Posts by Cassius

I see we touched on some of these issues before (four years ago), but not thoroughly: Passions / Emotions / Feelings - The Second Leg of the Canon of Truth

For example:

Haris Dimitriadis The word passions needs special care because its meaning has been influenced by the definition of the soul that Plato gave. He imagined the soul as a chariot in which, logic-wisdom was the driver, and the two horses were the feelings and the desires. The feelings were obedient to the driver's instructions, and they contributed to the driver's guides to take under control the second horse, which was expressing the desires=passions of the body. To Plato the material body was the source of unhappiness and this was referred by him as the tomb of the mind. So to Plato passions reflected the desires of the body, which by nature are difficult to get hold on to.As regards then Democritus saying is risky to interpret it according to the platonian terminology because they had different views. They both lived in the same time period but Democritus was about 30 years older. Plato by his influence managed to distort the initial meaning of the word passion and hence makes difficult for us to know what Deemocritus meant exactly by the saying.

December 31, 2016 at 11:52amCassius Amicus Those are exactly the kinds of concerns I had in mind. In order to even begin to dig further we would presumably need the greek version of the fragment, and then compare the word choice to the word choice in Diogenes Laertius, who is himself giving his own summary and apparently not a direct quote. But rather than the end of the question I still think we are at the beginning. In discussing Epicurus we really need a firm statement of the "name" of the third leg of the canon as Epicurus used the term. Other than the two statements in DL I quoted I am not sure there is a direct statement in the core texts we have of the name of this third leg.

I personally refer to it as "the faculty of pleasure and pain" but I am not at all sure that that is the best wording. "pleasure" or "pain" alone do not seem appropriate, and "feelings" and "passions" have all the limitations we are noting. It seems clear that this third leg is also a something we commonly think of as a "sensation" but that too is not a satisfactory word. As I think of final remarks to close out 2016 I think this issue is one that would really help to make progress on in 2017. Greater clarity on this central point would be critically helpful - and ought to be doable if we are going to represent that we have a good understanding of Epicurean doctrine.

Aside: Ok in the "there he goes again" department After finding the Konstan book, what do I look for and find, happily, to be a major indication of Konstan perhaps being on the same wavelength (as far as I remember I have not read any Konstan before)?

Unlike what appears to be the modern trend,Konstan includes several approving references to DEWITT!

You have quoted the critical part Eugenios and it immediately jumps out why the pathe are part of the canon of truth - they are analogous to sensations and function "automatically" such as not to be considered subject to error:

Rather than mapping pathē onto either the soul as a whole or the body, Konstan assigns pathē to the non-rational part of the soul, the seat of sensation. He locates the emotions, which “do not seem to have a special name in Epicurean theory,” in the rational part (11). Crucial to this schema is Konstan’s claim, based on Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura and Diogenes Laertius’s doxography of Epicurus, that Epicureans did not consider emotions such as fear and joy to be pathē at all, since emotions depend on memory and reasoning, whereas pathē do not. The upshot is that fear, as a rational emotion, involves belief and evaluation, and is therefore susceptible to error; whence the psychological roots of pernicious “empty beliefs ....

--and to emphasize the point that last sentence should say something to the effect "while the pathe do not involve evaluation, and thus, like the senses, are direct contacts with human reality to be considered as truly reported at all times."

In this analysis it is extremely useful to see that "emotions depend on memory and reasoning, whereas pathē do not."

VERY good direction I think!!

1 - Oh yes that IS extremely interesting and a promising path.

2 - I had forgotten about the word "passions" but yes - I like to use words that appear to derive from the same root so that is one to remember, even though the modern associations will need clarification.

3 - I want to read that article.....

(Aside: At the moment I think I am going to let this thread run without splitting off the detailed discussion of Feelings/Pathe since I do think this is directly related to the question at hand: the best way to manage expectations surely includes an accurate explanation of the role of pleasure/pain and the goal/guide of life.) However if at any point someone feels otherwise let me know and I can easily divide up the thread.)

If Bailey's "internal sensations" is referring to the same subject, then maybe what we're missing is a word or terminology that ties pleasure and pain more tightly to some kind of "internal natural guidance system" that does in fact stand shoulder to shoulder as an equivalent with "divine inspiration" or "logic" as a concept in the fight to determine what is the proper goal of life. As it is, when we talk of "pleasure" the connotation is so tightly tied to "chocolate cake" and the like that it is hard to see the forest for the trees. When we explain to people that "pleasure and pain" are the guides to life, it would be nice to have an articulate way to explain to them that Epicurus was not meaning to list PARTICULAR pleasures or pains, but was referring to the overall mechanism given to us by nature to fulfill that guidance role.

It seems hugely important to me to be able to start with the observation that Diogenes Laertius made that "the feelings are two - pleasure and pain" in order to explain the whole issue of absence of neutral states, limits of pleasure, and especially how the presence of one equals in quantity the absence of the other.

