Posts by Cassius

Quote from smoothiekiwi

If a friendship will produce more pain in the long run (although that seems difficult to achieve), then we should end it, or at least de-attach us.

Or conclude either that (1) it is not a friendship at all, or (2) our definition of friendship needs reworking.

Thank you Kalosyni and good catch as to "intrinsic value." I think we're on safe ground to assert that the only thing Epicurus would label as "intrisically desirable" (which I interpret as the meaning of "intrinsic value) is pleasure itself. Friendship might come close, depending on one's definition of it, but I think the way most people speak and understand the terms Friendship would generally be thought of as a tool for achieving pleasure, but not a pleasure itself.

That takes us toward definitional rabbit holes but I wonder if anything can be defined as "always" a pleasure other than pleasure itself.

Perhaps "joy" and "delight" and other words which are always associated with "pleasure," and maybe even "tranquility," but I would think that whatever we're discussing would have to be something that we "always" consider to be pleasurable. In that regard, "friendship" is probably tricky to classify.

What do others here think about that?

Credit to Joshua for this:

Post

RE: Epicurean Worldview, Personal Identity, and Creating Community

[…]

[…]

I might agree with the first part, but not as much with the second.

It's important to consider the whole proposition. Epicurus thought that the sun was;

1. Wholly material

2. In constant but not uniform motion

3. In a centerless cosmos

4. Governed by the same laws as things on Earth

5. Arose out of matter, and has a finite period of existence

5a. But its matter will recombine into other things

6. About as big as it seems.

Compare Aristotle's sun;

1. Made of aether, an element that didn't exist on…

Joshua

January 20, 2022 at 12:45 PM

Quote

His idea, that the Sun is as big as it seems (—> DeWitt), is very naive...

Quote

...even in the ancient world.

I might agree with the first part, but not as much with the second.

It's important to consider the whole proposition. Epicurus thought that the sun was;

1. Wholly material

2. In constant but not uniform motion

3. In a centerless cosmos

4. Governed by the same laws as things on Earth

5. Arose out of matter, and has a finite period of existence

5a. But its matter will recombine into other things

6. About as big as it seems.

Compare Aristotle's sun;

1. Made of aether, an element that didn't exist on earth

2. In constant and uniform motion (because aetherial)

2a. Set in motion by unmoved mover (god)

3. Orbiting a stationary earth that was the center of everything

4. Governed by different laws than Earth (the laws of the aether)

5. Exists in perpetuity (because aetherial)

6. Size uncertain (not mentioned, as far as I can tell)

______________________

In view of the above, I think Epicurus came out alright.

That's a great list and we need to refer to it every time the size of the sun issue comes up. I added it into the FAQ.

Quote from smoothiekiwi

His idea, that the Sun is as big as it seems (—> DeWitt), is very naive, even in the ancient world

He was clearly wrong, but I don't think that "naive" is warranted. He had very specific epistemological reasons for his view point based on observing objects at a distance here one earth, and he was also concerned about the use of mathematecs to allege that the sun and other stars are gods. Exploring that further belongs in another thread, but I wanted to make a note on this.

Also, as to Martin's post above, which I agree with, I think the big picture point on all of this is that Epicurus was using his physics as a foundation for his epistemology, such as is stated in the quote that's currently at the top of the website home page:

Quote

Moreover, unless the constitution of the world is thoroughly understood, we shall by no means be able to justify the verdicts of our senses. Further, our mental perceptions all arise from our sensations; and if these are all to be true, as the system of Epicurus proves to us, then only will cognition and perception become possible. ... [W]hen cognition and knowledge have been invalidated, every principle concerning the conduct of life and the performance of its business becomes invalidated. So from natural science we borrow courage to withstand the fear of death, and firmness to face superstitious dread, and tranquillity of mind, through the removal of ignorance concerning the mysteries of the world, and self-control, arising from the elucidation of the nature of the passions and their different classes....

