Posts by Cassius

Wonderful Joshua! Thank you very much for doing this and telling us about it! I think Koen was probably very wise to republish the site exactly as it was before - who (who might have a right to) could complain about that? I know that circumstances will control, and that indeed the ancient Epicureans discussed that it is justified to charge for philosophical guidance, but I strongly suspect that most truly Epicurean-minded people are very liberal on their "intellectual property" claims (liberal meaning that they grant free use liberally

Don just for the record I see you searched http://epicurism.info/ and that's the info I get too. I would really be curious to know because they sure did a good job of lifting the old contents.

Joshua that looks good. Unfortunately i do not know any leads on who resurrected Eric's site.

As to that particular image - https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection…=0&rpp=20&pos=1 We see that one used all the time and it being public domain may explain it.

Which is a shame.

I have to say that my personal opinion is that is the LEAST flattering portrayal of Epicurus in existence. With the broken eyebrow, he looks confused or resigned or 'stoned,' which is why I never use that one in any of my work. Of course I generally bite my tongue when others use it though At least it's not one of those older portrayals of a bald or other wise totally "wrong" portraits - not Epicurus at all - that we sometimes see used, such as:.

That "bald" Epicurus is the worst, but a close runner up is the broken eyebrow version:

pasted-from-clipboard.png

I suppose it's possible that this bust was mutilated by the Christians, so maybe it's a badge of honor, but in this view and lighting I think he actually looks sad:

But of course, to each his own

i know nothing about copyright law either, but I too see these same images everywhere and I would imagine the worst that would happen is you eventually get asked to take it down, which is probably a one in a thousand chance, or less. I never studied the Digital Millennium Copyright Act either but maybe if someone were concerned they would even have to issue a take-down notice first? I wouldn't imagine that anything major bad could happen except in situations where maybe someone takes a Getty or other commercial image and then crops off the copyright watermark, and even then I have to wonder what's the worst that could happen for a project like this.

Looking forward to hearing the first episode!

Perhaps in the distant future there will one day be successful Epicurean organizations in "real life" (not just on the internet) at both local and regional and larger levels. There is nothing of the sort in existence today, but for real people to embrace and live by Epicurean principles on any kind of scale, organization is required. The enemies of Epicurean philosophy are well organized and have thousands of years of experience in suppressing Epicurean ideas. The purpose of this subforum is to explore ideas for future organizations of Epicureans.

The first and main article I am aware of that is relevant to this topic is DeWitt's "Organization and Procedure In Epicurean Groups." Let's use this thread and subforum for general brainstorming on what kinds of organization might eventually be possible, and how we get one day to that point.

File

"Organization and Procedure in Epicurean Groups" - Norman DeWitt - 1936

DeWitt's summary of what is known about organization and procedure in ancient Epicurean Groups as published in the July 1936 edition of Classical Philology.

Cassius

November 22, 2017 at 8:29 AM

Quote from Don

It's not enough to use reason, we need evidence as "seen" by our senses (and the extension of our senses through instruments etc.).

I agree. We need to be able to articulate WHY that is so. The issue is so obscured in common discussion that many people seem to have become convinced that there is something called "reason" which makes evidence unnecessary, so it no longer appears to go without saying that "reason" requires evidence, and then explaining what kind of evidence we're talking about, and why it is in fact legitimate to rely on the evidence of the canonical faculties even though we are the first to admit that the information they provide may not in every instance be true to what we regard as the ultimate facts. it's the circular issue that Epicurus and Lucretius address directly: Ultimately there is NOTHING that can be used to justify an opinion (or reason itself) other than the evidence we obtain through the canonical faculties.

Quote from Don

There are some things that are "real" or true for the individual but there is also an objective reality we all need to agree on.

Yes I agree with that. A significant part of coming to an agreement would be to define the terms as clearly as possible so we see if we can't come to a common understanding of how we are using those words "real" and "true." And I think that issue is what started some of the recent conversation as you were pointing out that it probably isn't sufficient to say that "we all just know" what "real" and "true" mean. ("We all just know" not being a good description of anyone here's position, but just a stand-in for the question of how we go about coming to agreement.)