I bet that the ambiguity that we experience in the term "feeling" would almost without a doubt have been addressed and explained by Epicurus if we had more of the texts. On that same point, my bet is also that certain aspects of this, like with the issue of "preconceptions" are buried unrecognized in plain view in front of us in Lucretius - we just fail to recognize it.

Thank you Eugenios! I have been wanting to investigate this further for a while but not made much headway. It seems like a pretty important subject to me to clarify what is being discussed. Maybe we should split this off into a different thread or start one soon if we are able to find more on this.

I will paste the references here:

Others to consider:

Menoeceus:

Principal Doctrines:

I agree with everything written above, and especially with Eugenios that Godfrey's comment is not off topic. Yes we need to be referring to both and "pleasure and pain" can be a little unwieldy and may not be exactly the right term. Clearly "pain" deserves respect as guidance from Nature too. To some extent that is why I find myself referring to "feeling" more so than pleasure or pain sometimes. I gather that the Greek word used to describe the two is some form of "pathe" and I also see (and commented somewhere recently) that Bailey uses the term "internal sensations." It would probably help to do some kind of study on what it is we are really talking about in this "faculty," because "feeling" is close but may not be precisely the right term.

I think the place to start there would be Diogenes Laertius when he says "the feelings are two" and I think there is a reference in the letter to Herodotus where the same word is apparently used.

Good comments Eugenios. As I was reading them i was thinking you're right: What's IN the cookbook is the issue!

Because even though I think you feel you shifted your answer from cookbooking to PD10, as for me, I really consider the latter part of your post to be the fundamental start of any cookbook.

Isn't a cookbook supposed to be about making appetizing food, and not just anything that's edible?

I feel the same issues of "lumpiness" in our food over and over, as illustrated by a couple of word choices:

(1) In item three, the "BUT." I explain it the same way, but why is our description so focused on "buts" which imply that what we have said before is not clear. Why is it not clear enough to say "choose pleasure and avoid pain" without having to emphasize the BUT DON'T choose unwisely (or some variation). We end up looking like the "wisdom" is the end goal rather than the pleasure, and we end up sounding sometimes like we are talking to stubborn children. Is it really necessary, once we say that pleasure is the good, to have to harp on the fact that some pleasures are going to come at a cost that is not worth that pleasure? (To repeat, I am not complaining about your formulation, I am complaining about our not being in a position to have this more easily understood).

And that leads to:

(2) Your item 6 ("thus leading to pain")

This is another part of the "rhetoric" issue we face. The act of being alive "leads to pain" so we cannot expect to pursue many of the pleasures we value most without some cost in pain. So the continuing underlying issue is HOW we stack the pleasure up against the pain and decide how much pain is worthwhile. Pretty clearly it is incorrect to focus entirely on duration/time, although that is certainly something to consider. I am thinking the problem is in our inability to articulate fully the "intensity" issue (or whatever word we want to use) is a large part of the problem. I think most people understand the "long term vs short term" issue, or at least they can grasp it as soon as they think about it, and they can see that duration/time is not a sufficient analysis. Possibly the issue of "dying for a friend" may be one of the best ways to express that some pleasures are worth pursuing even if they are achievable only briefly and at great cost in pain, and some pains are worth avoiding due to their intensity even by death which (if avoided) might buy us quite a long period of time.

Both of these comments are intended to focus on the issue that the cookbook, or the presentation, or whatever we do to set and manage expectations needs to be able to convey the issues involved and point the way to how the resolution is both individual according to context but also has a great degree of regularity given our nature as humans and the functioning of our faculty of pleasure and pain.

My general criticism is that cookbooks that focus too much on food and wine and other specific pleasures don't communicate these underlying issues that are of pretty much supreme importance, but at the same time, it is also true that cookbooks that are nothing but general analysis are of little help unless they have specific examples of the kinds of decisions that are best to make in particular contexts.

Edit 1: By no means do I intend to criticize Epicurus by saying this, but if we had a longer version of the letter to Menoeceus, which included specific examples of applications of his statements vs only the very high-level statements of principles that are included, we might have been able to avoid many misunderstandings about what he meant. I am sure Epicurus probably gave those specific examples in "On Nature" and other books, and that is why Lucretius seems to almost drown us in detail. So I guess that is why I think it's essential to combine the study of the letter to Menoeceus with Lucretius in order to give life and body to the high-level summary in the letter.

Episode 17 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. In this episode, we discuss how all things are not made of a single element, such as fire, as Heraclitus asserted.

Welcome to Episode Eighteen of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a self-taught Epicurean. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

Before we start with today's episode let me remind you of our three ground rules.

First: Our aim is to go back to the original text to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it, not simply repeat for you what passes for conventional wisdom about Epicurus today.

Second: We won't be talking about Epicurus from the point of view of modern political perspectives. Epicurus must be understood on his own, and not in terms of competitive schools which may seem similar to Epicurus, but are fundamentally different and incompatible, such as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, and Marxism.