And we can see that reflected in Diogenes Laertius:

Quote

We must begin with the first letter, but I will first speak briefly about the divisions of his philosophy. It is divided into three parts, the Canonicon (or Procedure), the Physics and the Ethics. The Canonicon gives the method of approach to the system, and is contained in the work called The Canon. The Physics contains all the investigation into nature, and is contained in the thirty-seven books On Nature and in an abridged form in the letters. The Ethics deals with choice and avoidance, and is contained in the books On Lives and the letters and the book on The End. The Epicureans usually group the Canonicon with the Physics and state that it deals with the criterion of truth and the fundamental principles and contains the elements of the system.

In the past I don't think I paid sufficient attention to that line, and I think from now on I am going to emphasize it as strongly as I can.

The purpose of the study of phyiscs is to be able to grasp the way the universe works well enough to understand how to make sense of anything. Unless you have a basic framework that establishes that knowledge is possible, you can't make any progress on anything else.

Epicurean physics isn't perfect from our point of view today, but it provided a basis for being able to have confidence in things right in front of us - things that are essential to happy living. I don't think anything in modern physics has come close to an effective challenge to that basic point of view, which is probably summarized in this statement of Diogenes of Oinoanda. He gets taken to task for attributing the wrong view to Aristotle rather than to others, but I am not going to be quick to just as wrong someone who presumably had access to much more of Aristotle's materials than we do. The point is to argue against those "who hold the same view... that nothing is scientifically knowable...."

Quote

Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.

Quote from Don

has led me to understand he was including a calm mind in his definition of what it means to lead a pleasureable life.

Yes, and the key world there is "including" -- which is different from what some modern commentators seem to allege when they convert Epicurean philosophy into "Tranquilism" - with calmness as the highest good of life.

Also, I should clarify that when I seemed to admit the possibility that someone might choose a life of contemplation as their highest good, I was trying only to make the theoretical point that there's no absolute single definition of how to experience pleasure as the highest good, so i suppose someone "might" want to devote themselves to a life of contemplation, if that somehow floats their boat. The bigger difficulty would be to succeed in sustaining that. i doubt that either of these would be very common, and they probably are not even possible to sustain for very long.

I have tried to pull together in that last post some of the key references to Epicurean canonics. I know that there are significant additional references in Sextus Empiricus and no doubt other places, so If someone has others to suggest please add them to the thread.

Depending on what size screen you are using, you may find that this link provides a more clear view of that outline of the major references: Epicurus College Course Material On Canonics

Key References for the Epicurean Canonics (Epistemology - The Basis of Knowledge):

1. This document in updated and easier to read form at the Epicurus College Course Materials
2. The EpicureanFriends forum on Canonics (Epistemology)
   
3. Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus (Much of Herodotus is devoted to images, and thus the way the sensations work. Impotant to this also is the issue of Qualities (Events, Accidents) and Properties
   1. [37] Wherefore since the method I have described is valuable to all those who are accustomed to the investigation of nature, I who urge upon others the constant occupation in the investigation of nature, and find my own peace chiefly in a life so occupied, have composed for you another epitome on these lines, summing up the first principles of the whole doctrine. First of all, Herodotus, we must grasp the ideas attached to words, in order that we may be able to refer to them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of investigation or reflection, so that we may not either leave everything uncertain and go on explaining to infinity or use words devoid of meaning.
   2. [38] For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference. And besides we must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate apprehensions whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgment, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, in order that we may have indications whereby we may judge both the problem of sense perception and the unseen.
   3. Images
      1. [46] Moreover, there are images like in shape to the solid bodies, far surpassing perceptible things in their subtlety of texture. For it is not impossible that such emanations should be formed in that which surrounds the objects, nor that there should be opportunities for the formation of such hollow and thin frames, nor that there should be effluences which preserve the respective position and order which they had before in the solid bodies: these images we call idols.
      2. [47] Next, nothing among perceptible things contradicts the belief that the images have unsurpassable fineness of texture. And for this reason they have also unsurpassable speed of motion, since the movement of all their atoms is uniform, and besides nothing or very few things hinder their emission by collisions, whereas a body composed of many or infinite atoms is at once hindered by collisions. [48] Besides this, nothing contradicts the belief that the creation of the idols takes place as quick as thought. For the flow of atoms from the surface of bodies is continuous, yet it cannot be detected by any lessening in the size of the object because of the constant filling up of what is lost. The flow of images preserves for a long time the position and order of the atoms in the solid body, though it is occasionally confused. Moreover, compound idols are quickly formed in the air around, because it is not necessary for their substance to be filled in deep inside: and besides there are certain other methods in which existences of this sort are produced. For not one of these beliefs is contradicted by our sensations, if one looks to see in what way sensation will bring us the clear visions from external objects, and in what way again the corresponding sequences of qualities and movements.
      3. [49] Now we must suppose too that it is when something enters us from external objects that we not only see but think of their shapes. For external objects could not make on us an impression of the nature of their own colour and shape by means of the air which lies between us and them, nor again by means of the rays or effluences of any sort which pass from us to them — nearly so well as if models, similar in color and shape, leave the objects and enter according to their respective size either into our sight or into our mind; moving along swiftly, and so by this means reproducing the image of a single continuous thing and preserving the corresponding sequence of qualities and movements from the original object as the result of their uniform contact with us, kept up by the vibration of the atoms deep in the interior of the concrete body.
      4. [50] And every image which we obtain by an act of apprehension on the part of the mind or of the sense-organs, whether of shape or of properties, this image is the shape or the properties of the concrete object, and is produced by the constant repetition of the image or the impression it has left. Now falsehood and error always lie in the addition of opinion with regard to what is waiting to be confirmed or not contradicted, and then is not confirmed or is contradicted.
      5. [51] For the similarity between the things which exist, which we call real and the images received as a likeness of things and produced either in sleep or through some other acts of apprehension on the part of the mind or the other instruments of judgment, could never be, unless there were some effluences of this nature actually brought into contact with our senses. And error would not exist unless another kind of movement too were produced inside ourselves, closely linked to the apprehension of images, but differing from it; and it is owing to this, supposing it is not confirmed, or is contradicted, that falsehood arises; but if it is confirmed or not contradicted, it is true.
