Posts by Cassius

I think we can agree with all you wrote their yet we seem to be separate on something - and I perceive the issue is still the question of whether pleasure is any any sense "objective" across people(s) or is always a matter of individual perceptions.

I would say yes the faculty of pleasure is always the faculty of pleasure, but different people have different pleasure responses to exactly the same stimulus - and some people will find that exact stimulus painful. This means presumably that while it is fair to say that "pleasure" is the same faculty for all, there is no "objective" sense of pleasure that we can point to as leading to the same pleasure response in all situations, so we must always defer to the people involved and ask them "Do YOU find this pleasurable?"

These are good points to move the discussion along. Let me comment on them:

Quote from Don

I'm interpreting some things posted here to say that everyone has their own standard. No. I can't see how that can be correct. Everyone has their own opinions, beliefs, interpretations, etc., but the Canon provides a standard against which those opinions and beliefs are measured. You can't say a belief or opinion is "empty" κενός if you have nothing against which to measure it. Otherwise, the Canon has no meaning. You can't say the standard is not a standard. That doesn't place a value judgement. It a belief does not START with a canonical sensation, preconception, or feeling, it's not a valid belief. Not all beliefs are equal. How else could you say that a belief that the gods influence my actions is vain/empty/κενός without referring to the yardstick/ruler/Canon?

Let's start with that one: Yes I do think that everyone has there on sense of pleasure, and I think that is the easiest one to deal with. Some people find pleasure in many different ways -- do we agree on that?

If we do, then that's the first indication that a canonical faculty gives different results for different people.

Don't we also agree that people see colors in different ways (for example some are color-blind) and hear in different ways (some are "tone-deaf")? I think we'll agree there too.

As for anticipations, that's really the question we're discussing, so let's defer whether people have different instances of anticipations, though I will assert eventually that those differ too.

Where I think you are going, though, is that yes I agree that we can "generalize" and find that MOST people's sense of pleasure and pain, and their senses of sight and sound etc, do fall within ranges or bell curves or whatever. I would think that those "ranges" or "statistical probabilities" are what we are all thinking form the basis for our generalizations as to what is desirable and what is not desirable for most human beings.

But the real point there is that these are just generalizations, and they vary (sometimes dramatically) by individual, so while it is correct to say "generally" that most people (or most "Amerians") or most "men," or most of many other types of categories that we could come up with, do perceive things in a general way, that's pretty much the same as any other kind of statistical generalization. While yes that generalization does arise from nature, it's not really the kind of "absolute" standard at all that most people think about.

Now when we are talking about purely "mechanical" observations like length or width or weight or many many other things that can be "measured" yes we can come up with rulers and yardsticks and ways to measure them that are in fact 'objective' in way, but even there it is us (rather than nature) that is selecting an arbitrary standard to compare them against. Our confidence that those measurements always remains the same comes from the fact that we can reliably repeat them over and over and get the same result, not from any reference to an absolute standard "floating in the air"

Quote from Don

The Canon provides no ethical or conceptual content. All the canonic faculties (I think that's a good word) function pre-conceptually. "Images" impact the senses. Preconceptions/anticipations are exactly that: they are "before concepts" or "anticipate" concepts. The feelings of pleasure and pain are automatic. We cannot (really) control whether we feel pleasure or pain. We can decide to endure pain as a choice. But we feel pleasure or pain prior to any conceptual understanding of it or "meaning" behind it.

I think we are completely in agreement here, with the exception that pleasure and pain are the foundation of all ethical choices, and so I doubt that it is really proper to completely sever ethics from the canonical discussion.

Quote from Don

As far as determining whether something is just or not, whether there is justice in a given situation, that is entirely a matter for Ethics and the social contract. The most basic social contract - according to Epicurus - is "to neither harm nor to be harmed." That's not the prolepsis of justice. Granted, I'm still wrestling with what the "Prolepsis of Justice" is, but I'm leaning toward it having to do something with those animal experiments, especially since their working out something preverbally and maybe preconceptually but rather instinctually. The "prolepsis of justice" will not "tell" us whether something is just or not. That's determined by the social contract of a particular time and place.

I am pretty sure here is where we will disagree. First, I don't really think there is a sanction for saying that Epicurus really endorsed a 'social contract' in the first place, other than his observations that when people do agree not to harm each other, we can call that the foundation of any concept of "justice" that may exist. But he is also very clear that circumstances can and do change at a moment's notice, so that agreements which may have been "just" yesterday can become "unjust" today or tomorrow. And I think that just emphasizes the ephemeral nature of justice and that nothing is ever just in and of itself. He's really saying that any relationship that leads to the happiness of the person concerned with it may be considered just, but he's also saying that if we choose not to enter into any such arrangement (or for some reason we're not capable of it) there is no justice involved.