Third: We will be approaching Lucretius exactly as he intended, with the goal of understanding the fundamental nature of the universe as the essential base of Epicurean philosophy. From this perspective you will see that Epicurus taught neither the pursuit of luxury nor the pursuit of simple living, but the pursuit of pleasure, using feeling as the guide to life, and not supernatural gods, idealism, or virtue ethics. As important as anything else, Epicurus taught that there is no life after death, and that any happiness we will ever have must come in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Remember that our podcast home page is LucretiusToday.com, where you can download a free copy of the versions of the poem we are reading, and our home for discussion of Lucretius and all other aspects of Epicurean philosophy is Epicureanfriends.com

Now for today in this Episode 18, we will discuss how just as things are not formed of a single element such as fire, divine or otherwise, all things are also not simply formed from the four classical elements (earth, air, fire, and water).

Now let's join the discussion with Martin reading today's text.

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Note: In previous episodes we have discussed:

• (1) Venus / Pleasure As Guide of Life: That Pleasure, using the allegory of Venus, is the driving force of all life; That the way to rid ourselves of pain is to replace pain with pleasure, using the allegory of Venus entertaining Mars, the god of war;

• (2) The Achievement of Epicurus: That Epicurus was the great philosophic leader who stood up to supernatural religion, opened the gates to a proper understanding of nature, and thereby showed us how we too can emulate the life of gods;
• (3-4) So Great Is The Power of Religion To Inspire Evil Deeds! That it is not Epicurean philosophy, but supernatural religion, which is truly unholy and prompts men to commit evil deeds;
• (5) On Resisting The Threats of Priests And Poets: That false priests and philosophers will try to scare you away from Epicurean philosophy with threats of punishment after death, which is why you must understand that those threats cannot be true; That the key to freeing yourself from false religion and false philosophy is found in the study of nature;
• (6-7) Step One: Nothing Comes From Nothing. The first major observation which underlies all the rest of Epicurean philosophy is that we observe that nothing is ever generated from nothing.
• (8) Step Two: Nothing Goes To Nothing. The second major observation is that nothing is ever destroyed completely to nothing.
• (9) The Evidence That Atoms Exist, Even Though They Are Unseen. The next observation is that we know elemental particles exist, even though we cannot see them just like we know that wind and other things exist by observing their effects.
• (10-11) The Void And Its Nature. We also know that the void exists, because things must have space in which to move, as we see they do move.
• (12) Everything We Experience Is Composed Of A Combination of Matter And Void. Everything around us that we experience is a natural combination of atoms and void.
• (13) The Things We Experience Are Properties and Qualities Of Atoms And Void And Cease To Exist When Their Atoms Disperse. All things we experience around us are either (1) the properties (essential conjuncts; essential and unchanging) or qualities (events; inessential and changing depending on context) of bodies. All these arise from the nature, movement, and combinations of the atoms, and cease to exist when the atoms which compose the bodies disperse. Therefore it is incorrect to think that ideas or stories such as that of the Trojan war have any permanent existence.
• (14-15) Atoms Are Solid And Indestructible, And Therefore Eternal. The argument that atoms are solid and indestructible and therefore eternal.
• (16) The Atoms Are Never Destroyed, they Provide Continuity To All Nature, and there is a strict limit on Divisibility of All Things.
• (17) All things are not made of a single element, such as fire, as some philosophers assert - such as Heraclitus, who asserted all things are made of fire.

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Here is the text that will be covered in Episode Eighteen. The Latin version of Book One has this as beginning at approximately line 713 of the Daniel Brown Edition and of the Munro Latin Edition here.

Daniel Brown 1743 Edition:

[713] And so do those who doubt the first elements of things, and to produce all beings, join the air to fire, the earth to water, or believe that from all four all beings are produced, and spring from air, and water, earth and fire. The chief of these we rank Empedocles of Agrigentum, born in Sicily, the island famed for its three promontories, whose sides the Ionian sea flows all around, with mighty windings, from whose coast the sea, by a narrow Frith, divides the bounds of Italy. Here is the fierce Charybdis, here Aetna roars, and threatens loud to suck in flames of vengeance, with greater force to belch them out again, burst from his jaws, and throw the flashing fire high as the sky. This island, though renowned by men for many things, and worth their sight, rich in the best advantages of life, by mighty men defended, yet produced nothing more glorious than this one great man, nothing more venerable, admired, and dear. Besides his verse, that from his soul divine flows sweetly, so clearly proves, and so explains the noble secrets he has found, he seems scarce born of human race, but from the gods.

[735] Yet he, with others inferior note we named before, remarkably, by great degrees, and much below him, though these have succeeded well in their search, and many things have found as if inspired, and have pronounced their oracles (from the most close recesses of their souls) much more divine, and founded more on reason than Pythia, sacred prophetess, from Tripod, or from Apollo's laurel ever spoke. Yet they have made sad havoc, when they search into the principles of things and fell with this great man's mistakes together with him.

[743] And first, because, denying there is void in bodies, they admit of motion, and allow that things are soft or rare; as the air, the sun, the fire, the earth, the creatures, fruits, and yet will mix no empty space in the contexture of bodies that are formed.

