Posts by Cassius

Yes in science it is a different context, as the "law of gravity" doesn't necessary imply god to most people nowadays. But as always it depends on who is reading.

Quote from Elayne

Hiram, ok, if you are asserting that the science on pious practices is solid, please give me a study.

Yes, agreed.

So far the example I see being cited is "chanting."

For me personally, if I hear someone chanting I am going to head for the nearest exit as quickly as possible. All the while I admit that the chanter may be a wonderful person and given leisure time to investigate I might find them to be my closest friend. But pleasure and pain are subjective, and I personally classify chanting as painful for me to hear, just as it would be painful for me to hear the "muslim call to prayer" that some people seem to think is the most beautiful thing they have ever heard.

The point here is not that chanting or the muslim or call to prayer cannot be extremely pleaurable to some people. I know that it can be and is. But it is not so for everyone, and what we are talking about here is incorporating general observations of philosophy into a "Society of Epicurus." Rename it "Society of Eastern Rite Epicureans" and that would be another discussion entirely.

I want to say this before I forget and then I come back to more:

When Hiram says

Quote from Hiram

chanting happens in both Catholic rosaries and Buddhist and Hindu mantras, so

I will go ahead and go on record that I find in general things that I identify as distinguishing traits of catholic or buddhist or hindu practices personally repelling and something to separate myself from, not endorse or accept as something that I would incorporate in my life unnecessarily. Of course at the same time I fully admit that that's "just me," and some others no doubt find them warm and cuddly. To each his own!

I see Martin Ferguson Smith on the Oinoanda.cat website has:

Fr. 112

The sum of happiness consists in our disposition, of which we are master. Military service is dangerous and one is subordinate to others. Public speaking is full of agitation and nervousness as to whether one can convince. Why then do we pursue an occupation like this, which is under control of others?

So that means:

(1) This is a fragment which he wasn't able to place clearly in context.

(2) We'd have to know how confident MFS word of this wording.

(3) "The sum of happiness consists in our disposition" is an extremely broad statement that seems to go further than anything we have read in Epicurus' letters, in Diogenes Laertius, or Lucretius, or anything that Cicero quoted. Before taking it as widely as you are taking it I think we'd need to reflect on the implication of there being nothing else which goes that far, and much else that can be read to be much more narrow and contextual, especially since as written this could easily be interpreted as something akin to stoicism, which we know Epicurus was not.

(4) As for the rest of the statement, to which we do not have further answer or explanation, I would argue that there are legitimate Epicurean reasons why someone would choose to pursue military action or public speaking, and that Epicurean philosophy does not stand for a blanket denunciation of these in all circumstances, such as when they are needed for the survival or happiness of ourselves and our friends. Cassius Longinus and other Epicureans he cited to Cicero, as well as Cicero's own example of Torquatus, did not reach the conclusion that Epicurean philosophy was incompatible with these things, at least when needed.

So where I see these issues going is more toward something like:

We should strive to be master of our dispositions just like we strive to master all our circumstances toward the goal of living pleasurably.

As is this one is going to be read by most people as something akin to Stoicism.

We may not be too far apart here, but the word "law" is something that in the minds of most people in my experience means that there must also be a "lawgiver." Which can also be ok so long as we are clear that we are not talking about an intelligent actor giving those laws.

We are definitely talking finer points of strategy and terminology here. I am not comfortable that I have enough knowledge to say whether Epicurus spoke in terms of "laws" of nature, and if he did not employ that easy analogy then there might have been a good reason for him not to.

Did Lucretius employ words that we would clearly translate as "laws of nature?" Again I am not sure - it seems that I have read that maybe he did, but this would be something to explore. I don't gather that he or Epicurus included a word meaning "law" in the title of works (?) Not sure either whether "De Rerum Natura" is a true title for the poem or something added by others, but it would have been easy to write "On the Laws of Nature" if "law" were an easy analogy.

My main concern at this point is to advise caution in using a word that has strong connotations of there being an intelligent purposeful lawgiver.

Quote from Hiram

But do you agree that EP offers the tools to help a lawmaker consider the advantages and disadvantages in a particular moment and circumstance to make his choices and avoidances (to pass a law)? And that it gives us the tools to determine whether an existing law is JUST for now, or for a given time?

Yes, BUT! It doesn't just give those tools to a "lawmaker" it gives the same tools to everyone including the people living under the laws. And while you can definitely provide innumerable examples of agreements ('laws") that people might choose to live by, the issue is that not everyone will agree that those laws/agreements are advantageous to them, and their analysis can be every bit as based on Epicurean principles as can the lawgiver's.

