Posts by Cassius

Corrspondence between Cicero and Cassius Longinus, highly relevant here and perhaps even directly on point. The exchange seems to be joking, but Cassius seems to be denying Cicero's extremely expansive interpretation (intentionally derogatory) reference to the role of images:

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Cassius had recently become a follower of the Epicurean school of philosophy.

[15.16] Cicero to Cassius

[Rome, January, 45 B.C.]

L I expect you must be just a little ashamed of yourself now that this is the third letter that has caught you before you have sent me a single leaf or even a line. But I am not pressing you, for I shall look forward to, or rather insist upon, a longer letter. As for myself, if I always had somebody to trust with them, I should send you as many as three an hour. For it somehow happens, that whenever I write anything to you, you seem to be at my very elbow; and that, not by way of visions of images, as your new friends term them, who believe that even mental visions are conjured up by what Catius calls spectres (for let me remind you that Catius the Insubrian, an Epicurean, who died lately, gives the name of spectres to what the famous Gargettian [Epicurus], and long before that Democritus, called images).

2 But, even supposing that the eye can be struck by these spectres because they run up against it quite of their own accord, how the mind can be so struck is more than I can see. It will be your duty to explain to me, when you arrive here safe and sound, whether the spectre of you is at my command to come up as soon as the whim has taken me to think about you - and not only about you, who always occupy my inmost heart, but suppose I begin thinking about the Isle of Britain, will the image of that wing its way to my consciousness?

3 But of this later on. I am only sounding you now to see in what spirit you take it. For if you are angry and annoyed, I shall have more to say, and shall insist upon your being reinstated in that school of philosophy, out of which you have been ousted "by violence and an armed force."

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[15.19] Cassius to Cicero

[Brundisium, latter half of January, 45 B.C.]

L I hope that you are well. I assure you that on this tour of mine there is nothing that gives me more pleasure to do than to write to you; for I seem to be talking and joking with you face to face. And yet that does not come to pass because of those spectres; and, by way of retaliation for that, in my next letter I shall let loose upon you such a rabble of Stoic boors that you will proclaim Catius a true-born Athenian.

2 I am glad that our friend Pansa was sped on his way by universal goodwill when he left the city in military uniform, and that not only on my own account, but also, most assuredly, on that of all our friends. .....

I think it would be helpful to post here some of the passages from DeWitt where these issues are discussed:

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MIND AS A SUPERSENSE

It is part of the psychology of Epicurus that the mind under certain conditions is capable of functioning as an organ of sense; thus the procedure of Lucretius is quite regular in discussing the topic immediately after sensation. The exposition presumes certain subsidiary ideas, such as the gradations of atoms, the irrational nature of sensation, the faculty psychology, and a phenomenon of double reactions.

The gradation of atoms is basic to the account of sensation. The conformations that cause vision, for instance, while finer and more mobile than those of odors, are not sinuous enough to penetrate walls, as sounds do. Vision, moreover, is subject to another limitation: unless the idols be discharged from an object in plain view and so constitute a steady stream, no sufficient pressure on the eyes results and no sensation registers itself. Of the random and vagrant idols only the mind can take cognizance because of the extreme mobility of its component atoms and the resulting supersensitivity.

In order to discern the circumstances under which this takes place the principle must be invoked that sensation is irrational. It merely delivers a stimulus and this may fail of registering itself. It is possible to hear without listening and to see without observing.

Down to this point there is nothing peculiar in the thought of Epicurus. The rest of the teaching is his own. He thinks of the mind as a mechanism for processing sensations. Its activity may be automatic or volitional. The automatic mind, though normally dependable, is capable of erring; it may report the square tower to be round. To guard against such errors and to correct them when once made is the function of the volitional mind, directed by reason. Unlike the automatic mind, it pays attention to all sensations and corrects the false by calling the true to witness.

In dreamful sleep, according to Epicurus, the erring, automatic mind alone is active. Bodily sensation, memory and volition are all quiescent. Under these circumstances the stage is cleared for the entrance of all the random, floating idols that survive from the swift, coherent streams that under waking conditions press upon the organs of sense and register themselves as sensations. Of these errant, subsensory idols the passive mind, partly because of its relief from interference and control, and partly because of the supermobility and supersensitivity of its component atoms, alone is capable of taking cognizance. Thus it functions as a supersense.

To complete this exposition a subsidiary doctrine of the two reactions must be invoked. Let it be assumed that the image of a centaur presents itself to the dreamer; it may even be a galloping centaur. This acts as a stimulus to the mind and causes a reaction, kinesis. This is not the end, however, because a second reaction follows and the automatic mind registers a recognition: "It is a centaur." The dream carries the conviction of reality because the memory and the volitional mind, which is rational, are quiescent. Thus the deceitfulness of dreams is an error of the same kind as that of the automatic mind that judges the square tower to be round. The waking mind, in command of the total experience, knows that no such things as centaurs exist.

Even this is not the whole story. The mind is capable of functioning as a supersense even in the hours of waking. It loses this capacity if the being is in a turmoil through fears and anxieties. Thus Lucretius warns Memmius that, unless free from such fears "you will never be able to capture with unruffled peace of mind the idols that from the blessed bodies of the gods float into the minds of men." ⁵² These idols belong in that isolated, vagrant class of images, which, not being part of a pressing stream, are imperceptible to fleshly sensation and register themselves only upon the mind and only under restricted conditions.

The caution must be observed, however, that visions of the mind do not enjoy the status of criteria of truth. They do possess value but only at the level of circumstantial evidence; they afford reason for believing, by way of example, that the bodies of the gods are anthropomorphic.

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MIND

It is now possible to summarize the psychology of Epicurus and to describe with more precision and detail his teaching concerning the mind and its activities.

The human being consists of body and soul, both alike corporeal by nature. The two are born at the same time and grow and decline in pace with one another. They are coterminous and cosensitive. They function as a unit and reactions are psychosomatic.