[747] And then they set no bounds to bodies being divided, nor will admit an end to blows that break their frame; nor will they grant that such a thing as least is found in bodies, when we plainly see that every being has a part, a point that utmost lies, and obvious to our sense, which is the least of all; and thence conclude, that utmost point is that same least in things too small to be discovered by the sight.

[754] Besides, these men make their principles of things consist in soft seeds, which we see are born, and altogether mortal in their frame; if so, the whole of things must have returned to nothing, and be again from thence restored; how distant both from truth you have heard before. And then such seeds are many times at war among themselves, and poison to each other, and so will perish in the attack, or fly scattered, as in a tempest we observe the thunder, and the showers and wind disperse.

[764] Lastly, if all things from four elements are formed, and into them are finally dissolved, why should they rather the first principles of things be called, than things the principles of them? For they are produced alternately, are ever changing their form and their whole nature mutually into each other; but if by chance you think the body of the fire and earth is joined, that air is joined to water, and this united, each element preserves its nature still entire; nothing from seeds like these could have been formed, not men, nor things inanimate, as trees: for every element in this various heap of matter, ever changing, would display its proper nature still; you'd see air mixed with the earth, and fire and water joined. But the first principles whence things are formed should be in nature close and undiscerned, that nothing might appear which should oppose or jar, and thus prevent the compound body from being uniform, and make it consist of parts dissimilar, confused and void.

[782] Besides, philosophers like these derive their transmutation from celestial fire; and first, they make this fire change to air, from air is water formed, the earth from water; and then again, from earth these elements return, first water, then the air, then last the fire. Nor do these constant changes ever cease among themselves, but still proceed from heaven to earth, from earth to stars, that light the world. But the first seeds of things must by no means be thus disposed; for something immutable must needs remain, lest things should utterly to nothing be reduced: For whatsoever suffers change, by passing over the bounds of its first nature, dies, and is no more what it first was. Those elements therefore, which, as we said above, admit of change, must needs consist of other seeds which never can change at all, lest things should utterly to nothing be reduced: Then rather say, there are some certain principles in nature which are the seeds of fire, suppose, and some of these being taken away, or else by adding more, by changing of their order or their motion, they compose the air, and so all other beings may be produced by changes such as these.

[803] But you say, that common fact does clearly show that all things grow and rise into the air and are supported by the earth; and unless the season, in happy time, indulges rain, and shakes the trees with driving showers, unless the sun, on his part, cherishes and gives his heat, nor fruits, nor trees, nor creatures could increase. 'Tis true, but these are not first seeds; and we likewise, unless dry food and kindly juice preserve our bodies, they must perish, and every spark of life, out of our nerves and bones, must be extinct. We are upheld, no doubt, and nourished by certain means; and other things are staid by certain others; for many common principles of many things are mixed in each. And therefore, the various kinds of things we find supported in a different manner; but yet it much concerns with what, and in what order, these first seeds unite, and what motion they give and take among themselves; for the same seeds compose heaven, earth, the sea, the rivers, and the sun, the same compose the creatures, fruits, and trees, they differ only as they are moved by others, and as their mixture differs in themselves.

[823] So, in these lines of mine, the many letters you see are common to the make and form of many words; and yet, you must confess, the verses and the words are much unlike in sense and sound: Such is the force of letters, by change of order only. But the first seeds of things being more, must needs admit of changes more different; from whence proceeds that great variety of things we see produced.

Munro:

[713] As well as they who make the first-beginnings of things twofold coupling air with fire and earth with water, and they who believe that all things grow out of four things, fire earth and air and water. Chief of whom is Agrigentine Empedocles: him within the three-cornered shores of its lands that island bore, about which the Ionian sea flows in large crankings, and splashes up brine from its green waves.Here the sea racing in its straitened froth divides by its waters the shores of Italia’s lands from the other’s coasts; here is wasteful Charybdis and here the rumblings of Aetna threaten anew to gather up such fury of flames, as again with force to belch forth the fires bursting from its throat and carry up to heaven once more the lightnings of flame.Now though this great country is seen to deserve in many ways the wonder of mankind and is held to be well worth visiting, rich in all good things, guarded by large force of men, yet seems it to have held within it nothing more glorious than this man, nothing more holy marvelous and dear.The verses too of his godlike genius cry with a loud voice and set forth in such wise his glorious discoveries that he hardly seems born of a mortal stock.

[735] Yet he and those whom we have mentioned above immeasurably inferior and far beneath him, although the authors of many excellent and godlike discoveries, they have given responses from so to say their hearts’ holy of holies with more sanctity and on much more grounds than the Pythia who speaks out from the tripod and laurel of Phoebus, have yet gone to ruin in the first-beginnings of things: it is there they have fallen, and, great themselves, great and heavy has been that fall;

[743] first because they have banished void from things and yet assign to them motions, and allow things soft and rare, air sun fire earth, living things and corn, and yet mix not up void in their body;

[747] next because they suppose that there is no limit to the division of bodies and no stop set to their breaking and that there exists no least at all in things; though we see that that is the bounding point of any thing which seems to be least to our senses, so that from this you may infer that because the things which you do not see have a bounding point, there is a least in them.