While it's possible to correctly generalize that most people in most situations benefit if they agree with each other, all those caveats to me simply emphasize that there is no such thing as absolute natural justice, social contract or not, so that the entire discussion just becomes another illustration that there is no such thing as absolute virtue (with justice simply being a subset of virtue).

As to this sentence "The "prolepsis of justice" will not "tell" us whether something is just or not. That's determined by the social contract of a particular time and place." I doubt I agree with that. I am thinking that would be better stated as something like "When I was a child I had four friends and the ice cream man gave us four ice cream cones so one of us didn't have one so we shared them equally anyway." I think that child found PLEASURE in seeing herself and all her friends get the same amount of ice cream. She found pleasure in that, however, only because her faculty of anticipations told her to recognize that there was an issue in everyone getting a a similar amount. Some of the other children could also have recognized the issue but thought "I am older so I should get more." And another one could think "I haven't eaten lunch so I should get more." And another one could think "I don't care what she thinks I am stronger and they depend on me so I deserve more." and many other possibilities could occur along the same lines.

In that scenario I would think that is an example that there is no natural sanction for a "social contract" for everyone to agree to divide equally, although that is ONE among several options that they could choose to follow. It was the sense of pleasure that ultimately provided the stop and go signal as each child evaluated (using their anticipations that there was an issue to consider) the situation that they might or might not choose to divide the ice cream equally. And to make Epicurus' point, they could choose to "agree" to divide it equally if they want, and they can call that "justice" if they want and "injustice" if someone breaks the agreement, but that ultimately if someone chooses to exit they agreement because it is no longer in their view mutually beneficial to them, they can simply choose to do so and no "injustice" is then involved. The word "just" becomes from that point of view as maleable as any other virtue - none of which are "absolute."

So ultimately I come down to the canonical faculty of pleasure as ultimately determining the "ethical choice" to be made. But it's also significant to note that no one would have ever even considered "ethics" to be involved at all if they didn't have an "anticipation" that "ethics" was a factor that they needed to consider as to how best to divide the ice cream. They could have, without that anticipattory disposition, just grabbed for all of the ice cream and each one tried to devour it all themselves just like we might say that a "savage" or some other primitive or hungry set of animals might do.

This continues to be a key passage too. To any question of whether Nature gives us any standard of conduct whatsoever, in the form of "ideas" "concepts" "justice" or whatever - there is only ONE answer: "What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance?'" (and of course the answer implanted there is NOTHING)

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Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, be thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.) Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that Nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature.

What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance? Some members of our school however would refine upon this doctrine; these say that it is not enough for the judgment of good and evil to rest with the senses; the facts that pleasure is in and for itself desirable and pain in and for itself to be avoided can also be grasped by the intellect and the reason. Accordingly they declare that the perception that the one is to be sought after and the other avoided is a notion naturally implanted in our minds. Others again, with whom I agree, observing that a great many philosophers do advance a vast array of reasons to prove why pleasure should not be counted as a good nor pain as an evil, consider that we had better not be too confident of our case; in their view it requires elaborate and reasoned argument, and abstruse theoretical discussion of the nature of pleasure and pain.

Updating this thread -- try this link at Smashwords, and if any of them require a charge, let me know -- all should be free:

Cassius Amicus

My goal is to study and promote the philosophy of Epicurus. If you would like to participate in this work, don't hesitate to contact me at…

www.smashwords.com

As indicated above the only reason some had a charge associated with them at any point is that I could not figure out a way to get them on the Kindle platform and listed at amazon without a nominal charge.

This is the position Epicurus was fighting AGAINST, and so you can pretty much REVERSE this and see what Epicurus' position would have been in arguing that these things are impossible due to the nature of the universe. That means that these things don't exist anywhere, and we won't find them existing in anticipations either. Anticipations will be something different - a faculty that allows us to see the issues involved in justice, like an eye allows us to see trees. But in processing our conclusions about trees or about justice, all of that process is something the human mind does to the best of its own ability, and people aren't going to reach the same conclusions about justice any more than they are going to use the same words or even use the same language to describe trees:

https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4104&context=ndlr

The follow up point Eric is that YES, it is through the anticipations of the people involved that they will reach their decisions as to what is just and what is unjust and they will work as hard as they can to implement those ideas.

BUT at the same time they must realize that the answer they reach to their questions is determined by a combination of their own circumstances plus the developed dispositions they bring to the table, and that there is no God, or Ten Commandments, or any other "supernatural" or "eternal" or even "Nature's Own Single Answer" justification for their decisions

I would say Eric just remember that formulation of absolute law in Cicero's Republic, and compare it to PD 30-40.