The soul consists of atoms surpassing others in fineness, smoothness, and sphericity and consequently in mobility. All the component atoms are in contact throughout the body, unless in the condition of sleep, when the contiguity is broken, part of the soul escaping from the containing body, part retreating deep within. In daydreaming -a less extensive but similar condition arises. Among the component atoms gradations of mobility exist, the less mobile being at the periphery and associated with the operations of sense, which are all varieties of touch. The most mobile of the component atoms constitute the rational part of the soul and are situated deep within the breast. This location is no less fixed than that of the ears or eyes, because the mind is an organ of the being no less than they.

Although it is usual to speak of this part of the soul as rational, the adjective is inadequate. The so-called rational part could with equal justice be called the emotional part, because fears and joys, according to Epicurus, have their seat in the same place.⁵⁷ In this instance the Latin language is for once superior to Greek in respect of terminology. The word mens is capable of denoting both mental and emotional aspects of the mind's activity, while animus can be equated with Greek dianoia, "intellect," and anima may be used as equivalent to psyche, "soul," including all capacities, rational, emotional, and sensory.

The activity of the rational part, dianoia, animus, is either voluntary or involuntary, that is, either automatic or volitional. The character of the automatic mind that most impressed Epicurus was its speed. Its function is to receive and process sensations and under normal conditions this is done instantaneously: to cite trite examples, the individual is unerringly warned of ditches and precipices and other dangers in his path. It is this automatic mind that takes care of man in his daily rounds on the physical or somatic level of life.

The Sensations are irrational and merely register a stimulus, kinesis. It is the quick and automatic mind that with the aid of memory registers a recognition and says, "This is honey." It is likewise the mind that makes the generalization "Honey is sweet." These are "fantastic perceptions of the intelligence." They do not possess the rank of criteria because they are not a direct contact between mind and matter but are rather the result of a process or operation. "Fantastic" means "immediate." ^5S

Under the abnormal conditions of either genuine dreaming or daydreaming the supersensitive mind is capable of operating as a sense, registering the incidence of those vagrant idols which, being detached from visual streams, are incapable of exerting pressure and stimulating the senses of the flesh. These visions, however, do not rank as criteria, being subject to no correction by the conscious, rational mind.

Even under normal conditions, however, the automatic mind is liable to err. This error often consists in adding to and subtracting from the data of sense. For instance, to the observer the moon may seem to be moving and the drifting clouds to be standing still; or the shore may seem to be moving and the passing ship to be stationary; or the anchored ship may seem to the passenger to be moving and the passing ship to be motionless. In all of these examples the error is not in sensation but in the automatic mind, which adds motion to standing objects and subtracts it from moving objects. Epicurus calls this error "the addition of opinion," but the fact that it also includes subtraction is recognized by the statement that sensation "is neither stimulated by itself nor, when stimulated by an external object, is it capable of adding or subtracting anything." ⁵⁹ In such instances Epicurus is at pains to point out that the reaction caused by sensation is followed by a second reaction within the observer "which is connected with 'the fantastic perception' but distinct from it." ⁶⁰ This second, involuntary reaction is the source of error.

It is another shortcoming of the automatic mind that its operations confine themselves to the sensations of the moment. It must consequently be subjected to correction by the volitional mind, which is truly rational. The latter is aware of the danger of error; it remembers that the value of sensations depends upon distances; it recollects past sensations; it takes cognizance of all sensations and it appeals to the observations of others.⁶¹

Unlike the automatic mind that warns the observer of ditches and precipices, the volitional mind takes cognizance of the Anticipations, that is, the innate ideas of justice, of the divine nature, and other such abstractions, and it puts to the test every law of the land to determine whether it harmonizes with the innate idea of justice. The volitional mind also takes cognizance of the Feelings, that is, those fears and anxieties which warn the individual of the false opinions concerning things of supreme importance, the causes of the worst turmoil in the soul.

The status of the volitional mind, which alone is truly rational, is that of a judge presiding in court. The litigants are truth and error. The role of the Sensations, Anticipations, and Feelings is that of witnesses. The judge, as becomes his office, rejects no evidence that is pertinent; he distinguishes between mere opinion and knowledge, between the idea that awaits confirmation by additional evidence and that which is already certain, between the immediate, dependable sensation and the deceptive, distant view, between false pleasures and wholesome pleasures and between true and false concepts of abstract truth. If the mind falls short of performing these judicial functions, the conflict in the soul will be prolonged and no satisfying decision between truth and error will be attainable. This is the gist of Authorized Doctrine 24.

The point that bears the stress in the above exposition is the danger of indecision, which is even more destructive of happiness than false opinion. For example, it is worse to suspect the truth of the tales about Acheron than to believe in them.⁶² Again, the sole reason for acquiring knowledge of celestial phenomena is "serenity of mind and an unshakable faith." ⁶³ The lack of faith, apistia, is of the same effect as indecision, akrisia. Both spell turmoil.

This equivalence of indecision with lack of faith is made clear in two sayings. The first is Doctrine 22: "We must take into our reckoning the established telos [pleasure] and all the manifest evidence, to which we refer the opinions we form. If we fail to do so, our whole life will be filled with indecision and turmoil." The second dictum is Vatican Saying 57: "His whole life will be thrown into confusion through lack of faith and will be wrecked." Epicurus was in the process of discovering the part played by faith in the happy life. In so doing he was preparing popular thought for the acceptance of the New Testament, where faith at last attained to full stature as a virtue. The difference between faith as it first emerged and the perfected faith resides in the fact that the former was faith in the truth of doctrine while the latter was faith in Jesus Christ as a redeemer.

With the idea of mind as a judicial faculty Epicurus anticipated tin practical reason of modern philosophy; in the Platonic vocabulary it was phronesis. Describing it by paraphrase in his usual way, he called it "sober calculation" and assigned to it the function "of investigating the reasons for every choice and avoidance and of expelling false opinions, the chief cause of the turbulence that takes possession of the souls of men." It was to him the starting point for all the virtues and for this reason more precious than philosophy, by which he meant what is now called pure reason, and when he says "it teaches the impossibility of living happily without living according to reason, honor and justice," ^M he means that geometry was incapable of imparting this lesson. It is true that geometry is not mentioned, but by implication the Platonic program of education, based upon mathematics, is being repudiated.