The problem we are having is not the issue of saying that Epicurean philosophy does not have immediate practical application. The problem we are having is that we are talking (at least in hypothetical terms) about a "Society of Epicurus" rather than a "Society of Republican Epicureans" or a "Society of Democrat Epicureans" or a "Society of Tory Epicureans" or a "Society of Labor Epicureans."

If you were suggesting that you were forming a "Society of Vegetarian Epicureans" then I think it would be exactly proper to cite as a ground rule that the members of the society find the killing of animals so abhorrent / painful that as a premise of membership they agree never to kill any animal (except maybe in self defense). That would make perfect sense and I would think have no conflict with any Epicurean principle.

But there could just as easily be a "Society of Epicurean Carnivores" that makes a condition of membership being to advance the cause of eating meat / living keto style, due to the pleasures and health benefits they perceive to result.

Both of the opposite extremes could be perfectly organizable in Epicurean terms.

So our issue of disagreement is that as a philosophy, the philosophy does not justify or condemn any personal preference of pleasure as intrinsically superior or inferior than another, and to suggest that it does undermines the philosophy at its core.

Catherine Wilson does that to a relative extreme, and I certainly see that you have distanced yourself from that, but I don't see you embracing the full implication to the point of being willing to make your society distinct from the "absolutist" ideas that are inherent in humanism, stoicism, etc. By failing to make that distinction you're inviting the water-ing down of the philosophy, and I tend to think that watering down by later Epicureans was perhaps as much to blame for the fall in popularity as was the affirmative suppression by Abrahamic religion.

Until Norman DeWitt hardly anyone recognized Epicurus as such as strong anti-Platonist, and significant numbers of people today seem to have no problem combining Epicurus with supernatural religion, stoicism, and all sorts of other ideas that are fundamentally contradictory.

Quote from Hiram

If the people in the community AGREE to protect a species, then this is their agreement and it's THEIR posited justice, not because they owe a duty to the rabbits but because they owe an agreement to each other. (

OK then we may not be so far apart on this, but I think the issue here is that the Epicurean terminology of justice is so different from non-Epicurean usage, just like it is with "gods," that discussing "justice" without making the Epicurean context very clear ends up being more confusing that helpful.

Let's take the example you give, that a certain set of people agree among themselves to protect animals, and then presumably one person violates the agreement and kills a rabbit. In what sense does it help anything to describe the result as "unjust"? And I am not sure that Epicurus would describe that result as "unjust" either.

I think we have had this discussion before and I have the same issue. Is every breach of every agreement "unjust?" I don't think that is likely that Epicurus was suggesting that, at least not in any sense of the word "unjust" that is in common usage today. Would you suggest another definition of "unjust" that you think Epicurus would apply to that situation (of killing the rabbit despite the agreement not to)?

Welcome DariusN ! Thanks for joining us! When you get a chance, please tell us about yourself and your background in Epicurean philosophy.

It would be particularly helpful if you could tell us (1) how you found this forum, and (2) how much background reading you have done in Epicurus. As an aid in the latter, we have prepared the following list of core reading.

We look forward to talking with you!

----------------------- Epicurean Works I Have Read ---------------------------------

1 The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.

2 "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt

3 "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius

4 Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

5 Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

6 The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

7 "A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

8 Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus (3) Others?

9 Plato's Philebus

10 Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

11 "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.

Yes as to paragraph one.

As to paragraph two, I think you are correct two, Joshua. How could there be any confidence in the meaning of a word that was constructed of an alphabet for which there is no established list of symbols.

Now I guess what I am concerned about is the question of whether an alphabet could start off being a defined set but somehow expand without end, but since the expansion (it would seem) could not be agreed upon ahead of time then the result would surely be at least uncertain, if not totally meaningless.

I think the analogy is probably a very good one but I am looking to test it before reusing it. Since the root of it can be found in Lucretius it is an excellent suggestion.

Quote from JJElbert

Lucretius makes explicit the analogy that compounds of atoms are a kind of coded information, just as latin letters come together to form words. But in order for this to work out, there must be a finite library or alphabet of atomic 'letters'. If they could be infinitely divided, no such set would be possible. In this instance, infinity really does lead to zero.

Hmmmm. There is either a flaw in this reasoning, or it is an EXCELLENT observation and not one that I have personally seen before. Do those reading this agree that an alphabet must be finite in order to convey meaning? Is that what you are saying Joshua? If this argument holds up it is one that we definitely want to use over and over.

Does this go too far?

Quote from JJElbert

But in order for this to work out, there must be a finite library or alphabet of atomic 'letters'. If

Oscar if I understand you correctly I completely agree with where you are going, and I do believe it relates to our current discussions.