You know "it strikes me" (a good Epicurean expression, right?) as a good idea to reemphasize not only the operation of the canon but also some of its most important implications.

Would it be fair to say that those include?

1 - This is an Epicurean response to total skepticism. It's the theory that tells us that when used properly and under the right conditions there are some opinions that can be considered to be ""true" as opposed to "false."

2 - This is an Epicurean response to the suggestion that nothing in life is "real." A premise of the canon is that these faculties are providing to us what is "real to us" in life.

3 - This may be just another way of saying item one, but this approach allows us to affirm that knowledge is possible because we define knowledge as that which is established by the use of the canonical faculties, which is the proper way of defining knowledge, rather than requiring supernatural omniscience.

4 - it's an explanation of a valid human approach to consciousness which shows that it all can occur in a reliable way without divine inspiration.

5 - it's an explanation that allows us to reject Platonic rationalism by insisting that whatever is the subject of our reasoning be validated by one of more of the canonical faculties.

There is probably a lot more to say on this but I wanted to interject these first thoughts into the discussion so we can keep oriented not only to some of the procedural issues (how the canon is non-rational or pre-rational, how the three legs are separate but work together) but also the significance of why the entire topic is important.

Quote from Godfrey

I keep leaning toward the notion that they function together as a process, but I may be bringing that to it from my personal bias.

... Or else you are mind-melding with Norman DeWitt, because I think that's his position too Godfrey you've read DeWitt's chapter on anticipations? He has a very involved discussion of this functioning that I can't say I agree with 100% but makes a lot of sense and definitely ought to be part of your reading as you think about this

Quote from Godfrey

But in thinking of it in terms of a process, the prolepses or feelings aren't activated without a stimulus.

I think that is probably correct too. That steps us closer toward the subject that none of us (to my knowledge) have ever really dived into -- the "images" which are distinct and not received through the sight - which seem to be a MUCH more important part of all these processes than most people talk about much nowadays. Don't let me get us off too far on that tangent, but in the context of when stimuli are involved, remember this passage from Cicero to Cassius:

Quote

For it somehow happens, that whenever I write anything to you, you seem to be at my very elbow; and that, not by way of visions of images, as your new friends term them, who believe that even mental visions are conjured up by what Catius calls spectres (for let me remind you that Catius the Insubrian, an Epicurean, who died lately, gives the name of spectres to what the famous Gargettian [Epicurus], and long before that Democritus, called images).

2 But, even supposing that the eye can be struck by these spectres because they run up against it quite of their own accord, how the mind can be so struck is more than I can see. It will be your duty to explain to me, when you arrive here safe and sound, whether the spectre of you is at my command to come up as soon as the whim has taken me to think about you - and not only about you, who always occupy my inmost heart, but suppose I begin thinking about the Isle of Britain, will the image of that wing its way to my consciousness?

http://www.attalus.org/translate/cassius.html

Godfrey you are asking the question that leads me to my own conclusion: How are all three legs of the canon supposed to work and what makes them canonical?

I've always come to the conclusion that in order for the legs of the canon to serve as criteria of truth, they had to function "automatically" without the input of reason/opinion. Therefore I have always rejected the view that anticipations could be "concepts," because in my view that creates a feedback loop. If the opinion we form after experience becomes part of our standard of truth, then that just doesn't work if the main feature of the canon is that it is pre-rational.

Now in my mind there is a possibility that the anticipation faculty is some kind of "organizational" capacity that can be made sharper over time, just as perhaps our ear for music or our ability to pick out detail in sight might improve with experience. But that would just be improvement in the working of a non-rational faculty, and if you consider concepts like "ox" to be subjects of anticipations, then in my mind that's a non-starter. "Ox" is a human-developed category of living things summarized in a particular word "ox," and it's going to be a matter of opinion where the dividing line between an ox and a cow and a horse and sheep really lies.

So I think DeWitt is correct in ruling out the possibility of there being an "anticipation" of a concrete particular like an ox or Plato.