      6. [52] Therefore we must do our best to keep this doctrine in mind, in order that on the one hand the standards of judgment dependent on the clear visions may not be undermined, and on the other error may not be as firmly established as truth and so throw all into confusion. Moreover, hearing, too, results when a current is carried off from the object speaking or sounding or making a noise, or causing in any other way a sensation of hearing. Now this current is split up into particles, each like the whole, which at the same time preserve a correspondence of qualities with one another and a unity of character which stretches right back to the object which emitted the sound: this unity it is which in most cases produces comprehension in the recipient, or, if not, merely makes manifest the presence of the external object.
      7. [53] For without the transference from the object of some correspondence of qualities, comprehension of this nature could not result. We must not then suppose that the actual air is molded into shape by the voice which is emitted or by other similar sounds — for it will be very far from being so acted upon by it — but that the blow which takes place inside us, when we emit our voice, causes at once a squeezing out of certain particles, which produce a stream of breath, of such a character as to afford us the sensation of hearing. Furthermore, we must suppose that smell too, just like hearing, could never bring about any sensation, unless there were certain particles carried off from the object of suitable size to stir this sense-organ, some of them in a manner disorderly and alien to it, others in a regular manner and akin in nature.
      8. [54] Moreover, we must suppose that the atoms do not possess any of the qualities belonging to perceptible things, except shape, weight, and size, and all that necessarily goes with shape. For every quality changes; but the atoms do not change at all, since there must needs be something which remains solid and indissoluble at the dissolution of compounds, which can cause changes; not changes into the nonexistent or from the non-existent, but changes effected by the shifting of position of some particles, and by the addition or departure of others. For this reason it is essential that the bodies which shift their position should be imperishable and should not possess the nature of what changes, but parts and configuration of their own. For thus much must needs remain constant.
      9. [55] For even in things perceptible to us which change their shape by the withdrawal of matter it is seen that shape remains to them, whereas the qualities do not remain in the changing object, in the way in which shape is left behind, but are lost from the entire body. Now these particles which are left behind are sufficient to cause the differences in compound bodies, since it is essential that some things should be left behind and not be destroyed into the non-existent. Moreover, we must not either suppose that every size exists among the atoms, in order that the evidence of phenomena may not contradict us, but we must suppose that there are some variations of size. For if this be the case, we can give a better account of what occurs in our feelings and sensations.
      10. [56] But the existence of atoms of every size is not required to explain the differences of qualities in things, and at the same time some atoms would be bound to come within our ken and be visible; but this is never seen to be the case, nor is it possible to imagine how an atom could become visible.
4. Lucretius' Discussion of Qualities (Events. Accidents) and Properties - The reference to the Trojan War In Book One:
   1. [449] For all things that have a name, you will find either properties linked to these two things or you will see them to be their accidents. That is a property which in no case can be sundered or separated without the fatal disunion of the thing, as is weight to rocks, heat to fire, moisture to water, touch to all bodies, intangibility to the void. On the other hand, slavery, poverty, riches, liberty, war, concord, and other things by whose coming and going the nature of things abides untouched, these we are used, as is natural, to call accidents. Even so time exists not by itself, but from actual things comes a feeling, what was brought to a close in time past, then what is present now, and further what is going to be hereafter. And it must be avowed that no man feels time by itself apart from the motion or quiet rest of things. [464] Then again, when men say that ‘the rape of Tyndarus’s daughter’, or ‘the vanquishing of the Trojan tribes in war’ are things, beware that they do not perchance constrain us to avow that these things exist in themselves, just because the past ages have carried off beyond recall those races of men, of whom, in truth, these were the accidents. For firstly, we might well say that whatsoever has happened is an accident in one case of the countries, in another even of the regions of space. Or again, if there had been no substance of things nor place and space, in which all things are carried on, never would the flame of love have been fired by the beauty of Tyndaris, nor swelling deep in the Phrygian heart of Alexander have kindled the burning battles of savage war, nor unknown of the Trojans would the timber horse have set Pergama aflame at dead of night, when the sons of the Greeks issued from its womb. So that you may see clearly that all events from first to last do not exist, and are not by themselves like body, nor can they be spoken of in the same way as the being of the void, but rather so that you might justly call them the accidents of body and place, in which they are carried on, one and all.
5. Lucretius' Discussion of Images, Illusions, and Confidence in the Senses (Links to Bailey Edition)
   1. Opening of Book IV
   2. Discussion of Images
      
