Two thoughts for the day (1) Don't expect Platonists (or their gods) to treat Epicureans with respect, and (2) as a result, be prepared, after you die, for your soul to flutter continually around the world for quite a long period of punishment until you are "purified" -- or so sayeth Cicero.
DAILY LUCRETIAN TUESDAY OCTOBER 29, 2019 (Continuation of Book Three, Daniel Brown 1743 Edition)
And now, for your sake, my Memmius, and to let you know that the mind and soul are born in us and die with us, I will go on to write lines worthy of thy genius, and which I have been long preparing, and have at last by sweet labor happily perfected. Observe only that you apply both names indifferently, or, more plainly, when I offered to say the soul is mortal, you are to understand I mean the mind likewise, since they are both so united together, that in this respect, they make but one and the same thing.
First then, since I have proved that the soul consists of very minute seeds, and is formed of principles much less than clear water, or mist, or smoke, because it is more apt to move, and is set a-going by a much lighter stroke (for it is moved by the very images of mist and smoke) as when, by sleep overcome, in dreams we see the lofty altars exhale a vapor, and send up smoke into the air, the images of these things no doubt produce these phantasms in us. And since you see, when the vessel is broken to pieces, the water breaks loose and flows away in a stream; and since mist and smoke vanish into air, conclude the soul likewise to be poured out, and that its principles much sooner perish, and its seeds are more easily dissolved, when it is separated and retires from all the limbs; for since the body, which is, as it were, a vessel to it, when it is bruised to pieces by any outward force, or rarefied by the blood being drawn out of the veins, cannot keep it in, how can you suppose it can be contained by subtle air? How can that which is more rare than this body of ours preserve it entire?
Besides, we perceive the soul is born with the body, grows up with it, and both wax old together. For as children are of a weak and tender body, their mind likewise is of the same frail complexion. As their age improves, and their strength is more confirmed, their judgment ripens more, and the powers of their mind are more enlarged. But when the body is shaking by the irresistible stroke of time, and the limbs fail without strength, the understanding grows lame, the tongue and the mind lose their vigor, all the faculties fail, and go away together. The whole nature of the Soul therefore must needs be dissolved, and scattered like smoke into the air, since we see it is born with the body, increases together with it, and with it, as I said before, becomes feeble by age, and decays.
Add to this, that has the body is subject to violent diseases and tormenting pains, so the mind is affected by sharp cares, by griefs and fear, and therefore must equally partake of death and dissolution with it. And then, in great disorders of the body, the Mind frequently grows mad, raves, and talks wildly; sometimes it is sunk into such a profound and never-ending sleep by a heavy lethargy, the eyes shut, and the head nodding, so that neither hears the words, nor is able to distinguish the face of those who stand about bedewing their cheeks with tears, and striving to recall the departing breath. Wherefore you must needs allow that the mind may be dissolved, since the infection of the disease pierces through it; for grief and diseases are both the causes of death, as we are taught by experience in a thousand instances.
"Whether this applies to a 'sage' or to everyone is to me the more difficult question".
I definitely agree with you there, Joshua.
And as Godfrey says, life itself is not for the faint of heart.
Another question I would throw into the mix is whether there have been major changes in family relationships that color our modern attitude. I gather that in ancient world the role of parents was much less "permissive " than today.
But the main issue for me is that with so much emphasis in places like Lucretius on observing how pleasure leads all animals to continue their kind, I cannot see Epicurus exempting humans, even "sages" (a concept itself which may be questionable from an Epicurean viewpoint - is that supposed to be someone who pursues wisdom I instead of pleasure?) from the same natural order.
Wow very nice!
Joshua if you recall the thread at some point and could link it here I would appreciate it. Also, I presume you are correct, not knowing anything about Greek myself, but what do you think accounts for otherwise reputable translators deciding (at times) to make it seem clearly negative, as if marriage is never advised?
This conversation was extended further at FB by Shahob citing this:
"Interesting... According to Eric Brown, "He also counsels against contributing to the 'polis' by starting a family; marriage and children are too much trouble."
