Posts by Cassius

Well I totally missed seeing this - thanks Elli!

Welcome to Episode Ninety-Nine of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

At this point in our podcast we have completed our first line-by-line review of the poem, and we have turned to the presentation of Epicurean ethics found in Cicero's On Ends. Today we continue with that material and focus on "Justice" starting with line fifty.

Now let's join Charles reading today's text:

[51] But if there are any who seem to themselves to be sufficiently barricaded and fortified against all privity on the part of their fellow men, still they tremble before the privity of the gods, and imagine that the very cares by which their minds are devoured night and day are imposed upon them, with a view to their punishment, by the eternal gods. Again, from wicked acts what new influence can accrue tending to the diminution of annoyances, equal to that which tends to their increase, not only from consciousness of the actions themselves, but also from legal penalties and the hatred of the community? And yet some men exhibit no moderation in money-making, or office, or military command, or wantonness, or gluttony, or the remaining passions, which are not lessened but rather intensified by the trophies of wickedness, so that such persons seem fit to be repressed rather than to be taught their error.

[52] True reason beckons men of properly sound mind to pursue justice, fairness and honor; nor are acts of injustice advantageous to a man without eloquence or influence, who cannot easily succeed in what he attempts, nor maintain his success if he wins it, and large resources either of wealth or of talent suit better with a generous spirit, for those who exhibit this spirit attract to themselves goodwill and affection, which is very well calculated to ensure a peaceful life; and this is the truer in that men have no reason for sinning.

[53] For the passions which proceed from nature are easily satisfied without committing any wrong; while we must not succumb to those which are groundless, since they yearn for nothing worthy of our craving, and more loss is involved in the mere fact of wrong doing, than prot in the results which are produced by the wrong doing. So one would not be right in describing even justice as a thing to be wished for on its own account, but rather because it brings with it a very large amount of agreeableness. For to be the object of esteem and affection is agreeable just because it renders life safer and more replete with pleasures. Therefore we think that wickedness should be shunned, not alone on account of the disadvantages which fall to the lot of the wicked, but much rather because when it pervades a man’s soul it never permits him to breathe freely or to rest.

[54] But if the accolades passed even on the virtues themselves, over which the eloquence of all other philosophers especially runs riot, can find no vent unless it be referred to pleasure, and pleasure is the only thing which invites us to the pursuit of itself, and attracts us by reason of its own nature, then there can be no doubt that of all things good it is the supreme and ultimate good, and that a life of happiness means nothing else but a life attended by pleasure.

SUPPLEMENT:

Principal Doctrines and Vatican Sayings which are relevant to Justice.

PD06. Whatever you can provide yourself with to secure protection from men is a natural good.

PD07. Some men wished to become famous and conspicuous, thinking that they would thus win for themselves safety from other men. Wherefore if the life of such men is safe, they have obtained the good which nature craves; but if it is not safe, they do not possess that for which they strove at first by the instinct of nature.

PD08. No pleasure is a bad thing in itself; but the means which produce some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures.

PD10. If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky, and death, and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires (and of pains), we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full, with pleasures from every source, and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life.

PD31. The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage, to restrain men from harming one another, and save them from being harmed.

PD32. For all living things which have not been able to make compacts not to harm one another, or be harmed, nothing ever is either just or unjust; and likewise, too, for all tribes of men which have been unable, or unwilling, to make compacts not to harm or be harmed.

PD33. Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed. [see note below]

PD34. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which attaches to the apprehension of being unable to escape those appointed to punish such actions.

PD35. It is not possible for one who acts in secret contravention of the terms of the compact not to harm or be harmed to be confident that he will escape detection, even if, at present, he escapes a thousand times. For up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape.

PD36. In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all.

PD37. Among actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved, on examination, to be of advantage, in the requirements of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man makes a law, and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice. And even if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is nonetheless just for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts.

PD38. Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just have been shown not to accord with the general concept, in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, they were just at the time, when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer of advantage.

PD39. The man who has best ordered the element of disquiet arising from external circumstances has made those things that he could akin to himself, and the rest at least not alien; but with all to which he could not do even this, he has refrained from mixing, and has expelled from his life all which it was of advantage to treat thus.

PD40. As many as possess the power to procure complete immunity from their neighbors, these also live most pleasantly with one another, since they have the most certain pledge of security, and, after they have enjoyed the fullest intimacy, they do not lament the previous departure of a dead friend, as though he were to be pitied.

VS07. It is hard for an evil-doer to escape detection, but to be confident that he will continue to escape detection indefinitely is impossible.

VS12. The just man is most free from disturbance, while the unjust is full of the utmost disturbance.

VS13. Among the things held to be just by law, whatever is proved to be of advantage in men’s dealings has the stamp of justice, whether or not it be the same for all; but if a man makes a law and it does not prove to be mutually advantageous, then this is no longer just. And if what is mutually advantageous varies, and only for a time corresponds to our concept of justice, nevertheless for that time it is just, for those who do not trouble themselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts.

