Posts by Cassius

Quote from Susan Hill

So perhaps Epicurean spirituality is the recognition of the profound, intricate, beautiful, blissful, subtle, elating, humbling and tranquil nature of the gods, and the practice of attuning our own nature to that god-like state.

I think in response here that I would say that probably either as a part of anticipations, of pleasure-recognition, or of both, that there is a disposition to recognize the profound, intricate, beautiful, blissful, subtle, elating, humbling and tranquil nature of anything which we would expect to find the highest manifestation thereof in the highest level of beings which we would expect to exist within the universe.

So those characteristics you list are all things that exist in varying degrees in the things we come into contact with here on earth and would experience as part of those interactions, so we have a faculty of recognizing those characteristics which does process data received through the eyes/ears/tongue/nose/skin, but that faculty of recognition is probably not itself a part of the eyes/ears/tongue/nose/skin.

So the question that is probably on the table is how this faculty of recognition operates, and whether it can receive stimulus that is not strictly part of the eyes/ears/tongue/nose/skin.

1. Is this faculty purely operating in accord with the "etching" that it has at birth?

2. Is this faculty operating purely in accord with its etching plus its influences by the things we see/hear/taste/touch/smell during our lifetime after birth?

3. Is this faculty operating in accord with its etching, plus what we see/hear/taste/touch/smell during our lifetime after birth, plus something else that is perceivable by the brain through mechanisms not currently understood by science, but understandable by science after additional study through techniques not yet invented? (For a gross example, attempts to study claims of "ESP" or "gravity waves" or "cosmic rays" or similar claims of repeatable phenomena, all of which - if proved to exist through repeated observation - we will presume due to our prior conclusions to be the work of a "natural" and not the work of a "universe-creating-supernatural-being" phenomena? I suppose even "contact with a UFO" or "contact with an alien race" would fit in this category if they actually landed in Central Park and said "We are here to serve men" and gave us what we thought at first was a table of profound natural laws but which turned out to be a cookbook. )

Quote from Susan Hill

And yet we do manage to talk about it, even without a dictionary definition.

I definitely think we need to work on at least a "working" definition for our use here, which we will eventually want to add to the Lexicon and/or the FAQ. That's pretty much exactly what we have to do with "Gods" "Virtue" "Pleasure" "Truth" and probably many other words.

In this case it doesn't help much but whatever working definition probably needs to include the "not supernatural" qualifier, but obviously that's not a satisfactory start. "Divinity" is a term that presumably exists whether we recognize it or not, because "the Epicurean gods" are held to exist whether or not we know it. I presume "spirit" is also a term that is used so thoroughly that we can say that it exists whether we recognize it or not, but it's closely tied in to "mind" and "soul" and has be better articulated.

It's entirely unclear to me whether "spirit" in the Epicurean sense has any real connection with "the Epicurean gods" or what that connection would be. From the point of view of the surviving texts, we could probably have reverence for "the gods" and profit from that presumably even if we never had a "spiritual" experience.

Probably it is first necessary to define "spirit" before we define "spiritual experience." If the spirit is different from the mind, then presumably it has its own "experiences" which are different from mental or "physical" experiences. But of course there is the premise that nothing exists except "matter" and void, so whatever experiences are going on presumably have a "material" aspect to them.

I think the place to start is more the question of separating the terms "mind" "soul" and 'spirit" and determining whether they are separate entities from the Epicurean viewpoint.

NOTE: Again, I think it's best we start "from the Epicurean viewpoint" rather than "what we ourselves think is the case" because we can't really be sure whether we agree or disagree with Epicurus unless we know what HIS viewpoint was.

Yes that's definitely a foundational link. It seems like within the last year I found a link to a German website that had facsimiles of the originals, so any site that attempts to organize them has to go in the list.

As people add to this list I will go back and update the first post in the thread.

Quote from Susan Hill

As for the Hadzsits article, I don't think you will have a problem with his translations, because he doesn't translate anything. All sources are given in Latin and Greek.

Oh I HATE articles like that! I suppose academics have a right to write for other academics

Quote from Susan Hill

The Lexicon structure is probably better.

I am happy to give full access to any regular participant here who is interested in trying to work with the lexicon or other features. If someone tries to do something and doesn't seem to have access rights just let me know. I think it best that people go ahead on the "easier to get forgiveness than permission" theory. If someone posts something that we need to reorganize then we can do that afterwards - once material is typed in the hard part is done.

Quote from Susan Hill

Is there a point at which we can say "Okay, I think get the gist of this, let's give it a whirl!"