To which I Cassius responded:
Thanks for pasting that reference, Shahab. I know nothing about Eric Brown, but I have a feeling that people frequently read into Epicurus what they *wish* to read into him. For example in that comment is the editorial addition "against contributing to the polis..." I see no reference whatsoever to that angle in the DL quotes, and that sounds like someone who is focused on the politics of child-raising and the state. And did he cite both sides of the textual issues he referenced? Or say why he comes down against Bailey and Strodach, two highly respected commentators? And even the "too much trouble" gives off an air of flippancy where none is indicated in the texts.
I don't think issues like this are small, either. This excerpt rings to me as a good example of someone who uses Epicurus to grind their own axe, rather than looking to apply a comprehensive understanding of the big picture in a way someone sympathetic to Epicurus (someone like DeWitt) would do.
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For perspective on Mr. Brown's views, here are some of his viewpoints taken today from his website. https://pages.wustl.edu/ericbrown/research
Even more revealing is this. With "friends" like these, Epicurus hardly needs enemies:
This thread has pretty much expired but I came across this today from a professor who has written on Epicurus and I want to preserve this so I can find it later:
https://pages.wustl.edu/ericbrown/research
From the same professor's page:
I wish I had more to give! 
Michele here is a post I made about this issue in 2011 with the following being the core part on this discrepancy (pasting from the earlier post).
Here is how I concluded at the time that Bailey (and the others listed here) are correct - that Epicurus DID advise marriage and children, but (like everything else) according to circumstances:
As I have discussed in earlier posts, there is a maddening discrepancy in the various translations of Diogenes Laertius in the crucial “Wise Man” sequence. CD Yonge’s 1853 translation reports that Epicurus thought marriage to be a bad idea: “Marriage, they say, is never any good to a man, and we must be quite content if it does no harm; and the wise man will never marry or beget children, as Epicurus himself lays down in his Doubts and in his treatises on Nature. Still, under certain circumstances in his life he will forsake these rules and marry.”
The Loeb Classical Library version of the R.D. Hicks translation, which dates from 1931, concurs: “Nor, again, will the wise man marry and rear a family: so Epicurus says in the Problems and in the De Natura. Occasionally he may marry due to special circumstances in his life.”
But Cyril Bailey in his 1926 translation says the opposite: “Moreover, the wise man will marry and have children, as Epicurus says in the Problems and in the work On Nature. But he will marry according to the circumstances of his life.”
The more modern Epicurus Reader translation by Inwood and Gerson agrees with Bailey: “And indeed the wise man will marry and father children….”
The 1963 text by George Strodach endorses the same view: “In addition, the wise man will marry and beget children…. but he will marry according to his station in life, whatever it may be.”
In my view, this question is best answered by the observation that Epicurus himself provided in his last will and testament that the child of his valued student Metrodorus be married off to an Epicurean when she came of age. As Yonge translates: “In the same way also, they [Amynomachus and Timocrates] shall be the guardians of the daughter of Metrodorus, and when she is of marriageable age, they shall give her to whomsoever Hermarchus shall select of his companions in philosophy, provided she is well behaved and obedient to Hermarchus.”
It seems clear to me, therefore, that Epicurus held that marriage and child-bearing are natural, proper, and beneficial activities in which to engage, so long as partners are properly educated in and devoted to Epicurean principles of living.
It seems to me that this conclusion is also a logical extension of the very clear Epicurean principle that “friendship” is central to living a happy life. As Cicero wrote in “On Ends,” Epicurus “pronounced in regard to friendship that of all the means to happiness that wisdom has devised, none is greater, none is more fruitful, none is more delightful than friendship.” A happy marriage to one who is not only one’s mate but also one’s best friend would certainly seem to be a logical application of this principle.
We do, however, also have to consider the very strong cautions that abound in Epicurean literature against taking an unrealistic attitude toward romantic love. In addition to the admonitions stated in the Wise Man section cited above, there is the famous Vatican Saying 51, which contains what is widely regarded to be Epicurus’ advice to a young man: “You tell me that the stimulus of the flesh makes you too prone to the pleasures of love. Provided that you do not break the laws or good customs and do not distress any of your neighbors or do harm to your body or squander your pittance, you may indulge your inclination as you please. Yet it is impossible not to come up against one or other of these barriers, for the pleasures of love never profited a man and he is lucky if they do him no harm.”