I agree that erecting a viewpoint that a constant chaotic clash of ideas is a good thing is flawed, and it is probably the opposite of what Epicurus advised -- weighing and testing and then deciding what this process has confirmed and what it has invalidated.

It is one thing to always have an open mind toward new evidence, and being willing to immediately revise prior opinion to incorporate that new evidence. It is very difference to say that it is never proper to consider any opinion to be confirmed, which is what I sense is the issue you are picking up.

From the point of view of the Christians there was good reason for them to banish discussion of Lucretius -- because Epicurean philosophy IS incompatible with Christianity (and all Abrahamic religion) and they cannot coexist in the same mind without huge cognitive dissonance and confusion.

That's why ultimately we have to stiffen our spines and make decisions and follow them as best we can, and I can't think of any reason more urgent to do that than the knowledge that we get only one shot at life and when our time is up it's over.

One more comment, on the word "mistake":

Quote from Oscar

I'm for open and free exchanges of thought when used to understand issues and solve problems , but to say open the doors, we're coming in and you need to accept our view is a mistake.

No doubt that for some people this view is indeed a "mistake." I do agree that there is a pleasure that many find (I know I find it myself) in trying to be considerate to everyone you come into contact with, and telling them that they have an "equal voice" and essentially attempting to implement some kind of "pure democracy" where everyone has an equal part in making every decision." That view has a basic attraction because people of good will value their friends, and they want to make their friends feel good, and so it has an immediate appeal.

But I think it is pretty clear that in many contexts allowing all decisions to be made by anyone and everyone would be a chaotic disaster, and I think that result is so clear, even in the context of ideas and academia and the like, that I don't think we should conclude that everyone who pushes ideas like this is "mistaken."

As you were alluding in the other thread, Oscar, I think in many cases people are "responsible" for the things they do and positions they take, and they know full well what the natural and normal consequence of their actions is going to be.

So I think that we should be of good will and forgiving for anyone who mistakenly, presumably out of the best of intentions, advocates an organizational scheme that would lead to chaos. But I think there are definitely those also who realize that the maintenance of chaos is an opportunity for exploitation of those who do not know better, and I think we have to firmly and confidently stand up against that advocacy.

So another example would be that even as we debate in other threads the accurate meaning of Epicurean doctrines, the only reason we can allow that liberty to do so is that we firmly keep an eye out and exclude disruptive discussion that is not in good faith and clearly outside the scope of the overall goal of the group.

Quote from Hiram

I shared the hermarchus example elsewhere and am curious to know what you think about it because the scholarchs, it seems, would have wanted us to apply these Doctrines in real life situations and under diverse conditions rather than be armchair philosophers.

I think we all agree that it is desirable to apply the Epicurean doctrines to real life situations and not be armchair philosophers. That is a huge point and I cannot imagine anyone disagreeing with that. The real issue comes down to our attitude toward the fact that different people will come to different conclusions about what will make them happy in a particular situation. When that occurs, we can offer the Epicurean framework of the nature of the universe and point out that no god or no Platonic ideals justify any particular decision, and that if they do something to get themselves killed that will be the end of their life, and we can point out all sorts of related observations about the limits of logic, the nature of living things as having some free will but also doing some things by necessity, etc etc....

But the minute we stray into saying that "if you are an Epicurean you will reach XXX conclusion ....." then we've gone further than the philosophy allows and we have undercut all of our premises from which we started. At the very least before discussing any policy decision we would need an exhaustive review of as many relevant circumstances as we could gather, and in the process of discussing those it would quickly be clear that there are no firm rules that apply outside the particular context.

Which is not to say that the analysis can't be done. Not only can it be done, it MUST be done by the people involved. It's urgent that it be done! It's essential that it be done! If you back away from doing it you're not a man, you're a worm! (Let me not go too far in emphasizing my Nietzschean variation on the Epicurean tune that you have but one life to live and that nihilism for losers and so you must live as vigorously as you can! )

But in regard argain to the vegetarianism discussion, I don't see it as well documented enough to consider it outside the standard framework, and I wouldn't even get to the point of comparing it to the standard framework until I were firmly convinced that the text is reliable, which I am not.

Quote from Hiram

Of course once the population is under control then this may no longer be just because of the disadvantage of letting them be extinct and never being able to enjoy rabbit again, and the disadvantages of their large numbers not existing anymore..

I think we continue to disagree here. I personally have a lot of affection for all animals and I would have to be a vegetarian if it were up to me to kill my food. However I don't think that "justice" is involved here, and certainly not any kind of weighing "extinction" as some kind of duty to nature or to rabbits in general. I definitely think that a strong case can be made for me and others like me who agree to band together to defend a population of animals to prevent them from going extinct, even at the cost of inflicting some pretty strong harm on the humans who disagreed. I think we see this kind of conflict going on now in parts of Africa in regard to animals such as elephants, but that's just one example of many and probably a poor illustration.