As an essential precaution it deserves to be emphasized that this concept of the rational mind as a judge, soberly weighing the evidence contributed by the Sensations, Anticipations, and Feelings, which perform the office of witnesses, constitutes a frame of reference without which the teachings of Epicurus are bound to be misapprehended. This frame, moreover, is incomplete without the Twelve Elementary Principles, which are, as it were, a sort of legal code, in harmony with which the judging mind must reach its decisions.

That these Twelve Principles were the starting point for the Epicurean program of education is unmistakable whether from the Little Epitome or Lucretius. The truth of them was not demonstrated inductively from sensation but established deductively and only confirmed by sensation. If this involves a logical fallacy or a philosophical defect, it must be borne in mind that Epicurus was not constructing a theory of knowledge but a philosophy that would serve as a road to happiness. This called for a set of principles, a judging mind, and dependable witnesses, all of which his system furnished.

It was his view that only notions accessory or inferential to the Twelve Principles, such as the nature of the soul, had their origin in sensations. If this is a fallacy or a defect, it should be borne in mind that he was not working out a psychology but merely showing how his system based upon principles, the practical reason, and evidence was intended to operate. The notion of consciousness, as employed in modern psychology, lay outside of his problem and so he had no need to deal with the content of consciousness.

It should nevertheless be remembered that a misunderstanding of his teaching gave rise to Gassendi's doctrine "that there is nothing in the intellect which has not been in the senses" and that this in turn was a starting point for John Locke and modern empiricism. Epicurus was not himself an empiricist but rather an intuitionist: the mind of the infant was to his thinking not a blank tablet but already laced with the faint outlines of ideas that should gradually acquire definition in pace with experience, instruction, and reflection.

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After reading all this, considering what is said in the podcast, and combining it all together, I am thinking that among many other implications it is much easier to see the role of images of the divine playing an important part in Epicurus' thinking:

Episode Sixty of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. In this episode, we discuss dreams and the mind's use of images. There is some challenging material in this episode, especially as it relates to Epicurus' view of the use of images and how that may or may not relate to memory. We encourage you to listen and post any comments or questions in the thread below.

We just finished recording this one and I will try to get it posted as soon as possible. When you hear the episode, you'll see that one of our topics is to what extent this section describes a theory that may go so far as to be Epicurus' entire explanation of what we might think of as "memory." In the episode you will hear me resist that conclusion, but Elayne in particular makes good arguments that that might be the case, so please consider and if possible make comments in particular about that when you hear the episode.

Even if so, thanks for posting that. There's a lot to be learned from observing people who accept certain parts of Epicurus while rejecting other important parts. Seems to me that you can definitely see patterns in people picking and choosing only certain parts, and thinking about how they make those choices helps expose key questions that are very helpful to trace down and be clear on ourselves.

Thanks for the detailed post Titus. Here are my thoughts:

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Many thinkers only refer to the ethics as presented in letter to Menoeceus (additionally Principal Doctrines, Vatican Sayings) but do not apply Canonics and Physics, which they consider as a different point of interest. For a person who studies all three main branches of Epicurean philosophy and even tries to combine and interconnect, it's something different.

I very much agree with that. It seems to me that most of the people whose interpretations I find reason to criticize focus almost exclusively on one aspect (most frequently, the letter to Meoneceus) and act as if the epistemology and physics are irrelevant. In a nearby (in time) thread I think we see an example of that in an American philosopher (Pierce) who embraces one aspect of Epicurus to support his own views, but rejects the rest of Epicurus. I think it's necessary to incorporate them all to get a balanced picture.

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In my personal opinion, Epicurus is neither looking for painlessness nor for pleasure as pleasure on its own. He tries to find out what a human is in itself. This is why he focuses on senses, feelings and anticipations.

I agree that Epicurus is very concerned about looking to Nature to determine what a human is in itself, and that he does not just start with pleasure as the goal without any reason. But I would have to differ and say that the reliable texts when read as a whole (including the material cited in this thread) are clear that Epicurus held "pleasure" to be the goal and not painlessness. When you say he focuses on senses / feelings / anticipations I think that is where the answer is found, in that it seems to me that he is using "feelings" (or whatever word one prefers in translation) in general as the basis for choice, with pleasure being the positive thing to choose and pain being the negative to avoid, which is both a theoretical statement of the goal (pleasure) and a practical way of evaluating each decision (does it lead to greater pleasure or greater pain). I think the multiple perspective (incorporating both theory and practice) is how it is kept in mind that even when you are sometimes choosing pain in the short term, you are really always choosing pleasure (because you view the long term / total result),

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Consequently, satisfying all natural and necessery desires is the highest level of being.

This is a phrasing that I find very troublesome whenever I run into it, but it is definitely a conclusion a lot of people reach. For me, there is no way to carry such a formulation to its logical conclusion without accepting that living in a cave on bread and water is the course most to be desired for everyone. Epicurus himself certainly did not do that, and that observation alone is sufficient (to me) to show that such an interpretation would not be valid. I am sure that an elaborate and detailed rendering of such a phrase, by going through each word and applying very specific definitions, could be employed to save the formula from that result, but I just don't think Epicurus intended for his students to take that path.

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This is why Epicurus advices only to fullfill natural but not necessery desires if they do not harm.

I would repeat the same observation as I just made. There are literally (to my knowlege) zero exampled of actual Epicureans who pursued lives of asceticism and minimalism. Again, I realize that the formulation can probably be explained in a way that allowed the activism of a Cassius Longinus or the movement in the highest circles of Roman life of Atticus and other leading Romans who embraced Epicurus, but they had access to far more authoritative texts and teachers than we do, and they apparently found no contradiction in their lifestyles and fundamental Epicurean teaching. Maybe in fact there was a large body of ancient Epicureans who competed with the Stoics and the various ascetics in pursuing only that which was necessary to sustain their lives, but if there were such applications that seem to have escaped mention in the texts I have seen.