[754] Moreover since they assign soft first-beginnings of things, which we see to have birth and to be of a body altogether mortal, the sum of things must in that case revert to nothing and the store of things be born anew and flourish out of nothing: how wide now of the truth both these doctrines are you will already comprehend.

[760] In the next place these bodies are in many ways mutually hostile and poisonous; and therefore they will either perish when they have met, or will fly asunder just as we see, when a storm has gathered, lightnings and rains and winds fly asunder.

[764] Again if all things are produced from four things and all again broken up into those things, how can they be called first-beginnings of things any more than things be called their first-beginnings, the supposition being reversed? For they are begotten time about and interchange color and their whole nature without ceasing.But if haply you suppose that the body of fire and of earth and air and the moisture of water meet in such a way that none of them in the union changes its nature, no thing I tell you can be then produced out of them, neither living thing northing with inanimate body, as a tree; in fact each thing amid the medley of this discordant mass will display its own nature and air will be seen to be mixed up with earth and heat to remain in union with moisture.But first-beginnings ought in begetting things to bring with them a latent and unseen nature in order that no thing stand out, to be in the way and prevent whatever is produced from having its own proper being.

[782] Moreover they go back to heaven and its fires for a beginning, and first suppose that fire changes into air, next that from air water is begotten and earth is produced out of water, and that all in reverse order come back from earth, water first, next air, then heat, and that these cease not to interchange, to pass from heaven to earth, from earth to the stars of ether. All which first-beginnings must on no account do; since something unchangeable must needs remain over, that things may not utterly be brought back to nothing. For whenever a thing changes and quits its proper limits, at once this change of state is the death of that which was before. Wherefore since those things which we have mentioned a little before pass into a state of change, they must be formed out of others which cannot in any case be transformed, that you may not have things returning altogether to nothing. Why not rather hold that there are certain bodies possessed of such a nature, that, if they have haply produced fire, the same may, after a few have been taken away and a few added on and the order and motion changed, produce air; and that all other things may in the same way interchange with one another?

[803] “But plain matter of fact clearly proves” you say “that all things grow up into the air and are fed out of the earth; and unless the season at the propitious period send such abundant showers that the trees reel beneath the soaking storms of rain, and unless the sun on its part foster them and supply heat, corn, trees and living things could not grow.” Quite true, and unless solid food and soft water should recruit us, our substance would waste away and life break wholly up out of all the sinews and bones; for we beyond doubt are recruited and fed by certain things, this and that other thing by certain other things. Because many first-beginnings common to many things in many ways are mixed up in things, therefore sure enough different things are fed by different things. And it often makes a great difference with what things and in what position the same first beginnings are held in union and what motions they mutually impart and receive; for the same make up heaven sea lands rivers sun, the same make up corn trees and living things; but they are mixed up with different things and in different ways as they move.

[823] Nay you see throughout even in these verses of ours many elements common to many words, though you must needs admit that the lines and words differ one from the other both in meaning and in sound wherewith they sound. So much can elements effect by a mere change of order; but those elements which are the first-beginnings of things can bring with them more combinations out of which different things can severally be produced.

Bailey:

[713] Add to them too those who make the first-beginnings of things twofold, linking air to fire or earth to water, and those who think that all can grow up out of four things, fire, earth, wind, and rain.

[716] Of them in the forefront comes Empedocles of Acragas; him that island bore within the three-cornered coasts of its lands, around which flows the Ionian ocean, with many a winding inlet, splashing salt foam from its green waves, while with narrow strait a tearing sea sunders with its waves the coasts of Italy’s lands from the island-borders. Here is devastating Charybdis, and here the rumblings of Aetna threaten to gather once more the flames of its wrath, that again in its might it may belch forth the fires bursting from its throat, and once more dash to the sky its flashing flames. And though this mighty country seems in many ways marvelous to the tribes of men, and is said to deserve seeing, rich in goodly things, and strengthened with a mighty wealth of men, yet it is seen to have held nothing in it more glorious than this man, nothing more holy, more marvelous and loved. Nay, the songs of his godlike heart lift up their voice and set forth his glorious discoveries, so that he seems scarce born of human stock.

[735] Yet he and those whom I named before, weaker than he by exceeding many degrees, and far beneath him, though they discovered much in good, nay godlike fashion, and gave answers as from the shrine of their hearts in more holy wise and with reasoning far more sure than the Pythian priestess who speaks out from the tripod and laurel of Phoebus, yet in the first-beginnings of things they came to grief: great were they, and great and heavy their fall therein.

[743] First because they take away the void from things, but suppose movement, and leave things soft and rare, air, sunlight, fire, earth, beasts, and crops, and yet mingle no void in their body.

[747] Then because they hold that there is no limit at all to the cutting of bodies, that no halting-place is set to their breaking, nor again is there any least among things. And that when we see that there is that extreme point in each thing, which is seen to be the least to our senses, so that you can infer from this that the extreme point in things which you cannot see is the least in them.

