Posts by Cassius

Quote from Martin

The Stoics are relatively innocent and typically use logic properly for their reasoning as they have learned from Aristoteles except that some basic premises of the ancient Stoics are most likely false. There is no "Stoic logic" to refute.

I will have to come back to this too, but as to whether there is a "Stoic Logic":

Stoic logic - Wikipedia

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Stoic logic is the system of propositional logic developed by the Stoic philosophers in ancient Greece. It was one of the two great systems of logic in the classical world. It was largely built and shaped by Chrysippus, the third head of the Stoic school in the 3rd-century BCE. Chrysippus's logic differed from Aristotle's term logic because it was based on the analysis of propositions rather than terms. The smallest unit in Stoic logic is an assertible (the Stoic equivalent of a proposition) which is the content of a statement such as "it is day". Assertibles have a truth-value such that they are only true or false depending on when it was expressed (e.g. the assertible "it is night" will only be true if it is true that it is night). ^[1] In contrast, Aristollean propositions strongly affirm or deny a predicate of a subject and seek to have its truth validated or falsified. Compound assertibles can be built up from simple ones through the use of logical connectives. The resulting syllogistic was grounded on five basic indemonstrable arguments to which all other syllogisms were claimed to be reducible.

I agree with most of that Martin but this is not my understanding of the situation with Stoicism, so I will have to gather more material on this:

Quote from Martin

The Stoics are relatively innocent and typically use logic properly for their reasoning as they have learned from Aristoteles except that some basic premises of the ancient Stoics are most likely false. There is no "Stoic logic" to refute.

For now, I would generally refer to a couple of the standard texts that simply refer to "logic." I agree, and I think we discussed in the episode, that it is necessary to establish just what is being criticized, so we can deal with these uses of the word "logic" that appear in the standard translations:

Diogenes Laertius:

"...the Logicians [he called] ‘The destroyers,’"

[24] Metrodorus’ writings were as follows:

Three books _Against the Physicians. About Sensations. To Timocrates. Concerning Magnanimity. About Epicurus’ Ill Health. Against the Logicians._ Nine books _Against the Sophists. Concerning the Path To Wisdom. Concerning Change. Concerning Wealth. Against Democritus. Concerning Nobility of Birth._

[31] Logic they reject as misleading. For they say it is sufficient for physicists to be guided by what things say of themselves. Thus in _The Canon_ Epicurus says that the tests of truth are the sensations and concepts and the feelings; the Epicureans add to these the intuitive apprehensions of the mind. And this he says himself too in the summary addressed to Herodotus and in the Principal Doctrines. For, he says, all sensation is irrational and does not admit of memory; for it is not set in motion by itself, nor when it is set in motion by something else, can it add to it or take from it.

DeWitt:

...He declared dialectic a superfluity but was able to criticize Plato with great acumen and he wrote against the Megarians, the contemporary experts in logic.

...

The rejection of Plato's teachings is almost total. If the Authorized Doctrines be read item by item it may be observed that almost all are contradictions of Plato, and thus it becomes plainly manifest that the writings of Plato occupied the chief place in the youthful studies of Epicurus. The Platonic dialogues were the textbooks of dialectic and in modern parlance would be "required reading."

This almost total rejection does not, on the contrary, preclude extensive borrowing and adaptation on the part of Epicurus. Dialectic by virtue of its dramatic form is committed to a very casual employment of a great variety of analytical tricks and logical devices. If incidentally it furnishes instruction in logic, this is by a method analogous to the case system in the teaching of law. This casual use of logic is precisely what we find in the writings of Epicurus, and it was this practice that gave superficial justification to Cicero in accusing him of "abolishing definitions and offering no instruction in classifications and in partitions of subject matter." B2 Epicurus was not so foolish as to think of abolishing logic; he was merely determined to keep it in a subordinate place. This deliberate choice is additional evidence of extreme familiarity with dialectical writings.

Happy Birthday @EricR ! And you're the very first entry in our new "Happy Birthday" subforum. This isn't generated by a robot but by the poster of the event. That means that we need to monitor the "Today's Birthday" box and keep up with this (and add Happy Birthday entries) personally - which is the way it should be. Anyone who notices a "Today's Birthday" entry that doesn't have a corresponding Happy Birthday thread here, please feel free to start the thread yourself - that will help a lot!