Epicurus stands for the proposition that there is no absolute justice or absolute ethical standards, other than pleasure and pain as the guide to all choices and avoidances.

That means that all subsidiary parts of the philosophy, including anticipations, point in that same direction.

Quote from EricR

But I see I was making a mistake in being so specific. But I think Don has a good point about them being "always true" in their role as primary ways of knowing.

Respectfully to all concerned let's state all this in a way that is more clear about the "always" and the "absolute" implications. I think the point Epicurus was making is that "YES - "anticipations" as a PRE-conceptual source of raw data are always reported "honestly," but "No! - anticipations are not themselves ethical conceptions / propositions and they are themselves never fully formed conceptions that are absolutely applicable in all circumstances!"

Due to the nature of the universe (no gods, no ideal forms, nothing that is "always the same" except the fundamental elements themselves) there is no way possible that any ethical concept can ever be absolute for all people, all times, all places. That is in my view the clear meaning of the "justice" statements in the last ten PD's, but it's also compelled by the Epicurean physics. That's where DeWitt slipped (in my humble view) in describing anticipations as "ideas." They are used to FORM ideas, just like the data from all three of the canonical legs are used in our minds to form ideas, but they are not ideas themselves.

This is the point that was the fatal flaw in those who adopted a fourth leg of the canon (as cited in Laertius) and it's the flaw committed by Cicero's Torquatus in saying that he was one of those who believed that the proposition that pleasure is desirable should be the subject of essential logical proof.

What we're discussing here is what (in my opinion, I think following DeWitt) blew up the Epicurean movement in the ancient world. They gave in to the Platonists / Stoics and accepted the argument that their philosophy required proof through "logic" - when Epicurus told them that "logic" is not something that is canonical, and that proof comes through the natural faculties (data from all three canonical faculties viewed generally as "sensations") rather than through mental conceptions / logic.

I know pleasure because I can feel it, not because I can define it absolutely accurately in words. The same would go for all the inputs from all the canonical faculties. The data does not come to us in words/concepts, those are just devices that we use to try to describe them, but the words are just devices. The words cannot be mapped one-to-one exactly to the full context of the experience.

Quote from Don

That's where I'm uneasy about Cassius maintaining the anticipations are wrong or can be wrong, if I'm reading him correctly.

So please help me be as absolutely clear on this as possible, and let's beat the point home like a drum:

No data (sensation?) from a canonical faculty is anything other than "reported honestly" so that data is always "true to us at that moment" in the sense that it is reported truly ("honestly," "without injection of opinion.")

But at the same time, no "data" / "sensation" from a canonical faculty is ever, in itself, a "concept" or an "understanding" -- it is always simply a "feeling" or a "bit of sensory data" that must be built up in the mind into words and concepts.

This is the trademark attribute of what it means to be a canonical faculty - they operate "automatically" without injection of "opinion" ("concepts") at any time.

No "concept" is ever "absolutely true" because concepts are constructions of the human mind and are not given us by gods or through ideal Platonic forms.

Therefore in human terms, the only test of "truth" is really "true to us" which is what we build up from the set of three canonical faculties.

Now another absolutely vital concept that we haven't stated so far in this conversation is that these attributes of the canonical faculties (that they are only true to the extent we reliably build them up from our canonical faculties) is not a defect or a limitation of something to go hide in our cave and cry about. This attribute that these are the only things that are reported to us without opinion mean that they are our most prized and vital possessions which we MUST use and we MUST rely on to form our own judgments about how to live and everything else that is important in life.

The Platonists and Religionists have backed us into the corner of thinking that only if a concept is absolutely true for all people, all times, all places is it worth anything. That is absolute RUBBISH and BS and needs to be treated as such. We have to seize the moral high ground and assert not only that we are firm in going with the conclusions that we draw from our canonical faculties, but we absolutely reject and dismiss (probably even the Epicurean "spit on") the assertions of absolutely truth -- because they are childish fantasies and deserve to be treated as such.

At the risk of quoting too long an excerpt, I need to insert here the reference I have cited before as I think articulating the best way forward in understanding the difference between an "innate idea" versus an "innate principle." This is from Jackson Barwis' book against John Locke's view of innate ideas, and it is the most clear presentation of this issue I have found. I think Barwis is essentially stating the position Epicurus was describing.

This also addresses the argument which immediately must be confronted by anyone who asserts that there are truly innate "ideas." They must be confronted immediately with the question: "Well, then, give me a list of them!"

All this comes from Barwis's "Dialogues On Innate Principles"

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Mr. Locke then, you know, returned I, has used several ways to prove that we have no innate principles: and though I clearly see that your arguments do make generally against them all; yet I shall be better satisfied if you will permit me to particularize some of them, if it be only to hear, from you, a refutation of them.