So I hold up my credentials on cruelty to animals against anyone, but I do not believe that there is any form of Epicurean "justice" involved in this, because Epicurus says that there is no such thing as absolute justice and the only kind that exists to even discuss is something that arises from agreement, and we have no such agreement with (most) animals.

As for that material on Hermarchus and vegetarianism, I also find that material difficult to trust and not nearly as clear as we would need in order to be confident of it.

So to repeat back the quote that I pasted above, I hear you talking about advantage in a way that sounds correct, but then you take that away with your conclusion that that "justice" is involved, because there was never any agreement with those rabbits in the first place.

OK I am not sure that we have a deep dispute here - all I am saying is that I see "attestation" as just another word for a particular type of evidence, and I don't see anything gained by using words that imply some special meaning. I don't think it sounds right to imply that "Nature" attests or witnesses or speaks to anything - we are really just saying here that all we can know about any situation comes to us through the 5 senses, the anticipations, and the feelings, and that we must do our best to be clear when we describe to others what these sources of information are providing to us.

But it is in the nature of the problem that Nature does not attach specific words or ideas to the things that we perceive, and so it's up to us to develop language and other systems that allow us to communicate with as much precision as we can.

OK I am back after a delay in being able to respond. I want to repeat that I do not intend to dismiss anything in particular that can be well documented from the texts, but the first test in my mind of texts that are not well documented is "Is the suggested translation consistent with what we know from the reliable texts and from our understanding of the Epicurean worldview / nature of the universe?"

Here I would scrutinize both "noble" and "piety." We know that the only ultimate standard is pleasure and pain, and that concepts that we today associate with "nobility" are run through with Stoicism. Even if we are certain that the original text used a word like "kalon" (which is not a given unless we have a very good chain of custody of the original texts, which I don't think we have here) then we have to rely on what the translators think the word "kalon" meant to the Epicureans, and we know that they used words with their own twists on definitions.

I think that especially goes for "piety." I know what that word implies in 2019 America, but I don't know whether our word corresponds to what was in the texts or the minds of the ancient Epicureans. "Piety" has lots of meanings today and I don't think we can suppose anything about what it meant to the Epicureans that would be inconsistent with what we understand about their core views of their gods. To me personally I would not associate "chanting" with my attitude toward an Epicurean god in any way, even though I find singing and various types of music to be very pleasing. That is just an indication that you and I are different, and the more people we polled the more differences would arise, all of which preferences could be entirely consistent with Epicurean philosophy if they bring pleasure to he people holding them.

In both my examples I am just emphasizing that I think it is very dangerous to jump to conclusions and suggest particular applications that should apply across the board. We have a tremendous amount to do in order to get a good picture of what we DO know, so much so that I personally recoil from too much speculation about what we don't know.

And I say that especially in the context of "Society of Epicurus." I think it is absolutely fine for you Hiram or anyone else to define their own perspective on pleasurable living and unite a community that feels the same way. My comments and reservations are simply that - since we are discussing an organization called "Society of Epicurus" -- my personal opinion is that the more specific you are in endorsing particular practices, the more you stray from a "philosophy" into the realm of a particular type of community.

I don't know if I am getting my point across but to repeat it, I am all in favor of particular communities studying Epicurean principles as an aide in their own decisions about how to live. What you are discussing is totally appropriate for something with a name like "The Hiram Crespo Society of Epicureans." And of course since it is still somewhat a free country there is no stopping you from naming it anything you like, including a broad name like Society of Epicurus. My comments are just comments to register my view that by implying that particular preferences are identical with Epicurean philosophy, the result is something that I don't think Epicurus would approve of, because you are implying that one single set of preferences alone are consistent with Epicurus, when (in my view) that is clearly not the case.

No doubt you would reply that you think I am promoting a "Cassius Amicus Interpretation of Epicurus." But in dealing with that back and forth, the important distinction is that I recognize that some or all of your preferences are legitimate lifestyle choices if they bring you (and people like you) pleasure. All I am saying is that not everyone agrees with those lifestyle choices and I think it is improper to suggest that Epicurean philosophy leads to a single set for everyone.

