Posts by Cassius

Here is a link to the Latin at Perseus:

[40] Extremum autem esse bonorum voluptatem ex hoc facillime perspici potest: Constituamus aliquem magnis, multis, perpetuis fruentem et animo et corpore voluptatibus nullo dolore nec impediente nec inpendente, quem tandem hoc statu praestabiliorem aut magis expetendum possimus dicere? inesse enim necesse est in eo, qui ita sit affectus, et firmitatem animi nec mortem nec dolorem timentis, quod mors sensu careat, dolor in longinquitate levis, in gravitate brevis soleat esse, ut eius magnitudinem celeritas, diuturnitatem allevatio consoletur.

[41] ad ea cum accedit, ut neque divinum numen horreat nec praeteritas voluptates effluere patiatur earumque assidua recordatione laetetur, quid est, quod huc possit, quod melius sit, accedere? Statue contra aliquem confectum tantis animi corporisque doloribus, quanti in hominem maximi cadere possunt, nulla spe proposita fore levius aliquando, nulla praeterea neque praesenti nec expectata voluptate, quid eo miserius dici aut fingi potest? quodsi vita doloribus referta maxime fugienda est, summum profecto malum est vivere cum dolore, cui sententiae consentaneum est ultimum esse bonorum cum voluptate vivere. nec enim habet nostra mens quicquam, ubi consistat tamquam in extremo, omnesque et metus et aegritudines ad dolorem referuntur, nec praeterea est res ulla, quae sua natura aut sollicitare possit aut angere.

[42] Praeterea et appetendi et refugiendi et omnino rerum gerendarum initia proficiscuntur aut a voluptate aut a dolore. quod cum ita sit, perspicuum est omnis rectas res atque laudabilis eo referri, ut cum voluptate vivatur. quoniam autem id est vel summum bonorum vel ultimum vel extremum—quod Graeci τέλος nominant—, quod ipsum nullam ad aliam rem, ad id autem res referuntur omnes, fatendum est summum esse bonum iucunde vivere.

With links to word definitions:

XII

[40] Extremum autem esse bonorum voluptatem ex hoc facillime perspici potest: Constituamus aliquem magnis, multis, perpetuis fruentem et animo et corpore voluptatibus nullo dolore nec impediente nec inpendente, quem tandem hoc statu praestabiliorem aut magis expetendum possimus¹ dicere? inesse enim necesse est in eo, qui ita sit affectus, et firmitatem animi nec mortem nec dolorem timentis, quod mors sensu careat, dolor in longinquitate levis,² in gravitate brevis soleat esse, ut eius magnitudinem celeritas, diuturnitatem allevatio consoletur.

[41] ad ea cum accedit, ut neque divinum numen horreat nec praeteritas voluptates effluere patiatur earumque assidua recordatione laetetur, quid est, quod huc possit, quod melius sit, accedere? Statue contra aliquem confectum tantis animi corporisque doloribus, quanti in hominem maximi¹ cadere possunt, nulla spe proposita fore levius aliquando,² nulla praeterea neque praesenti nec expectata voluptate, quid eo miserius dici aut fingi potest? quodsi vita doloribus referta maxime fugienda est, summum profecto malum est vivere cum dolore, cui sententiae consentaneum est ultimum esse bonorum cum voluptate vivere. nec enim habet nostra³ mens quicquam, ubi consistat tamquam in extremo, omnesque et metus et aegritudines ad dolorem referuntur, nec praeterea est res ulla, quae sua natura aut sollicitare possit aut angere.⁴

[42] Praeterea et appetendi et refugiendi et omnino rerum gerendarum [p. 19] initia proficiscuntur aut a voluptate aut a dolore. quod cum ita sit, perspicuum est omnis rectas res atque laudabilis eo referri, ut cum voluptate vivatur. quoniam autem id est vel summum bonorum¹ vel ultimum vel extremum²—quod Graeci τέλος nominant—, quod ipsum nullam ad aliam rem, ad id autem res referuntur³ omnes, fatendum est summum esse bonum iucunde vivere.

Current "best version" in our Core Texts section: Cicero's "Torquatus" Presentation of Epicurean Ethics - from "On Ends"

Of all the remaining texts, Torquatus' statement at XII - 40 of Book One of On Ends might be the most clear, direct, and practical statement of the Epicurean view of the "ultimate good" - and how to achieve it - that survives to us. Until now I don't think we have a thread focusing directly on this passage so this is to serve that purpose.