[754] Then follows this that, since they suppose the first-beginnings of things soft, things which we see come to birth and endowed throughout with a mortal body, the whole sum of things must then return to naught, and the store of things be born again, and grow strong out of nothing. And how far both this and that are from the truth, you will know by now.

[760] Then again, these things are in many ways hostile, nay poison, the one to the other; therefore either when they meet they will pass away, or they will so fly apart, as when a storm gathers we see the thunderbolts and rain and wind fly asunder.

[764] Again, if from four things all are created and all again are dissolved into those things, how can they be called the first-beginnings of things any more than things the first-beginnings of them, with our thought reversed? For they are begotten turn by turn, and change their colour and all their nature one with the other from all time onward. But if perchance you think that the body of fire and the body of earth and the breezes of the air and the dewy moisture so unite, that in union no one of them changes its nature, you will see that nothing can be created out of them, no, not a living thing, nor one with lifeless body, like a tree. Indeed in the mingling of this diverse mass each thing will reveal its own nature, and air will be seen to be mixed together with earth, and heat to cleave to moisture. But first-beginnings ought in the begetting of things to bring to bear a secret and unseen nature, that nothing may stand out which might bar and thwart whatever is created from existing with its own true being.

[782] But indeed they trace it back to heaven and heaven’s fires, and hold that fire first turns itself into the breezes of the sky, that thence is begotten rain, and of rain is created earth, and then all things pass back again from earth, first moisture, next air, then heat, and that these things never cease their mutual changes, in their path from heaven to earth, from earth to the stars of the firmament. But the first-beginnings ought in no wise to do this. For it must needs be that something abides unchangeable, that all things be not altogether brought to naught. For whenever a thing changes and passes out of its own limits, straightway this is the death of that which was before. Wherefore since the things we have named a little before pass into a state of interchange, they must needs be made of other things, which cannot in any case be altered, lest you find all things returning altogether to naught. Why not rather suppose that there are certain bodies endowed with such a nature, and that, if by chance they have created fire, they can too, when a few are removed and a few added, and their order and movement is changed, make the breezes of the sky, and that thus all things are changed one into another?

[803] ‘But,’ you say, ‘the facts show clearly that all things are nourished and grow from the earth up into the breezes of the sky; and unless the season at a propitious time fosters them with rain, so that the trees rock beneath the outpouring of the storm-clouds, and the sun for its part cherishes them, and bestows its heat on them, crops, trees, living creatures, none could grow.’ Yes, in very truth, unless we too were nurtured by dry food and soft moisture, we should lose our flesh, and all the life too would be loosened from all our sinews and bones. For beyond all doubt we are nurtured and nourished upon things determined, and other things again, each in their turn, on things determined. Yea, we may be sure, it is because many first-beginnings common in many ways to many things are mingled among things, that so diverse things are nourished on diverse food. And often it is of great matter with what others those first-beginnings are bound up, and in what position, and what movements they mutually give and receive; for the same build up sky, sea, earth, rivers, sun, the same too crops, trees, living creatures, but only when mingled with different things and moving in different ways.

[823] Indeed scattered abroad in my verses you see many letters common to many words, and yet you must needs grant that verses and words are unlike both in sense and in the ring of their sound. So great is the power of letters by a mere change of order. But the first-beginnings of things can bring more means to bear, by which all diverse things may be created.

Those are good thoughts Godfrey.

Quote from Godfrey

To me, pleasure and pain is the key to implementing the philosophy in one's life

I think in my case I have a special perspective on that which may be the result of my age and background.

For me, I don't generally wrestle with particular "types" of pleasure, or how to implement them - I know I make the same mistakes that most people do in terms of over-indulgence, or just mistaken views of what will lead to more pleasure or more pain down the road.

For me, the issue of "pleasure and pain [as] the key to implementing the philosophy" is more the recognition that "pleasure and pain" are what actually stand in the role of "gods" or "idealism" that I see in other people of my generation.

Maybe the time has come when the issues of eternal life, fate, supernatural gods, divine punishment and reward, etc. are largely obsolete and even uninteresting, but I know in terms of how I have grown up the issues of existence of god, etc, were the main and overriding issues of importance.

So in my case it is such a huge issue to recognize that gods and idealism are false leads, and that natural mechanisms of pleasure and pain take the place of those, that I find Epicurean philosophy fully satisfying without looking to Epicurus for specific hints on particular pleasures to pursue or avoid. Certainly his advice as to friendship and living within one's means are highly useful, but I don't find those particularly unique or Epicurus' version of them to be the central items of interest.

I think people today in our much less religious and more secular society start from a much different point than did those in generations past, so maybe that partly explains why so many people are interesting in "techniques" when it seems to me that they should be asking "What's the right direction to go in the first place, regardless of technique in getting there?"

As for the questions about contradictions such as:

Quote from Godfrey

Is it possible that discussing our general frameworks for applying pleasure/pain could help to clarify that these two doctrines are in perfect agreement?

