reads DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy, then followed by Lucretius, Diogenes Laertius, DIogenes of Oinoanda, and the Epicurean sections of Cicero (Torquatus, Velleius), without reading any Wikipedia articles, books written after 1960, or Youtube videos, they would never become a "NeoEpicurean" in the first place. They would be grounded in Epicurean fundamentals and would never be tempted toward the Stoic / Eclectic / Neo-Epicurean approach.

For those however who have already been "corrupted" by the modern non-DeWitt academic consensus, and that includes probably 95% of the people who find their way to Epicurus because they are looking for "tranquility," there needs to be a path of study and rediscovery of what classical Epicurean philosophy was all about. That path would probably be something like this:

1. Read the Boris Nikolsky article "Epicurus on Pleasure" to see that there is a credible academic opinion which deviates from the "orthodoxy," and which holds that the katastematic/kinetic distinction is not Epicurean but a Stoic overlay.
2. Read the chapters devoted to Epicurus in the Gosling and Taylor book "The Greeks On Pleasure" to find a credible and thoroughly documented treatise which will explain in detail how Epicurus was focused on ordinary pleasure and not some ineffable "absence of pain" (which is essentially what is entailed in most "katastematic" arguments). (Note: the link is to only part of one chapter; the book is hard to find except in a library but well worth finding, because it traces the full history of philosophical debate about pleasure from the beginning of Greek philosophy up through Epicurus and slightly beyond. This is an excellent way of extending DeWitt's observation that Epicurus is essentially the ultimate anti-Platonism.)
3. Read the Wenham article "On Cicero's Interpretation of Katastematic Pleasure" for emphasis on how all goals of any significance to Epicurus must have been based on sensory experience (because absence of sensory experience is death).
4. These first three well-researched, well-documented, and academically-respectable sources ought to be sufficient to convince any fair-minded person, even in academia, that the academic consensus may be monolithic but ultimately is fatally flawed. With this new open-mindedness, it is then time to proceed back to DeWitt, who the academic reader would likely never have found previously, since he is effectively blacklisted in academia.
5. Now start at the beginning with DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy"and observe primarily how Epicurus was in rebellion against Platonism and Skepticism, and how these aspects - the erection of a logical argument derived from physics and canonics (epistemology) to identify and defend pleasure as the goal of life - are the true heart of the philosophy and the necessary prerequisite for understanding the ethics.
6. Then read Frances Wright's "A Few Days In Athens" and Thomas Jefferson's letters referencing Epicurus and Plato to see that some great past minds saw things much the same way (no obsession on "absence of pain" as the key to Epicurus).
7. Then go back into Lucretius and study the details of the analysis to see that as the Epicureans presented the philosophy to themselves, the key is physics, canonics, and pleasure as ordinarily understood, with no hint that "absence of pain" or "katastematic pleasure" is front and center in the philosophy, but rather how the methodology (a deductive process tied tightly to the observations made through the senses/feelings/anticipations) is the key to the entire structure.
8. From there I would include the warning to always be on the lookout and on guard against anyone who is shrinking back, or inventing reasons for, avoiding the word "pleasure." Unless the writer is embracing "pleasure" and defending it boldly, you can bet that the writer does not really either understand or endorse the Epicurean system, and that he or she is leading you down the path of NeoEpicureanism.

Someone at FB posted this link, which I don't recall seeing before: https://dailystoic.com/epicureanism-vs-stoicism/

Here are my major objections/issues with it on first reading. i quote the statement about Epicurus that I think needs clarification or is incorrect and then give my comment:

** They believed in thermodynamic entropy (it’s easier to destroy arrangements of atoms than for the arrangements to be made, thus the universe is ageing towards a state of complete disorganization). <<<< I don't believe this is correct from the texts. Yes decay takes place in parts of the universe, but in other parts the atoms are coming together, and this offsets the decay, so in total the different parts of the universe remain constantly cycling, not decaying overall.

** Pain and suffering were bad, happiness and fulfillment were good. <<< This may be true, but how in the world did he write that sentence without using the word PLEASURE? Using words like "fulfilment" is a typically Stoic way of avoiding the premise that Nature gives us the feeling of pleasure as the guide rather than abstraction like fulfilment, and that is why Epicurus talked about pleasure in general rather than using euphemisms or terms that are more narrow and indicative of a particular limited type of pleasure (e.g., '"fulfillment').