Yes I think we are definitely at that point and we need to talk about what "giving it a whirl" means. I keep thinking in terms of online interaction via zoom or skype or whatever, leading eventually to a polished presentation that we can maybe commit to video and then distribute for the use of others. That's something we can talk further about here in these threads and also on the 20th.

Brett that's a great idea to devote a section to it - There are several options on how to implement that, including the "Lexicon" page. I haven't really figured out how to use it but I think it works like a shared wiki.

I set this page up here: Epicurean Techniques for Better Living

And gave write access to those of us participating in this thread - if I missed anyone please let me know.

I think at that location we can basically develop a numbered list perhaps? I would appreciate anyone's input on this - this is an example of where I can help provide the infrastructure but I am sorely lacking in creativity and imagination to get things going sometimes!

This is the "home page" of the Lexicon: https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/lexicon/

This is the page announcing the setup and probably a good place to discuss how to use it:

Addition of the "Lexicon" Feature of the Forum

I'm starting this thread to place here links to the best online sources for review of the Philodemus materials from Herculaneum. Currently that is spread out over other threads and we need to pin this to the top of the Philodemus section as a starting point.

1. Foundational Lists of Resources
   1. The Herculaneum Society (England)
2. Philodemus On Piety
3. Philodemus On Methods of Inference
4. Philodemus On Rhetoric
5. Epicurus On Nature

Some comments on a number of posts:

Quote from Godfrey

so are you saying that that makes spirituality innate?

I singled that out as a good example of the need for a definition of spirituality. What is "spirituality"? Have we made any progress in defining what we mean there?

Quote from Godfrey

grappling with the gods

I like that phrase!

Quote from Godfrey

justice and fair play seem to be a way of connecting our sensations with our feelings.

Yes I am thinking in that direction too. Maybe more generally, "anticipations are a way of connecting our sensations with our feelings." Or at the very least, "anticipations and sensations and feelings are all connected closely" which I think is a point that DeWitt emphasizes.

Quote from Susan Hill

there is a genetic and innate neurological proclivity towards spiritual seeking/belief,

That's another sentence that cries out for clarity in "what does spiritual mean?"

Quote from Susan Hill

I'm wondering if this were the definition of a prolepsis/anticipation, how would it be different from simple "learning ability" or "the faculty of cognition", or "knowledge creation ability"?

Right Susan. That's where I think the issue is with the Diogenese Laetrius section on anticipations, and the standard position on anticipations today. Clearly there is a process of "conceptual reasoning" that coincides with your terms "leaning ability" and "faculty of cognition" and "knowledge creation ability." Clearly all normal people go through life seeing new things (cell phones for example) and forming new pictures/conceptions of groups of cell phones until they have a mental image/definition of a cell phone that they then apply to new experiences. There's no doubt that conceptual reasoning exists. The big question is whether there is any "etching" of mental operations that plants the seeds so to speak as to how that process is going to occur or the directions it is going to pursue. Even if we agree (I think most of us do) that there are no innate "ideas," there do seem to be innate "principles of operation" that will end up disposing us in certain directions.

I think a decent analogy here is that of how we distinguish a computer operating system from application software. The operating system sets the basis limits and bounds of what a computer can do to interface with the real world (including printers and hard disks and monitors) while the application program is where true "data" is dumped in over time and the conceptual assembly process gets working to do advanced calculatiing.

So think the big problem is that the standard commentators are caught in the "blank slate" Aristotelian position and they focus exclusively on conceptual reasoning, which is part of the process, but they exclude the "etching" aspect which is clearly stated in Velleius because they think that conflicts with their blank slate starting point.

Also Susan et al we need to find a good online source for material from Philodemus' "On Piety." I think the major reference is a work by Obbirk from 1996 which I have looked at but not studied closely. This brings us back to the continuing frustration that there ought to be free online access to at least some aspects of the Herculaneum material, even if individual researchers want/need to copyright and profit from their commentaries on it. I think in fact there are pages which do contain some of the raw material, and we've even discussed some of them here on the forum, but we haven't used them regularly enough to really get familiar with the material.

And IMHO that's particularly important with On Piety, since the material is challenging and I think I remember that what is left from Herculaneum is much more fragmentary than some of the other Philodemus material. This is one of the most delicate areas where we need to verify for ourselves exactly what the translator is working with and how much they are reconstructing, so we can more confidently assess how much stock to put into what they come up with.

As we go down this road in pursuing the divinity aspect of the philosophy I think we can really contribute to the state of understanding if we rigorously check the sources to make sure the commentator is being faithful to the rest of the texts in their word choices.

Quote from Godfrey

Consider the anticipations as "pattern recognition."