It seems to me that almost every phrase of this formulation is packed with meaning, and it is well worth going through the Latin in detail. I will look for that an post it too. This is the Rackham translation from Loeb. [Cicero, M.T. (45 BCE). On Ends. Translated by H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1914,1931.] One well-formatted internet presentation is here.

Raw English Text:

XII. The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement.

Suppose on the other hand a person crushed beneath the heaviest load of mental and of bodily anguish to which humanity is liable. Grant him no hope of ultimate relief in view also give him no pleasure either present or in prospect. Can one describe or imagine a more pitiable state? If then a life full of pain is the thing most to be avoided, it follows that to live in pain is the highest evil; and this position implies that a life of pleasure is the ultimate good. In fact the mind possesses nothing in itself upon which it can rest as final. Every fear, every sorrow can be traced back to pain; there is no other thing besides pain which is of its own nature capable of causing either anxiety or distress.

Pleasure and pain moreover supply the motives of desire and of avoidance, and the springs of conduct generally. This being so, it clearly follows that actions are right and praiseworthy only as being a means to the attainment of a life of pleasure. But that which is not itself a means to anything else, but to which all else is a means, is what the Greeks term the Telos, the highest, ultimate or final Good. It must therefore be admitted that the Chief Good is to live agreeably.

Alternate Versions:

1812 Version by S. Parker

1853 Version by Charles Duke Yonge

1883 Version by Reid (Google Books Download link)

Yes I think both Joshua and i not only have the Humphries text but also the Charlton Griffin reading available at Audible and Amazon. I actually listened to it read by Griffin before I bought the book, and listening to Griffin read it was my very first experience of "Hey this material actually makes sense!" Prior to that point there was something about the text that I just found unintelligible.

Now that I have something of an understanding of what the story is all about, I can pick up most any translation and appreciate the differences, but until that point i found the combination of all these archaic Roman references plus the unfamiliarity of the philosophy to be an unpassable barrier to reading more than a few paragraphs.

I was infected with the Ciceronian "What is this praise of pleasure?" nonsense and the response never clicked until I heard Charlton Griffin read it to me - like a child needs a book read by a father figure, I guess.

Note: Martin's post there is referring to a preliminary edit, so when a version is posted to this thread the parts he is suggesting be taken out will not appear. I also note that while I do remove particularly long strings of "ahs" in the editing process, I don't attempt to remove them all in Martin's case because I find them a positive part of his German accent that actually adds to the full effect rather than detracts. If anyone has suggestions on how I can improve editing of the final released versions of this or the podcast please post or feel free to private message me.

I particularly thank Joshua for keeping me honest in this episode when I mis-attributed the "emended" reference to Cicero himself rather than to Jerome, and I slandered Aristotle as calling him an oracle-monger.

That's why studying and talking together is so helpful!

Episode Ninety of Lucretius Today is now available. Special treat! Joshua joins us and does a special dramatic reading! But don't worry Don is not going anywhere!

OUTSTANDING - EXCELLENT - THANK YOU!

What's the reference to firefighters and pigs?

I thought I had read somewhere that part of the religious problem with pigs was due to their independent character and that they do not submit to higher rule. Here's the reference I think:

The operative text from Lactantius’ “Divine Institutes” was as follows:

Think what it means that the favored mascots of Epicurus are demeaned by the world’s religions, for reasons stated by Lanctantius: “The forbidding of the flesh of swine also has the same intention; for when God commanded them to abstain from this, He willed that this should be especially understood, that they should abstain from sins and impurities. For this animal is filthy and unclean, and never looks up to heaven, but prostrates itself to the earth with its whole body and face: it is always the slave of its appetite and food; nor during its life can it afford any other service, as the other animals do, which either afford a vehicle for riding, or aid in the cultivation of the fields, or draw waggons by their neck, or carry burthens on their back, or furnish a covering with their skins, or abound with a supply of milk, or keep watch for guarding our houses. Therefore He forbade them to use the flesh of the pig for food, that is, not to imitate the life of swine, which are nourished only for death; lest, by devoting themselves to their appetite and pleasures, they should be useless for working righteousness, and should be visited with death. Also that they should not immerse themselves in foul lusts, as the sow, which wallows in the mire; of that they do not serve earthly images, and thus defile themselves with mud: for they do bedaub themselves with mud who worship gods, that is, who worship mud and earth.” (From the “Divine Institutes“)

Quote from Philia

I myself am stuck on pleasure = food ... and hope to move beyond that.