** It’s a certain medieval christian bias that led to the interpretation of Epicureanism as the pursuit of sensual pleasure. <<<< No, this is not true, because Epicurus DID advocate the pursuit of sensual pleasure. The inaccuracy is that he advocated the pursuit of ALL KINDS of pleasure, including mental / emotional, and not ONLY sensual.

** What is important is the Greek term Eudaimonia, which is often translated as happiness, but has little to do today with what we call happiness (the bubbly, pleasurable sensation that accompanies agreeable outcomes and events). Perhaps a better translation would be “Flourishing of life.” <<< This is misleading. Epicurus focused on PLEASURE as the guide of life. Eudaimonia and flourishing are terms associated with Aristotle and other Greeks, not the Epicurean perspective.

** Accordingly, the Epicureans advocated moderation in things, and a balanced, “agreeable” life that pursued the “higher pleasures” of fraternity, self improvement, and freedom from the fear of death, which they thought would result in the freedom of all fear. <<<< False in several respects. Again, "moderation" is Aristotle - there is no advocacy of "moderation" in Epicurus. In fact it is the opposite, pleasure is the goal, and it should be pursued with all the vigor possible, but that means prudently so that in fact the pleasure is maximized, not run amuk and creating needless pain. Also, there are no "higher" pleasures ranked by Epicurus. Friendship is one of the greatest tools for achieving pleasure, but it is given no "ranking" as superior kind of pleasure - nor is any other type of pleasure-- pleasure is pleasure.

**They saw anxiety as the great thorn in mankind’s side, and their philosophical project was to rid themselves of it. <<< Partially true but misleading. Anxiety is certainly to be diminished, as is all pain, but the focus is on achieving pleasure, and we will at times choose pain in order to achieve greater pleasure.

Well, we certainly can and should use reason to achieve pleasure, and we can take pleasure in our reasoning, but in fact pleasure itself IS irrational, is it not? And Epicurus' lowering of the "rank" of reason, and not including it in the canon of truth, is indication of the secondary place "reason" holds in the Epicurean estimation.

Found them! I have several and will post them here in this post as I find them:

Yes, in my sarcasm I am referring to Cicero stating that the philosophy of Epicurus is better suited to an animal than a human. That's a cite I don't recall to mind readily enough, but I will eventually find it and paste it here. Possibly from On Ends but perhaps Tusculan Disputations (or maybe even another work)

Maybe this ought to be in the music section, or even the section on Romantic love, but due to the title, and I think also to the "feeling" that the music conveys, I think it belongs equally here as an anthem to the topic:

Quote from Mike Anyayahan

And Epicurus wouldn't tell us to live with pleasure if only the removal of pain is the end.

I could not have said it better myself!

Quote from Mike Anyayahan

I agree. I don't believe in anything static as well.

And one reason that Epicurus himself wouldn't believe in anything static either is that one of the very first and most fundamental principles of his physics is that the atoms (and therefore everything, ultimately) is constantly in motion, and NOTHING is ever actually "static."

That's the kind of observation deriving from physics that I am convinced shows how the ancient Epicureans would never have accepted such an argument. They were grounded, like Lucretius, from the beginning in the study of nature, and of atomism, and thus once they were taught that nothing exists for long periods of time without resolving back into their originating atoms, which are constantly in motion, the idea that there was something important that could be "static" in the sense of unmoving and unchanging would simply be "inconceivable."

While, on the other hand, the notion of something as "static" perfectly fits the Platonic/Stoic notions of an unchanging "god" and his realm of "virtue" and similar ideals.

"Static" has "Stoic" written all over it

Yes I am convinced that is the main point Mike. I know we are hitting you with a lot of material in terms of the DeWitt book and now these other articles such as Nikolsky, and I presume you have a life outside this philosophy work, plus you have to worry about a volcano!

But over time I hope you will keep an eye on this particular issue. It's something we are going to face with every new person who comes down the road, because the mainline summaries of Epicurus are so focused on this point. It is the strategy they use to back up their argument that Epicurus was not REALLY a hedonist after all, because what he really advocated was this "fancy pleasure" which really isn't pleasure as ordinary people understand it at all.

DeWitt actually does not deal with it a lot, primarily i think because - since he was so systematic in approaching first through the physics and the epistemology - he wasn't sidetracked on something that would never occur to a "normal person" to be an issue. When you are grounded first in the natural order of things, that pleasure guides all life, as illustrated in the opening of Lucetius, the person of common understanding would never naturally go off into exploring some ineffable "nothingness" as a legitimate form of pleasure, and certainly not the "highest pleasure."

