Posts by Cassius

Despite the different directions that some of these posts may have indicated, I think we can probably all agree that there is a distinct difference between the alternative guides of life offered by Epicurus vs the other Greeks.

The other Greeks were pointing to gods, or to "virtue," as absolutes which existed outside of the living human, either in heaven or in a realm of ideal forms or some other "external" place.

I think we would all agree that the "pleasure" to which Epicurus was pointing is not something that exists "in the air" in nature and does not exist apart from actual living beings, which to repeat what I wrote above, I think establishes that pleasure is an emergent property of those atoms and void which are so arranged and situated as to constitute living beings. So "pleasure" has no and can have no absolute existence in itself, it's going to be something ("a feeling" or "experience" or "affect" or whatever) that a living being experiences in the moment as part of its own existence, not something the living being pulls from somewhere else.

Anyone disagree or wish to tune that better?

Quote from Godfrey

I keep thinking that the only mechanism that Epicurus (not Cicero, the Cow) explicitly provided for ranking, prioritizing or choosing/avoiding was desires. He seems to me to keep saying that "pleasure is pleasure", a pathe. Why else would he repeatedly make the point that if all other things are equal (condensing/accumulation, duration, location in the body and so on) then pleasures would never differ from one another?

There's no doubt in my mind but that this is a very challenging passage.

In my mind, the first part of what you are referring to there " pleasure is pleasure" arises from the conjunction of the feeling and the definition - we have many different types of feelings which are knowable to us directly and without rationalization, but our decision to give them a single name ("pleasure") is a conceptual decision.

As for the hypothetical that if the pleasures could be condensed to fill the whole person then they would never differ from one another I better yield to Don since he is master of the hypotheticals!

However if I were to go ahead rather than wait for Don on PD09 (PD09. If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.) --- I would say that the point most likely is again some conceptual point of contention (probably with Plato) because I believe that Epicurus would say that the individual experiences of pleasure cannot be so intensified, so that observation of the reverse proves something (perhaps indeed the connection of the experience of pleasure with the particular part of the mind or body. I base that in large part on the presumption that it would be a core premise of epicurus that pleasure does not exist "in the air" but is an emergent property of particular living beings.

As to PD09 I seem to remember DeWitt asserted something about that so his suggestion is probably worth going back and looking up.

Quote from Godfrey

He seems to me to keep saying that "pleasure is pleasure", a pathe.

My mind is still open on the issue of the meaning of desire in this context, but I think all of these questions turn on subtle issues of definitions, and in the end all feelings of pleasure have the common denominator of feeling pleasurable, but I do not believe that the feeling is identical except in that strict definitional (conceptual) sense. And that's where I think we have one of these intersections of the limits of conceptual reasoning from totally capturing every aspect of reality.

Quote from Don

Now, if saying the pursuit of philosophy is a "greater" pleasure than eating candy is your shorthand for that wordy paragraph, we're on the same page.

That is EXACTLY what I am saying!

All of this in my mind is purely a relative subjective decision made by the individual under the circumstances then and there existing, with the individual reserving the right at any moment to revise and extend or completely reverse his/her viewpoint on which pleasure will please him/her more extensively. And then the appropriate decision for that person is to pursue that decision with all the energy they can muster:-)

Quote from Don

s that your position is that some pleasures are "better"/"greater" than others: e g., Eating chocolate candies is "better" than eating coffee candies (for you). Pleasures can be "ranked."

I think our key here is that I am distinguishing "better" from "greater." I use "better" when I mean to refer to some kind of intrinsic "nobler" or "worthier," and I am not meaning to refer to that in terms of pleasure, so I don't call one pleasure "better" than another unless I am trying to be very clear that "better" is subjective and really means something else (more intense, longer lasting, or some other feeling.)

When referring to "greater" I think that is more clear. A "greater pleasure" is to me something that has those same attributes (more intense, longer lasting, or some other feeling).

I think in regard to that distinction we are really talking subtle preferences in words.

Quote from Don

My position is that ranking pleasures into a hierarchy is a pointless exercise. All things which give pleasure give pleasure, period, by definition.

I am pretty sure we do disagree here. Eating chocolate candy is a pleasure. Pursuing philosophy or some other hobby is a pleasure. I clearly and emphatically in my own life would rank the pleasure of pursuing philosophy or the hobby in a hiearchy such that I devote much more time and attention to it than to eating candy.

Maybe we again have a subtle word issue but I have no problem describing that process as "ranking pleasures in a hierarchy" and I would think that Epicurus is implicitly urging everyone to perform that same calculation process for themselves, just as he did in pursuing his philosophic campaign rather than lounging in the garden all day eating figs.

