Episode 107 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week we continue with Torquatus' summary of some of the Key Doctrines of Epicurus, with a discussion of the Epicurean emphasis on natural science.
I originally thought Hiram may have been making more of it than was warranted. Now, Cassius might be imbuing it with more depth than is warranted. Maybe.
We'll all soon be having whiplash!
But I do think that the "images" aspect is one of the least appreciated aspects of Epicurean philosophy. It's almost totally neglected and most of us (including me) treat it as an amusing sidebar not worthy of much consideration.
But given how it appears to tie into many aspects of the philosophy, I bet if we had more materials we would find it popping up in unexpected places, and this may be one.
So I'm not really advocating any position yet except for let's dig into the material.
And I need to verify near the beginning of the dig is to verify how many (if any) of those "clear to see" references are indeed "ante oculos."
I need a good text version of Lucretius in latin somewhere -- I think there is or was a latinlibrary.com ?
. But I think it will be important to keep on top of the science.
That's the bottom line for me, just like a person might want to think about earthquakes before living in parts of California or tornadoes before living in Kansas. Lots of places have their own unique issues which overlay global issues, so the best you can do is to do your best to be intelligent and on top of all of them.
Great; if I won't be able to gather food without inflicting pain, I'll happily end my own life
I agree with the thrust of your post but I pick this part out just to extend the conversation:
It's pretty tricky to carry that statement out to a logical extreme, and in my view therefore important not to treat it as an absolute. If we consider animal pain in the equation (and I think we probably should), then most of us live off the spoils of some pretty horrible treatment of animals in factory farming and otherwise.
So it's important to keep before the eyes (right Don?) a clear view of the limits of what we can realistically experience in life. We inflict a certain degree of pain (in the form of effort) on ourselves every day just to continue living. And we do that for the pleasures obtained.
So yes ending our own lives is in fact a realistic option if the circumstances truly deserve it, but we have to be very careful in deciding when that is the case. If we choose unwisely in when to exit we don't get a "do-over!"
And that too is one of the invigorating things about Epicurus - we're playing for keeps, and there's no recompense for a mistake for us - no strumming harps in heaven as consolation prize.
In case it may be helpful here are other references in Lucretius which Bailey has translated the phrase "clear to see":
[700] And yet we must not think that all particles can be linked together in all ways, for you would see monsters created everywhere, forms coming to being half man, half beast, and sometimes tall branches growing out from a living body, and many limbs of land-beasts linked with beasts of the sea, and nature too throughout the lands, that are the parents of all things, feeding Chimaeras breathing flame from their noisome mouths. But it is clear to see that none of these things comes to be, since we see that all things are born of fixed seeds and a fixed parent, and can, as they grow, preserve their kind. You may be sure that that must needs come to pass by a fixed law. For its own proper particles separate from every kind of food and pass within into the limbs of everything, and are there linked on and bring about the suitable movements. But, on the other hand, we see nature cast out alien matter on to the ground, and many things with bodies unseen flee from the body, driven by blows, which could not be linked to any part nor within feel the lively motions in harmony with the body and imitate them.
[98] \[Yet many wise men have thought\] that the sensation of the mind is not placed in any part determined, but is a certain vital habit of the body, which the Greeks call a harmony, in that it makes us live with sensation, although in no part does an understanding exist; as when often good health is said to belong to the body, and yet it is not itself any part of a healthy man. In this wise they do not set the sensation of the mind in any part determined; and in this they seem to me to wander very far astray. Thus often the body, which is clear to see, is sick, when, all the same we feel pleasure in some other hidden part; and contrariwise it happens that the reverse often comes to be in turn, when one wretched in mind feels pleasure in all his body; in no other wise than if, when a sick man’s foot is painful, all the while, may be, his head is in no pain. Moreover, when the limbs are given up to soft sleep, and the heavy body lies slack and senseless, yet there is something else in us, which at that very time is stirred in many ways, and admits within itself all the motions of joy and baseless cares of heart.
[323] This nature then of the soul is protected by the whole body, and is itself the guardian of the body, and the cause of its life; for the two cling together by common roots, and it is seen that they cannot be torn asunder without destruction. Even as it is not easy to tear out the scent from lumps of frankincense, but that its nature too passes away. So it is not easy to draw out the nature of mind and soul from the whole body, but that all alike is dissolved. With first-beginnings so closely interlaced from their very birth are they begotten, endowed with a life shared in common, nor, as is clear to see, can the power of body or mind feel apart, either for itself without the force of the other, but by the common motions of the two on this side and on that is sensation kindled and fanned throughout our flesh.
