Posts by Cassius

This last discussion on differentiating an Epicurean society from an atheist church is related to the discussion we had to be about the role of philosophy. I think Godfrey is right that probably as a percentage, most of the atheist churches are essentially "humanist" which is a long and separate discussion but is not Epicurean.

Isn't there a bible verse to the effect that "not everyone who says the name Jesus goes to heaven?"

I would say "not everyone who denies a supernatural creator, who says he pursues pleasure, is an Epicurean."

There's a lot more to it, as Godfrey indicates.

I am happy to report that we had our recording session this morning and Elayne will indeed be in the next episode - and that she has returned with a vengeance! Toward the end of the episode as we began to summarize we began to talk about and debate the Polyaenus example (as discussed in A Few Days In Athens) so I think you guys will particularly find that interesting and will likely have comment. I'll get it edited and posted as soon as I can.

Episode 29 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available:

Welcome to Episode Thirty-Two of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

Before we start, here are three ground rules.

First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it, which may or may not agree with what you here about Epicurus at other places today.

Second: We aren't talking about Lucretius with the goal of promoting any modern political perspective. Epicurus must be understood on his own, and not in terms of competitive schools which may seem similar to Epicurus, but are fundamentally different and incompatible, such as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, and Marxism.

Third: The essential base of Epicurean philosophy is a fundamental view of the nature of the universe. When you read the words of Lucretius you will find that Epicurus did not teach the pursuit of virtue or of luxury or of simple living. or science, as ends in themselves, but rather the pursuit of pleasure. From this perspective it is feeling which is the guide to life, and not supernatural gods, idealism, or virtue ethics. And as important as anything else, Epicurus taught that there is no life after death, and that any happiness we will ever have must come in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Now let's join the discussion with Martin reading today's text:

Latin text location: Approximately lines 730-787

Munro Summary: Notes on the text

Daniel Brown:

Now, come on, attend to the rules which I have found, by a labor very delightful to myself; lest you should think those bodies that appear white to your eyes are composed of white seeds, or such as show black, are formed of black; or what color so-ever a thing wears, you should conclude the cause of it to be that the seeds of which it is made are stained with the same color. For the principles of matter are void of all color, both like or unlike what appears upon the bodies they produce. If you should chance to think that the Mind cannot possibly form an idea of seeds without color, you are under a strange mistake; for persons born blind, who never saw the light of the Sun, yet discover bodies by the touch, as if they had no manner of color belonging to them. So that seeds imbued with no color can offer themselves to our mind, and be conceived by us. And besides, the things we touch in the dark night we distinguish without any regard to the color they may otherwise appear in.

That seeds may be void of color I have shown; I shall now prove that they actually are so. Now every color may be changed one into another; but the principles of things will by no means admit of change, there necessarily must be something that remains immutable, lest all things should be utterly reduced to nothing; for whatsoever is changed, and breaks the bounds of its first nature, instantly dies, and is no more what first it was. Be cautious therefore, how you stain the seeds of things with color, lest all things should recur to nothing, and be utterly destroyed.

Besides, though Nature bestows no color upon seeds, yet they are endued with different figures, from which they form and vary the colors of every kind which show upon them. (For it is of great concern what seeds unite with others, and what positions they are preserved, and what motions they give and receive among themselves;) and thus you may readily account why things that just before appeared black, should suddenly look white. As the sea, when the rough winds enrage the waters, grows white with foaming waves. So you may say of what commonly appears black to us, when the seeds of which it is formed are mingled, and their order changed, when some new seeds are added, and some old ones are removed, the direct consequence is that its color is changed, and appears white. But if the water of the sea consisted essentially of blue particles, it could by no means change into a white color. Disturb the order of the seeds how you would, the principles that are blue would never pass into white.

But if you say that the seeds which make the sea look of one uniform white are stained with different colors, as a perfect square that is one figure, is made up of several bodies that are of several figures, then it would follow that, as we perfectly see that dissimilar figures which the square contains within it, so we might discover in the water of the sea, or in any other body of one simple color, the mixed and different colors from which that simple color proceeds.

Besides, the dissimilar figures that go to make up a square do by no means hinder that the surface of the body should appear square, but a mixed variety of colors will forever prevent that the surface of any body should appear of one fixed and uniform color. And then the very reason that would incline us sometimes to impute colors to seeds is by this means destroyed, or, in this case, white Bodies are not produced from white, or black from black, but from seeds of various colors. Now a white would much sooner proceed from seeds of no color at all, than from such as are black, or any other opposite color whatsoever.