He bowed.

You know, continued I, Mr. Locke advances that principles cannot be innate unless their ideas be also innate. "For, says he, if the ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was without those principles; and then they will not be innate, but be derived from some other original. For where the ideas themselves are not, there can be no knowledge, no assent, no mental or verbal propositions about them."

Now is there nothing in what he advances in this place that will affect your doctrine of innate principles?

I think not, answered he.

For granting that we have no innate ideas, it is by no means from thence follow, as he says, then we have no innate principles. Ideas, simply considered, are very different things from innate moral principles, or from any other principles, which constitute the nature of things. If I have not already shown, I will, by and by, endeavor more clearly to show that the propositions we compose according to our idea of things are nothing but propositions; they are not really the principles of the things treated of: the principles of the things treated of are naturally inherent and exist perpetually in them whether our ideas or propositions concerning them be true or false.

But in the part quoted there is a fallacy. He says, "if the ideas be not unique, there was a time when the mind was without those principles." The conclusion, you see, is vague and delusive. The only just conclusion he could have drawn was, that if the ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was without those ideas, out of which the propositions are formed, which I call principles. I doubt not that you perceive they are very improperly so called in the present question. For Mr. Locke thus confounds the principles of our nature, and the ideas contained in the propositions he names, together, as if they were the same things: but they cannot be so, because the one receives existence from the prior existence of the other. That is, our moral ideas receive their existence from the prior existence of our innate moral sentiments or principles: as our ideas of light and figure are derived from the prior existence of sight.

In this question the matter, as too frequently happens, has been puzzled and obscured by the misuse of words. Axioms, and allowed propositions, are called principles. But they are only principles formed by the human mind, in aid of its own weakness; which, in reasoning, can proceed but a little way without proved or granted propositions to rest on. They might, perhaps, with much more propriety, be called helps, assistances, or supports to the imbecility of the human mind, than principles of things. The principles which naturally inhere in every species of created beings are of a nature entirely different.

It seems, then, said I, that you agree with Mr. Locke that neither ideas or propositions can be innate: but you differ from him by denying any propositions what so ever to be properly the principles of any species of beings; and by affirming that both speculative and practical propositions are mere creatures of human invention; which whether they be true or false, that is, founded in the nature of things or not, the true natures and principles of things remain unalterably the same.

That is my meaning, replied he, and that, therefore, most of the arguments advanced by Mr. Locke against innate principles are nothing, or but very little, to the purpose; because they only tend to combat things as innate principles which are nothing like innate principles; and, if it be not too bold a thing to say of so penetrating a genius, he seems only to have been fighting with a phantom of his own creating.

Indeed, highly as I think of his genius and integrity, I should have much doubted of his sincerity in this doctrine if we had not frequently seen men of the first rate abilities suffer themselves to be carried into great absurdities by their fondness for a favorite system, or, by too hasty a desire of forming a perfect one.

It is certain, however, that nothing can be more excellent than his work as far as it regards our manner of acquiring ideas by sensation and reflection. But what should move him to advance that we have no other way of acquiring ideas; why he should exclude our moral sense and deny even its existence with the pains of so much acute false reasoning, I shall not, at present, endeavor to explain. But having so determined, he found it necessary to remove all notions of innate moral principles (and with them, all other innate principles) out of the way, in the beginning of his book: for had they been granted, another source of ideas must have been admitted besides those of sensation and reflection as explained by Mr. Locke. And I shall not hesitate to affirm that a clear and indisputable explication of this mode of acquiring ideas would have cost him much more pains in trouble than all the rest of his most ingenious work. For human actions and opinions, in the ordinary course of things, pass away in so rapid a succession as to leave no lasting traces behind them; nothing fixed to which we may refer for a renewal or a correction of our moral ideas concerning them, if our memory prove deficient. And, unless they be recorded with extraordinary accuracy, they can seldom be contemplated a second time in precisely the same light in which they were viewed at the first.

But all those ideas which arise in our minds by the impressions which external things make upon our senses being derived from objects of fixed and lasting natures, when our memory fails us, when we doubt the clearness or precision of our ideas, we can, generally, refer with ease to the objects themselves, and can renew, or rectify, our ideas at pleasure. This renders geometry so certain and indisputable as science: for the least variation or incorrectness in our ideas may be discovered and corrected by recurring to the figures themselves, which, through the medium of sight, convey invariably the same ideas to the mind. Nor is there any impediment, anything naturally interesting to our affections, in the nature of the things themselves, that should make us see them falsely or apply them irrationally.