[995] The Sisyphus in our life too is clear to see, he who open-mouthed seeks from the people the rods and cruel axes, and evermore comes back conquered and dispirited. For to seek for a power, which is but in name, and is never truly given, and for that to endure for ever grinding toil, this is to thrust uphill with great effort a stone, which after all rolls back from the topmost peak, and headlong makes for the levels of the plain beneath.
[54] First of all, since among things clear to see many things give off bodies, in part scattered loosely abroad, even as wood gives off smoke and fires heat, and in part more closely knit and packed together, as when now and then the grasshoppers lay aside their smooth coats in summer, and when calves at their birth give off a caul from their outermost body, and likewise when the slippery serpent rubs off its vesture on the thorns; for often we see the brambles laden with these wind-blown spoils from snakes. And since these things come to pass, a thin image from things too must needs be given off from the outermost body of things. For why these films should fall and part from things any more than films that are thin, none can breathe a word to prove; above all, since on the surface of things there are many tiny bodies, which could be cast off in the same order wherein they stood, and could preserve the outline of their shape, yea, and be cast the more quickly, inasmuch as they can be less entangled, in that they are few, and placed in the forefront. For verily we see many things cast off and give out bodies in abundance, not only from deep beneath, as we said before, but often too from the surface, such as their own colour. And commonly is this done by awnings, yellow and red and steely-blue, when stretched over great theatres they flap and flutter, spread everywhere on masts and beams. For there they tinge the assembly in the tiers beneath, and all the bravery of the stage and the gay-clad company of the elders, and constrain them to flutter in their colours. And the more closely are the hoardings of the theatre shut in all around, the more does all the scene within laugh, bathed in brightness, as the light of day is straitened. Since then the canvas gives out this hue from its outermost body, each several thing also must needs give out thin likenesses, since in either case they are throwing off from the surface. There are then sure traces of forms, which fly about everywhere, endowed with slender bulk, nor can they be seen apart one by one.[1056] Lastly, what is there so marvellous in this, if the human race, with strong voice and tongue, should mark off things with diverse sounds for diverse feelings? When the dumb cattle, yea and the races of wild beasts are wont to give forth diverse unlike sounds, when they are in fear or pain, or again when their joys grow strong. Yea verily, this we may learn from things clear to see.
[137] It comes to pass, too, sometimes, that the force of a mighty wind rushing on tears through the cloud and breaks it asunder with a front attack. For what the blast can do there is shown by things clear to see here on earth, where the wind is gentler and yet it tears out and sucks up tall trees from their lowest roots.
[272] Nor is it the same as when we move forward impelled by a blow from the strong might and strong constraint of another. For then it is clear to see that all the matter of the body moves and is hurried on against our will, until the will has reined it back throughout the limbs. Do you not then now see that, albeit a force outside pushes many men and constrains them often to go forward against their will and to be hurried away headlong, yet there is something in our breast, which can fight against it and withstand it? And at its bidding too the store of matter is constrained now and then to turn throughout the limbs and members, and, when pushed forward, is reined back and comes to rest again.
Also: Are there not some references in Lucretius to our motions being the result of us first visualizing the motion? I thought it was here in Book 2 in regard to the swerve, but it's not exactly stated that way -- HOWEVER see the reference to "clear to see" in line 272 : (Bailey) I wonder if that is an "ante oculos" ->
[251] Once again, if every motion is always linked on, and the new always arises from the old in order determined, nor by swerving do the first-beginnings make a certain start of movement to break through the decrees of fate, so that cause may not follow cause from infinite time; whence comes this free will for living things all over the earth, whence, I ask, is it wrested from fate, this will whereby we move forward, where pleasure leads each one of us, and swerve likewise in our motions neither at determined times nor in a determined direction of place, but just where our mind has carried us? For without doubt it is his own will which gives to each one a start for this movement, and from the will the motions pass flooding through the limbs.