Much more likely to me is the deduction from such references as are made in the Ciceronian comments set out here that Epicurus would have been fully aware of the option of setting up painlessness as the real goal, as set forth by Hieronymous, and that Epicurus rejected that option in favor of identifying the goal as "pleasure" - which he then proceeded to broadly define as including all types of physical and mental pleasures.

As in the concluding sections of Diogenes of Laertius:

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Epicurus differs from the Cyrenaics about pleasure. For they do not admit static pleasure, but only that which consists in motion. But Epicurus admits both kinds both in the soul and in the body, as he says in the work on Choice and Avoidance and in the book on The Ends of Life and in the first book On Lives and in the letter to his friends in Mytilene. Similarly, Diogenes in the 17th book of Miscellanies and Metrodorus in the Timocrates speak thus: ‘Pleasure can be thought of both as consisting in motion and as static.’ And Epicurus in the work on Choice speaks as follows: ‘Freedom from trouble in the mind and from pain in the body are static pleasures, but Joy and exultation are considered as active pleasures involving motion. '

A further difference from the Cyrenaics: they thought that bodily pains were worse than those of the soul, and pointed out that offenses are visited by bodily punishment. But Epicurus held that the pains of the soul are worse, for the flesh is only troubled for the moment, but the soul for past, present, and future. In the same way the pleasures of the soul are greater. As proof that pleasure is the end, he points out that all living creatures as soon as they are born take delight in pleasure, but resist pain by a natural impulse apart from reason. Therefore we avoid pain by instinct, just as Heracles, when he is being devoured by the shirt of Nessus, cries aloud,

Or maybe I could summarize my views on all of this subject as "Like Epicurus, I refuse to give up joy and exultation!"

Thank you Godfrey I had never heard of any of that. Two parts I note in the article of special interest to me are:

This is a point made in AA Long's "Chance and Natural Law in Determinism" and I have always thought it to be hugely important to keep in mind: Yes the swerve exists, but it generally does not break through to the macroscopic level so as to result in chaos. In my view people tend to talk about the significance of the swerve too broadly without noting this very important limitation.

Also:

So in the end Pierce seems to be very far from Epicurus, as the article's conclusion admits. Sounds like he is pretty much someone who agrees with Epicurus in opposition to hard determinism, but really doesn't agree with Epicurus on much else.

Welcome to Episode Sixty of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

For anyone who is not familiar with our podcast, please check back to Episode One for a discussion of our goals and our ground rules. If you have any question about that, please be sure to contact us at Epicureanfriends.com for more information.

In this episode 60 - we will discuss dreams, and the mind's use of images.

Our text comes from Latin Lines 907-1036 of Book Four.

Now let's join the discussion with Charles reading today's text.

Munro Notes

907-928: sleep takes place, when the soul is scattered in the body, and part of it has gone out, part withdrawn into the depths of the body: only part however can go forth; else death would ensue; enough must stay behind to let sense be rekindled, as fire is rekindled when buried under the ashes.

929-961: sleep is thus produced: the body is constantly beaten upon by the outer air as well as by that which is inhaled by breathing; thus assailed within and without the body gives way, and the soul is disordered, part of it as has been said leaving the body, part withdraw- ing into its recesses, while the rest cannot perform its functions: thus the body too becomes languid and powerless: again sleep follows eating, because the food in passing into the system acts on it as the air does; and the disorder of the soul is then greater than ever.

962-1036: the dreams of men generally turn on what has chiefly occupied their waking thoughts, whether business or pleasure: it is the same with brutes too: again the passions which are strongest in men often display themselves in dreams, as well as other mental states.

Browne 1743

Next, how soft sleep dissolves the limbs in rest, and frees the mind from anxious care, I choose in few but sweetest numbers to explain; as the swan's short song is more melodious than the harsh noise of cranes scattered by winds through all the air. Hear me, my Memmius, with attentive ears and a discerning mind, lest what I shall prove, you think impossible to be; and so your mind refusing to admit the truth I shall relate, you make no progress in philosophy, when the fault is in yourself, that you will not see. And first, sleep comes on when the power of the soul, diffused through the limbs, part of it is thrown out and fled abroad, and part being squeezed more close retires further within; then are the limbs dissolved and grow weak. For without doubt the business of the soul is to stir up sense in us, which since sleep removes, we must conclude that the soul then is disturbed and driven abroad: Not the whole soul, for then the body would lie in the cold arms of eternal death; then no part of the soul would lie retired within the limbs, as a fire remains covered under a heap of ashes; from whence the senses might be kindled again through the body, as a flame is soon raised from hidden fire. But by what means this wonderful change is brought about, how the soul is thus disordered and the body languishes, I shall now explain. Do you see that I do not scatter my words unto the wind.

And first, the outward surface of bodies which are always touched by the adjacent air, must of necessity be struck by it and beaten with frequent blows; and for this reason all things almost are covered either with skin, or bristles, or shells, or buff, or bark. This air then, as it is drawn in and breathed out by respiration, strikes upon the inward parts of the body. Since therefore the body is beat upon from within and without, and since the strokes pierce through the little pores into the seeds and first principles of it, this cause a kind of ruin and destruction through all the limbs; the situation of the seeds, both of the body and mind, are disordered, so that part of the soul is forced out, and part retires and lurks close within, and the part that is diffused through the limbs is so broken and divided, that the seeds cannot unite to perform their mutual operations, for nature stops up all the passages of communication between them, and therefore the regular motions being exceedingly changed, the sense is entirely gone. Since therefore there is not power sufficient to support the limbs, the body becomes weak; all the members languish; the arms, the eyelids fall, and the knees sink under the weight of the body. Thus sleep follows when the belly is full, because food, when it is distributed through all the veins, has the same effect upon the soul as the air had; and that sleep is by much the soundest which you take when you are weary or full, because then more of the seeds being agitated and put into motion by the hard labour, mutually disturb and disorder one another. And for this reason the soul retires further within, and a greater part of it is thrown out, and the parts that remain within are the more separated and the further disjoined.