But it is not so in moral science; it more closely concerns and is more deeply interesting to us in every point of view: it therefore throws more impediments in our way to a right understanding and clear comprehension of its truths. Our early-imbibed prejudices, misplaced affections, ill-governed passions, and jarring interests, distort and falsify our ideas in moral subjects extremely, nor can a just and natural representation of our moral sentiments or feelings take place in our minds until those delusive and turbulent enemies to moral truth be subdued or properly corrected. And also to men whose affections and passions are duly tempered, and minds naturally adjusted, moral truths may be as clear as mathematical ones, yet, from the unhappy circumstances above-mentioned, they are generally much more clouded and obscured; and are, therefore, perpetually subjected to tedious and unpleasant disputations: a very untoward and disgusting circumstance without a doubt.

But which you think, replied I, not enough so to have caused Mr. Locke to deny the existence of innate moral principles; things so essentially interesting to the calls of virtue: and which, you consider as a source of ideas, not comprehended in what he understands by sensation and reflection.

And are you not of the same mind, interrogated he, in a lively tone?

At present I am, answered I, but yet I must bid with Mr. Locke to be more clearly informed concerning the nature of those innate principles; for, says he, "nobody has yet ventured to give a catalogue of them."

By the demand of a catalog of them, said my friend, he seems only to expect a string of moral maxims or propositions: but these, we have agreed, with him, are not innate principles: we have agreed that they are not properly principles of things at all. But, before we attempt to explain farther what we mean by innate moral principles, it may not be improper to endeavor to define what we would be understood to signify by the word principle, so far, at least, as it regards our present inquiry: and so, perhaps, when we come to speak of any innate principle, after describing it as well as we can, we may be allowed to say what Mr. Locke says of the faculty of perception, which I presume is innate, viz. “who ever reflects on what passes in his own mind cannot miss it; and if he does not reflect, all the words in the world cannot make him have any notion of it.” So, our moral principles be innate, and of a simple nature, when we would describe the sensations or sentiments they produce in us; if by turning men's minds inward upon their own feelings we cannot make them perceive what they are, words in any other view will be vain and useless. Yet in essentials all men must be sensible of them, and capable of perceiving them, clearly enough, in plain, practical cases, for all the good purposes of human life: except, indeed, such persons as Mr. Locke very strangely, not to say preposterously, selects as the most likely to preserve a pure and perfect sense of them: viz. idiots, infants, and madmen.

He was going to proceed in the definition of his meaning by the word principle when finding we were just at home, he declined it to another opportunity; to which I assented, on a promise that it should be early next morning. And thus ended our first dialogue.

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[124] For the statements of the many about the gods are not conceptions derived from sensation, but false suppositions, according to which the greatest misfortunes befall the wicked and the greatest blessings (the good) by the gift of the gods. For men being accustomed always to their own virtues welcome those like themselves, but regard all that is not of their nature as alien.

This is the Bailey version, and it is my understanding that the word here listed as "false suppositions" is or is closely related to the prolepsis word. Let's dig into that, along iwth his "conceptions derived from sensation."

This takes us squarely into the "why is it called a PRE-conception vs a conception" argument.

Quote from Don

That's where I'm uneasy about Cassius maintaining the anticipations are wrong or can be wrong, if I'm reading him correctly. My reading of Epicurus is that the senses are an accurate reflection of reality. They are "true." It's our opinions and beliefs branching off from our canonical faculties that are the problem and not the Canon itself. I think it's the same or similar with the anticipations (as implied by that quote from the Letter to M.)

Yes this is the point we need to drill down on. I firmly think (and I think DeWitt says too) that any anticipation is always (1) reported truthfully - that's what makes it canonical, BUT ALSO - (2) need not be true "to all the facts" or "to the big picture" which is why we check one anticipation against another, just like we check one sight against other sights, one hearing against another hearing, etc .

This is EXACTLY the point that DeWitt goes into in regard to the multiple meaning of "all sensations are true" -- Yes they are reported honestly, but nobody ever said they are ominiscient or "absolutely true" for everyone in the world. Each sensation and feeling of pleasure and anticipation are "reported truly to us" by the faculty that is involved, but that does not make it "true for everyone in the world." The only way we have confidence in predicting that the sensation/feeling/anticipation will remain true for us is by the REPETITION of receiving the same sensation in the same context.

This is a huge point so we need to stay with it til we all come to a clear understanding of the parts where we agree and the parts where we don't agree.

If we were to conclude that an "anticipation" were "completely true to everyone" -- such that our view of "justice" is the same for all people all times all places we would immediately be transformed into Platonists and that is exactly what Epicurus was warning against.