I think that we've gotten in the the habit of thinking that "pattern recognition" is a part of anticipations, and I think that is a good start. However as we go further it's not clear to me that this is much more than a start, because what do we mean by "pattern" and "recognition." if we consider it to be a "matching" of something that is already within us then we have to be careful that we're not going Platonic and considering the mind at birth to have ready-made ideas of any kind within it. I don't really have anything better to suggest at the moment but if forced to say something more I would probably use words like a "faculty" that "disposes us to organize what we perceive" in ways that are helpful to our forming of mental images that we then store in our memories and use as operators for further analysis.

That would pretty well track what Diogenes Laertius was saying, but I'm thinking that what is missing in Laertius is a discussion of "how the faculty works" and what kind of "dispositions" do exist within it that influence the pictures that we eventually form. If we were to consider the faculty of anticipations as a process of forming these images within our minds then it might not be far-fetched to consider the possibility that this process could be influenced directly within the mind by infliuences from outside that don't come through the eyes, ears, nose, skin, or tongue, but more like I gather scientists experimenting with doing by use of ....(what, I am not sure how they are doing it, but I presume somehow electrical or magnetic?) stimuli.

So basically I am saying that calling anticipations pattern recognition is probably the start of the analysis rather than the end.

Michele has forwarded me the following announcement for a competition for an award for a masters degree or doctoral thesis. The topic appears very wide and simply generally related to Epicurean philosophy. It looks like the best way to find out more information will be to contact michelepinto directly. Thanks Michele!

Quote from Don

Epicurus does say we can live a life worthy of the gods (or was that Lucretius?)

I think your referencing Lucretius where he talks about using reason to deak with the residual forces that nature implants within us, but of course also it's Epicurus who talked about living "as gods among men."

I think it's a huge issue as to why, once we find that we can have pleasure even living in a cave on bread and water, we would ever decide to venture out for variations in pleasure. There are many practical reasons, of course, but I do think there is an inner drive to "self-improvement" that is associated or part of this pleasure drive. Variation may not be necessary, but there's no commandment or reason to settle for "simple pleasures" when there are other pleasures that you decide are within your reach at a reasonable cost in pain and that you judge (or feel) would be rewarding for you to have. And of course the aspect of "visualizing goals" seems to be deeply rooted in human psychology.

Susan I will see what I can find myself, but over the years I've worked with this software I've been very impressed with the people behind the program, but not so impressed with the documentation. I think their theory is that everything should be made as self-explanatory as possible for users, so they don't seem to have ready-made answers to frequently asked questions. So I am sad to say we may not find much and we probably need to just help each other as we can.

Also I don't think the software is actually more limited than on the phone. I think what's going on especially with pasting is that the operating systems copy different attributes, and that varies from system to system. It's frequently a problem on any platform that if you copy text from another program it tries to paste in the HTML attributes, so you're left to try to strip that yourself. That's probably why each of the major font controls in the toolbar has a "Remove" feature at the bottom.

Thank you for that information on the Greek, Don.

This is one of those places where I have to watch that I don't overstate the case, but I think it is mandatory, essential, and a key to the entire philosophy that Epicurus would not allow a major premise or observation to stand contradicted by another one, and leave the contradiction unresolved. Meaning, once he concluded that the gods were of such nature that they were (1) nonsupernatural, and (2) living in perfect peace, with the implication of no favorites or enemies among humans, and (3) by their nature in the intermundia or in some other way not here on earth where their type of existence would be excluded, then I think he would rigorously maintain that everything else has to be understood in accord with those premises.

So while we always have to be careful not to take things to an extreme that the words we have won't bear, I think the key to interpretation of the other passages is to work from the beginning on what is meant by "images" and also by "anticipations" and work toward a position that is logically consistent with those earlier "physics" positions about the nature of the gods.

I think all sorts of the term "idola" or "images" or "spectres" is possible, with the main limiting factor being that Epicurus was looking to explain how things occur naturally, and that "action at a distance" can never be supernatural, so must involve the flow of something between object and observer. That leaves a huge variety of options to choose from so long as it doesn't involve supernatural universe-creating god(s), and given that I understand Plato was postulating "lesser gods" as a means of world-governing then Epicurus might have left open that there are beings who are not gods who nevertheless could (if we could prove it) be flying around the universe. Of course what I am talking about there is more on the order of "Martians" and other sci-fi material, but I also gather without wearing too much tin foil that even the current observations of UFOs might not be ridiculous to entertain.

However to bring this back to base I think a large part of what Epicurus was thinking about was the benefit of contemplating what "the best life" might entail, as a means of inspiration and aspiration and motivation, all of which are necessary at least to some degrees for some people to ward off the ultimate evil of "nihilism."

Quote from Susan Hill

that he saw, e.g. Venus, as though in a dream - as a visual object.