[263] Do you not see too how, when the barriers are flung open, yet for an instant of time the eager might of the horses cannot burst out so suddenly as their mind itself desires? For the whole store of matter throughout the whole body must be roused to movement, that then aroused through every limb it may strain and follow the eager longing of the mind; so that you see a start of movement is brought to pass from the heart, and comes forth first of all from the will of the mind, and then afterwards is spread through all the body and limbs.
[272] Nor is it the same as when we move forward impelled by a blow from the strong might and strong constraint of another. For then it is clear to see that all the matter of the body moves and is hurried on against our will, until the will has reined it back throughout the limbs. Do you not then now see that, albeit a force outside pushes many men and constrains them often to go forward against their will and to be hurried away headlong, yet there is something in our breast, which can fight against it and withstand it? And at its bidding too the store of matter is constrained now and then to turn throughout the limbs and members, and, when pushed forward, is reined back and comes to rest again.
Now of course "images" do not appear to be the same thing in the texts as what we see, BUT it seems fair to say that the things that we see do generate images as well as visible sights. So is it possible that we are talking about picturing things so as to summon up the images that are received directly into the mind?
Duh. I should have brought this question up earlier too (I hope i didn't and have forgotten)!
What would be the relationship, if any, between this discussion and the flow of "images" that is discussed extensively in Book 4 of Lucretius?
I gather from our discussion of book 4 (which I think took place before your arrival in the podcast Don) that Epicurus was suggesting that many of our thought processes derive from our minds selectively receiving some from among many of the "images" that are constantly floating in the air. This is specifically suggested too by Cicero in his correspondence to Cassius Longinus and in Cassius' subsequent reference to "spectres."
To what extent would an idea of "setting before the eyes" be related to selectively tuning your attention to certain images as part of the thought process.
One of the reasons the images discussions seem to be largely ignored by modern commentators is that Epicurus seems to have been suggesting that these images were intimately involved in our thoughts, which we tend to reject today. I can't imagine that Philodemus departed too far from Epicurus on that, so is it possible that the Epicurean view of images is related to issues involving setting before the eyes?
10.2********Letter from Cicero to Cassius, written from Rome, January of 45 B.C.
DXXX \(F XV, 16\)
TO C. CASSIUS LONGINUS \(AT BRUNDISIUM\)
ROME \(JANUARY\)
I think you must be a little ashamed at this being the third letter inflicted on you before I have a page or a syllable from you. But I will not press you: I shall expect, or rather exact, a longer letter. For my part, if I had a messenger always at hand, I should write even three an hour. For somehow it makes you seem almost present when I write anything to you, and that not “by way of phantoms of images,” as your new friends express it, who hold that “mental pictures” are caused by what Catius called “spectres” – or I must remind you that Catius Insuber the Epicurean, lately dead, calls “spectres” what the famous Gargettius, and before him Democritus, used to call “images.”
Well, even if my eyes were capable of being struck by these “spectres,” because they spontaneously run in upon them at your will, I do not see how the mind can be struck. You will be obliged to explain it to me, when you return safe and sound, whether the “spectre” of you is at my command, so as to occur to me as soon as I have taken the fancy to think about you; and not only about you, who are in my heart’s core, but supposing I begin thinking about the island of Britain – will its image fly at once into my mind? But of this later on.
I am just sounding you now to see how you take it. For if you are angry and annoyed, I shall say more and demand that you be restored to the sect from which you have been ejected by “violence and armed force.” In an injunction of this sort the words “within this year” are not usually added. Therefore, even if it is now two or three years since you divorced Virtue, seduced by the charms of Pleasure, it will still be open for me to do so. And yet to whom am I speaking? It is to you, the most gallant of men, who ever since you entered public life have done nothing that was not imbued to the utmost with the highest principle. In that very sect of yours I have a misgiving that there must be more stuff than I thought, if only because you accept it. “How did that come into your head?” you will say. Because I had nothing else to say. About politics I can write nothing: for I don’t choose to write down my real opinions.
## ****10.3********Letter from Cassius to Cicero, written from Brundisium, January, 45 B.C.
I hope that you are well. I assure you that on this tour of mine there is nothing that gives me more pleasure to do than to write to you; for I seem to be talking and joking with you face to face. And yet that does not come to pass because of those spectres; and, by way of retaliation for that, in my next letter I shall let loose upon you such a rabble of Stoic boors that you will proclaim Catius a true-born Athenian.