And then the business we more particularly follow, the affairs we are chiefly employed in, and what our mind is principally delighted with when we are awake, the same we are commonly conversant about when we are asleep. The lawyer is pleading of causes and making of statutes, the soldier is fighting and engaging in battles, the sailor is warring against the winds; for myself, I am always searching into the nature of things, and writing my discoveries in Latin verse; and so, many other arts and employments are commonly the empty entertainments of the minds of men when they are asleep. And they who spend their time in seeing plays for many days together, when those representations are no longer present to the waking senses, there still remain some open traces left in the mind, through which the images of those things find a passage, so that for many days after the whole performance is acting over again before their eyes; and even while they are awake they fancy they see the dancers leaping, and moving their active limbs, and hear the speaking strings; they see the same audience, the same variety of the scenes and decorations of the stage. So strong impressions do use and custom make upon us; such effects do the common business of life produce in the minds of men, and beasts likewise.

For you shall see the gallant Courser, when his limbs are at rest, to sweat in his sleep, to breath short, and, the barriers down, to lay himself out as it were on the full stretch for the prize. And hounds frequently in their soft sleep throw out their legs, and of a sudden yelp and snuff the air quick with their nose, as if they were full cry upon the foot of the deer; and when awake they still pursue the empty image of the game, as if they saw it run swiftly before them, till undeceived they quit the chase, and the fancied image vanishes away. And the fawning breed of house-dogs, that live at home, often rouse and shake the drowsy fit from their eyes, and start up of a sudden with their bodies, as if they saw a stranger or a face they had not been used to. The sharper the seeds are of which the images are formed, they strike in the sleep with the greater violence; so, many birds will fly about, and hide themselves in the inmost recesses of sacred groves by night, if in their soft sleep they see the hawk pursuing them upon the wing, or pouncing or engaging with his prey.

Munro 1886

Now by what means yon sleep lets a stream of repose over the limbs and dispels from the breast the cares of the mind, I will tell in sweetly worded rather than in many verses; as the short song of the swan is better than the loud noise of cranes scattered abroad amid the ethereal clouds of the south. Do you lend me a nice ear and a keen mind, that you may not deny what I say to be possible and secede with breast disdainfully rejecting the words of truth, you yourself being in fault the while and unable to discern. Sleep mainly takes place when the force of the soul has been scattered about through the frame, and in part has been forced abroad and taken its departure, and in part has been thrust back and has withdrawn into the depths of the body: after that the limbs are relaxed and droop. For there is no doubt that this sense exists in us by the agency of the soul; and when sleep obstructs the action of this sense, then we must assume that our soul has been disordered and forced abroad; not indeed all; for then the body would lie steeped in the everlasting chill of death. Where no part of the soul remained behind concealed in the limbs, as fire remains concealed when buried under much ash, whence could sense be suddenly rekindled through the limbs, as flame can spring up from hidden fire? But by what means this change of condition is accomplished and from what the soul can be disordered and the body grow faint, I will explain: do you mind that I waste not my words on the wind.

In the first place the body in its outer side, since it is next to and is touched by the air, must be thumped and beaten by its repeated blows; and for this reason all things as a rule are covered either by a hide or else by shells or by a callous skin or by bark. When creatures breathe, this air at the same time buffets the inner side also, as it is inhaled and exhaled. Therefore since the body is beaten on both sides alike and blows arrive by means of the small apertures at the primal parts and primal elements of our body, there gradually ensues a sort of breaking up throughout our limbs, the arrangements of the first-beginnings of body and mind getting disordered. Then next a part of the soul is forced out and apart withdraws into the inner recesses; a part too scattered about through the frame cannot get united together and so act and be acted upon by motion; for nature intercepts all communication and blocks up all the passages; and therefore sense retires deep into the frame as the motions are all altered. And since there is nothing as it were to lend support to the frame, the body becomes weak and all the limbs are faint, the arms and eyelids droop and the hams even in bed often give way under you and relax their powers. Then sleep follows on food, because food produces just the same effects as air, while it is distributed into all the veins; and that sleep is much the heaviest which you take when full or tired, because then the greatest number of bodies fall into disorder, bruised by much exertion. On the same principle the soul comes in part to be forced more deeply into the frame, and there is also a more copious emission of it abroad, and at the same time it is more divided and scattered in itself within you.

And generally to whatever pursuit a man is closely tied down and strongly attached, on whatever subject we have previously much dwelt, the mind having been put to a more than usual strain in it, during sleep we for the most part fancy that we are engaged in the same; lawyers think they plead causes and draw up covenants of sale, generals that they fight and engage in battle, sailors that they wage and carry on war with the winds, we think we pursue our task and investigate the nature of things constantly and consign it when discovered to writings in our native tongue. So all other pursuits and arts are seen for the most part during sleep to occupy and mock the minds of men. And whenever men have given during many days in succession undivided attention to games, we generally see that after they have ceased to perceive these with their senses, there yet remain passages open in the mind through which the same idols of things may enter. Thus for many days those same objects present themselves to the eyes, so that even when awake they see dancers as they think moving their pliant limbs, and receive into the ears the clear music of the harp and speaking strings, and behold the same spectators and at the same time the varied decorations of the stage in all their brilliancy. So great is the influence of zeal and inclination, so great is the influence of the things in which men have been habitually engaged, and not men only but all living creatures.

Thus you will see stout horses, even when their bodies are lying down, yet in their sleep sweat and pant without ceasing and strain their powers to the utmost as if for the prize, or as if the barriers were thrown open. And often during soft repose the dogs of hunters do yet all at once throw about their legs and suddenly utter cries and repeatedly snuff the air with their nostrils, as though they had found and were on the tracks of wild beasts; and after they are awake often chase the shadowy idols of stags, as though they saw them in full flight, until they have shaken off their delusions and come to themselves again. And the fawning brood of dogs brought up tame in the house haste to shake their body and raise it up from the ground, as if they beheld unknown faces and features. And the fiercer the different breeds are, the greater rage they must display in sleep. But the various kinds of birds flee and suddenly in the night time trouble with their wings the groves of the gods, when in gentle sleep hawks and pursuing birds have appeared to show fight and offer battle.