Or I think it is also conceivable in all sorts of allegorical ways, as in seeing a statue or painting of Venus

As a note to @Martin on an issue I think he raised, I think the "gods are in the intermundia" point above bolsters Martin's observation. We have to accept the conclusion that the gods are in the intermundia, rather than here on earth, for a variety of reasons, and one thing that implies is that the gods are going to be so far away that we won't expect to be able to "see" them with normal vision any more than we can see the details of stars or planets. Were we to think we see a person-sized being in front of us talking to us, then no doubt we are experiencing something, but that person-sized being in front of us would not be expectable be a true "God" from the intermundia. In fact I think I will use the "conceivable" word there. Seeing a true god in front of us in human form would be "inconceivable" given our premises about true gods.

Quote from Susan Hill

Just me throwing woo into things again, right?

No, I don't think that is throwing woo into things, but for example in this case I think we need to question that wikipedia article's choice of words, this one in particular:

WIKIPEDIA: He did not mean that people can see the gods as physical objects, but rather that they can see visions of the gods sent from the remote regions of interstellar space in which they actually reside.

I would question the accuracy of this sentence, which in fact seems to me to be a little contradictory, in stating first that we can't "see" but then that we can "see." I question whether "see" is the right word even though "vision" is the word that I see is used to translate the passage from the letter to Menoeceus. This is Bailey:

This is where we need a Don to help us track down any critical Greek wording on "see," but my view is that these images are likely not the same kind of images that we talk about being received by "looking at that tree over there." If the gods are in the intermundia (which is probably a fundamental premise of discussions on gods, since it wouldn't e possible to life a perfectly happy life here on earth) then we aren't going to be able to "see" them directly with our eyes like we can see other things.

A related question would be: what do we "see" in dreams? Are we using the eyes for that?

I am thinking that the "knowledge of them by clear vision" must involve something other than the eyes, which I gather is why DeWitt talks about the brain as a "supersensory" mechanism (if I remember his term correctly). The whole nature of the "images" discussion seems to contemplate them traveling all across space in all directions at all times, regardless of whether we choose to turn our head and focus our eyes in a particular direction or not. That would be much like today we are constantly surrounded by radio and television waves which contain information, but which we can't interpret without electronic equipment.

Plus, I think it's probably true that the "images" discussion in general probably includes smells and sounds as well, since the whole discussion of all the bodily senses seems to involve particles traveling across space as the means of transmission.

So no I don't think that this discussion necessarily involves "woo" because I think that there is a lot of detail about images in the texts which are not being given effect by people who stop at the consideration of them as being "through the eyes." This is where I think the DeWitt approach is most important - we should dig through the details of the texts with fresh and unprejudiced eyes, without dismissing what we see at first glance as being "wrong," because Epicurus' frame of reference is so different from ours. I am convinced that Epicurus never "made things up" to suit his conclusions, and if he gave consideration to a particular phenomena like gods or divinity he did so because he thought there was something real there which needed examination.

I am perfectly prepared to believe that the explanation he gave to the phenomena might not be exactly correct, but at least for me I start with a strong presumption that the phenomena does exist in some way. We just need to work to dig it out, which is something that centuries of christians have had no real disposition to do.

Quote from Susan Hill

. Is there a manual for the software somewhere? I might just be more limited on my phone.

Hmm that is a good question. The software company has a user forum at this location, but I will have to go looking for whether there is a basic "help" page: https://community.woltlab.com/

Remembering always that all I can say is what I think makes the most sense from the material I have read, here is my view:

Quote from timrobbe

To summarize in my own words. EP states we can reach conclusions about gods through the anticipations. Gods are blissful and are not immortal per se, but have reached a level of competence which enable them to stop their body from 'falling apart' and die (so to speak).

Yes, that is pretty much exactly correct per my reading. What I would add is that the "conclusions" that can be reached about the gods through anticipations are probably pretty limited, to the view that such beings exist, and that since the goal of all life is total pleasure (with zero pain or as little as possible) then beings which have reached the zenith are leading lives that are fully pleasurable to them and are not concerned with rewarding human friends or punishing human enemies. In other words the conclusions that we can be confident about are pretty high level and the more detailed speculation you get into about how they spend their time, beyond the basics, the less confidence we can have in that particular speculation, such as "the gods speak Greek" or look like humans,

Quote from timrobbe

As simulacra in dreams about gods are insufficient proof of their existence and/or their properties we cannot infer that by simulacra in dreams about dead people, dead people have exist or have the same properties.