We've been talking lately about ways to build community and get to know each other better, so today let's say "Happy Birthday" to EricR in the Frozen North -- quite possibly our highest latitude participant here on the forum.

Eric - hope you are doing well and thanks for your past participation in the forum!

And for those of you who don't know him, Eric is a talented writer and musician which you can check out on his timeline.

Ok I am going to try to start using more of the Calendar function so people can check the agenda and indicate participation.

I have set up an agenda so please comment on it there:

epicureanfriends.com/wcf/calendar/event/1394/

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that we ought always to choose the former and avoid the latter, for they are measured by quantity and not by quality.

That would seem to be either an error in the text or maybe different meanings of the word "quality." Is it "quality" in the senses of "properties of atoms v qualities of combined bodies," or "quality" in the sense of "purity" or maybe even "intensity?"

If the point is the weighing of the quantity of pleasure vs the quantity of pain, that would make more sense, but I would argue even that isn't correct unless we're getting really abstract and saying that all pleasure is the same and all we have to do is add it up in terms of quantity (of time perhaps?) -- But I don't think Epicurus taught that simplistic a view of pleasure. All pleasure is desirable, because it is pleasing, but that doesn't mean that all pleasures are identical.

I agree that this doesn't sound correct.

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Else it would be a monstrous thing for beings endowed with man's nature to forsake the most divine judgement of the mind and entrust themselves to irrational pleasures and pains.'

Yes, Christians and most of the rest of the world think that Epicureans are monsters. Or that Epicurus was an Antichrist even. This is why we can't get too complacent and think that "everyone wants to be happy" means the same thing to everyone.

Well we made it through a grand total of two - arguably three - sentences today. Note that is "sentences" not sections!

Our purpose is to use Torquatus to provide an introduction to the big issues of Epicurean philosophy, so even a moderate but still superficial treatment takes a lot of time.

But the material is deep so I think you will like the finished product.

We started on the issue of Epicurus' rejection of Stoic logic, but we reserved til next week most of the detail of Epicurus' own positions, so we will treat that next week.

One omission I now recall from today is that when we referred to "your school" we talked mostly about Stoicism. We need to remember that Cicero was only partly Stoic, however, and he was probably more a Platonist or even Aristotelian on issues of "logic".

Ah - this from Don's link is probably helpful in understanding Wallace's perspective. If this is true that he was an Idealist, Wallace can't have ultimately been very interested in interpreting Epicurus sympathetically:

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Wallace had wide intellectual sympathies and found matter of agreement with philosophers of different schools; but all, in his hands, led towards a central idealism. His work consisted in pointing out the various avenues of approach to the temple of idealism, rather than in unveiling its mysteries.

(my underlining added)

Just in case that page goes away here's a clip:

I think your statement is probably right SimonC, but it's no doubt a complex matter. There are all sorts of reasons to be careful in this controversy, or else you end up where Bailey did in his translation of this section of Diogenes Laertius - you just start using the word "concept" instead of pre-conceptions or prolepsis or anticipation:

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The concept they speak of as an apprehension or right opinion or thought or general idea stored within the mind, that is to say a recollection of what has often been presented from without, as for instance ‘Such and such a thing is a man,’ for the moment the word ‘man’ is spoken, immediately by means of the concept his form too is thought of, as the senses give us the information. Therefore the first signification of every name is immediate and clear evidence. And we could not look for the object of our search, unless we have first known it. For instance, we ask, ‘Is that standing yonder a horse or a cow?’ To do this we must know by means of a concept the shape of horse and of cow. Otherwise we could not have named them, unless we previously knew their appearance by means of a concept. So the concepts are clear and immediate evidence.

I will give Bailey credit for honesty, because I think what he is describing is "conceptual reasoning" and certainly it does occur. We see or think of things over time, we form a definition of what is common or essential to a variety of things that we see (or just think about) to which we assign a name, and then we use that concept over time to discuss new instances of the same thing we have reduced to a definition.