Bailey 1921

Now in what ways this sleep floods repose over the limbs, and lets loose the cares of the mind from the breast, I will proclaim in verses of sweet discourse, rather than in many; even as the brief song of the swan is better than the clamour of cranes, which spreads abroad among the clouds of the south high in heaven. Do you lend me a fine ear and an eager mind, lest you should deny that what I say can be, and with a breast that utterly rejects the words of truth part company with me, when you are yourself in error and cannot discern. First of all sleep comes to pass when the strength of the soul is scattered about among the limbs, and in part has been cast out abroad and gone its way, and in part has been pushed back and passed inward deeper within the body. For then indeed the limbs are loosened and droop. For there is no doubt that this sense exists in us, thanks to the soul; and when sleep hinders it from being, then we must suppose that the soul is disturbed and cast out abroad: yet not all of it; for then the body would lie bathed in the eternal chill of death. For indeed, when no part of the soul stayed behind hidden in the limbs, as fire is hidden when choked beneath much ashes, whence could sense on a sudden be kindled again throughout the limbs, as flame can rise again from a secret fire?

But by what means this new state of things is brought about, and whence the soul can be disturbed and the body grow slack, I will unfold: be it your care that I do not scatter my words to the winds. First of all it must needs be that the body on the outer side, since it is touched close at hand by the breezes of air, is thumped and buffeted by its oft-repeated blows, and for this cause it is that well-nigh all things are covered either by a hide, or else by shells, or by a hard skin, or by bark. Further, as creatures breathe, the air at the same time smites on the inner side, when it is drawn in and breathed out again. Wherefore, since the body is buffeted on both sides alike, and since the blows pass on through the tiny pores to the first parts and first particles of our body, little by little there comes to be, as it were, a falling asunder throughout our limbs. For the positions of the first-beginnings of body and mind are disordered. Then it comes to pass that a portion of the soul is cast out abroad, and part retreats and hides within; part too, torn asunder through the limbs, cannot be united in itself, nor by motion act and react; for nature bars its meetings and chokes the ways; and so, when the motions are changed, sense withdraws deep within. And since there is nothing which can, as it were, support the limbs, the body grows feeble, and all the limbs are slackened; arms and eyelids droop, and the hams, even as you lie down, often give way, and relax their strength. Again, sleep follows after food, because food brings about just what air does, while it is being spread into all the veins, and the slumber which you take when full or weary, is much heavier because then more bodies than ever are disordered, bruised with the great effort. In the same manner the soul comes to be in part thrust deeper within; it is also more abundantly driven out abroad, and is more divided and torn asunder in itself within.

And for the most part to whatever pursuit each man clings and cleaves, or on whatever things we have before spent much time, so that the mind was more strained in the task than is its wont, in our sleep we seem mostly to traffic in the same things; lawyers think that they plead their cases and confront law with law, generals that they fight and engage in battles, sailors that they pass a life of conflict waged with winds, and we that we pursue our task and seek for the nature of things for ever, and set it forth, when it is found, in writings in our country’s tongue. Thus for the most part all other pursuits and arts seem to hold the minds of men in delusion during their sleep. And if ever men have for many days in succession given interest unflagging to the games, we see for the most part, that even when they have ceased to apprehend them with their senses, yet there remain open passages in their minds, whereby the same images of things may enter in. And so for many days the same sights pass before their eyes, so that even wide awake they think they see men dancing and moving their supple limbs, and drink in with their ears the clear-toned chant of the lyre, and its speaking strings, and behold the same assembly and at the same time the diverse glories of the stage all bright before them. So exceeding great is the import of zeal and pleasure, and the tasks wherein not only men are wont to spend their efforts, but even every living animal.

In truth you will see strong horses, when their limbs are lain to rest, yet sweat in their sleep, and pant for ever, and strain every nerve as though for victory, or else as though the barriers were opened [struggle to start]. And hunters’ dogs often in their soft sleep yet suddenly toss their legs, and all at once give tongue, and again and again snuff the air with their nostrils, as if they had found and were following the tracks of wild beasts; yea, roused from slumber they often pursue empty images of stags, as though they saw them in eager flight, until they shake off the delusion and return to themselves. But the fawning brood of pups brought up in the house, in a moment shake their body and lift it from the ground, just as if they beheld unknown forms and faces. And the wilder any breed may be, the more must it needs rage in its sleep. But the diverse tribes of birds fly off, and on a sudden in the night time trouble the peace of the groves of the gods, if in their gentle sleep they have seen hawks, flying in pursuit, offer fight and battle.

Episode Fifty-Nine of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. In today's podcast we will discuss the mind's direct receipt of images. There is some challenging material here on imagination and memory and whether / how the mind stores images, so be sure to let us know your questions and comments in the thread below.

At this moment on first scanning of this material I can't tell whether Aurelian's personal view is of the "ascetic" version of Epicurus, which I think most of us here will agree is incorrect history, but I can definitely tell that his level of research into the transmission of Epicurean philosophy will be of interest to many of us, regardless of whether he is personally more Stoic or more Epicurean,

This comes from Facebook - I hope we can encourage him to post here as well:

I am very pleased to announce the publication of my book: Epicurus in the Underworld. Heresy, atheism and hedonism in the Middle Ages, published by Fayard, Paris (in French). Here is the link to the publisher's website, where you can read a few pages and buy the book (with links to many bookshops online). With a lot of pleasure!

https://www.fayard.fr/histoire/epicu…s-9782213711744

Cassius: This looks like an interesting book, but unfortunately for most of us here, it is in French. Here is the opening blurb through google translate:

Aurélien Robert
Cassius Amicus
thanks a lot! I’ll try to post a more detailed overview in English very soon!

Please do, Aurelien! I wasn't sure whether it was a good idea for the group for us to post this, but if you are actively following along the thread and you can comment here, then that will be great.