Quote from Don

My position is that the common denominator is simply that all things that result in pleasure is simply the fact that they bring pleasure. Sometimes for a short time, sometimes long, sometimes intense, sometimes subtle. But it's *always* pleasure

I have absolutely no problem with that statement so I wonder what you think is the best way to state what it appears to you we are disagreeing about(?)

You've probably hit the nail on the head Godfrey by citing those two - especially nine - two of the more "opaque" of the first ten because - I would say - they rely on unstated premises about the subject in order to unravel how they are intended to apply.

Again referring to nine there is clearly a "common denominator" among pleasures, and yet I do not think it is maintainable that all pleasures are the same in every respect - only in some respects.

Welcome to Episode Ninety-Four of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who lived in the age of Julius Caesar, and who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

At this point in our podcast we have completed our first line-by-line review of the poem, and we have temporarily turned to the presentation of Epicurean ethics found in Cicero's On Ends, as narrated by "Torquatus." But before we start with today's episode, let me remind you of our three ground rules:

First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it, which is not the same as presented by many modern commentators. We hope that our fresh perspective will encourage you to rethink the meaning of Epicurean philosophy for yourself.

Second: We won't be talking about contemporary philosophical or political issues in this podcast, and in fact we will stay as far away from them as possible. We want everyone to understand that Epicurus had a unique philosophy of his own. Epicurus was not a Stoic, a Humanist, a Buddhist, a Taoist, an Atheist, a Marxist, or a modern politician of the left or right - and it is very unfair to Epicurus and to ourselves to try to force Epicurean philosophy into one of those modern boxes.

Third: Lucretius' poem is mainly concerned with the many details of Epicurean physics, but we'll always try to learn from those details what they mean for the best way to live our own lives. Lucretius will show that Epicurus was not obsessed with luxury, but neither did he teach minimalism or asceticism, as you often find written on the internet today. Epicurus taught that pleasure is the ultimate guide of life, not supernatural gods, not the abstractions of idealism, and not absolute notions of "virtue." Epicurus taught that there are no supernatural beings, no fate, and no life after death. That means that any happiness we will ever have must come in this life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive to you, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

Now let's join our panel for today's discussion, with Don reading today's text:

[32] X. But that I may make plain to you the source of all the mistakes made by those who inveigh against pleasure and eulogize pain, I will unfold the whole system and will set before you the very language held by that great discoverer of truth and that master-builder, if I may style him so, of the life of happiness. Surely no one recoils from or dislikes or avoids pleasure in itself because it is pleasure, but because great pains come upon those who do not know how to follow pleasure rationally. Nor again is there any one who loves or pursues or wishes to win pain on its own account, merely because it is pain, but rather because circumstances sometimes occur which compel him to seek some great pleasure at the cost of exertion and pain. To come down to petty details, who among us ever undertakes any toilsome bodily exercise, except in the hope of gaining some advantage from it? Who again would have any right to reproach either a man who desires to be surrounded by pleasure unaccompanied by any annoyance, or another man who shrinks from any pain which is not productive of pleasure?

[33] But in truth we do blame and deem most deserving of righteous hatred the men who, enervated and depraved by the fascination of momentary pleasures, do not foresee the pains and troubles which are sure to befall them, because they are blinded by desire, and in the same error are involved those who prove traitors to their duties through effeminacy of spirit, I mean because they shun exertions and trouble. Now it is easy and simple to mark the difference between these cases. For at our seasons of ease, when we have untrammeled freedom of choice, and when nothing debars us from the power of following the course that pleases us best, then pleasure is wholly a matter for our selection and pain for our rejection. On certain occasions however either through the inevitable call of duty or through stress of circumstances, it will often come to pass that we must put pleasures from us and must make no protest against annoyance. So in such cases the principle of selection adopted by the wise man is that he should either by refusing certain pleasures attain to other and greater pleasures or by enduring pains should ward off pains still more severe.

[34] Holding as I do this theory, what reason should I have for fearing that I may not be able to bring our Torquati into accord with it? You a little while ago shewed at once your copious memory and your friendly and kindly feeling for me by quoting their examples; yet you neither perverted me by eulogising my ancestors nor made me less vigorous in my reply. Now I ask, what interpretation do you put upon the actions of these men? Do you believe that they attacked the armed foe, or practised such cruelty towards their own children and their own esh and blood, absolutely without giving a thought to their own interest or their own advantage? Why, even the beasts do not act so as to produce such a tumult and confusion that we cannot see the purpose of their movements and attacks; do you believe that men so exceptional achieved such great exploits from no motive whatever?