The process of deciding whether the thing headed toward us is an ox, or Plato, clearly does involve some kind of process in which the mind works to narrow down the possibilities and fit the data to a pattern we have developed over time, but at the point we're saying "that's an ox because it matches our definition of an ox," and at that point we are pretty far from what Epicurus was considering to be a faculty analogous to seeing and hearing.

Now being a lawyer I think I can take the other side of that argument. I can argue that, "Yes, since human experience isn't absolute and so much is relative to our perspective, then we should consider our previously-formed concepts and opinions to be a part of our canon of "truth." In saying that we would have to emphasize that "truth" is not absolute, so it's ok to incorporate own on reasoning conclusions as part of what we think is true.

And it seems that the "later" or "the Epicureans generally" did take that course, thereby creating a fourth leg of the standard of truth.

However DeWitt concludes that that was a big mistake, and I agree with DeWitt. Once you admit that the product of conceptual reasoning itself is a part of your measure of "truth," to me you are on the slippery slope to Platonic rationalism, because your holding the opinions of your own mind as equal in authority to the promptings of nature.

[Edit: I made some pretty significant revisions to clean up my poor typing and phrasing hopefully without changing the meaning.]

Don I expected that you would not yet be satisfied. Have you yet gotten to the chapter in DeWitt where he talks about his view of anticipations?

We do probably have two very separate issues here:

(1) The practical meaning/definition/view of "truth"

(2) The nature and use of "anticipations."

My current thought is that I go very much along the lines of Godfrey's quote from "A Few Days In Athens" as to "truth," and as to anticipations, I am pretty much with DeWitt but with a focus on anticipations being a "faculty" (like sight) which makes it critical to distinguish the faculty from any single "perception" that arises from the faculty.

I think it is very very easy to equate an anticipation with a particular conclusion, and I think that is exactly what Bailey and probably Tsouna are doing, and I think they are wrong about that. I think that anticipations are distinct perceptions (just like from 5 senses and feelings) from which we draw opinions, but blurring the line between the perception and our opinion or conclusion is a major error.

Even DeWitt seems to me to be too close to equating an anticipation with a particular opinion, but if you read him closely enough I don't think he really goes over the line. For example when we talk about having an anticipation of justice, I don't think that means that our particular anticipation equates to a conclusion that a particular situation is just or unjust. My view is that it's a faculty that allows us to recognize that what is being observed is something that our minds are disposed to file under a category that "justice," but that all the conclusions about whether the particular situation is just or unjust are in the realm of opinion rather than in the realm of the anticipation faculty. Where I think DeWitt is most correct in ridiculing the idea that anticipations allow us to identify cows or horses. I think that process, which is featured in Diogenes Laertius, is something else (probably "conceptual reasoning"), not a description of the faculty of anticipations.

Hello and welcome to the forum @Billytea !

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. The Biography of Epicurus By Diogenes Laertius (Chapter 10). This includes all Epicurus' letters and the Authorized Doctrines. Supplement with the Vatican list of Sayings.
2. "Epicurus And His Philosophy" - Norman DeWitt
3. "On The Nature of Things"- Lucretius
4. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
5. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
6. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
7. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
8. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
9. Plato's Philebus
10. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
11. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially on katastematic and kinetic pleasure.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

Quote from Martin

Just for clarification:

The truth about something is not a prolepsis (in most cases). During the referred to podcast discussion, my agreement with truth as prolepsis was about the meaning of the word truth, not truth about something, and I thought the other participants were referring to the meaning of the word truth, too.

Don, I wonder if you have the same concern about this as your earlier concern?

if I recall the Voula Tsouna article correctly (and I think it is posted here) she discusses David Sedleys views as different from hers, and I recall agreeing more with Sedley than with her.

File

Tsouna - Epicurean Preconceptions (2016 Article)

Epicurean Preconceptions

Cassius

May 2, 2020 at 6:14 PM

Also in getting the terminology correct I think it is important to keep in mind that "prolepsis" appears to refer to a FACULTY, while "truth" in the way we are talking about it here probably always refers to a PARTICULAR truth, in the same we that SIGHT is the faculty but we SEE a particular object.