That's funny but a good start!

I was looking for the Metrodorus quote for that but all I found was:

**Plutarch, _Against Colotes_, 2, p. 1108C:** ... those who keep shouting that the _good_ is to be found in the belly and that they would not give a copper coin with a hole in it for all the virtues in bulk apart from pleasure.

Episode Eighty-Nine of Lucretius Today is now available. Thanks to Martin for reading this week's text.

As I have said before I really like Rolfe Humphries' version. Seems he can be less literal, but he really seems "into" the meaning so his intuition seems reliable.

Here is a reply to this thread on Facebook I want to memorialize, posted by Aaron Smith (author of the article) on 9/21/21:

Rand would disagree that reifying abstractions (e.g., 'capitalism') is part of Objectivism. Her view is Aristotelian in that only entities exist; abstractions do not -- at least not in the Platonist sense. In the 2nd ed. of her book Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, there's a good discussion of the sense in which she thinks that concepts can and cannot be thought of as entities (it's the section called 'Concepts as Mental Existents' -- in my copy, it's pp. 153-158). There's also a good discussion of the problem of people (Objectivists and non-Objectivists) Platonizing abstractions in The Art of Non-Fiction (an edited book version of a series of lectures Rand gave informally in her living room); it's chapter 4, pp. 27-31. There *is* a sense in which a concept has an identity. But since a concept, on Rand's view, results of the way we integrate the material provided by the senses (which is neither automatic or unerring) -- the identity of a concept is man-made, so to speak, rather than an immutable metaphysically-given fact of nature. So I think you're right to criticize the Platonizing of abstractions, but not in ascribing that kind of approach to Rand -- though you may have met fans of her ideas doing that -- I certainly have. At any rate, the resource on these questions is her book Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd, ed. Hope that's of some help.

And here is my reply to that:

Aaron thank you very much for those cites. For just the reason I posted, I think someone studying this issue would be well served by considering Rand's statements as part of the mix. Given that this is complicated enough as it is, do you have a typo here in this sentence "But since a concept, on Rand's view, results of the way we integrate the material provided by the senses (which is neither automatic or unerring)"? "results of the way?" I'm not sure that "in" for "of" is more clear so if you could look at that I would appreciate it as I would like to keep this thread for future reference.

I think your comment I am quoting here below is an important point that I would not suggest is limited to the Rand world. The problem is endemic to Stoicism, given it's Platonic basis, but I think there is a lot of work that needs to be done within the community of Epicurean partisans to deal with this problem too: "the identity of a concept is man-made, so to speak, rather than an immutable metaphysically-given fact of nature. So I think you're right to criticize the Platonizing of abstractions, but not in ascribing that kind of approach to Rand -- though you may have met fans of her ideas doing that -- I certainly have."

I agree that is a good location to find some people who are on the same wavelength, and that comment looks great you drafted. Here's my preliminary diagosis for your comment "Part of me thinks it could go off the rails....."

This line of reasoning below is what we are seeing over and over. The vast majority of people want to be "happy" but at the same time they don't want to give up their view of "meaningfulness" (which they see as being living consistent with their personal view of "virtue).

And so not only are they not really following Epicurus' lead, but they implicitly denounce him directly, by alleging that setting happiness as the goal of life is a "recipe for disaster." No matter we look at the texts about "pleasure" or about "happiness" one or the other is clearly the goal that Epicurus sets out as the correct one.

It seems pretty clear to me that this is the old central question of "politics." People do in fact (and should have!) have their own ideas of what a meaningful life should be, because their views of the "should" question do in fact bring them happiness.

But what they can't easily accept is that other people may (and do! and should!) have different views of what makes them happy. So these people who are examining the issue decide that they can't admit that happiness itself is the goal, but that their own view of happiness must be the goal. They aren't identifying happiness as a feeling which everyone has in somewhat different ways

And part of the reason for that is that they insist on focusing on the higher-level concept of "happiness" rather than PLEASURE which is a feeling, and they deny that the core of happiness is feeling:

I haven't watch most of the video so I am sure there are other aspects to it that are relevant to this, but I suspect a lot of the way these videos focused on "how to be happy" depart from Epicurean principles is along these lines.