   3. The Illusions  of Mirrors
      
   4. Brightness and Shadows
   5. The Illusion of Square Towers Appearing Round
      
   6. The Illusions of Ships
      
   7. Other Illusions
      
   8. The Fallacy of Thinking that Nothing Is Knowable
      
   9. Reason Is Dependent On The Senses
      1. [462] Wondrously many other things of this sort we see, all of which would fain spoil our trust in the senses; all in vain, since the greatest part of these things deceives us on account of the opinions of the mind, which we add ourselves, so that things not seen by the senses are counted as seen. For nothing is harder than to distinguish things manifest from things uncertain, which the mind straightway adds of itself.
      2. [469] Again, if any one thinks that nothing is known, he knows not whether that can be known either, since he admits that he knows nothing. Against him then I will refrain from joining issue, who plants himself with his head in the place of his feet. And yet were I to grant that he knows this too, yet I would ask this one question; since he has never before seen any truth in things, whence does he know what is knowing, and not knowing each in turn, what thing has begotten the concept of the true and the false, what thing has proved that the doubtful differs from the certain?
      3. [478] You will find that the concept of the true is begotten first from the senses, and that the senses cannot be gainsaid. For something must be found with a greater surety, which can of its own authority refute the false by the true. Next then, what must be held to be of greater surety than sense? Will reason, sprung from false sensation, avail to speak against the senses, when it is wholly sprung from the senses? For unless they are true, all reason too becomes false. Or will the ears be able to pass judgement on the eyes, or touch on the ears? or again will the taste in the mouth refute this touch; will the nostrils disprove it, or the eyes show it false? It is not so, I trow. For each sense has its faculty set apart, each its own power, and so it must needs be that we perceive in one way what is soft or cold or hot, and in another the diverse colours of things, and see all that goes along with colour. Likewise, the taste of the mouth has its power apart; in one way smells arise, in another sounds. And so it must needs be that one sense cannot prove another false. Nor again will they be able to pass judgement on themselves, since equal trust must at all times be placed in them. Therefore, whatever they have perceived on each occasion, is true.
      4. [500] And if reason is unable to unravel the cause, why those things which close at hand were square, are seen round from a distance, still it is better through lack of reasoning to be at fault in accounting for the causes of either shape, rather than to let things clear seen slip abroad from your grasp, and to assail the grounds of belief, and to pluck up the whole foundations on which life and existence rest. For not only would all reasoning fall away; life itself too would collapse straightway, unless you chose to trust the senses, and avoid headlong spots and all other things of this kind which must be shunned, and to make for what is opposite to these. Know, then, that all this is but an empty store of words, which has been drawn up and arrayed against the senses.
      5. [513] Again, just as in a building, if the first ruler is awry, and if the square is wrong and out of the straight lines, if the level sags a whit in any place, it must needs be that the whole structure will be made faulty and crooked, all awry, bulging, leaning forwards or backwards, and out of harmony, so that some parts seem already to long to fall, or do fall, all betrayed by the first wrong measurements; even so then your reasoning of things must be awry and false, which all springs from false senses.
6. Diogenes Laertius Section on Canonics (Bailey - Warning - Note that he uses 'concept' instead of 'preconception')
   1. [29] I will also give you the Principal Doctrines, and a selection from his sayings which seem most worthy of mention. You will thus be able to understand Epicurus from every point of view and could form a judgment on him. The first letter he writes to Herodotus (and it deals with Physics; the second is to Pythocles), and it deals with Celestial Phenomena; the third is to Menoeceus, and contains the moral teaching. We must begin with the first letter, but I will first speak briefly about the divisions of his philosophy.
   2. [30] It is divided into three parts, the Canonicon (or Procedure), the Physics and the Ethics. The Canonicon gives the method of approach to the system, and is contained in the work called The Canon. The Physics contains all the investigation into nature, and is contained in the thirty-seven books On Nature and in an abridged form in the letters. The Ethics deals with choice and avoidance, and is contained in the books On Lives and the letters and the book on The End. The Epicureans usually group the Canonicon with the Physics and state that it deals with the criterion of truth and the fundamental principles and contains the elements of the system. The Physics deals with creation and dissolution and with nature; the Ethics with things to be chosen or avoided, with the conduct of life and its purpose.
   3. [31] Logic they reject as misleading. For they say it is sufficient for physicists to be guided by what things say of themselves. Thus in The Canon Epicurus says that the tests of truth are the sensations and concepts and the feelings; the Epicureans add to these the intuitive apprehensions of the mind. And this he says himself too in the summary addressed to Herodotus and in the Principal Doctrines. For, he says, all sensation is irrational and does not admit of memory; for it is not set in motion by itself, nor when it is set in motion by something else, can it add to it or take from it. [32] Nor is there anything which can refute the sensations. For a similar sensation cannot refute a similar because it is equivalent in validity, nor a dissimilar a dissimilar, for the objects of which they are the criteria are not the same; nor again can reason, for all reason is dependent upon sensations; nor can one sensation refute another, for we attend to them all alike. Again, the fact of apperception confirms the truth of the sensations. And seeing and hearing are as much facts as feeling pain. From this it follows that as regards the imperceptible we must draw inferences from phenomena. For all thoughts have their origin in sensations by means of coincidence and analogy and similarity and combination, reasoning too contributing something. And the visions of the insane and those in dreams are true, for they cause movement, and that which does not exist cannot cause movement.
   4. [33] The concept [preconception] they speak of as an apprehension or right opinion or thought or general idea stored within the mind, that is to say a recollection of what has often been presented from without, as for instance ‘Such and such a thing is a man,’ for the moment the word ‘man’ is spoken, immediately by means of the concept his form too is thought of, as the senses give us the information. Therefore the first signification of every name is immediate and clear evidence. And we could not look for the object of our search, unless we have first known it. For instance, we ask, ‘Is that standing yonder a horse or a cow?’ To do this we must know by means of a concept the shape of horse and of cow. Otherwise we could not have named them, unless we previously knew their appearance by means of a concept. So the concepts are clear and immediate evidence. Further, the decision of opinion depends on some previous clear and immediate evidence, to which we refer when we express it: for instance, ‘How do we know whether this is a man?’
   5. [34] Opinion they also call supposition, and say that it may be true or false: if it is confirmed or not contradicted, it is true ; if it is not confirmed or is contradicted, it is false. For this reason was introduced the notion of the problem awaiting confirmation: for example, waiting to come near the tower and see how it looks to the near view. The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined. Of investigations some concern actual things, others mere words. This is a brief summary of the division of their philosophy and their views on the criterion of truth.
7. Diogenes of Oinoanda On The Flux
   1. Fr. 5: [Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] natural science as unnecessary, being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science? After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find?
   2. 
      Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Six of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