Now that one I think is mostly correct in both parts of the sentence but your are linking them in way that might need to be unwound. Yes I would say that Epicurus would hold that images of gods received in dreams is not sufficient proof of their existence. Yes I would say that Epicurus would hold that images of dead people (or anything else) received in a dream are not sufficient proof of the reality of what has been dreamed. Now whether the images received in dreams of gods vs dreams of people have any relationship that might need further discussion, because I get the impression that dreams of dead people and other things are generally dreams involving things that we have actually seen in the past, while awake, in distinction to dreams about gods, which pretty much by definition we have never seen while awake. So there is probably a distinction worth thinking about there.

Quote from timrobbe

The gods are perfect entities and therefor never die.

This is probably insufficient, as written, to capture the big picture. The gods remain alive, not because they are perfect, and because "perfect" somehow implies immortality, but because they have achieved a method of replenishing their atomic structure so that their overall existence remains in place without necessity of ending. The gods may be said to enjoy "perfect bliss" or "perfect pleasure" but to say today that "the gods are perfect" implies all sorts of other attributes that the Epicureans did not state belonged to the gods.

If that point is not clear then let's discuss further.

Quote from timrobbe

We know of the gods because in our dreams we receive simulacra of the atoms making up the bodies of the gods.

That is only a part of the full picture of what we know the Epicureans said. If you will refer to the Velleius section of Cicero's "On the Nature of the Gods," there you will find the most detailed information we have on what Epicurus taught, which involved anticipations, isonomia, and the view that Nature never creates only a single thing of a kind.

Yes there are passages in several texts which indicate that "images of the gods" are a source of information, but those images (like the anticipations themselves) would be subject to the same issue that you are concerned about - there is always a potential for distortion and inaccuracy in any single perception from any source.

I think it is fair to say that "Images" as a source of information about the gods would necessarily be received from a very long distance away (the gods are in the "intermundia" which we can't see or otherwise sense with the five senses) and in addition to distortions of many types II think you are right - those images might be floating around from dead gods, just like from dead people.

I am with Dewitt that a fair reading of all the texts indicates that the anticipations would be the most reliable way to reach basic conclusions about the gods. Anything that comes from images would be especially subject to correction by comparison to the ultimate conclusions we would draw with higher confidence from the anticipations - such as that the gods live in perfect pleasure and peace and safety and therefore have no need for friends or enemies among humans.

I think the most reliable summary of information we have about the gods would be the section "The New Piety" in DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy" (which I think you have, right?). I concur with DeWitt that the Velleius material, which was delivered specifically on the point you are asking about (What do we know about the gods and how do we know it?) is good evidence that "anticipations" are the major and overriding source of information, since it seems clear that Velleius rests the thrust of his argument in that department rather than on images.

Welcome to Episode Forty-Five of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

For anyone who is not familiar with our podcast, please check back to Episode One for a discussion of our goals and our ground rules. If you have any question about that, please be sure to contact us at Epicureanfriends.com for more information.

In today's episode, we will cover roughly lines 634-740 from Book 3 of the Latin Text. The topic will be further arguments for the mortality of the soul.

Charles reads today's text:

Munro Notes:

634-669: since life and sense pervade the whole body, if it be cut in two by a sudden stroke, the soul must also be divided ; but what is divided cannot be immortal : a soldier's arm or foot or head cut off in the heat of battle will shew for a time remains of sense and motion; a serpent chopped in pieces will writhe and with the severed mouth seek to reach the other pieces of the body : now you cannot say that in each part there is an entire soul ; therefore the soul has been divided, and therefore is as mortal as the body.

670-678: if the soul is immortal, why cannot we recollect what happened before our birth ? if the mind is so changed as to forget every-thing, that is very like death; so that even thus you must admit that the soul which then was, has perished, and that the one which now is, is newly made.

679-712: If the soul enters the body after it is fully formed, it should not seem to be so mixed up in it, but should have a hole to live apart in it; whereas in fact it so penetrates the whole frame that the very teeth have feeling; it therefore has birth and dies; else it could not be so united with the body, nor, being so united, leave it entire. But if it can so enter and then spread itself over the whole body, then must it perish thus diffused, even as food transmitted into the body perishes and then furnishes out of itself another nature; thus the soul that entered will die, and another will be formed out of it; thus the soul will be mortal.

713-740: are atoms of the soul left behind in the dead body or not? if they are left, it cannot be immortal, since it has left parts of itself behind ; if it goes out entire, whence come worms and other living things into the carcase? but if souls come from without into these myriads of creatures, do they each create a body for itself, or enter bodies already formed? then why make a body, when they are better without? disease and cold and hunger come from the body : but were it ever so useful, they could not make it: if again they entered it already made, they could not unite with it so closely as to have sensation in common.