There is a strong tendency for us to think that "anticipations" amounts to "innate ethical conclusions" but I think that would be a disastrous conclusion and surely what Epicurus was warning exactly against.

I think we'll find these things borne out as we dig into the actual citations.

Don looks like you were typing as I was writing post 10 so be sure you see it as now finished.

My comment in response to the last two posts is that I would emphasize over an over that any single "anticipation" might be just as erroneous as any single glimpse by sight or hearing of the thing being considered. A faculty of being aware that "there's something here I need to pay attention to" does not tell you what you should "conclude" about it. I think that is the main issue that needs to be grappled with in discussing anticipations -- "faculties" are not omniscient or omnipotent and the immediate temptation to conclude "Nature tells everyone to be 'fair'' or "Nature tells us to punish the unjust" needs to be resisted because as Epicurus hammers home there IS no absolute just or unjust.

Then:

Quote from EricR

While definitions abound in trying to pin down what is pornographic and what is not, I can say with confidence that "I know it when I see it." While the context can vary historically and across cultures, I've often wondered if most people "know it when they see it" and then attempt to define it afterward. Is this an example of an Anticipation?

I would say that yes this is quite possibly the faculty of anticipations at work. You recognize that there is an issue here that needs to be evaluated and dealt with, but you are not given at birth a "rule-book" written by a Censorship Committee of what is and is not acceptable. If you did not have some natural faculty disposing you to take notice of this issue, you would stare blankly at it and see nothing of significance to you any more than a grasshopper looking at a TV screen.

Quote from EricR

What is blank are the actual ideas, thoughts, concepts, etc. that are later conceived via the interaction of the Anticipations with experiences. Am I understanding this correctly?

I agree with Don that the terms "blank slate" and even "blank" are not very useful at all, and as they ARE used by those philosophers who promote it, it is very damaging, because what they are indeed trying to do is erase all reference to natural faculties and dispositions, in favor of "logic" -- conceptual processing that they seem to believe is TOTALLY within our own minds and arrived at by our own thinking.

Quote from EricR

Now, how about "divine nature"? If we are not born with actual innate ideas, what is going on with this one? What is innate in us that refers to what we later define conceptually?

I would say that the Velleius narative in "On The Nature of the Gods" is, as DeWitt suggests, an accurate version of Epicurus' views. We are born with a faculty that allows us to recognize higher and lower states of "performance" in living, and we are at birth wired / disposed to categorize ways of living as "more or less blessed" (or any similar superlative you want to use). As we grow older from day to day we are exposed to more examples of ways of living and our minds begin to classify them according to what we begin to conclude are better or worse. As we think about these ways of life we are exposed further to stories and natural scenery that inspire us to deeper and deeper thought. We are exposed to the idea that the universe is infinite and eternal and teeming with life. We are exposed to statues and artworks and depictions of divinity that others before us have conceived. And if you take Epicurus at his word, we are exposed to "images" that stimulate our minds directly (if you want to joke, like radiation from a cell phone, or radio reception through a tooth filling) to think further about these issues.

But despite all that, these things are not properly thought of as "innate ideas." We are not born Presbyterians or Islamists or atheists.

And to repeat my view is that it is very important to speak accurately and distinguish "the faculty of anticipations" which is like "the faculty of sight" as against "an anticipation" or "one or more anticipations" which is like saying "I observed elephants from a tour bus four times in my life." Those observations are extremely helpful, but they are raw data that must be processed into opinions, and once they become opinions, they are no longer strictly examples of anticipations. Your viewpoint of on whether you find elephants to be sympathetic and admirable creatures arises FROM your sensations of them in the past, and from the feelings of pleasure or pain you felt in regard to them, and from your anticipations by which you organized your views of their "justice" or "blessedness" or other abstract issues), but all of those you have processed into opinions, and those are YOUR opinions, not handed to you in final form by Nature, and YOU have to take responsibility for the correctness of your personal conclusion to be a Nature Guardian or a Big Game Hunter. Others can decide whether to judge you positively or negatively as to which of those choices you take, but everyone (you, those who judge you - everyone) are just acting to the best of your abilities. Nature hasn't programmed any of you on the final conclusion you "should" reach. There's no heavenly ranking or Platonic realm list which tells everyone how to evaluate those things.

Even though I am disagreeing with him as to the word "ideas," I believe I am essentially following, and simply expanding, on DeWitt's perspective on all this. DeWitt knows much better than I do that there can be false anticipations, as cited in the letter to Menoeceus. Once you incorporate into the big picture that no single anticipation can be considered to give you the "correct big picture," I think this "anticipations as a faculty that provides data that can be either 'right' or 'wrong' to the full facts" position is where you end up.