Quote from Hiram

I still can't wrap my head around your categorization of "idealist" after six years of work in positing what Onfray calls "a counter-history of philosophy from the perspective of the friends of Epicurus and the enemies of Plato". Maybe you have considered my willingness at some point or another to consider other people's views as my agreeing with them? I just don't see what you're even talking about

I think one way of stating what I see as "idealism" is a pattern of leaping from what we as individuals find pleasurable to a wider position on social/political issues. This pattern is clear in the work of Catherine Wilson (and she admits it, I think) and certainly in the work of Robert Hanrott, but it is also inherent Hiram in many of the things I see you writing in the 20 tenets threads. For example you are taking the last ten doctrines on "justice" and extrapolating that a certain set of conclusions on social issues should be "the Epicurean position." Catherine Wilson does that repeatedly, and while I may agree with her (or you) on many of the positions you choose to take, it seems absolutely clear to me that you violate the spirit of what Epicurus was saying, in proclaiming "no absolute justice" and "no matter how depraved we think the person is...." if it ends in pleasure for that person then we have no reason to complain with that person's choices. This is very clear from you "mutual benefit" conclusion, in translating "not to harm or be harmed," which is a restraint of action rather than a command of action, and turning it into a categorical imperative that we seemingly have a duty to "benefit" each other -- and implicitly not only each other, but *everyone.*

I am no libertarian myself and I am not looking for libertarianism in Epicurus' work, nor am I looking for justification to argue that *any* particular set of policy conclusions should apply to everyone. But it is absolutely clear to me that if someone continuously asserts that one or a list of policy choices should be adopted by everyone, then they have failed to accept the basic underlying premise that the feeling of pleasure, which all of us experience *individually* is the guide, rather than an idealized version that they think applies to everyone.

That is the problem with "Humanism" and I do not see you even acknowledging the issue, much less taking the non-asbsolute position that Epicurus's doctrines would plainly call for.

Interim comment: There is a lot going on in these exchanges, which combine philosophical and personal points with many thing in one post. I am going to have to come back to this series to break it down, but I want to make a procedural comment:

We are writing these posts publicly and I do not think people should read too much into the "Likes" or "Failure to Likes" that get added to posts in a series like this. At least in my own case I am having to think about a series of points being made in each post before I decide how best to respond, and I don't want people to think that I am taking flat sides one way or the other by liking or failure to like individual posts. I feel sure that this observation applies to other people as well but I thought this was worth saying. The "like" system has its uses, but in complicated discussions like this one I think its usefulness breaks down.

The issues being discussed here are important on lots of levels so I hope people will free to comment on "parts" of these posts without fear of being misunderstood as endorsing or not endorsing someone's entire position.

I agree with Elayne's comments and there is probably a lot more here to be unpacked.

I would first start however with the point that the Philodemus material is by no means as well established as the other core material including Lucretius. I presume you are referring to Dirk Obbink (sp?) material and I would simply not be willing to take material like that as confidently established without looking at exact pages and reference material to see what he had to go by in reconstructing his version. How much of the word being translated as "effortless" really survives, and how much is reconstructed? And what does survive, has Dirk himself seen the original, or is this itself reconstruction from 200+ year old material that all we have is penciled versions with who knows what level of accuracy?

I suspect that reconciliation could be done to bring "effortless" into consistency with the rest of the philosophy, but I just don't think it is a very good idea to place so much emphasis on such slender material.

And I also think that summarizing the point being made really comes across in " The goal of religion is the experience of pure, effortless pleasure."

The words "religion" and "pure" and "effortless" would all require explanation to make sense, and I would not think much is being accomplished with a summary that is so unclear absent explanation.

Yes, this is the key point:

Quote from Elayne

Giving specific lists is just a way to provide examples of what would cause pain or not if unsatisfied for _most_ people, but the map is not the territory.

None of these things, even air, water, food, clothing, are necessary at every particular moment, and some of them can be postponed for quite a while in order to pursue greater pleasure or avoid greater pain.

Natural and necessary are always going to be contextual and I don't think there is anything in Epicurus that would contradict that -- nor could there be consistent with the overall philosophy.

So the closer someone gets to a specific list, without always raising the context requirement, the closer it appears that they are approaching stoicism and absolutes which don't fit at all in Epicurean philosophy.

Hiram my issue here is probably mostly related to coming up with a word like "Attestation." Where do you get that and what is the purpose of seeming to coin it as if it means something specific?

Again, is not the entire point that, as Elayne describes, we are trying to use words to describe reality, and that this use of words is an individual contextual thing that is going to vary with circumstances?

Why imply that there is ever some kind of flash-point that changes this contextual explanation into something that is not contextual?

So that when you say ....

Quote from Hiram

An attestation is not "an abstract truth that is the same for everyone", it's a particular instance of direct perception of something.

... what is the authority and the reason for assigning a word "attestation" to a particular instance of combinations of perceptions?