[35] What the motive was, I shall examine presently; meanwhile I shall maintain this, that if they performed those actions, which are beyond question noble, from some motive, their motive was not virtue apart from all else. He stripped the foe of his necklet. Yes, and he donned it himself to save his own life. But he faced a grave danger. Yes, with the whole army looking on. What did he gain by it? Applause and affection, which are the strongest guarantees for passing life in freedom from fear. He punished his son with death. If purposelessly, I should be sorry to be descended from one so abominable and so cruel; but if he did it to enforce by his self-inicted pain the law of military command, and by fear of punishment to control the army in the midst of a most critical war, then he had in view the preservation of his fellow-countrymen, which he knew to involve his own.

[36] And these principles have a wide application. There is one field in which the eloquence of your school has been wont especially to vaunt itself, and your own eloquence in particular, for you are an eager investigator of the past, I mean the stories of illustrious and heroic men and the applause of their actions viewed as looking not to any reward but to the inherent comeliness of morality. All such arguments are upset when once the principle of choice which I have just described has been established, whereby either pleasures are neglected for the purpose of obtaining pleasures still greater, or pains are incurred for the sake of escaping still greater pains.

No each of those situations would have their unique aspects, but I would have no trouble ranking the respective pleasures and choosing between them as greater or lesser pleasures.

I definitely agree that there is no absolute way to rank them "objectively" - meaning between people.

But each individual can and does rank them moment by moment, and the particular experiences involved are readily evaluatable in terms of greater or lesser pleasure -- at least that is how I see it.

We agree there is no "absolute ranking" but we are apparently disagreeing on whether it is possible for any individual or group of individuals to perceive the experience of pleasure as greater or lesser, and to that I would say "surely so."

Quote from Don

What does "more pleasurable" mean to you?

For example, I occasionally eat candy.

All candy to me, to the extent it is sweet, involves some degree of pleasure. However I can and do easily rank which candies I like most (find to be the most pleasant).

For example I have in front of me a bag of "Soft Caramel Candies" from "Lidl" (the grocery store). The bag says ("Caramel, Banana, Coffee, Vanilla, Mint, and Chocolate."

After I open the bag I can easily rank them in order of the pleasure they will give me, so I place them in line in this order (the most pleasant first): Chocolate, Caramel, Vanilla, Banana, Mint, Coffee

And I eat them in order, with clearly diminishing pleasure, til I get to the last of the coffee.

So I have no problem considering the flavor, intensity, texture (some are softer than others), staying power (some dissolve faster than others) all of which let me easily categorize them as greater or lesser pleasures.

Quote from Don

You seem to be trying to make a value judgment among "good things" as well as "things that bring pleasure".

Not a value judgement, but a judgment that I prefer some pleasures to others.

Quote from Don

some pleasures are more pleasing (greater) than others."

No. All things which bring pleasure are good, a priori (I think I'm using that right).

All I can say there is that for myself, some things are more pleasant than others. I think that's where we are going to have to agree to disagree until we can break this impasse.

Quote from Don

. That doesn't mean the pleasure of intoxication doesn't feel pleasurable in the moment. It's just maybe not a good choice. That doesn't mean the pleasure is greater or lesser.

We're at an impasse for the moment due to the flat way you make this observation (that there is no greater or lesser pleaure), but I am confident that we will break through it over time.

My position at the moment remains that philosophically "all pleasure is good" and "all goods are good," but that from the "perspective of real life," "some things that are good are better than others" and therefore "some pleasures are more pleasing (greater) than others."

And when I refer to "from the perspective of real life" this is one of those areas where I think there is no satisfactory way for words to capture the full depth of "better" or "more pleasing" other than to broadly indicate that there are degrees. In an analogy to mathematics I would say that words can model real life just like math can model real life, but they are not equivalent and cannot capture the complete issue. I cannot measure or fully understand the difference in pleasure that, for example, Martin may get from vanilla ice cream than I do.

Therefore also I would say that "pleasure is the (highest) good" is a perfectly appropriate way to respond to "holiness is the (highest) good" or "rationality is the (highest) good."

But as another example, I would also so that "pleasure is the good" is not what Torquatus (and we can assume he as an Epicurean par excellance for this analogy) would say to his army as he was directing his son to be executed for disobeying orders.

Torquatus might later deliver a philosophy lesson in which he explained that what he was doing was for the sake of pleasure, yes, but he would not likely choose to describe his analysis in that way at the moment that he was requiring his orders be carried out. He would more likely remind his men and his son of the relative differences in the various pleasures and pains of life and rank them (with the safety of his country as a higher pleasure than the safety of his son) as explanation for what he was doing.

Welcome @Lupercus !

This is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
2. The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
3. "On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
4. "Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
5. The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
6. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
7. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
8. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
9. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
10. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
11. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
12. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

Yes that is definitely key material!

How do you interpret the "this" in "And because this is the primary and inborn good, we do not choose every pleasure...?