And again from Cicero’s On Ends, we see the Epicurean advocate listing those who are “enslaved to the follies of love” as among those men whose failings “render their lives one unbroken round of misery.”
And perhaps most famously of all, we have the long dissertation of Lucretius at the end of Book IV, which reminds us that the intense emotions involved in romantic love are ultimately derived from Nature’s call to procreation, and that the intensity of the emotion must be kept under control if we are to live happy lives and escape misery. Lucretius abounds with practical advice in this department, reminding us to keep our emotions under control, and that we can escape the mischief of unhappy romance if we do not stand in our own way: “And yet even when you are entangled and held fast, you may still escape the mischief, unless you stand in your own way and overlook all the defects of the mind and body of the person you woo. But men often do this, blinded by passion, and they attribute to the beloved advantages which are not really theirs.”
Now let us turn back to the present and to our own lives. I would be fascinated to know how many readers of the NewEpicurean blog, or any of the various Epicurus facebook pages, have been successful in finding mates who share some or most of their Epicurean viewpoints. It is certainly possible to live a happy and fulfilling life without an Epicurean romantic partner, and I can imagine few things worse than feeling trapped in a marriage where one’s mate fails to understand, or even actively deprecates, the insights of Epicurus. But in the world we live in today, it unfortunately seems that the best most students of Epicurus can realistically hope for is to find a mate who shares what some might call a basic “sense of life” compatible with Epicureanism — but even that goal will not be reachable for some, and others will not find it satisfactory.
Martin - I found the setting and have tripled the allowed size. Now that I know where this is it will be easy to increase if we need more space. Please test when you get a chance! Thanks!
Here is a quick promo I made to call attention to a new project: a podcast dedicated to going step by step through Lucretius' "On the Nature of Things." Surprisingly few fans of Epicurus have taken the time to read Lucretius's poem in its entirety, and I think there's a good reason why commentator's rarely recommend him: because in his six books and thousands of lines, Lucretius has very few crumbs for those who want to portray Epicurus as motivated by "freedom from pain" rather than Pleasure.
From start to finish Lucretius focuses on a practical approach to following "Divine Pleasure, Guide of Life" by blasting the foundation out from under supernatural religion, threats of punishment after death, and dialectical trickery, all the while pointing out "the straight path" to follow pleasure to happy living. We very much need a podcast on this, and several of us will work to bring you this as soon as we can.
Thank you for letting me know Martin! I am investigating that now. I don't see an option that I can change but I have posted a request on the user forum and I will report back to you.
I need to check back in DeWitt to see how he documents the "Twentiers" comment, and whether that is more Cicero or from another source.
Horace's "herd" and the funeral inscription "choic" are both clearly by Epicureans, but could perhaps be "tongue in cheek."
I am not sure that I am aware of Lucretius or anyone who was clearly an Epicurean using the term "Garden" and I wonder if that is also a term applied by outsiders, perhaps just because it is somewhat parallel to place names like Stoa and Peripatetic and Academy.
So as part of this discussion it would be interesting to see if we could clearly document a name that the Epicureans called themselves. I need to check Lucian...
There is a lot of fun stuff in there - you won't regret it!
I am trying to come up with a list of names which were applied to the Epicureans either by themselves or others. So far I have:
Are you aware of any others?
Cites:
20ers -
Joyous Choir
https://newepicurean.com/keeping-watch-…alive-with-joy/
Hog in the Epicurean Herd -- Horace letter to Tibulus
Todd I am forgetting - is this tied to an Epicurean context or chapter?
Second, an anecdote from Diogenes Laertius, where some philosopher has defined "man" as a featherless biped. Later, someone shows up with a plucked chicken and says, "Behold, a man!" (I'm paraphrasing, but that's the gist of it.)
DAILY LUCRETIAN FRIDAY OCTOBER 25, 2019 (Continuation of Book Three)
To say likewise, that the eyes can see nothing of themselves, but the mind looks through them as through doors laid open, this is ridiculous, when sense itself tells them the contrary, and sets it full in their view; especially when we are unable to look upon objects that dazzle the eyes, because our site is confounded by too great a lustre. This could not be, if they were mere doors, nor are open doors that we look through capable of pain. Besides, if our eyes were no more than doors, the mind would see clearer when the eyes were pulled out, and the whole frame taken away.