Besides, since colors cannot appear without light, and since the seeds of things cannot appear in the light, you may thence conclude that they are covered with no colors at all. For how can any color show itself in the dark, which surround in the light itself, as it is differently struck either with a direct or oblique ray of light? After this manner, the plumes of doves, which grow about their neck, and are an ornament to it, show themselves in the sun. In one position they appear red like a fiery carbuncle, in another light, the greenness of the emerald is mixed with a sky blue. So, likewise, the tail of the peacock, all filled with light, changes its colors, as the rays strike directly or obliquely upon it. Since therefore colors are produced only by the strokes of light, we cannot suppose that they can possibly exist without it.

Munro:

Now mark, and apprehend precepts amassed by my welcome toil, lest haply you deem that those things which you see with your eyes to be bright, because white are formed of white principles, or that the things which are black are born from black seed, or that things which are steeped in any other color bear that color because the bodies of matter are dyed with a color like to it.For the bodies of matter have no color at all either like to the things or unlike.But if haply it seems to you that no impression of the mind can throw itself into these bodies, you wander far astray. For since men born blind who have never beheld the light of the sun, yet recognize bodies by touch, though linked with no color for them from their first birth, you are to know that bodies can fall under the ken of our mind too, though stained with no color. Again, whatever things we ourselves touch in the thick darkness, we do not perceive to be dyed with any color.And since I prove that this is the case, I will now show that there are things [which are possessed of no color].

Well any color without any exception changes into any other; and this first-beginnings ought in no wise to do: something unchangeable must remain over, that all things be not utterly reduced to nothing.For whenever a thing changes and quits its proper limits, at once this change of state is the death of that which it was before. Therefore mind not to dye with color the seeds of things, that you may not have all things altogether returning to nothing.

Moreover, if no quality of color is assigned to first-beginnings and they are yet possessed of varied shapes out of which they beget colors of every kind and change them about by reason that it makes a great difference with what other seeds and in what position the seeds are severally held in union and what motions they mutually impart and receive, you can explain at once with the greatest ease why those things which just before were of a black color, may become all at once of marble whiteness; as the sea, when mighty winds have stirred up its waters, is changed into white waves of the brightness of marble: you may say that when the matter of that which we often see to be black has been mixed up anew and the arrangement of its first-beginnings has been changed and some have been added and some been taken away, the immediate result is that it appears bright and white. But if the waters of the sea consisted of azure seeds, they could in no wise become white; for however much you jumble together seeds which are azure, they can never pass into a marble color. But if the seeds which make up the one unmixed brightness of the sea are dyed some with one, some with other colors, just as often out of different forms and varied shapes something square and of a uniform figure is made up, in that case it were natural that as we see unlike forms contained in the square, so we should see in the water of the sea or in any other one and unmixed brightness colors widely unlike and different to one another.

Moreover the unlike figures do not in the least hinder or prevent the whole figure from being a square on the outside; but the various colors of things are a let and hindrance to the whole things being of a uniform brightness.

Then too the reason which leads and draws us on sometimes to assign colors to the first-beginnings of things, falls to the ground, since white things are not produced from white, nor those which are black from black, but out of things of various colors. For white things will much more readily rise up and be born from no color than from a black or any other color which thwarts and opposes it. Moreover since colors cannot exist without light and first-beginnings of things do not come out into the light, you may be sure they are clothed with no color. For what color can there be in total darkness? Nay it changes in the light itself according as its brightness comes from a straight or slanting stroke of light. After this fashion the down which encircles and crowns the nape and throat of doves shows itself in the sun: at one time it is ruddy with the hue of bright pyropus; at another it appears by a certain way of looking at it to blend with coral-red green emeralds. The tail of the peacock when it is saturated with abundant light, changes in like fashion its colors as it turns about. And since these colors are begotten by a certain stroke of light, sure enough you must believe that they cannot be produced without it.