I am thinking that is sort of a result of the same issue. People come to Epicurus thinking that they are going to read about some Stoic "mind manipulation" technique, and instead of that they find a lot of fundamentals about the nature of the universe and humanity that seems to them irrelevant, because they think they have the "end goal" already figured out and they don't need any lectures on that!

Someone you like who are now fully into the issues won't make that mistake, but I can see what you are observing operating as part of the problem we're discussing - people are looking for a "cookbook" of quick and easy suggestions, and instead they hear lectures on issues they didn't even realize existed!

To those kinds of complaints my general response would have to be a diplomatic version of "that's just too bad that you don't understand the questions that you should be asking." And a certain number of people like that have already equipped themselves with such blinders that there's not much hope for them to become "committed" members of an Epicurean community anyway.

But I do think that a significant percentage of the type of people who come looking for a cookbook will recognize and say to themselves - "Wait a minute! I never knew these questions existed but I see why they are important!" And those are the ones that it would be good to be prepared for with some initial guidance about what to expect and why they need to expect it.

As for those of us who do see and understand the issues, we too need the kind of community you're talking about - with practical advice for those of us who do see the deeper issues on how to dig ourselves out of those weeds regularly enough that we don't get overcome by the work required for the larger tasks.

Here's an observation about a problem I see recurring over and over:

People who find out about Epicurus in general or our Epicurean forums in particular often start reading because they have heard something general with which they agree. They hear and immediately like things such as: "Epicurus rejected supernatural religion," or "Epicurus rejects the idea of life after death," or "Epicurus held that pleasure is the guide of life," or "Epicurus taught that the universe is made up of atoms and his views of nature were way ahead of his time," or "Epicurus taught that it is a good idea not to live beyond one's means, because our goal is to be happy whatever means are available to us."

They start reading about Epicurus because they identify with one of more of these general ideas, but over time as they find our more specifics, they sometimes lose interest because the specifics are not what they expect. In many cases their interest fades in disappointment because they think that just because Epicurus agrees with them on one or a couple of basic conclusions, they expect to find that Epicurus agreed with them on every conclusion that they themselves reach about how to live.

I think the problem here - and the error on their part, which is not a flaw in Epicurus - is that they fail to understand that the Epicurean view of the nature of the universe means that different people are inevitably going to have very different experiences and backgrounds. These different experiences and backgrounds are going to lead people to have different tastes and opinions about what they find pleasing. The result is totally normal, and to be expected: not every Epicurean will reach the same conclusion on every issue in life.

It seems to me it would help people manage expectations if we made a point of emphasizing this early in the process of discussing Epicurus. If we emphasize that from the beginning of our discussions, maybe that will lessen the impact of the "disappointment" that people frequently feel when they find some detail in Epicurus that doesn't match their own viewpoint, and they will realize that instead of being a flaw, this is a feature of Epicurean philosophy.

Here at this Epicureanfriends.com forum we've tried to address this with the "Not Neo-Epicurean But Epicurean" and the "Our Posting Policy" graphics, These are intended to steer people away from the day-to-day political issues where the issue and the conflict and the disappointment most clearly arise.

But I am thinking it would be good to find more ways to emphasize this issue fast and hard.

I get the impression that Epicurus himself had such thoughts when he wrote material like PD10. What is PD10 except an in-your-face warning to put aside your personal viewpoint about what may be "worthy" or what may be "depraved" to you?

Quote

10. If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky, and death, and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires (and of pains), we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full, with pleasures from every source, and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life.

The point seems to be that people have have a hard time accepting - and need to be taught clearly - that it really is true that Nature's only stop and go signal to each person is the pain and pleasure that the individual person feels - and yes, this includes the pain and pleasure of our friends and those we value, whose pain and pleasure are important to us as well.

Calculating out the implications of that is not easy to do, and is going to differ with people and with circumstances, but the ultimate point is that there is no single rule that applies to everyone, everywhere, and all the time, and the sooner we disabuse ourselves of that notion the less likely we are to pull back once we realize that his is true.

What are your thoughts about this, and if you agree, possible ways we could work on doing a better job of dealing with this?

Hello and welcome to the forum escu !

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.
2. "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt
3. "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius
4. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
5. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
6. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
7. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
8. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
9. Plato's Philebus
10. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
11. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

OMG the "end times" discussions are among the worst and most frustrating, and hard to avoid using expletives. How many darn episodes does humanity have to go through to convince it that this is not "the end" or "the second coming" or whatever!

This is one of many reasons why I think it's necessary to have our own alternate "institutions" -- because monolithic heavily funded organizations like the various churches and religions just perpetuate their poison from generation to generation in a way that no individual or loosely-affiliated sets of individuals can withstand.

I feel sure that Epicurus himself, and no doubt the later Epicureans as Christianity emerged as a force of disruption in the Greco-Roman world had to see this too. Obviously they didn't succeed in building fast enough or thoroughly enough to withstand the tide of their time, but this is one of a thousand reasons why the 'retire to your cave and live as a hermit' model can never work. Which is not at all to fault Epicurus, because his emphasis on "Friends" and on advice such as PD39 holds the key to realizing that the passivist and hermitist interpretation is incorrect.