VS43. The love of money, if unjustly gained, is impious, and, if justly gained, is shameful; for it is unseemly to be parsimonious, even with justice on one’s side.

VS62. Now if parents are justly angry with their children, it is certainly useless to fight against it, and not to ask for pardon; but if their anger is unjust and irrational, it is quite ridiculous to add fuel to their irrational passion by nursing one’s own indignation, and not to attempt to turn aside their wrath in other ways by gentleness.

Another citation in the body of the podcast is to this quote from Cicero's "Republic" - in which he is stating the standard Platonic/Aristotelian view of justice, to which Epicurus objected:

Quote

True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrong-doing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to to sic alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment.

I'll look for an exact cite and link so this can be read in context.

Here is an article that discusses the issue: https://www.academia.edu/43419632/3_Sto…as_Right_Reason

Quote

In De Re Publica [On the Commonwealth] 3.33, on behalf of the Stoic Laelius, Cicero left for posterity an unsurpassed definition of natural law:

True law (lex) is Right Reason (recta ratio) in agreement with nature (naturae congruens); … it summons to duty by its command, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. … We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or by people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment.

Episode 98 of the Lucretius Today podcast is now available. In this episode, we tackle the fascinating subject of the Epicurean view of Justice. As always we invite your comments and questions, and we will try to incorporate them in future episodes.

Continuing to edit the podcast I see that I made reference to this quote from Thomas Jefferson in reference to justice as viewed by regular people as against experts:

– Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr, August 10, 1787

“He who made us would have been a pitiful bungler if he had made the rules of our moral conduct a matter of science. For one man of science, there are thousands who are not. What would have become of them? Man was destined for society. His morality, therefore, was to be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong, merely relative to this. This sense is as much a part of his Nature, as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation of morality, and not the [beautiful], truth, &c., as fanciful writers have imagined. The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is given them in a greater or less degree. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body. This sense is submitted, indeed, in some degree, to the guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this: even a less one than what we call common sense. State a moral case to a plowman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, & often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules.”

Quote from Kalosyni

I found a translation that is different than one you have here on the forum.

If I recall correctly the one here is Bailey. I am not sure which one (or more than one) is posted at Epicurus.net.

I had to choose between thumbs up and laugh so I choose laugh, but both apply!

I think a lot of the points in this article are relevant to conversations we have had with Don in the past, so notwithstanding his podcasting sabbatical I am looking forward to his comments on Striker's article!

And the article concludes with a very good taking-apart of the Pyrrhonist view that happiness IS tranquility. It's impossible for me to read very much about Pyrrho without seeing him as absurd and a good example of what not to believe and to do, and that's a very good end to the article.

This is one of the best articles I have read in a long time! Thank you again Kalosyni!

Martin - I think if I were looking to nominate someone for "Foremost Living German Scholar on Epicurus" I would have to put Gisela Striker's name near the top of the list. Can you think of anyone better?

Might be fun sometime to think about listing them by nationalities. I would put David Sedley at or near the top of the Englishmen, and I would list Boris Nikolsky as important in Russian, but I am not sure as to French or American or others.

I agree with Gisela Striker there too. No matter how much lipstick you put on a pig, a pig is still a pig. "Ataraxia" is (like aponia) a negative term, and would In my view never be used by Epicurus as the primary way to express and convey the ultimate goal of life.

A negative term suits very well to explain why Plato and Aristotle are wrong in saying that pleasure cannot be the highest good, but a negative term is never going to take the place of hedone, or other words like euthymia, as the positive way Epicurus would articulate the guide and goal of life.

Call it a matter of style, or tone, or a 'sense of life' issue, but if there is a "Stoic personality" and an "Epicurean personality" (and I would say there probably is) then I would say that the Epicurean personality is going to find much more pleasure and affinity in the "positive" rather than the "negative." Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius just ooze with sourness and negativity and darkness and defeat.

So in post number 18 above, when Kalosyni writes:

There is this important clarification of 'the happy person will be unperturbed":

I agree with this too, but due to the damnable Stoic/religious influences that are so widespread today, I think in most contexts when you can make the statement underlined in red you should go further and clarify that Epicurus did not think you reach that state through mind games (like the Stoics) but through the aggressive and vigorous study of nature and the taking of all actions that are possible to create and maintain your state of pleasurable living in the real world.

As Joshua said in the current podcast, or as Raymond Massey character says at the end of the "Things to Come" scene, the work of getting your life in order philosophically is not the end of the process, but only the beginning. Yes philosophy itself is pleasurable, but once you have your philosophical life in order you aren't finished, you're only beginning. Then and only then are you prepared and equipped to go out into the world and do what needs to be done to obtain and secure your pleasant life.

And the Stoic task was not only more "ambitious" but also unnatural, foolish, and impossible - and the list of negative adjectives could go on and on.