Ok I looked back at 16 and 27 but I still don't see much more there than an allusion or idiom referring to "confronting" a person with the consequences of their thoughts or actions, which seems to me to be a fairly ordinary thing that anyone of any philosophy would do in making a point.
Do you see Philodemus saying more than that in those passages?
What I am reading seems to be something like:
"If someone has a problem confront them by discussing with them the consequences of their actions and fleshing those out in detail."
Ok, if so, that makes sense.
But is there more than that?
Now the specific aspect of telling them to "picture it" might be significant, but wouldn't it be significant only if there is something special in the Epicurean view of how "picturing"relates to thinking?
So I gather that is what we are talking about, some kind of special relationship between thinking and picturing (?)
if so, what is that special insight of Epicurus that makes this significant?
Welcome @jonathan !
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All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.
One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.
In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.
- "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
- The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
- "On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
- "Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
- The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
- Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
- Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
- The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
- A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
- Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
- Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
- "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.
It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.
And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.
Welcome to the forum!
So see I am not at all resistant to pursing the implications of "ante oculos" and that reminds me too:
1 - Is "ante oculos" what we are discussing?
2- Did we yet pull out the actual quotes from Philodemus (rather than Voula Tsouna's paraphrases or opinions)? That's what I was really concerned about, that we were speculating based on relying on Tsouna rather than on reading the actual reliable-grade texts themselves.
Right now I can picture at least two sections of Lucretius that might be relevant to a "picture this" idiom or method of explaining, but I don't have a firm picture of anything specific from Philodemus.
So I am not asking you (Don) to do it since we are all covered with work, and I don't have the time right now to offer to do it myself, but that would be a good goal for us at some point to pull together at least some preliminary English version of those cites for this project.
And if the texts are so fragmentary that all we can put together in English is Tsouna's conjectures as to the meaning of corrupted sentences, then we can do that, but then at least we can have them clearly labeled as such.
As usual my thoughts are clear as mud 
Combined with a half-memory of reading something in "On methods of inference."
I think the key word for any potential relationship would be what I think is translated as "inconceivability.". That might sound like a logical concept at first glance, but since proof of anything is grounded in the senses, and there is probably a major role for "picturing" things in Epicurean views of thought processes, we might have a related issue.
Also long ago in the Lucretius podcast I think we ran into reason to discuss the extent to which memories constitute stored pictures, and I think there was resistance to that view, but that might factor in too if our emphasis on the use of words is clarity of meaning in a "picture" sense.
Do you have the picture of what I am suggesting yet?
I am sure by now you are getting the picture.
I had more to say on this earlier today and I should have pulled off the road to post it, but this is the best I can reconstruct hours later:
When I think of telling someone one to "set this before their eyes" I think of telling them to "picture this" in their minds.
Telling them to "picture this" is pretty close to asking them "Can you picture this?"
The reason I bring that up is that it seems to me that some of the epistemology sections refer to what may be a test of "can you picture this?" For example, I am thinking of Lucretius' suggesting that we imagine throwing a javelin toward the edge of space. and picturing whether anything might ever stop it.
It's my impression that Lucretius/Epicurus is suggesting that it is impossible ("inconceivable?") to imagine anything stopping the javelin, or that there is a wall or limit or end to outer space.
So where I am going is that as we examine passages which talk about "setting before the eyes" we might want to be on the alert for epistemological test aspects to the exercise.
If we can picture something in our minds, that might be an indication that the thing "might" at least possibly exist. If we cannot even picture it, that might be an indication of "inconceivability." Maybe I am picking up that"inconceivability" word in Philodemus On signs and it has no relation to the current discussion, but it seems to me to be something to be on the alert for as we read whatever material may exist. Because we clearly have Lucretius using the term "ante oculos" in one part of book one, plus we have him suggesting that we imagine the flying javelin as a technique of impressing the lesson on the student.
I am rushed for time so I will have to read the article later. I presume we will eventually want to move this to the Canonics section, but I am not able in a few seconds to figure out his point. Is there a way to briefly summarize why this looks like it could be relevant to Epicurean reasoning? By no means am I saying it's not, I am just not quickly grasping the major idea of his suggestion(?) Is this related to probability vs "certainty"?
Is this the essential point?
Including a qualifier or a rebuttal in an argument helps build your ethos, or credibility. When you acknowledge that your view isn’t always true or when you provide multiple views of a situation, you build an image of a careful, unbiased thinker, rather than of someone blindly pushing for a single interpretation of the situation.