But what Epicurus seems to be describing is something that occurs before we reach the stage of assigning a definition or even before we see any examples of a thing (this is where I think DeWitt rightly points to the Velleius material).

Plus, the process of assigning words (and aren't words pretty close to concepts?) would seem to be discretionary, and that's where you get the issue of opinion which is where error becomes possible, and it does not seem consistent to include a process where we know errors enter in to be a part of the "canon of truth" which seems to be uniformly "pre-rational."

I am not suggesting that what I am writing here is "correct" any more than previous attempts. I suppose the point here is that I don't see William Wallace's formulation as any more helpful than any of the other discussions.

As Nate has done for the translations, we probably would profit from trying to assemble the various options (DeWitt's, Bailey's, this one, etc etc etc) because it is even hard to state a list of the varying positions. I doubt that is at the top of my list to do, but assembling a list of the major positions on anticipations (sort of like we sometimes refer to idealist and realist views of the gods) would be very helpful. Simply saying "The DeWitt position" vs. "the Bailey position" vs. the "Voula Tsouna position" isn't really very helpful.

Quote from Nate

And here, perhaps, is a fundamental fallacy of Epicureanism. It holds that truth is identical with what is clearly and distinctly conceived. It substitutes imagination for thought. Unlike Spinoza, who contrasts the imperfect conception of the imagination with the adequate knowledge of understanding, Epicurus abides by what is easily and satisfactorily presented to the mind under a pictorial or semi-sensuous aspect.

This is an example of the generally hostile tone toward Epicurus I pick up in Wallace's writing when I last tried to read this book. There's a lot going on here - another example is in referencing Berkeley, and I don't find Wallace persuasive in even being clear what his point is, much lest making it in a compelling way.

Quote from Nate

What the Epicureans principally objected to, we infer, were the principles—the axioms, postulates, and definitions: though others of them, like Zeno the Sidonian, went further, and urged that there were points involved in the demonstrations which had not been explicitly accepted in the preliminary principles.

This is a reference to geometry, but again I am not able to clearly say where Wallace is going. Is he saying that Epicurus was going too far in objecting to mathematics, or is he endorsing what I gather was Frances Wright's final viewpoint, that all efforts to conclude that any theory is sound, beyond just observation, is bound to fail.

It's definitely useful to add Wallace's translations to the big collection of variations of the texts, but I have not found his commentaries to be very helpful.

[Not posting this to be argumentative, just as a marker that if someone who is newer reads a long paragraph like that, and doesn't really follow where Wallace is going, that person is not alone.]

At the very least, if he is going to suggest that he is smarter than Epicurus and say something like this: "And here, perhaps, is a fundamental fallacy of Epicureanism. It holds that truth is identical with what is clearly and distinctly conceived. It substitutes imagination for thought." then I would like him to clearly explain why he thinks Epicurus was wrong and what he thinks the correct answer is. Does this mean he is a Platonist or religionist and finds truth in ideal forms or divine revelation or some kind of logic ("thought")?

Ok Matt's comment was in the back of my mind. It's more fun here to talk than just go to Wikipedia. So this IS or IS not that same person that Matt refers to? I have a feeling the dates don't quite match up

Thank you. What is this Nate?

I think that would mean sometime from about 12 pm eastern to be reasonable for the west coast USA to about 3 pm eastern so as not to be too late for Europe. Let's see what other responses come in.

Correcting now to "good" from " food"!

We have four already signed up at Facebook and I think this is the kind of activity that we will probably get good participation from the Facebook-oriented people.

Then I think we may have to complain to Charles that in his writing about the French enlightenment he did not being this to our attention earlier!

I have regularly referred to my interest in Jackson Barwis' "Dialogues Concerning Innate Principles" as potentially relevant to Epicurus' views of anticipations and their relationships to feelings. I won't expand on that here beyond saying that Barwis suggests a perspective in which Nature implants "principles of operation" which ultimately lead to the formation of ideas in particular areas of life, but that Nature does not implant specific ideas at birth. This is directly relevant to such issues as Aristotle's position concerning the "Blank Slate" and John Locke's development of a form of empiricism. The "Dialogues Concerning Innate Principles" is directly aimed at refuting John Locke's views on that subject as expressed in "Essays Concerning Human Understanding."