Browne:

And since the vital sense, we perceive, is diffused through the body, and we see the whole body animated throughout, if any weapon cuts it in two in the middle of a sudden stroke, and divides the parts asunder, the powers of the soul, without doubt, being separated and disunited, will follow the fate of the body; but whatever is cut asunder and falls into parts can have nothing immortal in its nature. Chariots, we read, armed with Scythes, and reeking with confused slaughter, would cut off a limb with so quick a force that the divided part that fell off from the body might be seen trembling upon the ground when the mind and heart of the man feel nothing of the pain, so sudden was the wound. His whole soul is so taken up with the heat of action that he pursues the fight and the intended slaughter with the remainder of his body, nor does he imagine that the wheels and mangling hooks have torn off among the horses his left hand, or that he has lost his shield. Another knows nothing that his right hand is lopped off, as he scales the wall, and presses eagerly forward. Another attempts to rise with one leg, while the dying foot moves the toes as it lies by him upon the ground; and the head cut off, the trunk yet warm and heaving preserves the same fierce look in the face, and keeps the eyes open, til it has lost all remains of the soul within it. And so divide with a sword, if you please, into many parts, the tail of a long snake, threatening, and brandishing his tongue, and you'll see every divided part wiggling with the fresh wound, and staining the ground with blood. You'll perceive the serpent turning his head about to find his divided body and bite it with his teeth, from the anguish of the pain he suffers. Shall we say that a proper soul belongs severally to all these parts? By this rule it will follow that the same creature is animated by many souls at the same time. 'Tis plain therefore that the soul before was one, and diffused through the whole body, is divided, and consequently they are both mortal, because they are both equally divided into many parts.

Further, if the nature of the soul be immortal, and is infused into the body when a child is born, why do we remember nothing of the life we led before? Nor retain any traces of things done long ago? For if the power of the soul be so utterly changed that all recollection of past actions is entirely gone, this kind of oblivion is (I think) not far removed from death itself. We must needs allow therefore that the soul that was before utterly perished, and that which now is was newly created.

But when the body is completely formed, when we are born, and enter within the door of life, if then the vital power of the soul were infused, it would have nothing to do to grow up together with the body and the limbs, and be united with the very blood, but, as it were in a cage, it would live entire of itself, and so diffuse the faculties of sense all through the body. Again then and again it must be said that the soul is neither without beginning, nor exempt from the laws of death; for we cannot conceive that the soul, were it infused from without into the body, could be so nicely and closely united to the several parts of it, as the thing itself evidently proves she is. She is indeed so diffused through the veins, the bowels, the nerves, and bones, that even the teeth are not without sense, This appears from the acute pain we feel from the chillness of cold water, or the grinding of a rough stone when we eat. The soul therefore being so closely connected with the several parts cannot be supposed to depart whole, or deliver herself entire from the bones and nerves and joints of the body. But if you think the soul is infused from without, and so spread over all the limbs, she is for this reason still more liable to perish with the body; for a thing that flows through so many passages is dissolved, and therefore dies, for she must be thus divided through all the pores. And as the food, when it is distributed through the members and the limbs, loses its first form, and take up another quite different, so the soul, though it enters whole and fresh into the body, yet, in passing through, its parts are dissolved, because the particles of soul which now rules and governs the body is produced from that which perished, and was dissolved in passing through into the limbs. The nature of the soul therefore is neither without beginning nor free from death and dissolution.

Besides, in a dead body some particles of the soul remain, or they do not. If they do remain and abide in it, you can by no means properly say she is immortal, because she withdrew with her seeds divided, and with some of them left behind. But if she retired from the body with all her parts whole, how comes the carcass to breed so many worms in the corrupted bowels? And whence do such abundance of creatures without bones and blood swarm over the bloated limbs? But if you fancy that souls formed without creep into these worms, and every single worm has a particular soul, nor think it strange that so many thousand should flow together from without to the place from whence one departed, yet it is proper to inquire into and to examine this, whether every particular soul searches into the several seeds of the worms, and chooses for itself what seeds are most proper to make itself a body, or whether she enters into a body already formed.

But there is no reason to be given why she should build a dwelling for herself, and go through such fatigue, especially since, disentangled from matter, she cannot be tormented with diseases, with cold and hunger, for body only can labor under these calamities, and the soul suffers many such distresses only by her conjunction with it. But allow it inconvenient for souls to fashion out bodies for themselves to dwell in, yet there is no way possible for them to do this. They do not therefore make up bodies and limbs for themselves, nor are they infused into bodies ready made, for they could not be so nicely united as to inform every part of the body, nor could the vital motions be mutually carried on between them.