If we substitute "pleasure" there we get "And because pleasure is the primary and inborn good we do not choose every pleasure...."

Are we not left with the same question as to how to distinguish between which pleasures to choose, and is not "pleasure" as used here a very high-level term encompassing many particulars? I don't see how that conclusion can be avoided unless we take the position that "the feeling of pleasure" is exactly the same in every respect in every experience that we find pleasing. And in case the answer to that question doesn't seem immediately clear, don't pleasures vary at least in how long they last? (And I would assert that it is clear that pleasures vary in many other ways as well.)

And in fact even in this passage it's clear that we are sometimes even selecting a temporary pain when a "greater pleasure" comes from having endured that pain.

So aren't we left with the clear conclusion that some pleasures are greater (and some are lesser) than others? And if so, the question to "what is the highest pleasure?" is not answered simply by saying "pleasure"? Is it?

Quote

"And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good. And again independence of desire we think a great good — not that we may at all times enjoy but a few things, but that, if we do not possess many, we may enjoy the few in the genuine persuasion that those have the sweetest pleasure in luxury who least need it, and that all that is natural is easy to be obtained, but that which is superfluous is hard."

I am pretty sure the bent stick is in the form of a bent oar in the discussion of illusions that just precedes the longer discussion of images. I always forget whether that is book four or five....

This is one of those "passing thought" posts and not intended to be particularly profound:

In opening the EpicureanFriends home page today and once again rereading the summary of the life that "will not admit of future improvement," it occurs to me that (in addition to serving other purposes) this might be thought of as the "No Need For Nihilism Proof":

Quote

One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity.

When the worst that can happen to us is seen to not to really be so bad at all, isn't that good reason to reject nihilism (and fears of all kinds) and get on with the business of enjoying living?

Considering this along with some of our other recent discussions, maybe this passage could be thought of as an "observation-based" rejection of nihilism that doesn't rely on elaborate "logical" argument.

For example, Epicurus' proof that pleasure is the good was not based on elaborate argument but amounts to: "Look over there at the young of all species and how they act before anyone has had the chance to corrupt them. They pursue pleasure!"

In this case, the proof that there is no need for nihilism and fear amounts to something like: "Look over there, the worst that can happen to you really isn't so bad at all. No unbearably severe pain lasts for very long, so don't give up on life or be afraid, you can handle anything bad that happens to you!."

I have not had time to watch this. The brief glimpse I took of it indicates it may be too basic for most of us here (or may not).

One thing I noticed immediately is that the lecturer has a strong British accent and the sound is not optimum, so I found him somewhat difficult to understand.

However all in all this one may be worth linking here, so if someone watches this and has a comment please let us know.

The following from Shakespeare was brought to my attention today:

There is a tide in the affairs of men,

Which taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;

Omitted, all the voyage of their life

Is bound in shallows and in miseries.

On such a full sea are we now afloat,

And we must take the current when it serves,

Or lose our ventures.

Source:

Julius Caesar

Act 4 Scene 3 Line 249

I presume that this is a fictional line made up by Shakespeare, but it has that seductive quality of much of Stoicism's appeal to virtue and glory.

I decided to post this because I realized that it may essentially be an appeal to "fate" ("tide in the affairs of men" "take the current when it serves or lose our ventures")

I don't have time to do more research on this right now, but I would like to:

(1) see what else is contained in this war council between Cassius and Brutus,

(2) See how much of it is actually believed to be true, tracing presumably back to Plutarch or other ancient sources, and

(3) See if there is enough historical information to come to any informed conclusions as to whether Brutus' position can be evaluated more "objectively" to assess how much he might in fact have been influenced by his Stoicism, or whether this was mainly lip service to support a plan he favored for other reasons.

Apparently Cassius gave in to the plan and "the rest is history" as to their defeat at Phillipi (though the outcome was very close and in fact it sounds like miscommunication may have been the ultimate cause of defeat).

Probably this is not a thread of wide interest but the "tide in the affairs of men" line is pretty well known, and it does seem to me that it rings of Stoicism - even though there clearly are going to be facts and times (literal tides) that need to be acted upon. That's part of what we can discuss here: Is this in fact a Stoic-influenced appeal to "fate"?

Does every child whirling a slingshot around his head carry in his mind a past memory of geometry or trigonometry from before his birth?

Does our ability to see these geometric relationships and calculate them mean that Nature's clerk sat down somewhere and calculated them originally at the foundation of the world?

Does the slingshot whirling around our head whirl the way it does because it is governed by laws which are portrayed in this diagram?

Is knowledge of sines and cosines and geometry a good in and of itself, putting us in touch with a world beyond our senses?

Note: I really just wanted to know if an animated gif would work here - it appears that it does!