I am coming to the conclusion that if I had to randomly pick the people from a particular country to rate them as "most in tune with Epicurus" I would probably pick France. I have some ideas for "least in tune" too, but I will keep those to myself.

I am going to tag Charles Edwins
here to be sure he sees this, as he is particularly interested in French literature on Epicurus

Aurélien Robert
Epicurus in the Underworld. Heresy, Atheism and Hedonism in the Middle Ages

Aurélien Robert

Could the figure of the epicurean jouster be a medieval invention? Was it not until the rediscovery of Lucretius in the 15th century that Epicurean philosophy regained its letters of nobility? Did the notion of pleasure play a role in the philosophical debates of the Middle Ages? By answering these questions, this book proposes a new history of the reception of Epicurus and his philosophy, which breaks with certain received ideas. Far from being unknown until the 15th century, Epicurean thought was the subject of intense debates in the Middle Ages, ranging from religious anathema to philosophical praise. To understand this history, it is necessary to distinguish, on the one hand, the origin and function of the figure of the heretical, atheist and hedonistic Epicurean, and, on the other hand, the philosophical reception of Epicurus' wisdom, which took a decisive turn in the 12th century. While the caricature of the depraved Epicurean who does not believe in God originated in Antiquity, the Middle Ages made it popular by identifying it with a number of well-known biblical figures. Furthermore, although no medieval thinker accepted his materialistic physique or his criticism of religion, from the 12th century onwards, some did not hesitate to take up for them part of Epicurus’ ethics. This same ambiguity was found up to the 17th century, even among the Renaissance humanists: the vulgar Epicurean was publicly criticised, but Epicurus' wisdom was praised in more restricted cenacles. Epicurus' slow return to philosophy can therefore only be analysed over a long period of time. This is what this book tries to show.

The heretical Epicurean

In his Lives and Doctrines of Illustrious Philosophers, Diogenes Laertius reports a number of malicious remarks against Epicurus. In addition to the frequent philosophical attacks aimed at his materialism, his refusal of all providence or the role he accorded to pleasure, they were aimed at the man, his morals and his beliefs. However, as the book shows, an important change took place from the second century AD, when the Epicurean became a figure of heresy. Such an association was born in the eastern confines of the Roman Empire, from Asia Minor to Egypt, where the first Christian sects were in competition with pagan philosophical schools, particularly those of the Epicureans. The extent of this competition can truly be gauged by reading the apologies of Christianity sent to Roman dignitaries, sometimes even to the emperor. The Epicurean appears to be the most immoral pagan thinker and the furthest removed from Roman moral and religious practices, as opposed to Christianity, which is presented as fully compatible with these values. These attacks on philosophers quickly turned into speeches against heretics. For if the Greek term hairesis initially designated a group or sect, without any religious connotation, it took on a new meaning at that time and allowed an unprecedented rapprochement between religious heresies and philosophical schools, establishing a consubstantial link between the two types of sect. The leaders of heretical movements were in reality disguised philosophers. Gradually, by aberrant shortcuts, so far removed from Epicurean philosophy, the Epicurean was made the heretic by antonomasia. A strategy that can be found, in slightly different forms, in Judaism and Islam, to which the book offers a significant place.

A pastoral use of the figure of the Epicurean

The image of the heretic Epicurean, a symbol of atheism and vulgar hedonism, is therefore by no means a medieval creation, although it is found even in Dante's Divine Comedy, which places Epicurus and his disciples in the sixth circle of Hell among heretics. From this ancient heritage, the Middle Ages forged a "biblical portrait" of the Epicurean, matching several figures from the Old and New Testaments to the ancient philosopher. The Epicurean was none other than the madman of the Psalms who said in his heart that God does not exist; he was also the character of the Ecclesiastes who drew from the observation of the vanity of the world that all pleasures must be enjoyed; and finally, he was the one who cried out "let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we will die" in Isaiah. In addition to this new portrait of the Epicurean, it is above all the use of this figure that evolved during the medieval period to occupy a very important place in what Jean Delumeau called "the pastoral care of fear". The people must have recognised themselves in this portrait of the heretic Epicurean and feared that they would suffer the punishments of hell that were reserved for them. This is why it occupies a singular place in the sermons. To be epicurean, that is, not to believe or to believe badly, or to be guided by earthly pleasures alone, was to become a heretic Christian. Due to the multiplication of this public discourse of the theologians, this representation of the Epicurean became extremely popular and it was soon found in literature and poetry, including popular ones. It can therefore be said that Dante's Inferno expresses a vision of Epicurus that is the culmination of this logic at work in medieval preaching.

A first rehabilitation of Epicurus in the Middle Ages?

In the shadow of this theological and pastoral literature, we find texts praising the wisdom of Epicurus as early as the 12th century. We can thus see the existence of a double discourse: one is addressed to the people, the other is limited to scholarly debates. The second half of Epicurus in the Underworld analyses this positive discourse on Epicurean asceticism, which was supposed to serve as a model for Christian ethics. In addition to the very favourable judgements of Peter Abelard, William of Malmesbury and John of Salisbury, Epicurus found its place in numerous collections of "Lives of Philosophers", as early as the 13th century, two centuries before the Latin translation of Diogenes Laertius. These texts are most often compilations of quotations from classical authors - particularly Seneca - and from the Fathers of the Church. Epicurus almost appears as a monk before his time: he despises external goods, honours, wealth and abuses of all kinds. If he makes use of pleasures, it is a measured use, always governed by virtue. He is therefore considered to be a great sage, whose features no longer have anything in common with those of the heretic Epicurean. Paradoxically, when humanists took over this literary genre in Petrarch's time, they were much more critical of Epicurus than were the so-called "scholastic" authors, often in a pejorative manner. Despite the scarcity of sources, interest in Epicurean wisdom was therefore ancient and the early humanists were hardly in favour of it, contrary to a widespread idea.