Bailey:

Come now, listen to discourse gathered by my joyful labour, lest by chance you should think that these white things, which you perceive shining bright before your eyes are made of white first-beginnings, or that things which are black are born of black seeds; or should believe that things which are steeped in any other colour you will, bear this colour because the bodies of matter are dyed with a colour like it. For the bodies of matter have no colour at all, neither like things nor again unlike them. And if by chance it seems to you that the mind cannot project itself into these bodies, you wander far astray. For since those born blind, who have never descried the light of the sun, yet know bodies by touch, never linked with colour for them from the outset of their life, you may know that for our mind too, bodies painted with no tint may become a clear concept. Again, we ourselves feel that whatever we touch in blind darkness is not dyed with any colour. And since I convince you that this may be, I will now teach you that [the first-beginnings] are [deprived of all colour].

For any colour, whatever it be, changes into any other; but the first-beginnings ought in no wise to do this. For it must needs be that something abides unchangeable, that all things be not utterly brought to naught. For whenever a thing changes and passes out of its own limits, straightway this is the death of that which was before. Therefore take care not to dye with colour the seeds of things, lest you see all things altogether pass away to naught.

Moreover, if the nature of colour has not been granted to the first-beginnings, and yet they are endowed with diverse forms, out of which they beget and vary colours of every kind, forasmuch as it is of great matter with what others all the seeds are bound up, and in what position, and what movements they mutually give and receive, you can most easily at once give account, why those things which were a little while before of black colour, are able of a sudden to become of marble whiteness; as the sea, when mighty winds have stirred its level waters, is turned into white waves of shining marble. For you might say that when the substance of that which we often see black has been mingled up, and the order of its first-beginnings changed and certain things added and taken away, straightway it comes to pass that it is seen shining and white. But if the level waters of the ocean were made of sky-blue seeds, they could in no wise grow white. For in whatever way you were to jostle together seeds which are sky-blue, never can they pass into a marble colour.

But if the seeds which make up the single unmixed brightness of the sea are dyed with this colour and that, even as often out of different forms and diverse shapes some square thing is made up with a single shape, then it were natural that, as in the square we perceive that there are unlike forms, so we should perceive in the water of the ocean, or in any other single and unmixed brightness, colours far different and diverse one from another. Moreover, the unlike shapes do not a whit thwart and hinder the whole from being square in its outline; but the diverse colours in things do check and prevent the whole thing being of a single brightness. Then, further, the reason which leads us on and entices us sometimes to assign colours to the first-beginnings of things, is gone, since white things are not made of white, nor those which are seen black of black, but of diverse colours. And in very truth much more readily will white things be born and rise up out of no colour than out of black, or any other colour you will which fights with it and thwarts it.

Moreover, since colours cannot be without light nor do the first-beginnings of things come out into the light, you may know how they are not clothed with any colour. For what colour can there be in blind darkness? Nay even in the light it changes according as it shines brightly, struck with a straight or slanting beam of light; even as the plumage of doves, which is set about their throats and crowns their necks, is seen in the sunshine; for anon it comes to pass that it is red with bright garnet, sometimes in a certain view it comes to pass that it seems to mingle green emeralds among coral. And the tail of the peacock, when it is bathed in bounteous light, in like manner changes its colours as it moves round; and since these colours are begotten by a certain stroke of light, you may know that we must not think that they could come to be without it. And since the pupil of the eye receives in itself a certain kind of blow, when it is said to perceive white colour, and another again, when it perceives black and the rest, nor does it matter with what colour things you touch may choose to be endowed, but rather with what sort of shape they are fitted, you may know that the first-beginnings have no need of colours, but by their diverse forms produce diverse kinds of touch.

Welcome to Episode Thirty-One of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

Before we start, here are three ground rules.

First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it, which may or may not agree with what you here about Epicurus at other places today.

Second: We aren't talking about Lucretius with the goal of promoting any modern political perspective. Epicurus must be understood on his own, and not in terms of competitive schools which may seem similar to Epicurus, but are fundamentally different and incompatible, such as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, and Marxism.

Third: The essential base of Epicurean philosophy is a fundamental view of the nature of the universe. When you read the words of Lucretius you will find that Epicurus did not teach the pursuit of virtue or of luxury or of simple living. or science, as ends in themselves, but rather the pursuit of pleasure. From this perspective it is feeling which is the guide to life, and not supernatural gods, idealism, or virtue ethics. And as important as anything else, Epicurus taught that there is no life after death, and that any happiness we will ever have must come in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Now let's join the discussion with today's text:

Latin text location: Approximately lines 730-787

Munro Summary: Notes on the text

Daniel Brown:

Now, come on, attend to the rules which I have found, by a labor very delightful to myself; lest you should think those bodies that appear white to your eyes are composed of white seeds, for such as show black, are formed of black; or what color so-ever a thing wears, you should conclude the cause of it to be that the seeds of which it is made are stained with the same color; For the principles of matter are void of all color, both like or unlike what appears upon the bodies they produce. If you should chance to think that the Mind cannot possibly form an idea of seeds without color, you are under a strange mistake; for persons born blind, who never saw the light of the Sun, yet discover bodies by the touch, as if they had no manner of color belonging to them. So that seeds imbued with no color can offer themselves to our mind, and be conceived by us. And besides, the things we touch in the dark night we distinguish without any regard to the color they may otherwise appear in.