Notes: Wikipedia

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An Essay Concerning Human Understanding is a work by John Locke concerning the foundation of human knowledge and understanding. It first appeared in 1689 (although dated 1690) with the printed title An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. He describes the mind at birth as a blank slate (tabula rasa, although he did not use those actual words) filled later through experience. The essay was one of the principal sources of empiricism in modern philosophy, and influenced many enlightenment philosophers, such as David Hume and George Berkeley.

Book I of the Essay is Locke's attempt to refute the rationalist notion of innate ideas. Book II sets out Locke's theory of ideas, including his distinction between passively acquired simple ideas—such as "red," "sweet," "round"—and actively built complex ideas, such as numbers, causes and effects, abstract ideas, ideas of substances, identity, and diversity. Locke also distinguishes between the truly existing primary qualities of bodies, like shape, motion and the arrangement of minute particles, and the secondary qualities that are "powers to produce various sensations in us"^[1] such as "red" and "sweet." These secondary qualities, Locke claims, are dependent on the primary qualities. He also offers a theory of personal identity, offering a largely psychological criterion. Book III is concerned with language, and Book IV with knowledge, including intuition, mathematics, moral philosophy, natural philosophy ("science"), faith, and opinion.

This is just to not that today I "upgraded" the JacksonBarwis.com website, and this is to link to that site for future reference.

I can't resist posting one sentence from the first of the Dialogues Concerning Innate Principles which is probably the key to it all, and on which assertion has argument stands (as I think it does) or falls:

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When we are told that benevolence is pleasing; that malevolence is painful; we are not convinced of these truths by reasoning, nor by forming them into propositions: but by an appeal to the innate internal affections of our souls: and if on such an appeal, we could not feel within the sentiment of benevolence, and the peculiar pleasure attending it; and that of malevolence and its concomitant pain, not all the reasoning in the world could ever make us sensible of them, or enable us to understand their nature.

And if true, as I think it is, what would this mean other than that all "Natural" morality is ultimately based on pleasure and pain? The remainder of the Dialogues expands upon this principle.

Announcement Posted at Facebook.

Online "A Few Days In Athens" Book Review

Planning is underway for a Zoom online "Book Club" read-through, chapter by chapter, of Frances Wright's "A Few Days In Athens." This is a fictional introduction to Epicurus through the eyes of a formerly-Stoic young philosophy student. Our plan is to do one chapter per week, for about an hour, with a short presentation of each chapter at the start of the session, followed by a round-the-table discussion afterward. We will be screen-sharing to highlight the text so participants will not be visible by video unless they request to be.

Current plans are for a late-afternoon or early evening start time by Eastern USA time, but we recognize that causes problems for participation in Europe, and if you are there and prefer an earlier start time, let us know in the thread and we will see what we can do. We will probably start Sunday January 30 depending on level of interest, so let us know if you would like to participate. In order to prevent disruptions we will ask those who wish to attend to sign up and you will be sent the appropriate zoom link close to the start time. We will probably set up a "private" Facebook group for attendees to make that process easier.

Let us know your thoughts on this.

A Few Days In Athens

Quote from Titus

I've just finished a reading, written by a guy called Cassius who deals with this subject at length

I shudder to check some of my old writing sometime. Hopefully it's still useful, but I continue to learn a lot every day.

This (like most hard-to-find French issues) is something I would love to hear from Charles on!

Wow that IS interesting! Cyrano de Bergerac seems to be a universally-admired figure - although I wasn't even sure he was a real person until I read Godfrey's links. It would be great to link him to Epicurus if we could. I had no idea he was linked to Gassendi. Maybe it's only the figure in the play that is admired, but if he was a student of Gassendi, and considered a "Libertine" then that sounds like there's potential Epicurean connection at work.

I wasn't aware of the recent movie material but of course the old black and white version available free is considered a classic. Even I who am not much of a movie buff have seen this one, and have to admit it is really amazing in quality. Once I got used to the highly intellectual dialog, that is. I bet Joshua has seen and liked this one.

Let's see if i can find a link to add here.