But the seeds of this argument were planted centuries ago, at least as far back as Cicero, and now it is the standard way used to explain what Epicurus was supposedly all about. The ancient Stoics and Epicureans didn't think that way, because they fought to the end, but the argument has gained a lot of steam in more recent centuries because Stoicism has achieved such a sweeping victory that people are afraid of emotion, afraid of pleasure, and do all they can to explain the viewpoint away. Such things are good enough to be the guide of all OTHER forms of life, but not humans -- no not humans! -- because we are the "rational animal" and we are "better" than that! (I am being sarcastic, of course)

It's probably worth pasting here the summary from the Nikolsky article:

Mike I will be interested in your comments if / when you are able to read the Nikolsky article, and the section of Gosling and Taylor on katestematic pleasure, and the Wenham article...

Quote from Mike Anyayahan

I am referring to static pleasure that is produced by the absence of pain.

... because i am not at all sure that such as think as this exists. If there is a change in state, as in removal of pain, then there is some action going on that explains the source of the pleasure. I do not believe that "absence of pain" alone is an activity, any more than "calmly" expresses an activity. As per the argument in these articles, especailly Wenham perhaps on this particular point, all pleasure comes through sensation, and absence of sensation is death. If you are sensing pleasure, you are sensing "something' -- even if your mind is merely contemplating, which you find enjoyable. The pleasure in that moment is from your mind contemplating, a positive action, not an "absence of" anything. i think it ends up being a non-sequitur, and essentially a sophisticated attack on the feeling of pleasure itself, to talk in terms of "absence of" as describing the positive experience of pleasure.

That's why this entire issue of katastematic pleasure is so important, and why Nikolsky and gosling and taylor and Wenham write to refute it. As Nikolsky state most explicitly, the entire issue of "static pleasure" was likely invented by a later stoic (Carneades) as part of their categorization obsession, and it seems to me very likely that Epicurus would have rejected the classification if he himself had been asked about it.

But this is a deep subject where you need to expose yourself to the arguments that are stated in much more detail in these articles than I can do. If you have the time, I recommend Nikolsky first, then the Gosling and Taylor article (by which Nikolsky was inspired to write his) then followed by Wenham.

The metaphor that makes the most sense to me is the filling of a vessel, for example with a liquid. You fill the tank of your car with gasoline, and in doing so the air is expelled. The maximum that the tank can hold is when all the air is expelled. This is the point of maximum gasoline, and minimum air. But the nature of the gasoline is not changed when it reaches the maximum point of being filled.

Thus so, a life of pleasure has reached its height when it is filled with the experience of ordinary pleasures, of whatever type, and when the experience of your life has no further component of pain.

But there is nothing magic about the expelling of the last ounce of pain. The dancing and eating and drinking and appreciation of art and thinking and friends etc is just the same at the point of maximum pleasure as it is all along the way in the course of being filled -- the only difference is at the point of maximum pleasure there is no longer any distraction whatsoever from pain or turbulence.

in Cicero's words, nothing is better than a life of tranquility, crammed full of pleasures. That is the description of the moment when the person's experiences nothing but pleasures, and nothing can be better than that because the feeling - the experience - of the person is completely consumed with pleasures, and there is no room left -- no ability to experience anything else - beyond that.

Quote from Mike Anyayahan

Therefore, pleasure (and happiness) is not simply produced by the absence of pain but out of a particular desire that demands no pain at all.

Mike I can see why you would say "no pain" because of the point that the two feelings are separate and distinct. But in terms of 'demanding no pain at all' you would also keep in mind that we sometimes choose pain in order to produce pleasure, so while they are not the same feeling, a pleasure that is purchased at the cost of a particular pain might be a pleasure that we would choose, despite the cost in pain, would it not?

Quote from Charles

Or is it instead that in his refutations he presented the original ideas and opinions of the Epicureans that have otherwise been lost to history?

I think the answer is almost exclusively this aspect - he is the best source for otherwise unpreserved material. We know also that Cicero was very good friends with Atticus, who was a very strong Epicurean, so I think it is fair to say that Cicero had some degree of restraint on him that he could not misrepresent Epicurus too strongly lest he lose credibility with Atticus and others of his friends, as Epicurus was very popular then.