They are in fact falling for the old old issue of looking for "virtue" and they are denying the essential nature of happiness as being based on the feeling of pleasure. That leads them down the road to stoicism, but they can't embrace the core of stoicism either, so that look for some kind of hybrid that really strips the core meaning out of both. The end up much closer to stoicism than to Epicurus, because in the end Stoicism is just an elaborate manipulation game that seeks to persuade people that there's a god-based universe in which there's a single best way of life for everyone - and of course that single way just happens to be the one they approve of.

I wouldn't be surprised if there's not a lot more important material in this video so f people watch the whole thing please comment.

Quote from Don

"Pleasure is not a Four-Letter Word"

You're right - very good!

Welcome to Episode Ninety of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

For anyone who is not familiar with our podcast, please visit EpicureanFriends.com where you will find our goals and our ground rules. If you have any questions about those, please be sure to contact us at the forum for more information.

In this Episode 90 we will read approximately Latin lines 906-998 as we discuss the hot and cold springs and similar phenomena.

Today we have with us a guest panelist, Joshua, who is a regular member of the EpicureanFriends.com forum. Now let's join Joshua reading today's text.

Munro Notes-

906-916: to discuss now the magnet, a stone which has the power of attracting iron, and communicating this power to a series of pieces of iron.

917-920: but many points have to be cleared up, before we come to the actual question.

921-935: we have said already that particles are constantly streaming from all things, which affect in various ways all the senses.

936-958 let me repeat that all things in being are of rare and porous bodies, so that particles can and do pass through them in all directions : this is proved by the whole of nature.

959-978: again particles emitted from bodies act very differently on different things: fire hardens one thing, melts another; and so does water; what is pleasant to one creature is hateful to another.

979-997: once more, the pores of things differ, as well as the particles which things emit; so that by different kinds of pores the different senses receive each its own object : thus too one thing will pass through a metal, another through wood, and so on; and one thing will pass more quickly than another through the same pore or opening.

Browne 1743

[906] And now I shall begin to show by what power of nature it is that the stone (which the Greeks call a magnet, from the country that produces it, for it is found in the region of the Magnetes) has the virtue to attract iron. Men are amazed at the qualities of this stone, for it will make a chain of several little rings of iron, without a link between, to hang together entirely from itself. You may sometimes see five or more hanging straight down, and play in the gentle air, as they stick close and depend at the bottom one upon another; the ring that follows feels the attraction and power of the stone from that above it. So strongly is the virtue of the magnet communicated to the several rings; it acts with so great a force.

[917] In inquiries of this nature many things are to be first proved before we can fix upon the true cause; we must trace the subject through many long and intricate difficulties; and therefore I beg you will hear me with a willing mind, and with the closest attention.

[921] And first, certain seeds must necessarily flow, be sent out, and continually dispersed abroad, from all things whatever we see, which must strike upon the eye and affect the sight. From some bodies a train of smells are always flying off. So cold is emitted from the rivers; heat from the sun; a salt vapor from the water of the sea that eats through walls along the shore, and various sounds are always flying through the air. And as we walk upon the strand, a briny taste frequently offends our mouth, and when we see a bunch of wormwood bruised, the bitterness strikes upon the palate. So plain it is that something is continually flowing off from all bodies, and is scattered about. There is no intermission, the seeds never cease to flow, because the sense is continually affected, we still continue to feel, to see, to smell and hear.

[936] Now I shall repeat what I have proved at large in the first book of this poem, that no bodies are perfectly solid, for though it is proper to know this upon many accounts, yet it is of principal use in the subject I now offer to explain. In this place it is necessary to establish this truth, that there is nothing in Nature but body mixed with void. And first, in the deep caverns of the earth, the rocks above will sweat with moisture, and weep with flowing drops; and sweat will flow from all our bodies and through every pore. The beard will grow, and hairs spread over our members and our limbs. Nature divides our food through all the veins; it feeds and nourishes the extreme parts, our very nails. We find that cold and heat will pass through brass, will make their way through gold and silver. We know, by feeling the outside of a cup, whether the juice within be hot or cold. And lastly, sounds will pierce stone walls of houses, and so will smells, and cold, and heat. The force of fire, thrown from without, will pass through iron, and scorch the soldiers limbs, though armed about with coats of mail. And tempests, rising from the earth or skies, and sent from thence, will strike through every thing before them, for nothing in nature is without some void.