Eric you have highlighted a passage in DeWitt that I agree is very important but where I have a different point of view than DeWitt:

Quote

the innate ideas of justice, of the divine nature, and other such abstractions, and it puts to the test every law of the land to determine whether it harmonizes with the innate idea of justice.

In my view DeWitt would have been better off if he had not used the word "idea" here and had instead used a word like "principle." Not to split hairs, but i think to suggest that we are born with fully formed "ideas" would be a form of Platonism that Epicurus was reacting against. DeWitt consistently points out how Epicurus is antiPlatonic in many areas, and he should have carried over that analogy more clearly in this area as well.

In my view, the anticipations have to be considered to be a "faculty" that is equivalent to the five senses and the feeling of pleasure. Faculties is a reference to mechanisms that work through principles, like eyes involve natural "physical" principles of optics and hearing involves natural "physical" principles of sounds. We are not born with "ideas" of shapes or sizes or colors, we are born with a faculty of sight which perceives those qualities about things when we "see" them through the physics involved in optics. We are not born with "ideas" of music or symphonies or claps of thunder, we are born with a faculty of hearing that perceives those things when we are exposed to the physical phenomena involved with sound, for the first time after birth. We are not born with feelings of pleasure in ice cream or pleasure in sex or pleasure in dancing, we are born with a faculty that perceives those pleasures through the physical principles involved in the way we are "wired" for pleasure and pain, when we experience those phenomena for the first time.

Likewise I think it is not correct to suggest that we are born with "ideas" of justice such as equality before the law or contracts or cooperation or teamwork. We are born with a faculty of perceiving that something called "justice" is involved in certain situations and arrangements when we perceive those arrangements for the first time. We are not born with an "idea" of a god being omnipotent or omniscient of even self-sufficient. We are born with a faculty of perceiving that there is a spectrum of perfection in living beings, and that as we come into contact with examples of living beings we can recognize that there is a way to rank living beings in terms of how successful they are in living.

I think that "ideas' as that term is generally understood (fully formed concepts) is very different from "principles" of operation of the faculties that nature gave us, which is all very "preconceptual."

So I think DeWitt is correct that anticipations are something we are born with, but instead of suggesting that they are "ideas" he should have suggested that there is a "faculty of anticipations" which involved physical principles of operation that dispose us to form concepts in certain ways in those areas of human life.

And in addition, it seems to me critical to observe that just as any single sight or hearing or touch may not be "true to all the facts" of what we are seeing or hearing or touching, just as Epicurus said in the letter to Menoeceus, it is possible for "anticipations" not to be true to the facts as well, as when people have anticipations about the nature of gods that are incorrect, such as when they think that the gods are like themselves. That means that there can also be anticipations of justice that can be incorrect, such as when we think that justice can or should be the same for all people at all times and all places, which Epicurus says specifically is not the case.

I recognize that my thoughts here are not fully-formed and are more assertions than something that can be considered firmly established, but this is personally how I think is the best way to extend the direction that DeWitt was correctly moving, but (in my humble opinion) did not state quite as well as he could have.

Very interesting Joshua!

Possibly one of the ironies here is that even to engage in a discussion for the proposition "there is no highest good" or "there are no supernatural gods" you are necessarily entering into a playing field of abstract logic where you are accepting definitions which do not map perfectly to reality. Did Epicurus do that at times? Apparently, so as to show the way out of Platonic logic traps, but it seems the later Epicureans felt forced to do so more frequently (as cited by Torquatus) and even though they perhaps fought fiercely to maintain Epicurus' original point as well, it's easy for establishment victors to preserve only what they want to preserve.

I do think though that when "other" Epicureans went so far as to admit a fourth leg into the canon, which seems to me to have been done as an accomodation to "logic", was a fateful and fatal mistake.

Ok I am back!

It seems to me that in the past I've had several conversations along these lines so I'd like to try to move straight to the ultimate issues if I can -

I don't think what we're really discussing is varying views of the gods (that they exist in reality vs as ideal constructions of the human mind). We have many opinion on that here among Epicureanfriends users and I don't think we have enough evidence to choose one option as the only one that was in Epicurus' mind. In fact this might be analogous to the multiple options that he allowed in astronomical matters (as long as the options all are consistent with observable facts).

It sounds to me like what you're really arguing in the issue of gods is that we should accept that some people have views of active gods that are not destructive of and in fact beneficial to their happiness.

I think my best response to that would be to drop back and say that I think we should keep in mind the likelihood (I think a certainty) that Epicurus was aware of the need to, and constantly did, swap back and forth between talking in terms which are primarily "logical" at times, while at other times focusing on the "practical." I think he would say that doing so does not make him inconsistent but acknowledges the limits of logic (the need to always tie it to observable evidence) and the ultimate primacy of the canonical faculties given by nature.

