Posts by Cassius

Quote from Godfrey

Perceptions are true and not describable by propositions, while beliefs are testable propositions and therefore not a criterion of truth.

Now I do think that is a very clear and useful statement.

Quote from Godfrey

An example he uses, with reservations, is that of a photograph

And that's an interesting example and gives something concrete to talk about. The photograph becomes something to which we can compare future observations ,but in and of itself the photograph is a limited representation and doesn't really contain any opinion about what is on the film. Sounds like a good article.

Looks like a good find and important read. I had time to skim the first page or two but I was immediately struck that DeWitt's way of explaining the truth issue (honestly reported, like a witness in court who is honestly reporting but might be mistaken) doesn't seem to be Milos' approach. If you have read the full article, Godfrey, is my impression correct?

I see this is the conclusion. "Factive"?????? That doesn't sound very helpful to me.

Then there is the sentence that I underlined. If I read this correctly then he is basically taken the Bailey approach: we see things, we form concepts (pictures) of what we have seen, and those concepts/pictures become standards of truth for future analysis. That's not the view I tend to agree with, but I want to read and think about this in more detail. My problem has always been, and remains, that I think Epicurus held a standard of truth to be something that is perceptual and not challengeable in and of itself, in that we need to take every perception (taste, touch, sight, etc) as a given for what is being honestly reported by the faculty at that moment. A "belief" or a "concept," on the other hand, is by definition full of opinion, and can't be considered unchallengeable, can it? Or can it? I think another way of stating my concern relates to his last sentence. To me, the process of seeing things and forming pictures is obviously very important, but I don't consider it to be an "epistemological" tool as much as an "analytic" tool (or thinking tool or some other word that preserves the distinction that this tool contains opinion, while the other tools -the five senses - do not).

I haven't made it to episode yet, but the framing of the post led me to search dictionary.com on "emotion." How in the world did we get to the point where "emotions" have a negative connotation, whereas the original Latin seems broad enough to encompass everything that "sets us in motion"? I smell a religious or a Stoic rat at work, because who else would want to turn a word that expresses a totally basic and benign understanding of what moves us as humans into a word to treat with suspicion at first mention of it?

The best source for the text of this work is the De Lacy translation available here. The appendix is excellent and should be read, if possible, before the work itself.

BW --

Thanks for engaging on this. You're coming at the issue from the normal perspective, so I understand why you reached the conclusions about Epicurus that you did. If you have the time and inclination to get started on the DeWitt book, you will see there is a different perspective on "pleasure" which involves the observation that what might be called "the faculty of pleasure," being Nature's ultimate stop and go signal, is not properly divided in to "good pleasures" vs "bad pleasures" or any other categories. There is only "pleasure" which covers a vast spectrum of pleasurable experiences, and there is only "pain" which also covers a vast spectrum.

In Epicurean philosophy it is fundamental that all pleasures are desirable, and all pains are undesirable, but it is also fundamental that there is no absolute standard as to how you as an individual (or humans as a group, for that matter) must always choose from among the available pleasures and pains. The "natural" and "necessary" divisions are totally pragmatically based -- there is no "list" by which nature approves or disapproves of any set category.

I don't want you to take what I am saying on my or DeWitt's authority - unfortunately there is no way for someone like you to be sure who is right without reading both sides of the argument and the texts for yourself. I cite DeWitt so strongly because his summary is the most concise and persuasive of which i am aware, but the articles I cited also provide much additional documentation for the same conclusions.

Also I have to note that I think that you are off on a significant detour by talking in terms of "vainglories" -- which is not an Epicurean term in any way, and rather conveys the implication that there is a set category of prohibited pleasures, which I am contending, and think you will eventually find - there is not.

For example, this from Epicurus' letter to Menoeceus:

Quote

"Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good."

Today we had a short forum outage, and that's a reminder that we need a contingency plan in case something happens to this forum for a longer period.

Probably the easiest temporary solution is to have an easy-to-remember domain name on a totally different server with instructions on where to continue communications in the event of an emergency.

For the present let's use this as a location name you might be able to remember: CASSIUSAMICUS.COM.

If you click there now you'll see that I have that page set up as a tree of links at which you ought to be able to find the other regulars of the forum if we are down for an extended period.