OMG YES this is so true from my point of view too! --->

To repeat - I would contend that In the minds of many modern writers (many, not all), THAT is the reason they push "tranquility" and seek to ignore "pleasure" by redefining it as "absence of pain" - because they want to ELIMINATE pleasure from the entire discussion!

...Which means that every emphasis on tranquility and similar concepts should be rigorously and vigorously scrutinized to determine whether the writer is in fact explaining an aspect of pleasure as taught by Epicurus, or is seeking to overturn and rewrite the entire system of Epicurus to conform to Stoic principles.

And outside of Epicureanfriends.com and other contexts and writers who explicitly make this point early and often (like this Striker article), I would say that a large segment of modern "Epicurean" commentary in fact undermines and would destroy what Epicurus in fact taught.

I agree with this fundamental point too:

Couple of comments on that article. First: i wish she had included a cite on where to find this in Aristotle, but I think this true and a crucial observation for Epicureans to understand about the prevailing view that Epicurus faced:

That is why I argue that PD3, and all Epicurean discussion of "absence of pain" as constituting the highest state of pleasure, is really aimed at establishing pleasure as the highest good, not at making the point that modernists allege (they allege that absence of pain is some uniquely desirable special kind of pleasure - a "fancy pleasure" as described in Elayne's article).

In truth, I would argue, PD3 and PD4 are like PD1 and PD2 - they are statements that establish something else and far more important than what may appear to be on the surface.

PD1, if accepted, makes it impossible to believe in the supernatural meddling gods of the majority view.

PD2, if accepted, makes it impossible to believe in life after death and in the threats and rewards of an afterlife of the majority view.

and PD3, if accepted, makes it impossible to accept the argument of Plato and Aristotle that "Pleasure" can not be the highest good.

Again, the point is this: that Plato and Aristotle and others had seemingly proved to the majority's satisfaction that pleasure alone cannot be considered to be the good. From their perspective pleasure has no "limit" - more of it is always better, so it fails to meet the test of "such that no added good could make it any better." Epicurus answers that and provides a proof of its error by pointing out that "the limit of the quantity of pleasure is the absence of pain." This produces the vessel analogy that a vessel (a human life, viewed as the maximum amount of pleasurable experience a single human can feel) can only be filled so far, and once a vessel is filled to the brim, it cannot be filled any further. Thus PD3 is in my view a backhand / roundabout way of saying what you would expect Epicurus to say: "Pleasure is the highest good."

But just as he chose to say "There are no supernatural gods" and "There is no life after death" in a roundabout way, to "inoculate" you against the reverse opinion, he said "Pleasure is the highest good" in a roundabout way, to inoculate you against accepting the specious arguments of Plato and Aristotle and the rest.

Yes that is indeed a promising looking article. Thank you Kalosyni!

Kalosyni yes you're right that language is a little over the top. The key issue would be more at the level of how to analyze the question of pursuing pleasures that come only at the cost of danger and how to compare that with an attitude of avoiding danger at all cost.

Unfortunately the loss of subtly arises from viewing just the final scene without the rest of the movie. In general the prior sections are probably consistent with much that most people here probably agree, in a generally nonpolitical sense, of having a general attitude of how "science" properly employed can help end war and bring all sorts of other beneficial results - but not without costs.

The British accent of the characters is kind of hard to understand at various places, but in general I am pretty comfortable recommending the film as setting up a lot of very important questions and implying an answer that is generally in an Epicurean direction -- but only through confronting this issue that sometimes great pleasures can come at great costs, and it's essential to think about how to make those difficult decisions.

Yep I agree there too for exactly the reason Joshua stated.

I don't want to always be in the mode of reacting, and reacting negatively, to Buddhism and Stoicism and the like as if they're the only thing that's worth talking about, but if we're realistic about the place that most general readers of Epicurus are in November of 2021, I think it's fair to say that most of them have been exposed to so much argument from that direction that they think it's a given that Epicurus was saying the same thing.

So i think that's where we have so much opportunity and can have a real impact - in showing how wrong that picture is.

I completely agree and this is a subject that needs lots of attention.

I think it's quite proper to refer to "laws of nature" and there's a lot of that in Epicurus/Lucretius if I recall correctly, but they were talking generally in terms of physics. They were also talking carefully about the issue of "properties" and "events" or "incidents" (I hate the word "accidents" as I think its connotations make it misleading in this context) and I think most modern discussions skip over that without realizing the important implications.

And then there's the biblical "slave of the weak and beggarly elements" reference which also is a point of connection where we can show how the Epicureans were directly translating their physics into implications for human life.

But I think you're exactly right. There is this long "laws of nature of of nature's god" that appears in even in Jefferson that is being used to establish the viewpoint that social / political conventions were themselves written by "Nature," and most of those implications I think go way too far.

This is a part of the subject of justice that really cries out for expansion to clarify where Epicurus was going.