Also Charles I highly recommend reading the full book of "On Ends." I think it is pretty well documented and accepted by the experts that Cicero was not himself a Stoic, but in fact a neo-Platonist, and he disliked Stoicism almost as much as Epicurus. And as much or more of "On Ends" is devoted to refuting the Stoics than to the Epicureans. In fact I think you will find that Cicero's anti-Stoic argument is probably at least as intense, and perhaps even more vicious (and effective), than his anti-Epicurean argument.

Cicero was a smart guy and probably quoting directly from Epicurean texts in order to make is compilation work manageable. But you are correct he was very antiEpicurean so that slant has to be kept in mind.

And yes other than Lucretius, the Torquatus narrative in On Ends, and the Velleius narrative in "On the Nature of the Gods, are the most extensive surviving texts on Epicurean positions other than the letters of Epicurus in Diogenes Laertius, and the wall of Diogenes of Oinoanda, which has not been as accessible over the centuries as has been the work of Cicero, which has possibly been more accessible even than Diogenes Laertius.

Which to some extent explains how this part of On Ends is now preserved as the Lorem Ipsum filler text.

Mike on this issue of ataraxia as the alleged highest pleasure I have summarized my research into the cites in THIS article: The Full Cup / Fullness of Pleasure Model

I have accumulated the cites that I have found that make clear that Epicurus was referring to pleasure in the same way we ordinarily understand that word, and I also point to links to the works of Plato which I believe explain why Epicurus developed the absence of pain terminology, as a means of logical refutation of the Platonic argument that pleasure cannot be the goal of life because pleasure allegedly is insatiable (has no limit): The Full Cup / Fullness of Pleasure Model

Several of the most clear text cites are this from Epicurus himself:

“It is observed too that in his treatise On the Ethical End he writes in these terms : “I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, of sex, of sound, and the pleasures of beautiful form.”

– Diogenes Laertius, Book X

and this from Torquatus, which makes clear that the best life is one surrounded by numerous and vivid pleasures:

The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement.

and this from Cicero himself, which shows how you can easily and logically link tranquility to ordinary vivid pleasures without any contradiction:

Cicero, In defense of Publius Sestius, 10.23: “He {Publius Clodius} praised those most who are said to be above all others the teachers and eulogists of pleasure {the Epicureans}. … He added that these same men were quite right in saying that the wise do everything for their own interests; that no sane man should engage in public affairs; that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures.

Quote from Charles

I believe the Stoics are looking for Eudaimonia, Ataraxia is much more Epicurean.I

I agree Charles, although I think what we're really saying is what words are associated with those schools today. Eusdaimonia definitely sounds Aristotelian today (as does "flourishing), and ataraxia is alleged to be Epicurean, but I perceived there's lots of crossover. And come to think of it I am not sure WHAT word is associated with Stoicism other than words maybe like glory that refer to their goal of virtue.

Yes that (the focus on tranquility / ataraxia / peace of mind as some unique kind of highest pleasure) is a common assertion that I reject, Mike, and I think you will find that Dewitt states it considerably differently. In fact I do not believe that either ataraxia or aponia are "kinds of pleasure." I believe they are adverbs that describe ways / contexts in which pleasure (ordinary pleasures of all kind) are experienced. In other words, the best way to experience any pleasure is "without distraction" (ataraxia) and "without pain" (aponia).

An illustration I would give would be applicable to any pleasure, but let's just choose "dancing." The best way to experience dancing would be not to be distracted from dancing (don't fall, don't bump into others, don't get called away to do something else) and without any pain mixed in (don't be distracted thinking about painful thoughts) while you are dancing.

I think that is the obvious and commonsensical interpretations of those words, and I think Epicurus was nothing if not common-sensical about the way he thought.

These people who elevate "ataraxia" to something unique in itself are basically playing the katastematic pleasure game of suggesting there is something different and better than pleasure as ordinarily understood.

If I recall correct this is where Elayne's article discusses "fancy pleasure."

And this is related I think to DeWitt's discussion of the "unity of pleasure." All pleasure is unified in that it "feels pleasurable" which is what makes it pleasure. With such a sweeping definition there is no room for some kind of "special pleasure" which is so uniquely the best that it is of a different type than the rest of pleasure.

Again, the unifying characteristic of all pleasure (and in fact the only common characteristic that describes all pleasures) is that it "feels good." So to repeat there's no unique experience of painlessness that has a feeling of it's on. Also on this point is the Wenham article, which focuses on pleasure as an "experience." So it is obvious and saying nothing new to say that pleasure is best experienced without interruptions, and without pain.