Munro:

And since we perceive that vital sense is in the whole body and we see that it is all endowed with life, if on a sudden any force with swift blow shall have cut it in twain so as quite to dissever the two halves, the power of the soul will without doubt at the same time be cleft and cut asunder and dashed in twain together with the body. But that which is cut and divides into any parts, you are to know disclaims for itself an everlasting nature. Stories are told how scythed chariots reeking with indiscriminate slaughter often lop off limbs so instantaneously that that which has fallen down lopped off from the frame is seen to quiver on the ground, while yet the mind and faculty of the man from the suddenness of the mischief cannot feel the pain; and because his mind once for all is wholly given to the business of fighting, with what remains of his body he mingles in the fray and carnage, and often perceives not that the wheels and devouring scythes have carried off among the horses’ feet his left arm shield and all; another sees not that his right arm has dropped from him, while he mounts and presses forward. Another tries to get up after he has lost his leg, while the dying foot quivers with its toes on the ground close by. The head too when cut off from the warm and living trunk retains on the ground the expression of life and open eyes, until it has yielded up all the remnants of soul. To take another case, if, as a serpent’s tongue is quivering, as its tail is darting out from its long body, you choose to chop with an axe into many pieces both [tail and body], you will see all the separate portions thus cut off writhing under the fresh wound and bespattering the earth with gore, the fore part with the mouth making for its own hinder part, to allay with burning bite the pain of the wound with which it has been smitten. Shall we say then that there are entire souls in all those pieces? Why from that argument it will follow that one living creature had many souls in its body; and this being absurd, therefore the soul which was one has been divided together with the body; therefore each alike must be reckoned mortal, since each is alike chopped up into many pieces.

Again, if the nature of the soul is immortal and makes its way into our body at the time of birth, why are we unable to remember besides the time already gone, and why do we retain no traces of past actions? If the power of the mind has been so completely changed that all remembrance of past things is lost, that methinks differs not widely from death; therefore you must admit that the soul which was before has perished and that which now is has now been formed.

Again if the quickened power of the mind is wont to be put into us after our body is fully formed, at the instant of our birth and our crossing the threshold of life, it ought agreeably to this to live not in such a way as to seem to have grown with the body and together with its members within the blood, but as in a den apart by and to itself: the very contrary to what undoubted fact teaches; for it is so closely united with the body throughout the veins, flesh, sinews, and bones, that the very teeth have a share of sense; as their aching proves and the sharp twinge of cold water and the crunching of a rough stone when it has got into them out of bread. Wherefore, again and again I say, we must believe souls to be neither without a birth nor exempted from the law of death; for we must not believe that they could have been so completely united with our bodies, if they found their way into them from without, nor since they are so closely interwoven with them, does it appear that they can get out unharmed and unloose themselves unscathed from all the sinews and bones and joints. But if haply you believe that the soul finds its way in from without and is wont to ooze through all our limbs, so much the more it will perish thus blended with the body; for what oozes through another is dissolved, and therefore dies. As food distributed throughout the cavities of the body, while it is transmitted into the limbs and the whole frame, is destroyed and furnishes out of itself the matter of another nature, thus the soul and mind, though they pass entire into a fresh body, yet in oozing through it are dissolved, whilst there are transmitted, so to say, into the frame through all the cavities those particles of which this nature of mind is formed, which now is sovereign in our body, being born out of that soul which then perished when dispersed through the frame. Wherefore the nature of the soul is seen to be neither without a birthday nor exempt from death.

Again, are seeds of the soul left in the dead body or not? If they are left and remain in it, the soul cannot fairly be deemed immortal, since it has withdrawn lessened by the loss of some parts; but if when taken away from the yet untainted limbs it has fled so entirely away as to leave in the body no parts of itself, whence do carcasses exude worms from the now rank flesh and whence does such a swarm of living things, boneless and bloodless, surge through the heaving frame? But if haply you believe that souls find their way into worms from without and can severally pass each into a body and you make no account of why many thousands of souls meet together in a place from which one has withdrawn, this question at least must, it seems, be raised and brought to a decisive test, whether souls hunt out the several seeds of worms and build for themselves a place to dwell in, or find their way into bodies fully formed so to say.

But why they should on their part make a body or take such trouble, cannot be explained; since being without a body they are not plagued as they flit about with diseases and cold and hunger, the body being more akin to, more troubled by such infirmities, and by its contact with it the mind suffering many ills. Nevertheless be it ever so expedient for them to make a body, when they are going to enter, yet clearly there is no way by which they can do so. Therefore souls do not make for themselves bodies and limbs; no: nor can they by any method find their way into bodies after they are full formed; for they will neither be able to unite themselves with a nice precision nor will any connection of mutual sensation be formed between them.