I have recently been testing out the SESSION instant messenger, which isn't as fancy as Telegram or some of the others, but which has the redeeming virtue of not requiring a telephone number or user name to be associated with the account. I've been using that for several weeks now, so if you would like to communicate on Session, set up an account at getsession.org and look up the EpicureanFriends Session group (or look me up there and send me a direct message).

Also Bartleby, in regard to this, did you find us by Googling or some other method? It's always good to know how people find us - thanks.

Quote from Bartleby

I found this site while trying to answer a specific question, but I have long meant to deepen my knowledge of Epicurus.

Good to hear from you Bartleby. If you read through the site at all you will see that head and shoulders above all others I recommend the DeWitt book. There are many disputes as to how to interpret Epicurus, and I won't suggest to you that there is any way you can know that you should accept the viewpoints you'll read here on this forum over those you will read most other places - the only judge of that can be your yourself. But many of us have found that the DeWitt approach summarizes in one place a clear alternative to the conventional analysis of Epicurus, and it is the best place to begin to check out that viewpoint.

I summarize these recommendations in the sidebar on the front page which I will paste here in case you're on a smartphone and don't see the sidebar. In this comment i suggest starting with a couple of articles, but in any order these sources will present you the alternative analysis:

Quote

Don't Be A "Stoic In Disguise!"

Many people who come here have been influenced by the alleged importance of a distinction between "kinetic" and "katastematic" pleasure. This argument is unsound, probably not of Epicurean origin at all, and can be very damaging to a proper understanding of Epicurus. To research this issue, start with Boris Nikolsky's "Epicurus on Pleasure," which argues that the katastematic issue was not introduced by Epicurus and reflects a later Stoic-influenced viewpoint. Next, read the chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks on Pleasure," from which Nikolsky got the inspiration for his article. The whole section on Epicurus is good, but be sure to read their Chapter 19 "Katastematic and Kinetic Pleasure." Add to that the Wentham article "Cicero's Interpretation of Katastematic Pleasure," which highlights how emphasis on katastematic pleasure contradicts other core aspects of Epicurean philosophy.

Those shorter articles should then take you back to the best general book on Epicurus, Norman DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philosophy."  DeWitt provides a sweeping overview of Epicurus which hardly mentions the katastematic - kinetic distinction except to point out how - even if one considers the categories relevant - Epicurean philosophy embraces both types. If you don't read anything else at this website, check out the articles listed above, and you'll see how important this issue is to a proper understanding of Epicurean philosophy. And if you are brand new to the study of Epicurus, be sure to start your study with DeWitt's "Epicurus and His Philsosophy."

Don as for an example of the drift toward asceticism which is so widespread, check out this post: Is Romantic Love a Vainglory

Bartleby I have not yet had a chance to absorb your full article, but this catches my eye:

I would disagree that Epicurus took the position which I underlined in red. As per my earlier post, the "principle of classification being that the necessary desires are gratified with little trouble or expense; the natural desires also require but little, since nature's own riches, which suffice to content her, are both easily procured and limited in amount; but for the imaginary desires no bound or limit can be discovered." This is no doubt an accurate generalization of what most people find to be the case in life, so as a general rule it makes very good sense to think about these observations before deciding what to choose and what to avoid.

But that does not mean that you should "never" pursue a pleasure which is difficult to obtain without pain. The logical conclusion of taking your position to an extreme would be to put avoidance of pain as your most important goal, and would in many cases lead to living in a cave on bread and water -- and the weight of Epicurean philosophy does not at all support such a conclusion. One of the most important reasons for that, i think, is that there is no absolute rule of what pleasures are most to be chosen, because even those pleasures that last the longest are not always to be chosen (as per the letter to Menoeceus). Epicurus does not give a list because it is the individual's faculty of pleasure which is the test for that individual - there is no platonic ideal list of pleasures which are "best" for all people at all times and all places to pursue. In the absence of such a list, it is the faculty of pleasure alone which a person can look to for the answer on what to pursue and what to avoid, and so use of the word "never" in this context is something I think which would violate basic premises of Epicurean philosophy.