That seeds may be void of color I have shown; I shall now prove that they actually are so. Now every color may be changed one into another; but the principles of things will by no means admit of change, there necessarily must be something that remains immutable, lest all things should be utterly reduced to nothing; for whatsoever is changed, and breaks the bounds of its first nature, instantly dies, and is no more what first it was. Be cautious therefore, how you stain the seeds of things with color, lest all things should recur to nothing, and be utterly destroyed.

Besides, though Nature bestows no color upon seeds, yet they are endued with different figures, from which they form and vary the colors of every kind which show upon them. (For it is of great concern what seeds unite with others, and what positions they are preserved, and what motions they give and receive among themselves;) and thus you may readily account why things that just before appeared black, should suddenly look white. As the sea, when the rough winds enrage the waters, grows white with foaming waves. So you may say of what commonly appears black to us, when the seeds of which it is formed are mingled, and their order changed, when some new seeds are added, and some old ones are removed, the direct consequence is that its color is changed, and appears white. But if the water of the sea consisted essentially of blue particles, it could by no means change into a white color. Disturb the order of the seeds how you would, the principles that are blue would never pass into white.

But if you say that the seeds which make the sea look of one uniform white are stained with different colors, as a perfect square that is one figure, is made up of several bodies that are of several figures, then it would follow that, as we perfectly see that dissimilar figures which the square contains within it, so we might discover in the water of the sea, or in any other body of one simple color, the mixed and different colors from which that simple color proceeds.

Besides, the dissimilar figures that go to make up a square do by no means hinder that the surface of the body should appear square, but a mixed variety of colors will forever prevent that the surface of any body should appear of one fixed and uniform color. And then the very reason that would incline us sometimes to impute colors to seeds is by this means destroyed, or, in this case, white Bodies are not produced from white, or black from black, but from seeds of various colors. Now a white would much sooner proceed from seeds of no color at all, than from such as are black, or any other opposite color whatsoever.

Besides, since colors cannot appear without light, and since the seeds of things cannot appear in the light, you may thence conclude that they are covered with no colors at all. For how can any color show itself in the dark, which surround in the light itself, as it is differently struck either with a direct or oblique ray of light? After this manner, the plumes of doves, which grow about their neck, and are an ornament to it, show themselves in the sun. In one position they appear red like a fiery carbuncle, in another light, the greenness of the emerald is mixed with a sky blue. So, likewise, the tail of the peacock, all filled with light, changes its colors, as the rays strike directly or obliquely upon it. Since therefore colors are produced only by the strokes of light, we cannot suppose that they can possibly exist without it.

Munro:

Now mark, and apprehend precepts amassed by my welcome toil, lest haply you deem that those things which you see with your eyes to be bright, because white are formed of white principles, or that the things which are black are born from black seed, or that things which are steeped in any other color bear that color because the bodies of matter are dyed with a color like to it.For the bodies of matter have no color at all either like to the things or unlike.But if haply it seems to you that no impression of the mind can throw itself into these bodies, you wander far astray. For since men born blind who have never beheld the light of the sun, yet recognize bodies by touch, though linked with no color for them from their first birth, you are to know that bodies can fall under the ken of our mind too, though stained with no color. Again, whatever things we ourselves touch in the thick darkness, we do not perceive to be dyed with any color.And since I prove that this is the case, I will now show that there are things [which are possessed of no color].

Well any color without any exception changes into any other; and this first-beginnings ought in no wise to do: something unchangeable must remain over, that all things be not utterly reduced to nothing.For whenever a thing changes and quits its proper limits, at once this change of state is the death of that which it was before. Therefore mind not to dye with color the seeds of things, that you may not have all things altogether returning to nothing.