In this case it is vain to take shelter under the sacred opinion of Democritus, who says that as many parts as there are of the body, so many parts too of the soul are answerable, and are contained in them; for since the principles of the soul are not only much smaller than those of which the body and its parts consist, but are fewer in number, and are spread thinly in distant Spaces all over the limbs, you may a firm so far, that the principles of the Soul take up only so many different spaces and intervals, as may be sufficient for those little seeds that are in us to incite those motions that produce Sensation.
That this sense does not affect every minute part of the body is plain; for we seldom feel the dust that sticks upon us, nor the particles of chalk that drop upon our limbs; nor do we perceive the dew by night, or the fine threads of the spider meeting us, when we are entangled by the subtle net as we pass along; nor the decaying web lighting upon our heads, nor are we sensible of the soft feathers of birds, nor of the flying down of thistles, which from their natural levity are scarce able to descend upon us; nor do we feel the motion of every creeping insect, nor the little traces of the feet which gnats and such animals make upon us. So that the many seeds which are diffused over all the limbs, must be first put into motion before the principles of the soul are agitated and made capable to feel, and before its seeds, by striking upon each other through so many distance spaces, can meet, unite, and part again, and be so variously moved as to produce sense and perception in us.
But the mind it is that keeps up the defences of life, and has a more sovereign power to preserve our beings, then all the faculties of the soul; for, without the mind, the least part of the soul cannot secure its residence in the body for a moment, but follows it readily as a close companion, and vanishes into air along with it, and leaves the cold limbs in the frozen arms of death. But the man whose mind is whole and entire, remains alive, though he be mangled and all his limbs lopped-off; yet his trunk, though his soul be so far gone, and his members separated from him, still lives and breathes the vital air; the trunk, if not spoiled of the whole, yet of a great part of the soul, still continues alive and holds fast its being. So, if you tear the eye all round, if the pupil remains safe, the power of sight continues entire, so long as you do no injury to the Apple, but cut the white all around, and leave that hole, this may be done without any danger or lost to the sight; but if ever so little of the middle of the eye be pricked through, though the ball otherwise looks bright and sound, the light instantly dies away, and darkness follows. This is the case of the mind and soul, and by such bonds are they always held together.
Maybe the "first mental image" is our own in each case, and the reference is not to everyone having the same or even a similar image, or to communication with others at all, but a reference to we ourselves having confidence in our own image being clear and firm. And so maybe the entire passage by Epicurus is not referring to language or communication but is referring to having confidence in our own thought processes?
Elli found this for Philebus, in the website of philologers/teachers in hellenic education at schools of Greece. She translated this passage:
The work was written in Plato's old age, probably between 362-360 BC and the main person is Socrates who discusses with the Protarchus and Philebus. At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates introduces Philebus to claim that pleasure is the supreme good for all beings. Because Philebus appears to be a devotee of Aphrodite and surrendered to pleasures, he could not adopt his personal dialectical views and therefore shows confidence in his defense of his friend the Protarchus who had trained near Gorgias. Philebus may not have been an actual but imaginary person because this name did not exist in Attica, and Plato probably chose it as the sign of "friend of puberty”. In contrast, Protarchus was a real person. He was the son of Callias and a student of Gorgias and he already is mentioned some of his quotes by Aristotle in his book "The physics".
https://www.filologikos-istotopos.gr/2017/04/30/to-platoniko-ergo-filivos
The writer here is Suzana Karakosta, who has a degree in theology and history of philosophy.
Here is an excellent article shared today by the Epicurus page - I am pasting a clip of the conclusion. Claims of truth without evidence are something that Epicurus dealt with regularly. When people make claims for which they have no evidence, can they not at least pay us the respect of saying so, even if they do so in the name of "science?"
(I see the piece comes from Britain, where they do not have American freedom of speech. Because I like free speech, nor do I see any evidence that Epicurus attempted to restrict the speech of his adversaries, I editorialized by striking the "within reason" comment.)