At this point in our podcast we have completed our first line-by-line review of the poem, and we have turned to the presentation of Epicurean ethics found in Cicero's On Ends. Last week we spent most of the episode discussing several listener questions. Today we return to the Torquatus text and look more closely at this list of core Epicurean doctrines.

Now let's join Joshua (or Charles) reading today's text:

[63] It was indeed excellently said by Epicurus that fortune only in a small degree crosses the wise man’s path, and that his greatest and most important undertakings are executed in accordance with his own design and his own principles, and that no greater pleasure can be reaped from a life which is without end in time, than is reaped from this which we know to have its allotted end. He judged that the logic of your school possesses no efficacy either for the amelioration of life or for the facilitation of debate. He laid the greatest stress on natural science. That branch of knowledge enables us to realize clearly the force of words and the natural conditions of speech and the theory of consistent and contradictory expressions; and when we have learned the constitution of the universe we are relieved of superstition, are emancipated from the dread of death, are not agitated through ignorance of phenomena, from which ignorance, more than any thing else, terrible panics often arise; finally, our characters will also be improved when we have learned what it is that nature craves. Then again if we grasp a firm knowledge of phenomena, and uphold that canon, which almost fell from heaven into human ken, that test to which we are to bring all our judgments concerning things, we shall never succumb to any man’s eloquence and abandon our opinions.

[64] Moreover, unless the constitution of the world is thoroughly understood, we shall by no means be able to justify the verdicts of our senses. Further, our mental perceptions all arise from our sensations; and if these are all to be true, as the system of Epicurus proves to us, then only will cognition and perception become possible. Now those who invalidate sensations and say that perception is altogether impossible, cannot even clear the way for this very argument of theirs when they have thrust the senses aside. Moreover, when cognition and knowledge have been invalidated, every principle concerning the conduct of life and the performance of its business becomes invalidated. So from natural science we borrow courage to withstand the fear of death, and rmness to face superstitious dread, and tranquillity of mind, through the removal of ignorance concerning the mysteries of the world, and self-control, arising from the elucidation of the nature of the passions and their different classes, and as I shewed just now, our leader again has established the canon and criterion of knowledge and thus has imparted to us a method for marking off falsehood

from truth.

I just listened to the finished episode and I was right that my bandwidth significantly impacted my own part of the show. I will work to improve that including a new mike I bought today.

