QuoteIn Part Three I pursue the aforementioned distinction in late Epicureanism, in particular Lucretius and Philodemus. I try to show how, during that period, epibolê enjoys the status of a criterion and also acquires paramount moral importance. I conclude with a few general remarks.
If she got around to discussing this in the Zoom presentation I must have missed it. I heard a few comments about it, but it seemed to me that most of the presentation ended up revolving around the issue of what the epibole word means, rather than how it fits into the Epicurean canon of truth.
Did anyone pick up her position in any greater clarity than what is written above? I remain unclear on Tsouna's own view as to whether any form of grasp should be considered a criteria of truth. I didn't hear anything to persuade me that it should be counted a fourth leg, and much that I heard continue to motivate me that it shouldn't.