Moreover, if no quality of color is assigned to first-beginnings and they are yet possessed of varied shapes out of which they beget colors of every kind and change them about by reason that it makes a great difference with what other seeds and in what position the seeds are severally held in union and what motions they mutually impart and receive, you can explain at once with the greatest ease why those things which just before were of a black color, may become all at once of marble whiteness; as the sea, when mighty winds have stirred up its waters, is changed into white waves of the brightness of marble: you may say that when the matter of that which we often see to be black has been mixed up anew and the arrangement of its first-beginnings has been changed and some have been added and some been taken away, the immediate result is that it appears bright and white. But if the waters of the sea consisted of azure seeds, they could in no wise become white; for however much you jumble together seeds which are azure, they can never pass into a marble color. But if the seeds which make up the one unmixed brightness of the sea are dyed some with one, some with other colors, just as often out of different forms and varied shapes something square and of a uniform figure is made up, in that case it were natural that as we see unlike forms contained in the square, so we should see in the water of the sea or in any other one and unmixed brightness colors widely unlike and different to one another.

Moreover the unlike figures do not in the least hinder or prevent the whole figure from being a square on the outside; but the various colors of things are a let and hindrance to the whole things being of a uniform brightness.

Then too the reason which leads and draws us on sometimes to assign colors to the first-beginnings of things, falls to the ground, since white things are not produced from white, nor those which are black from black, but out of things of various colors. For white things will much more readily rise up and be born from no color than from a black or any other color which thwarts and opposes it. Moreover since colors cannot exist without light and first-beginnings of things do not come out into the light, you may be sure they are clothed with no color. For what color can there be in total darkness? Nay it changes in the light itself according as its brightness comes from a straight or slanting stroke of light. After this fashion the down which encircles and crowns the nape and throat of doves shows itself in the sun: at one time it is ruddy with the hue of bright pyropus; at another it appears by a certain way of looking at it to blend with coral-red green emeralds. The tail of the peacock when it is saturated with abundant light, changes in like fashion its colors as it turns about. And since these colors are begotten by a certain stroke of light, sure enough you must believe that they cannot be produced without it.

Bailey:

Come now, listen to discourse gathered by my joyful labour, lest by chance you should think that these white things, which you perceive shining bright before your eyes are made of white first-beginnings, or that things which are black are born of black seeds; or should believe that things which are steeped in any other colour you will, bear this colour because the bodies of matter are dyed with a colour like it. For the bodies of matter have no colour at all, neither like things nor again unlike them. And if by chance it seems to you that the mind cannot project itself into these bodies, you wander far astray. For since those born blind, who have never descried the light of the sun, yet know bodies by touch, never linked with colour for them from the outset of their life, you may know that for our mind too, bodies painted with no tint may become a clear concept. Again, we ourselves feel that whatever we touch in blind darkness is not dyed with any colour. And since I convince you that this may be, I will now teach you that [the first-beginnings] are [deprived of all colour].

For any colour, whatever it be, changes into any other; but the first-beginnings ought in no wise to do this. For it must needs be that something abides unchangeable, that all things be not utterly brought to naught. For whenever a thing changes and passes out of its own limits, straightway this is the death of that which was before. Therefore take care not to dye with colour the seeds of things, lest you see all things altogether pass away to naught.

Moreover, if the nature of colour has not been granted to the first-beginnings, and yet they are endowed with diverse forms, out of which they beget and vary colours of every kind, forasmuch as it is of great matter with what others all the seeds are bound up, and in what position, and what movements they mutually give and receive, you can most easily at once give account, why those things which were a little while before of black colour, are able of a sudden to become of marble whiteness; as the sea, when mighty winds have stirred its level waters, is turned into white waves of shining marble. For you might say that when the substance of that which we often see black has been mingled up, and the order of its first-beginnings changed and certain things added and taken away, straightway it comes to pass that it is seen shining and white. But if the level waters of the ocean were made of sky-blue seeds, they could in no wise grow white. For in whatever way you were to jostle together seeds which are sky-blue, never can they pass into a marble colour.

But if the seeds which make up the single unmixed brightness of the sea are dyed with this colour and that, even as often out of different forms and diverse shapes some square thing is made up with a single shape, then it were natural that, as in the square we perceive that there are unlike forms, so we should perceive in the water of the ocean, or in any other single and unmixed brightness, colours far different and diverse one from another. Moreover, the unlike shapes do not a whit thwart and hinder the whole from being square in its outline; but the diverse colours in things do check and prevent the whole thing being of a single brightness. Then, further, the reason which leads us on and entices us sometimes to assign colours to the first-beginnings of things, is gone, since white things are not made of white, nor those which are seen black of black, but of diverse colours. And in very truth much more readily will white things be born and rise up out of no colour than out of black, or any other colour you will which fights with it and thwarts it.