Elli's vocabulary list -- which is excellent - but which unfortunately we cannot expect most new people to have access to:

What bothers me most is for example here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ataraxia

This entry is a series of assertions about philosophical positions - but on what is it based? I see no texts citing words of the philosophers themselves for these definitions. In describing the alleged philosophical positions we are relying entirely on the commentator as authority for his own assertions.

Given how widely differently Epicurus used the term "gods" than we use that word today, I think it is entirely possible that the common definition of ataraxia, even among Greeks, may be widely different than any particular philosopher used it.

When you go beyond the root meanings, which apparently are pretty clear: (Ataraxia (ἀταραξία, alpha privative negation of tarachê -- disturbance, trouble;[1] hence, "unperturbedness", generally translated as "imperturbability", "equanimity", or "tranquility") how do we know than any of the added atttributes beyond this are what Epicurus (or any other philosopher) was saying?

For example " a lucid state of robust equanimity characterized by ongoing freedom from distress and worry. In non-philosophical usage, the term was used to describe the ideal mental state for soldiers entering battle. " REALLY? Are we really sure that a particular reference was intended to confey all this added meaning beyond just "undisturbed"?

I would think it would be much better to start with root meanings and make absolutely sure that if we add more to that, we have the addition specified by the philosopher himself, so that we do not get our conclusions polluted by commentators who may be sincere, but may be totally wrong.

Check the references to that wikipedia article. Okeefe, Warren.... In particular how it is alleged that the Epicurean view of ataraxoa revolves around katatestematic pleaures: "Katastematic pleasures were regarded to be better than kinetic pleasures by Epicurus, believing that one could feel no more pleasure than the removal of all pain."

By letting people with a particular view of Epicurus define the term which supposedly (in some people's minds) represent the goal of the philosophy you are letting them define the philosophy itself.

This is very dangerous. - to allow a single word definition to overrule and decide the outcome of every significant issue in the philosophical debate - and that's just what Jason L was suggesting yesterday - he's suggesting that we NOT translate it and just go with the definition war that is being dominated by the Okeefe versions of epicurean philosophy. All someone has to do is flip over to that wikipedia definition, believe that it reflects Epicurus, and they are - rightly - going to be totally turned off to Epicurus.

Thanks for thank Eugenios. This is probably also what is covered in DeWitt's "unity of pleasure" discussions, but I find the entire discussion by virtually everyone to be unsatisfying.

As that wiki entry points out, there really is even lingering doubt as to whether the point is that pleasures cannot be so condensed, or is in fact a hypothetical asking us to imagine that they can be condensed and therefore asking us to think about what that tells us about the particular pleasures.

I could read that to mean that he is saying that pleasures differ ONLY in "intensity," and that he is arguing that the pleasure of cutting your fingernails differs from the pleasure of listening to a symphony only in "intensity" -- which apparently is a way of looking at how much of the total experience of the organism is taken up by that particular experience.

If that were the point, then this would be another way of emphasizing that there is simply no "outside" standard (outside of pleasure itself) by which to judge or rank pleasures. And that would be consistent I think with the thrust of several other positions Epicurus seems to take.

It would also join up with what I think is going on in PD3 and much of the rest of the "limit" analysis, which I think involves looking at life as the "sum total of experience" and thinking about how individual pleasures and pains are added to the vessel to come up with the sum of whatever is in the vessel at a particular moment.

However the point the wiki derives seems to be 'his belief that the various pleasures are in an important sense independent' which would be a very different point, if true.

Eugenios and others - what do you think? Is the emphasis that "the various pleasures are 'independent'" or something else?

I think I end up as usual thinking that dewitt is correct with a "unity of pleasure" approach, but i have not read that section recently enough to recall if I am remembering it correctly.

Yes Nate I think you're right.

It's kind of like the glass half-full or half-empty issue. We can look at the same words and choose to see what we "want" to see, or what we "expect" to see, because we're looking at something that is an either/or between two sets of opposites.

Either way of labeling the glass is ok, because it is accurate as to quantity of liquid and quantity of air, but the problem comes when we read into the situation implications that are not there when simply looking at the quantity.

WE are the ones who load the observation as to quantity with the additional meaning of "Which way is in trending?" in using full and empty.

And so in the issue of pleasure and pain, WE are the ones who are choosing whether to look at the issue from one that emphasizes pleasure or emphasizes pain.

The choice tells a lot more about us than it does about the ultimate conclusion toward which Epicurus was leading, which he made clear in many other statements.

And that's why I am still convinced that a large part of the key to unwinding this is to refer to PD3 where the words "limit of quantity" tell us that what is being discussed is not equivalence of pain and pleasure in every respect, but instead, what's being discussed is a logical point as to limits, which was made necessary by the Platonic argument that pleasure cannot be the good because it has no limit.