So when you point to particular cases and say that particular people get particular hope from their particular views of a particular type of god, I believe Epicurus would say "of course that can happen." He basically says as much in his concluding remarks on agency in the letter to Menoeceus where he points to it being better to believe in myths than to succumb to hard determinism. That is the ultimate practical side of Epicurus.

But I also think that Epicurus lived in a world dominated by Platonists and the rest who identify "logic" as the way to approach these issues, and so he also took a position on the "logical best" position to take, as he seems to have done on the issue of the "greatest good / good" even while criticizing the Peripatetics for walking around harping on it uselessly.

And I think Epicurus would say that on that purely theoretical level (which I think is where you also get the best reasoning in favor of the "idealist" view of the gods) the best way for the "average" human to view the gods so as to live the theoretical happiest life with the least possible anxiety is the way he advocated -- that as a logical ideal, "gods" should be thought of in absolute terms as supremely self-sufficient and therefore not concerned about things that they have no need to be concerned about. I see that as analogous to the point which causes so much debate and (in my view) is so easy to misinterpret - that the greatest pleasure can be equated (at least in magnitude) with the absence of pain. That observation in my view is based on the logical abstraction of quantity which results from categorizing ALL experience as either pleasure or pain. In that statement I believe he is abstracting those two words "pleasure" and "pain" and expecting us to understand that those two words cover a myriad - actually unlimited - number of experiences that are each subtlety different from each other and tied to their individual facts.

So where I end up is the view that you can definitely be right that in certain contexts certain views which we might not consider to be "ideal" can be practically useful, so it would be perverse to deny that and make "the perfect the enemy of the good."

However at the same time it is important in other contexts to be able to engage with the world around you, and if you are surrounded by Platonists instead of fundamentalist Christians, you need to be able to identify in your own mind, in response to the Platonists, a logical formulation of the "best" view of religion -- at least if you decide to play their game of accepting for the sake of discussion that there is a "best" view at all.

We probably ought to have an independent discussion of whether it is ever a good idea, and if it is, in what circumstances, to engage in these logic games despite Epicurus' insistence that there is no realm of pure logic, that logic itself is not part of the canon, that the canonical faculties are themselves the standard of truth, etc.

But just like you are pointing to realities that some people do seem to profit from their "active god" religious views, there are some people who insist on being Platonists / Stoics / and idealists of all kinds, and we live in a world were in practical terms most of us cannot escape from engaging with them.

That's the main point I wanted to make. Then there is also this:

To the extent you are saying that it seems likely to you that advanced beings would take interest in lesser beings as a matter of pleasure to themselves, I think Epicurus would also say "of course" and he would point to his position on isonomia and on infinite numbers of worlds with life on them and he would say of course there are highly advanced beings who do exactly like that, just like we do ourselves, but on a far more advanced scale that would seem to most of us as being "godlike." The isonomia view would I think allow for an infinite progression / spectrum of advancement above us.

It's only when someone insists on speculating "What about the TOP level of advancement" (as if there is such a thing, which I am not sure Epicurus would say that there is) that I think it would become appropriate to discuss his views of "perfect" beings. I would expect him to say that either virtually all or actually all of the advanced god-like beings that exist in the universe are somewhere on that spectrum other than at the logical top, so to greater or lesser degrees that might well take interest in things around them.

In my mind, it is not Epicurus' views of the theories of gods that would make him reject the claim that such things as Jesus rising from the "dead" happened, or the various miracles that they claim are true did not actually happen. In my view, Epicurus would take the position that all kinds of things that we have never seen before "may" actually come to our attention, but if they do they are not "supernatural" - a logical term which is an impossibility in terms of Epicurean reasoning.

The real persuasive objection to the claims of miracles is not the assertion of abstract logic that they "cannot" happen, but that there is no valid evidence that they do happen. Many of our technological marvels today would seem like magic to the ancient Epicureans (at least in a manner of speaking) but they would be (1) confident that the effect was not supernatural, and (2) confident that upon studying the facts long enough they would eventually be able to understand how such things were brought about naturally.

Just because we think that it is impossible for supernatural gods to exist, that doesn't mean that tomorrow our solar system isn't going to be invaded by living breathing highly-advanced aliens from another galaxy who choose to destroy the earth in an instant for some purpose of their own.

OK I have probably rambled enough but maybe some of these comments will advance the conversation.

It's 2am for me and the only thing I have time to say before I fall asleep is "You're going to have to work a lot harder before it's time to consider Banishment!" :-). Now my problem is how to remember to come back here since I've flipped the "unseen" notification. I will have much more to say.