Moreover, since colours cannot be without light nor do the first-beginnings of things come out into the light, you may know how they are not clothed with any colour. For what colour can there be in blind darkness? Nay even in the light it changes according as it shines brightly, struck with a straight or slanting beam of light; even as the plumage of doves, which is set about their throats and crowns their necks, is seen in the sunshine; for anon it comes to pass that it is red with bright garnet, sometimes in a certain view it comes to pass that it seems to mingle green emeralds among coral. And the tail of the peacock, when it is bathed in bounteous light, in like manner changes its colours as it moves round; and since these colours are begotten by a certain stroke of light, you may know that we must not think that they could come to be without it. And since the pupil of the eye receives in itself a certain kind of blow, when it is said to perceive white colour, and another again, when it perceives black and the rest, nor does it matter with what colour things you touch may choose to be endowed, but rather with what sort of shape they are fitted, you may know that the first-beginnings have no need of colours, but by their diverse forms produce diverse kinds of touch.

Welcome to Episode Thirty-One of Lucretius Today.

Episode 31 of the Lucretius Today podcast is now available. This week we have only two of our regular four panelists, so rather than read a new section of text we went back to pay further attention to the issues raised in Episode 30. We read several reader comments from the Epicureanfriends . com forum (Don and Godfrey) which bear on the same issue: the example of Polyaenus, who was reputed to have been a great mathematician but allegedly gave up (or reduced) his science focus when he became an Epicurean. Many aspects of that story are questionable but we will do the best we can to untangle the issue of "who needs a philosophy." As always let us know if you have any comments or questions either in the thread below or at Epicureanfriends . com. Thanks for listening!

#Polyaenus

Yes Lukel, try to check in periodically and give us updates as you make progress, run into obstacles, or whatever. News of any kind, good or bad, would probably be useful to the group since this is the kind of project most all of us would be interested in.

Wonderful Joshua! Thank you very much for doing this and telling us about it! I think Koen was probably very wise to republish the site exactly as it was before - who (who might have a right to) could complain about that? I know that circumstances will control, and that indeed the ancient Epicureans discussed that it is justified to charge for philosophical guidance, but I strongly suspect that most truly Epicurean-minded people are very liberal on their "intellectual property" claims (liberal meaning that they grant free use liberally

Don just for the record I see you searched http://epicurism.info/ and that's the info I get too. I would really be curious to know because they sure did a good job of lifting the old contents.

Joshua that looks good. Unfortunately i do not know any leads on who resurrected Eric's site.

As to that particular image - https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection…=0&rpp=20&pos=1 We see that one used all the time and it being public domain may explain it.

Which is a shame.

I have to say that my personal opinion is that is the LEAST flattering portrayal of Epicurus in existence. With the broken eyebrow, he looks confused or resigned or 'stoned,' which is why I never use that one in any of my work. Of course I generally bite my tongue when others use it though At least it's not one of those older portrayals of a bald or other wise totally "wrong" portraits - not Epicurus at all - that we sometimes see used, such as:.

That "bald" Epicurus is the worst, but a close runner up is the broken eyebrow version:

pasted-from-clipboard.png

I suppose it's possible that this bust was mutilated by the Christians, so maybe it's a badge of honor, but in this view and lighting I think he actually looks sad:

But of course, to each his own

i know nothing about copyright law either, but I too see these same images everywhere and I would imagine the worst that would happen is you eventually get asked to take it down, which is probably a one in a thousand chance, or less. I never studied the Digital Millennium Copyright Act either but maybe if someone were concerned they would even have to issue a take-down notice first? I wouldn't imagine that anything major bad could happen except in situations where maybe someone takes a Getty or other commercial image and then crops off the copyright watermark, and even then I have to wonder what's the worst that could happen for a project like this.

Looking forward to hearing the first episode!

Perhaps in the distant future there will one day be successful Epicurean organizations in "real life" (not just on the internet) at both local and regional and larger levels. There is nothing of the sort in existence today, but for real people to embrace and live by Epicurean principles on any kind of scale, organization is required. The enemies of Epicurean philosophy are well organized and have thousands of years of experience in suppressing Epicurean ideas. The purpose of this subforum is to explore ideas for future organizations of Epicureans.