Pleasure regained

The first praises of Epicurus in the 12th century, then the Lives of Epicurus of the 13th and 14th centuries, insisted on the intellectual dimension of epicurean pleasure. But this ascetic vision of Epicurean philosophy was also accompanied by more precise philosophical debates on the relationship between virtue and pleasure, or on the necessity of bodily pleasures. Among these debates, the one inaugurated by physicians as early as the 12th century proved to be particularly rich in teachings. Against Epicurus, some of whose ideas they knew through Galen, they defended the necessity of sexual pleasure, not only for the body, but also for the balance of the mind. They therefore went further than the philosophy of the Garden in the rehabilitation of pleasure, finding, without knowing it, the analyses of Lucretius. In De natura rerum, Lucretius situated the evils of love in passion, not in sexuality. Most of the themes that would become important during the Renaissance were therefore already dealt with in the Middle Ages. They certainly lacked the humanistic erudition to describe Epicurus' theses accurately, but they still gave a glimpse of them that no longer had anything to do with the popular image of the heretical, atheistic and hedonistic Epicurean. The final chapter thus shows how humanists, including those most inclined to praise Epicureanism, ultimately contributed little to the positive discourse of the Middle Ages in terms of philosophical content. The tone certainly gained in freedom, the historical accuracy was greater, the language more beautiful and the rhetoric more effective, but we cannot attribute all the credit to the Italian humanists in the rediscovery of epicureanism.

Epicurus' reception over time

The issues addressed in this book therefore fill a void in the studies on the reception of epicureanism. Above all, they challenge the widespread (and recently brilliantly staged by Stephen Greenblatt in The Swerve) idea that epicureanism was rediscovered only in the 15th century, thanks to the humanist Poggio Bracciolini, who brought back to Italy a (medieval) manuscript of Lucretius. At the end of the itinerary proposed in the book, it seems more accurate to say that this return of Epicurean ideas to the Renaissance would probably not have been possible without the first historical and philosophical work of the scholars of the Middle Ages. For it was indeed during Antiquity that Epicurus was placed in the underworld and it was in the Middle Ages that he began to get out from it.

This is a rather nerdy but informative discussion of the state of the "fediverse" applications that I was reading last night: https://linuxreviews.org/Fediverse

I gather that the technology is pretty much in place to set up independent services, even to a significant extent mimicing facebook: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friendica

But the issue seems to be getting critical mass to make anything successful. On the other hand, if you're working with a limited group of people in the first place and you're not going to mass conversions, several of these sites already can be used pretty nicely to duplicate twitter, facebook, etc.

Well we definitely want to get this wording as accurate as possible to avoid having to backtrack immediately in an explanation.

However, at the same time, I doubt that the subtle difference between feelings or sensation or a similar word is the most important factor. The real "kick in the gut" to the opposing team is no so much specifying how all good and evil do arise from sensation or feeling as much the point that good and evil DO NOT arise from the gods, or from reason, or from anything absolute that the world of conventional philosophy asserts is the source of their right to give commands to tell everyone else how to live.

And no matter whether we pick feeling or sensation or some other similar word, the real "explanation" of this assertion is really focused on Epicurus' rejection of what everyone else in the world thinks is the source of moral authority, with Epicurus pointing instead, as Elayne points out, to the individuals own "feelings" or whatever word is chosen.

A_Gardner do you also use Mastodon or Pleroma or any "fediverse" app? Along the lines of the original post I would like to establish beachheads in the "open source" world to be sure we are as insulated as possible from censorship. Any thoughts on any of the open source / peer to peer options?

Absolutely I would be happy for you to do so!

A_Gardner I have a twitter account under the name NewEpicurean, but all that ever gets posted there is a mirror of what is posted at NewEpcurean.com, which for the last year has meant nothing but the weekly dates to the Lucretius podcast.

https://twitter.com/NewEpicurean

Yes Don and while I have the highest respect and gratitude for your translations, when the "classical experts" seem to agree that some kind of "feeling" or "sensation" is the better translation, we'll need to take a position on whether THEY are the ones who are picking from among the alternatives the word their notion of what is 'correct' or whether we are the ones doing that. I don't begin to have the ability to weigh in on whether they could be wrong, and in the confines of my own analysis I am pretty much unable to take a position on what is correct, other than by "intuiting" the right word, as I think Elayne is doing.

Maybe what we have going on here is what DeWitt talks about the three legs of the canon not operating independently but in some way being integrated together into a single unit.

Wow the time does fly! Thank you for all your contributions Don - seems like you and several others all got active at nearly the same time, and the last year or so has been one of our most productive periods. If you could just find a way to replicate yourself about a hundred times we'd be well on our way to domination of the philosophic world!

That is a very good point Elayne and something that needs to be considered, especially when writing an explanation of the point. In stating the four in most succinct form, however, I think it is important to stay a closely as possible to the wording of Epicurus or the most reliable texts, and the translations of that seem to all say "sensation." Now it might be relevant here to go back to what Don has been pointing out that perhaps "internal sensations" is better than feelings.

This is the kind of thing that needs to be thought through and perhaps should vary with the location where it is being used.

Actually as I type this I am now thinking that this is an issue which is not entirely clear, and we need to be careful. We need to consider whether what we today define as "feeling" what Epicurus was saying in the words translated as "pathe" or "passions" or "internal sensations" or feelings?" And I am not entirely sure whether Epicurus was equating sensations with feelings or not (probably not) nevertheless the way he is relating them may not be something we really have a final finger on.

I guess the place to start would be to examine that segment of the passage in PD2 to see exactly what word was used. Don or anyone, can you help with that?

"For our nature [wants what] is better for our soul. Moreover, the soul is manifestly more [powerful] than the body; for it [has] control of the extreme and supremacy over the other [feelings], as indeed we revealed it [above.] [So if], through paying attention to the arguments of Aristippus, we take care of the body, [choosing] all the pleasure derived from drink, food and [sexual acts] and indeed absolutely all the things which no longer [give enjoyment after the happening], but neglect the soul, we shall deprive ourselves of the greatest pleasures."

Diogenes of Oinoanda Fragment 29 http://www.english.enoanda.cat/the_inscription.html