[959] Besides, all seeds that are thrown off from bodies are not the same in quality and shape, nor do therefore they equally agree to things they strike or act upon; for first the sun burns up and dries the earth, but thaws and melts the snows so deep upon the mountaintops. And wax will drop when placed before the fire, and brass will run, and gold dissolve by heat, but skin and flesh it shrinks and shrivels up. Water will harden steel made weak by fire, but softens skin and flesh made hard by heat. Leaves of wild olive please the bearded goats as if they flowed with juice of nectar or ambrosia, when nothing is more bitter than that leaf to us. The swine fly every strong perfume, and fear the smell of every ointment; 'tis the sharpest poison to the bristly race, but cheers our spirits with a sweet delight. And then, to roll in the mud is the most odious filthiness to us, to them a cleanly pleasure; they are never tired of wallowing in the mire.

[979] But before I enter fully upon the subject before us it is proper first to premise that, since there are many pores of little spaces in all compound bodies, it is necessary that these passages should be of different natures, and should vary severally in their size and figure, for all creatures are formed with different organs, every one of which has an object proper and peculiar to itself. Sounds, we perceive, make their passage one way, and taste another, and smell another, according to the different nature and texture of the things that strike the sense. One thing, we find, will make its way through stones, another through wood, another will pierce through gold, another through silver, and another will fly through glass. This the images flow through, through these the heat, and some seeds will sooner pierce through the same pores than others. This is owing to the different figures of these passages which vary wonderfully in shape, as we said before.

[998] These things therefore, being fully proved and laid down, and every thing made ready and easy for the grand inquiry, we shall easily discovery the reason, and open every cause that moves and invites the iron to the stone.

Munro 1886

[906] Next in order I will proceed to discuss by what law of nature it comes to pass that iron can be attracted by that stone which the Greeks call the Magnet from the name of its native place, because it has its origin within the bounds of the country of the Magnesians. This stone men wonder at; as it often produces a chain of rings hanging down from it. Thus you may see sometimes five and more suspended in succession and tossing about in the light airs, one always hanging down from one and attached to its lower side, and each in turn one from the other experiencing the binding power of the stone: with such a continued current its force flies through all.

[917] In things of this kind many points must be established before you can assign the true law of the thing in question, and it must be approached by a very circuitous road; wherefore all the more I call for an attentive ear and mind.

[921] In the first place from all things whatsoever which we see there must incessantly stream and be discharged and scattered abroad such bodies as strike the eyes and provoke vision. Smells too incessantly stream from certain things; as does cold from rivers, heat from the sun, spray from the waves of the sea that eats into walls near the shore. Various sounds too cease not to stream through the air. Then a moist salt flavor often comes into the mouth, when we are moving about beside the sea; and when we look on at the mixing of a decoction of wormwood, its bitterness affects us. In such a constant stream from all things the several qualities of things are carried and are transmitted in all directions round, and no delay, no respite in the flow is ever granted, since we constantly have feeling, and may at anytime see, smell and hear the sound of anything.

[936] And now I will state once again how rare a body all things have: a question made clear in the first part of my poem also: although the knowledge of this is of importance in regard to many things, above all in regard to this very question which I am coming to discuss, at the very outset it is necessary to establish that nothing comes under sense save body mixed with void. For instance in caves rocks overhead sweat with moisture and trickle down in oozing drops. Sweat too oozes out from our whole body; the beard grows, and hairs over all our limbs and frame. Food is distributed through all the veins, gives increase and nourishment to the very extremities and nails. We feel too cold and heat pass through brass, we feel them pass through gold and silver, when we hold full cups. Again voices fly through the stone partitions of houses; smell passes through and cold, and the heat of fire which is wont ay to pierce even the strength of iron, where the Gaulish cuirass girds the body round. And when a storm has gathered in earth and heaven, and when along with it the influence of disease makes its way in from without, they both withdraw respectively to heaven and earth and there work their wills, since there is nothing at all that is not of a rare texture of, body.