Bailey:

And since we feel that the sensation of life is present in the whole body, and we see that the whole is a living thing, if some force suddenly hew it in the middle with swift blow, so that it severs each half apart, beyond all doubt the force of the soul too will be cleft in twain, torn asunder and riven together with the body. But what is cleft and separates into any parts, disclaims, assuredly, that its nature is everlasting. They tell how often scythe-bearing chariots, glowing in the mellay of slaughter, so suddenly lop off limbs, that the part which falls lopped off from the frame is seen to shiver on the ground, while in spite of all the mind and spirit of the man cannot feel the pain, through the suddenness of the stroke, and at the same time, because his mind is swallowed up in the fervour of the fight; with the body that is left him he makes for the fight and the slaughter, and often knows not that his left arm with its shield is gone, carried away by the wheels among the horses and the ravening scythes; and another sees not that his right arm has dropped, while he climbs up and presses onward. Then another struggles to rise when his leg is lost, while at his side on the ground his dying foot twitches its toes. And the head lopped off from the warm living trunk keeps on the ground the look of life and the wide-open eyes, until it has yielded up all the last vestiges of soul. Nay more, if you should choose to chop into many parts with an axe the body of a snake with quivering tongue, angry tail, and long body, you will then perceive all the hewn parts severally writhing under the fresh blow, and scattering the ground with gore, and the fore part making open-mouthed for its own hinder part, in order that, smitten by the burning pain of the wound, it may quench it with its bite. Shall we say then that there is a whole soul in all those little parts? But by that reasoning it will follow that one living creature had many souls in its body. And so that soul which was one together with the body has been severed; wherefore both body and soul must be thought mortal, since each alike is cleft into many parts.

Moreover, if the nature of the soul is immortal, and it enters into the body at our birth, why can we not remember also the part of our life already gone, why do we not preserve traces of things done before? For if the power of the mind is so much changed that all remembrance of things past is lost to it, that state is not, I trow, a far step from death; wherefore you must needs admit that the soul, which was before, has passed away, and that that which now is, has now been created.

Moreover, if when our body is already formed the living power of the mind is wont to be put in just when we are born, and when we are crossing the threshold into life, it would not then be natural that it should be seen to grow with the body, yea, together with the limbs in the very blood, but ’tis natural that it should live all alone by itself as in a den, yet so that the whole body nevertheless is rich in sensation. Wherefore, again and again, we must not think that souls are without a birth, or released from the law of death. For neither can we think that they could be so closely linked to our bodies if they were grafted in them from without—but that all this is so, plain fact on the other hand declares: for the soul is so interlaced through veins, flesh, sinews, and bones that the teeth, too, have their share in sensation; as toothache shows and the twinge of cold water, and the biting on a sharp stone if it be hid in a piece of bread—nor, when they are so interwoven, can they, it is clear, issue forth entire, and unravel themselves intact from all the sinews and bones and joints. But if by chance you think that the soul is wont to be grafted in us from without, and then permeate through our limbs, all the more will it perish as it fuses with the body. For that which permeates dissolves, and so passes away. For even as food parceled out among all the pores of the body, when it is sent about into all the limbs and members, perishes and furnishes a new nature out of itself, so soul and mind, however whole they may pass into the fresh-made body, still are dissolved as they permeate, while through all the pores there are sent abroad into the limbs the particles, whereof this nature of the mind is formed, which now holds sway in our body, born from that which then perished, parceled out among the limbs. Wherefore it is seen that the nature of the soul is neither without a birthday nor exempt from death.

Moreover, are seeds of soul left or not in the lifeless body? For if they are left and are still there, it will follow that it cannot rightly be held immortal, since it has left the body maimed by the loss of some parts. But if it has been removed and fled from the limbs while still entire, so that it has left no part of itself in the body, how is it that corpses, when the flesh is now putrid, teem with worms, and how does so great a store of living creatures, boneless and bloodless, swarm over the heaving frame? But if by chance you believe that the souls are grafted in the worms from without, and can pass severally into their bodies, and do not consider why many thousands of souls should gather together, whence one only has departed, yet there is this that seems worth asking and putting to the test, whether after all those souls go hunting for all the seeds of the little worms, and themselves build up a home to live in, or whether they are, as it were, grafted in bodies already quite formed.

But there is no ready reason why they should make the bodies themselves, why they should be at such pains. For indeed, when they are without a body, they do not flit about harassed by disease and cold and hunger. For the body is more prone to suffer by these maladies, and ’tis through contact with the body that the mind suffers many ills. But still grant that it be ever so profitable for them to fashion a body wherein to enter; yet there seems to be no way whereby they could. Souls then do not fashion for themselves bodies and frames. Nor yet can it be that they are grafted in bodies already made; for neither will they be able to be closely interwoven, nor will contact be made by a sharing of sensation.