Don makes good points about being precise, but I often fall into stating it the way you do SK. So this is one of the good things about the forum - we can learn to be precise while deciding exactly the point we want to make, because I think Don is very much with us that a life of total contemplation might or might not be hypothetically the one some of us would choose, but as with the Bliss machine hypotheticals, is not practical for most any of us.

There is an Epicurean saying about taking risks for friendships that has come to mind several times recently, but for which I have not located the cite. However I am confident it's there and I think it supports the position all of us are ultimately saying, that since we aren't Epicurean gods we are going to need to sometimes choose pain in order to experience much of the pleasure that is possible for us before we die.

Quote from smoothiekiwi

By the way, regarding idealism. I've catched myself admiring students who e.g. work on school stuff during their lunch time. Although I've many opposite arguments why my way of spending time is far better- I talk with people and have pleasure, I don't need to study during my free time in order to get good grades, I simply study during another time than them, etc.-, I still doubt if it'd better to pursue "fullfilling your potential" in an Aristotelian manner. Yet I also recognize that I'm far too young to judge it, because I simply can't see the implication of studying during your lunch time in the long run. What do you think on that?

Only one I have time to comment on now is this one: As usual with Aristotle I think he's sounding grand without being suspicous. What IS your potential? Just like "what IS happiness?" Aristotle evades giving an answer to those questions, or simply hints that you should follow virtue or what noble Athenians do. I think Epicurus might say that your "potential" is not being the best student you can be, but living a happy life based on what is pleasurable to you. Now study might in fact be pleasurable, in the way that Epicurus said he liked to pursue the study of nature. But if you're studying just to get the highest grades, or out of some duty or abstract goal that you can't really even identify, that seems very shortsighted to me.

Episode 105 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week we continue with Torquatus' summary of some of the Key Doctrines of Epicurus.

I am making good progress editing the podcast but before I forget let me issue this apology. When we recorded this past weekend we had a winter storm going, and it appears that the storm significantly impacted the bandwidth of my connection. The result is that my side of the recording has more interruptions and background noise than usual. It seems I also didn't hear Martin and Joshua speaking and I talked over them more than usual. I am going to edit to correct these issues as much as possible but thought I would make note that we're aware that the audio quality of this one may be a little subpar. Skype generally works well for this purpose but when it tries to compensate for bad connections the audio quality suffers.

Yes, welcome again, and thanks for letting us know how you found the forum. I think we're gradually making progress toward being easier to find.

My gosh if three of your four brothers committed suicide I can't imagine that didn't hang like a sword of doom over every minute of his life, and that would have had an effect on anyone.

Thank you for joining us tonight Scott and I enjoyed it too. I am getting used to zoom and we will definitely continue this for anyone who has the time to join us.

Ha! What a quote. I have heard his name but not much else. Presumably he was either religious or maybe more likely "Humanist" of the "good without God" variety? I am just speculating with out bothering to go to wikipedia....

I am thinking also that if I were to convene a meeting this weekend at some convention, I would have one of those large standup posters made with the quote that is currently on the top of the home page as a verbal summary of how things all fit together and what to expect in the discussion over time.

Quote

Moreover, unless the constitution of the world is thoroughly understood, we shall by no means be able to justify the verdicts of our senses. Further, our mental perceptions all arise from our sensations; and if these are all to be true, as the system of Epicurus proves to us, then only will cognition and perception become possible. ... [W]hen cognition and knowledge have been invalidated, every principle concerning the conduct of life and the performance of its business becomes invalidated. So from natural science we borrow courage to withstand the fear of death, and firmness to face superstitious dread, and tranquillity of mind, through the removal of ignorance concerning the mysteries of the world, and self-control, arising from the elucidation of the nature of the passions and their different classes...

I am thinking that Scott and Kalosyni and perhaps Martin (not sure) have indicated they can participate tonight so I will start a new conversation and send a link. If any others would like to attend please post here and I will get you the link.

thanks