The first and main article I am aware of that is relevant to this topic is DeWitt's "Organization and Procedure In Epicurean Groups." Let's use this thread and subforum for general brainstorming on what kinds of organization might eventually be possible, and how we get one day to that point.

File

"Organization and Procedure in Epicurean Groups" - Norman DeWitt - 1936

DeWitt's summary of what is known about organization and procedure in ancient Epicurean Groups as published in the July 1936 edition of Classical Philology.

Cassius

November 22, 2017 at 8:29 AM

Quote from Don

It's not enough to use reason, we need evidence as "seen" by our senses (and the extension of our senses through instruments etc.).

I agree. We need to be able to articulate WHY that is so. The issue is so obscured in common discussion that many people seem to have become convinced that there is something called "reason" which makes evidence unnecessary, so it no longer appears to go without saying that "reason" requires evidence, and then explaining what kind of evidence we're talking about, and why it is in fact legitimate to rely on the evidence of the canonical faculties even though we are the first to admit that the information they provide may not in every instance be true to what we regard as the ultimate facts. it's the circular issue that Epicurus and Lucretius address directly: Ultimately there is NOTHING that can be used to justify an opinion (or reason itself) other than the evidence we obtain through the canonical faculties.

Quote from Don

There are some things that are "real" or true for the individual but there is also an objective reality we all need to agree on.

Yes I agree with that. A significant part of coming to an agreement would be to define the terms as clearly as possible so we see if we can't come to a common understanding of how we are using those words "real" and "true." And I think that issue is what started some of the recent conversation as you were pointing out that it probably isn't sufficient to say that "we all just know" what "real" and "true" mean. ("We all just know" not being a good description of anyone here's position, but just a stand-in for the question of how we go about coming to agreement.)

You know "it strikes me" (a good Epicurean expression, right?) as a good idea to reemphasize not only the operation of the canon but also some of its most important implications.

Would it be fair to say that those include?

1 - This is an Epicurean response to total skepticism. It's the theory that tells us that when used properly and under the right conditions there are some opinions that can be considered to be ""true" as opposed to "false."

2 - This is an Epicurean response to the suggestion that nothing in life is "real." A premise of the canon is that these faculties are providing to us what is "real to us" in life.

3 - This may be just another way of saying item one, but this approach allows us to affirm that knowledge is possible because we define knowledge as that which is established by the use of the canonical faculties, which is the proper way of defining knowledge, rather than requiring supernatural omniscience.

4 - it's an explanation of a valid human approach to consciousness which shows that it all can occur in a reliable way without divine inspiration.

5 - it's an explanation that allows us to reject Platonic rationalism by insisting that whatever is the subject of our reasoning be validated by one of more of the canonical faculties.

There is probably a lot more to say on this but I wanted to interject these first thoughts into the discussion so we can keep oriented not only to some of the procedural issues (how the canon is non-rational or pre-rational, how the three legs are separate but work together) but also the significance of why the entire topic is important.

Quote from Godfrey

I keep leaning toward the notion that they function together as a process, but I may be bringing that to it from my personal bias.

... Or else you are mind-melding with Norman DeWitt, because I think that's his position too Godfrey you've read DeWitt's chapter on anticipations? He has a very involved discussion of this functioning that I can't say I agree with 100% but makes a lot of sense and definitely ought to be part of your reading as you think about this

Quote from Godfrey

But in thinking of it in terms of a process, the prolepses or feelings aren't activated without a stimulus.

I think that is probably correct too. That steps us closer toward the subject that none of us (to my knowledge) have ever really dived into -- the "images" which are distinct and not received through the sight - which seem to be a MUCH more important part of all these processes than most people talk about much nowadays. Don't let me get us off too far on that tangent, but in the context of when stimuli are involved, remember this passage from Cicero to Cassius:

Quote

For it somehow happens, that whenever I write anything to you, you seem to be at my very elbow; and that, not by way of visions of images, as your new friends term them, who believe that even mental visions are conjured up by what Catius calls spectres (for let me remind you that Catius the Insubrian, an Epicurean, who died lately, gives the name of spectres to what the famous Gargettian [Epicurus], and long before that Democritus, called images).