Welcome Bartleby -

1 - The reference to a "specific piece of cake" is to some commentator, correct, as there is no reference in the Epicurean texts to that effect? I suppose you are asking if there is a reference to that effect, and my response would be "no" - that sounds like a commentator's overgeneralization and not something that Epicurus would have said.

2 - I see you defined vainglory as an unnatural, unnecessary pleasure. I realize of course what you are referring to there from the letter to Menoeceus and other references, but as a general observation it seems to me that the contextual nature of all human actions under the Epicurean view of nature overrides the significance of any specific list of categories of pleasures or pains, so to me that is one part of the answer to the question you are examining, and why you are not likely to find the "specific piece of cake" reference - or any extensive discussion of specific categories that are "vainglory" - anywhere in the texts. The general rule is as explained in Torquatus section of "On Ends" - that the principle of the classification arises from the difficulty of obtaining the pleasure without significant pain -- which is not a list of proscription, but an observation that helps you make your own decisions about which pleasures to pursue. ("... the principle of classification being that the necessary desires are gratified with little trouble or expense; the natural desires also require but little, since nature's own riches, which suffice to content her, are both easily procured and limited in amount; but for the imaginary desires no bound or limit can be discovered.)

3 - As to whether "Epicurus disapproved of ... placing sexual desire above friendship" as a general observation no doubt he would place friendship at or near the top of things that he approved of given PD 27. However once again the contextual would control and at certain times and places sexual desire would have its place. I would generalize that like any other goal, Epicurus would say that it is wrong to elevate sexual desire to an end in itself without regard to the ultimate outcome in terms of pleasure and pain. The issue with sexual desire is not that it is wrong or flawed in itself - no pleasure is intrinsically bad - but that the fulfillment of sexual desire without incurring pain that outweighs the pleasure is a particularly difficult goal to achieve.

Again, welcome to the forum,

Hello and welcome to the forum Bartleby ! (Note- I am setting this up as a normal welcome, but I see you have already posted a substantive thread, and some will probably choose to comment there: Is Romantic Love a Vainglory )

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
   
2. "A Few Days In Athens" by Frances Wright
   
3. The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
4. "On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
   
5. "Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
6. The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
   
7. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
   
8. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
9. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
   
10. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
11. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
    
12. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

Episode Forty-Six of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available.
As always we invite your comments and suggestions.

i do have a tendency to be sarcastic and hyperbolic and without hearing my voice that can be a danger I have to watch.

But I will say in accord with the letter to Menoeceus that I would rather worship at the altar of a revealed religion any day of the week rather than give in to an across the board asceticism in the name of "freedom from pain" or in the name of "virtue."

Quote from Don

Living in a cave": I don't remember the texts talking about a cave. Am I correct in assuming you use this as hyperbolic shorthand for your opposition to literal interpretations of lathe biosas "live unknown" and "Epicurus forbade being active in politics"?

Yes - exactly.

Quote from Don

But I do see a general recommendation to not rock the boat, and I think this comes from Epicurus's own life experience.

i would rather put that "a general recommendation to be prudent in how you go about rocking the boat.". I think you are correct and Epicurus saw himself as a revolutionary , but knew that the deepest revolution has to be prepared for at a deep level - a position we face too today, I think.

Sorry to be short but I am driving....

In general I agree with your comments - what you perceive is there mostky due to ten years of fencing with Stoics on facebook who think that there is nothing interesting about Epicurus other than a twist-of-words take on asceticism. And on general they are quite unstoically assertive in how they advocate their position and ridicule the common sense approach you are taking.

These articles and comments are relevant to one of the things I find most important about this topic:

A superficial hearing of "pleasure" as the guide of life leaves open the possibility that a human could find pleasure living in a cave on bread and water and never do anything else.

I don't think that's correct and I don't think Epicurus meant that.

From a practical point of view, it's just not possible to do that, given the threats and hazards of human life and the need to work to make defenses against them. So you could say from a "rational" point of view, under the given facts of life, that a human who tries to go to a cave and live on bread and water will not likely succeed for very long, and not without indeed taking some precautions (obtaining a cave, obtaining the supply of bread and water).

But that's not a very satisfying analysis, and I don't think Epicurus would have relied on it. I think he would have relied on "feeling" as the driving force. But what tells us that one type of pleasure is more desirable to us than another? Certainly the feelings themselves do, but what about the human who has indeed lived all his life on bread and water in a cave and would have come into contact with nothing more to which to aspire (the Lucretian problem of the theory that the gods created the universe - from where did they get their model?)

