And in fact my comment as to needing to know the "why" and the "how" is pretty much exactly the point made by Torquatus which is at the top of the home page now:
QuoteMoreover, unless the constitution of the world is thoroughly understood, we shall by no means be able to justify the verdicts of our senses. Further, our mental perceptions all arise from our sensations; and if these are all to be true, as the system of Epicurus proves to us, then only will cognition and perception become possible. ... [W]hen cognition and knowledge have been invalidated, every principle concerning the conduct of life and the performance of its business becomes invalidated. So from natural science we borrow courage to withstand the fear of death, and firmness to face superstitious dread, and tranquillity of mind, through the removal of ignorance concerning the mysteries of the world, and self-control, arising from the elucidation of the nature of the passions and their different classes....
If we can't "justify the verdict of our senses" then we can't be sure of anything - that's the "skepticism" problem that Buddhism jumps off the deep in by accepting as having no solution.
And without confidence in the verdicts of our senses only then is "cognition and perception" about anything possible.
And without cognition and knowledge, "every principle concerning the conduct of life and the performance of its business" is invalidated.
As Diogoenes of Oinoanda stated it, we accept that the flux exists, but not that it is so fast that we can't come to grips with it!
QuoteFr. 5
[Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] natural science as unnecessary, being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science? After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find?
Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.