2 But, even supposing that the eye can be struck by these spectres because they run up against it quite of their own accord, how the mind can be so struck is more than I can see. It will be your duty to explain to me, when you arrive here safe and sound, whether the spectre of you is at my command to come up as soon as the whim has taken me to think about you - and not only about you, who always occupy my inmost heart, but suppose I begin thinking about the Isle of Britain, will the image of that wing its way to my consciousness?

http://www.attalus.org/translate/cassius.html

Godfrey you are asking the question that leads me to my own conclusion: How are all three legs of the canon supposed to work and what makes them canonical?

I've always come to the conclusion that in order for the legs of the canon to serve as criteria of truth, they had to function "automatically" without the input of reason/opinion. Therefore I have always rejected the view that anticipations could be "concepts," because in my view that creates a feedback loop. If the opinion we form after experience becomes part of our standard of truth, then that just doesn't work if the main feature of the canon is that it is pre-rational.

Now in my mind there is a possibility that the anticipation faculty is some kind of "organizational" capacity that can be made sharper over time, just as perhaps our ear for music or our ability to pick out detail in sight might improve with experience. But that would just be improvement in the working of a non-rational faculty, and if you consider concepts like "ox" to be subjects of anticipations, then in my mind that's a non-starter. "Ox" is a human-developed category of living things summarized in a particular word "ox," and it's going to be a matter of opinion where the dividing line between an ox and a cow and a horse and sheep really lies.

So I think DeWitt is correct in ruling out the possibility of there being an "anticipation" of a concrete particular like an ox or Plato.

The process of deciding whether the thing headed toward us is an ox, or Plato, clearly does involve some kind of process in which the mind works to narrow down the possibilities and fit the data to a pattern we have developed over time, but at the point we're saying "that's an ox because it matches our definition of an ox," and at that point we are pretty far from what Epicurus was considering to be a faculty analogous to seeing and hearing.

Now being a lawyer I think I can take the other side of that argument. I can argue that, "Yes, since human experience isn't absolute and so much is relative to our perspective, then we should consider our previously-formed concepts and opinions to be a part of our canon of "truth." In saying that we would have to emphasize that "truth" is not absolute, so it's ok to incorporate own on reasoning conclusions as part of what we think is true.

And it seems that the "later" or "the Epicureans generally" did take that course, thereby creating a fourth leg of the standard of truth.

However DeWitt concludes that that was a big mistake, and I agree with DeWitt. Once you admit that the product of conceptual reasoning itself is a part of your measure of "truth," to me you are on the slippery slope to Platonic rationalism, because your holding the opinions of your own mind as equal in authority to the promptings of nature.

[Edit: I made some pretty significant revisions to clean up my poor typing and phrasing hopefully without changing the meaning.]

Don I expected that you would not yet be satisfied. Have you yet gotten to the chapter in DeWitt where he talks about his view of anticipations?

We do probably have two very separate issues here:

(1) The practical meaning/definition/view of "truth"

(2) The nature and use of "anticipations."

My current thought is that I go very much along the lines of Godfrey's quote from "A Few Days In Athens" as to "truth," and as to anticipations, I am pretty much with DeWitt but with a focus on anticipations being a "faculty" (like sight) which makes it critical to distinguish the faculty from any single "perception" that arises from the faculty.

I think it is very very easy to equate an anticipation with a particular conclusion, and I think that is exactly what Bailey and probably Tsouna are doing, and I think they are wrong about that. I think that anticipations are distinct perceptions (just like from 5 senses and feelings) from which we draw opinions, but blurring the line between the perception and our opinion or conclusion is a major error.

Even DeWitt seems to me to be too close to equating an anticipation with a particular opinion, but if you read him closely enough I don't think he really goes over the line. For example when we talk about having an anticipation of justice, I don't think that means that our particular anticipation equates to a conclusion that a particular situation is just or unjust. My view is that it's a faculty that allows us to recognize that what is being observed is something that our minds are disposed to file under a category that "justice," but that all the conclusions about whether the particular situation is just or unjust are in the realm of opinion rather than in the realm of the anticipation faculty. Where I think DeWitt is most correct in ridiculing the idea that anticipations allow us to identify cows or horses. I think that process, which is featured in Diogenes Laertius, is something else (probably "conceptual reasoning"), not a description of the faculty of anticipations.

Hello and welcome to the forum @Billytea !

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.
2. "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt
3. "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius
4. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
5. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
6. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
7. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
8. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
9. Plato's Philebus
10. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
11. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!