I too follow his principle in that I’m linked to my kids preservation, therefore if I die I won’t be present for them to continue my fatherly duties, but I would die for them if no options presented themselves. But I won’t be performing any uncalculated heroic acts of bravery for strangers, for my children’s sake.
I can't remember which conversation we were in but I recall someone (Joshua or Don) addressing the hypothetical of whether a young person would die to save the life of their 99 year old grandfather. Every situation is different and even there I would not suggest a uniform rule, but even with people we know it is plain (at least to me) that we would not always give up our lives even for people who are close to us, depending on the circumstances.
When you extend that reasoning the idea of dying for "humanity at large" when you might have a chance to save or alleviate the suffering of your child or spouse or someone close to you is pretty breathtakingly abstract and (at least for me) a non-starter on the gut-level scale of the way I think I would personally act. And I suspect that Epicurus would well understand that argument.
My gosh there are reasonable arguments that he said something about living alone, and away from the crowd, and not paying attention to their lack of understand. I seriously doubt he would entertain the idea that he ought to be willing to give up his life for any number of strangers when he could preserve those of his family and friends.
however my personal revulsion is not based necessarily on the fact that my own society considers these acts as unlawful nor because of an ad populum argument that because the majority of the world rejects them as wrong or unlawful, I do as well…my own internal instinct tell me it’s “wrong” based on my natural experiences and empathetic reaction.
This point made by Matt here strikes me as essentially the exact same argument made by, and extended in great detail, in Jackson Barwis' "Dialogues Concerning Innate Principles" (his response to John Locke on the blank slate theory). I continue to recommend that to anyone interested in developing the argument. Here he makes Matt's point in other words:
The innate principles of the soul, continued he, cannot, any more than those of the body, be propositions. They must be in us antecedently to all our reasonings about them, or they could never be in us at all: for we cannot, by reasoning, create any thing, the principles of which did not exist antecedently. We can, indeed, describe our innate sentiments and perceptions to each other; we can reason, and we can make propositions about them; but our reasonings neither are, nor can create in us, moral principles. They exist prior to, and independently of, all reasoning, and all propositions about them.
When we are told that benevolence is pleasing; that malevolence is painful; we are not convinced of these truths by reasoning, nor by forming them into propositions: but by an appeal to the innate internal affections of our souls: and if on such an appeal, we could not feel within the sentiment of benevolence, and the peculiar pleasure attending it; and that of malevolence and its concomitant pain, not all the reasoning in the world could ever make us sensible of them, or enable us to understand their nature.
Possibly that's one of my favorite quotes of all time, because it not only hits against Aristotle's blank slate, but it also in my view hits on the heart Epicurus' argument against improper logical reasoning:
"we are not convinced of these truths by reasoning, nor by forming them into propositions:"
In my view this is an exact echo of what DeLacy says in his book on Philodemus On Signs about Epicurus' critique of Aristotle's position:
I am thinking that this issue can be summarized as:
"We are not convinced of truth by forming it into logical propositions."
And that applies with special force in issues of ethics and morality.
If civilization ended and cannibalism became the only way to survive, I can imagine that an Epicurean would sacrifice themselves or give themselves up for another's food because at that point "the party is over" meaning that a joyful life wouldn't be possible anymore, and it would also be chosen since "death is nothing to us".
I agree with that, but with the critical caveat that the issue would not turn so much on "civilization" but on those who are our family and "friends" (which would be an interesting issue to tackle as to who fits that). In other words there are people whose existence are critical to us, and people who we have essentially no relationship to, so it would be important to make that distinction. But in the sense of "the world of living human beings" for example if the entire earth were being destroyed by a meteor there wouldn't be much to argue about 
Article from Academia.com Probably lots of good research in it that will be helpful on this topic, but I haven't read it - only long enough to word search "DeWitt" and find no hits
Here's the final paragraph:
Thus, Lucretius’ account of APT and simulacra supports the following view: all sensations (dreams
and hallucinations included) are truth-conducive (TCR), and their object is typically distal. Illusion
about distal objects is never stricto sensu perceptual but depends on the informational integration by
our doxastic activity; only in hallucinations and dreams is the object not a solid but the very floating
simulacra (distal view plus disjunctivism), but this does not undermine truth-conduciveness, because
the difference between solid and non-solid objects is phenomenologically appreciable, except when
dreaming. However, even in this last circumstance it is not the case that dreamed contents are not
truth-conducive, as it is their very truth-conduciveness that cannot be appreciated due to the inactivity
of senses, so APT is safe and consistently grounds an objectivist epistemology.