I think that aspirational goals to improve one's condition are a logical extension of both the general Velleius theory of anticipations as intuitive etchings, plus the specific theory of "gods" as one of those etchings, plus the "images" theory that the mind can be stimulated directly from the outside. It may also be built in to the way "pleasure" functions as a faculty, but for the time being I'll accept that pleasure and pain may be simple go and stop faculties (but if so, programmed by what?).

I doubt the reductionist thought of living in a cave on bread and water was as much of a problem for Epicurus as it is today, and even today it's just a musing that few people really think about carrying out. But I think the question of "Why isn't bread and water in a cave good enough?" is an obvious one that would have concerned Epicurus and been dealt with in a variety of ways. Not by coming up with a list of better or worse, or nobler or baser pleasures, because that would be Platonic absolutism. The issue would have to be dealt with through "faculties" that are individual and contextual, such as the particular "etchings" with which a person might be born, plus the different observations a person makes / comes into contact with during life -- including these "divine images" whatever they are.

Quote from Godfrey

What I find interesting in the paper, although I haven't finished reading it, is that the last half or so invalidates "absence of pain" as an actionable goal.

Yes they can't even maintain their fiction long enough to write an article. They are so committed to accepting the view that pleasure is "sinful" or in some way disreputable that they use "absence of pain" like they are pronouncing an enchantment to protect them from evil as they then proceed to indulge exactly the sort of pleasures that they claim are not the goal of life.

Quote from Don

They're both orderly conglomerations of atoms. The gods don't live in a cosmos. They live between cosmoi.

Yes I agree. I am thinking this stems from the proposition that in order to remain deathless they need to be living in an area of perfect calmness, but we're in an area with very little to work with. In this context I wish we had more on the ""similarities" as that might throw more light on the term "orderly conglomeration of atoms."

I'm going to have to come back later to read the full article but on just the opening I would certainly dispute the part in red:

Good grief, there's a reason that Epicurus said the goal is "pleasure" and didn't fill the definition of the goal with all sorts of other qualifiers like "refined" and "sensual."

Further, though I see that there is preliminary discussion of it, I think we always have to remind ourselves that "pleasure" is what we all understand without need of explanation due to the faculty of pleasure. The word "happiness" however is a conceptual expression with all the limitations of any conceptual expression. There is no faculty of "happiness" - the faculty is of pleasure.

So as Torquatus said, a life of happiness is nothing else than a life of pleasure:

Quote

If then even the glory of the Virtues, on which all the other philosophers love to expatiate so eloquently, has in the last resort no meaning unless it be based on pleasure, whereas pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically attractive and alluring, it cannot be doubted that pleasure is the one supreme and final Good and that a life of happiness is nothing else than a life of pleasure.

Probably best in this context to remember Diogenes of Oinoanda too, in so that we identify happiness with the best mode of life:

Quote

Fr. 32

... [the latter] being as malicious as the former.

I shall discuss folly shortly, the virtues and pleasure now.

If, gentlemen, the point at issue between these people and us involved inquiry into «what is the means of happiness?» and they wanted to say «the virtues» (which would actually be true), it would be unnecessary to take any other step than to agree with them about this, without more ado. But since, as I say, the issue is not «what is the means of happiness?» but «what is happiness and what is the ultimate goal of our nature?», I say both now and always, shouting out loudly to all Greeks and non-Greeks, that pleasure is the end of the best mode of life, while the virtues, which are inopportunely messed about by these people (being transferred from the place of the means to that of the end), are in no way an end, but the means to the end.

Let us therefore now state that this is true, making it our starting-point.

Quote from Godfrey

Apparently modern research has validated many of the positions that we tend to take here.

I agree that it does validate Epicurus, but I think the starting point for the analysis is to be sure to get a grip on what "absence of pain" is supposed to mean. Unless you start with Epicurus' premise that all reactions are either pleasure or pain, the term "absence of pain" or "absence of" anything is not going to give a coherent statement of what is present to even begin to talk about, so most discussions of "absence of pain" are going to be meaningless without further starting-point definitions.