So whether we have "prolepsis of truth" very possibly should always be stated to convey that we are talking about having a prolepsis of the truth of a particular situation.

Maybe there is a prolepsis of what truth is in the abstract, like there are prolepsises of the nature of the gods, but we have to remember I think that a prolepsis is like any other faculty (like sight) in that what the prolepsis reports will be reported truly, but may be "untrue to the facts" just like people can have incorrect preconceptions of the nature of the gods.

Yes Godfrey that is the direction I think probably Elayne will come down on when she has a chance to elaborate. In the sense you are talking evaluation of a "prolepsis of truth" would probably include recognition that human truth is contextual and that godlike omniscient certainty is an invalid standard.

Quote from Don

I'm also reading Philodemus' "On Methods of Inference" and the commentary that you recommended. This does seem to bear directly on the issue at hand, so thanks for that suggestion.

Don it's going to take you a while to get through that material so we are going to have to give your some time, but I do think you will continue to agree that it is extremely relevant material. It's possibly some of the most helpful material I've come across, especially in how it provides background in comparing Epicurus to Plato and especially Aristotle. Aristotle is often considered much appreciative of the senses than was Plato, and that's probably true, but DeLacey helps show I think that Epicurus went much further in rejecting rationalism and that is point that deserves tremendous emphasis (to the everlasting pain and embarrassment of the Randians/Objectivists!).

As we discuss that remember that i have the full book online so we can post links to this location: https://archive.org/stream/philode…age/n5/mode/2up

Wow my compliments and thanks to both Godfrey and Don for these last posts. Godfrey that quote from Frances Wright is directly on point, and Don thanks for that link to the article on Prolepsis which I have not seen. I have not yet started to read it but the abstract sounds very promising to me. Sounds like most all of us are going to agree with his direction as the prolepsis being pre-rational and not at all the same thing as "concept formation" (which would involve reasoning/opinion.

If I understand the direction Don is going (and I think i do) he will not be surprised that I agree with him and the direction. At this point in the conversation I am prepared to commit that I believe that Epicurus held that prolepsis/anticipation/preconception is a faculty that provides a COMPONENT of "truth," just as do the five senses and the feelings of pain and pleasure, but I would not say that in general we can say that 'truth' IS a preconception.

I am pretty convinced along with Frances Wright and Don that truth is a purely contextual proposition. I think the word "objective" when evaluating the "truth" of a situation means something like "repeated observations from the same perspective under the same conditions will produce the same result" which I gather to be something like the "correspondence theory" of truth in that the opinion corresponds reliability with the situation about which the opinion is given. I think that in order to evaluate the "truth" of any proposition you have to have an opinion about the nature of the observer, and an opinion about the nature of what is being observed, and an opinion about the conditions under which the observation is being made. I think that that is why we're going to find Lucretius devoting so much attention to "images" in De Rerum Natura, in that he is stressing that our opinion as to truth (which he is convinced we can obtain in at least some instances) has to be tested by whether repeated observations produce the same result. That would constitute "our truth" but even then, as Frances Wright says, that truth ceases to exist when the facts change and the repeated observations stop yielding the same result. (And yes I am kind of mirroring the statements about "justice" in the PDs to the effect that justice changes when the facts change.

This is all hugely deep and I reserve the right to amend and change my comments, but the general direction that I am going is that I am agreeing with Don's observations. I think that Elayne is raising a valid point too, but I think that point is eventually going to resolve itself in the direction of clarifying that "we know truth instinctively by prolepsis" more to something like "'truth' is an important and valid human experience in which input from the faculty of preconception is an important point, but one of the most important things to recognize about truth is that what we consider to be true changes with contextual facts." I suspect that's the direction that Frances Wright was going in and her version is probably much more clear than mine.

Don -- Elayne got called away today and wasn't able to participate in this episode, so we'll bring up these comments next week and now you have a full week to consider whether there's any other aspect for us to cover