So you may want to read the article, or else read Chapter 8 in DeWitt as to the multiple meanings of "true" and consider which is more clear and useful.
While Epicurus was adamant in his determination to defend the validity of the sensations as being the means of direct contact between man and reality and as possessing precedence over reason, he exhibits no desire to defend the individual sensation. The fallacies of those who impute to him belief in the infallibility of sensation lie partly in their failure to observe the ambiguity of the word true and in their confusion of ~'truth" with "value."
It is not difficult to differentiate the various meanings of true and it is essential to right understanding. For example, when Epicurus declared that "the phantasms seen by the insane and in dreams are true," he meant that they were "real" and existed independently of the madman or the dreamer, because "they act as a stimulus and that which does not exist does not deliver a stimulus." 13 These phantasms, however, are not "true" in the sense that a sensation experienced by the waking observer is true. The dreamer may have a vision of a centaur but no centaurs exist in real life. If the waking man sees an ox, then the sensation is true because the stimulus is delivered by a living ox.
A still different meaning of true may be discerned when Epicurus denominates his system as "true philosophy." He means it is true in the sense that his Twelve Elementary Principles are true or in the sense that the modern scientist believes the accepted calculation of the speed of light to be true. This may be called absolute truth, if there is such a thing.
It remains to speak of the relatively true. The views of a tower at various distances may be cited as examples. Each is true relative to the distance; its value as evidence of the facts is another mauer. This distinction was no novelty to the ancients; Sextus Empiricus sets it forth at some length in a discussion of Epicureanism.
Also worthy of mention is the sensation which is optically true but false to the facts. An example much brandished by the skeptics was the bent image of the oar immersed in the water. 15 Epicurus made logical provision for this difficulty: "Of two sensations the one cannot refute the other,16 because we give attention to all sensations." This statement alone would acquit him of belief in the infallibility of sensation, because it is distinctly implied that some ~ensations are employed to correct others.
The example of the tower will serve as a transition from the topic of ambiguity to that of confusion. When modern scholars seize upon the saying "all sensations are true," which appears nowhere in the extant writings of Epicurus, and stretch it to mean that all sensations are reliable or trustworthy or "that the senses cannot be deceived," they are confusing the concept of truth with the concept of value. They overlook the fact that even a truthful witness may fall short of delivering the whole truth or may even give false evidence. The distant view of the square tower is quite true relative to the distance but it fails to reveal the whole truth about the tower.
To assume that Epicurus was unaware of these plain truths. as one must if belief in the infallibility of sensation is imputed to him. is absurd. It is because he was aware that the value of sensations, apart from their truth, varied all the way from totality to zero, that he exhorted beginners "under all circumstances to watch the sensations and especially the immediate perceptions whether of the intellect or any of the criteria whatsoever."
Obviously. so far from thinking the sensations infallible. he was keenly aware of the possibility of error and drew sharp attention to the superior values of immediate sensations, When once these ambiguities and confusions have been discerned and eliminated, it is possible to state the teaching of Epicurus with some of that precision by which he set high store. In the meaning of the Canon, then, a sensation is an aistllesis. All such sensations may possess value; otherwise there would be no sense in saying. "We pay attention to all sensations." Their values. however. range all the way from totality to zero. The value is total only when the sensation is immediate.
Of course Zucca is written for a professional audience so I am sure they will enjoy the jargon employed in the paper.
I see that occasionally Elli is dropping in so it would probably be worth "tagging" her when you have a need for translation support. But I know she's extremely busy so we'll have to take that into account!
There's some discussion of definitions and the Epicurean aversion to them in Philodemus's On Anger.
Yes Cicero states something similar. I suspect we're going to find that that is an overbroad statement, and that Epicurus used definitions just like anyone else, just with explicit caveats as to their limitations.
It might be better to frame the discussion in terms of "good" vs "bad", or "healthy" vs "unhealthy".
And that reminds me of a significant section in DeWitt's book where he suggests that Epicurus viewed pleasure almost in terms of "food" or at least analogous to health vs disease.
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