[959] Furthermore all bodies whatever which are discharged from things are not qualified to excite the same sensations nor are adapted for all things alike. The sun for instance bakes and dries up the earth, but thaws ice, and forces the snows piled up high on the high hills to melt away beneath his rays; wax again turns to liquid when placed within reach of his heat. Fire also melts brass and fuses gold, but shrivels up and draws together hides and flesh. The liquid of water after fire hardens steel, but softens hides and flesh hardened by heat. The wild olive delights the bearded she-goats as much as if the flavor it yielded were of ambrosia and steeped in nectar; but nothing that puts forth leaf is more bitter to man than this food. Again a swine eschews marjoram-oil and dreads all perfumes; for they are rank poison to bristly swine, though they are found at times to give us as it were fresh life. But on the other hand though mire is to us the nastiest filth, it is found to be so welcome to swine that they wallow in it all over with a craving not to be satisfied.

[979] There is still one point left which it seems proper to mention, before I come to speak of the matter in hand. Since many pores are assigned to various things, they must possess natures differing the one from the other and must have each its own nature, its own direction: thus there are in living creatures various senses, each of which takes into it in its own peculiar way its own special object; for we see that sounds pass into one thing, taste from different flavors into another thing, smells into another. Again one thing is seen to stream through stones and another thing to pass through woods, another through gold, and another still to go out through silver and brass; for form is seen to stream through this passage, heat through that, and one thing is seen to pass through by the same way more quickly than other things. The nature of the passages, you are to know, compels it so to be, varying in manifold wise, as we have shown a little above, owing to the unlike nature and textures of things.

[998] Therefore now that these points have all been established and arranged for us as premises ready to our hand, for what remains, the law will easily be explained out of them, and the whole cause be laid open which attracts the strength of iron.

Bailey 1921

[906] For what follows, I will essay to tell by what law of nature it comes to pass that iron can be attracted by the stone which the Greeks call the magnet, from the name of its native place, because it has its origin within the boundaries of its native country, the land of the Magnetes. At this stone men marvel; indeed, it often makes a chain of rings all hanging to itself. For sometimes you may see five or more in a hanging chain, and swaying in the light breezes, when one hangs on to the other, clinging to it beneath, and each from the next comes to feel the binding force of the stone: in such penetrating fashion does its force prevail.

[917] In things of this kind much must be made certain before you can give account of the thing itself, and you must approach by a circuit exceeding long: therefore all the more I ask for attentive ears and mind.

[921] First of all from all things, whatsoever we can see, it must needs be that there stream off, shot out and scattered abroad, bodies such as to strike the eyes and awake our vision. And from certain things scents stream off unceasingly; even as cold streams from rivers, heat from the sun, spray from the waves of the sea, which gnaws away the walls by the seashore. Nor do diverse sounds cease to ooze through the air. Again, moisture of a salt savour often comes into our mouth, when we walk by the sea, and on the other hand, when we behold wormwood being diluted and mixed, a bitter taste touches it. So surely from all things each several thing is carried off in a stream, and is sent abroad to every quarter on all sides, nor is any delay or respite granted in this flux, since we perceive unceasingly, and we are suffered always to descry and smell all things, and to hear them sound.

[936] Now I will tell “over again of how rarefied a body all things are; which is clearly shown in the beginning of my poem too. For verily, although it is of great matter to learn this for many things, it is above all necessary for this very thing, about which I am essaying to discourse, to make it sure that there is nothing perceptible except body mingled with void. First of all it comes to pass that in caves the upper rooks sweat with moisture and drip with trickling drops. Likewise sweat oozes out from all our body, the beard grows and hairs over all our limbs and members, food is spread abroad into all the veins, yea, it increases and nourishes even the extreme parts of the body, and the tiny nails. We feel cold likewise pass through bronze and warm heat, we feel it likewise pass through gold and through silver, when we hold full cups in our hands. Again voices fly through stone partitions in houses, smell penetrates and cold and the heat of fire, which is wont to pierce too through the strength of iron. Again, where the breastplate of the sky closes in the world all around \[the bodies of clouds and the seeds of storms enter in\], and with them the force of disease, when it finds its way in from without; and tempests, gathering from earth and heaven, hasten naturally to remote parts of heaven and earth; since there is nothing but has a rare texture of body.

[959] There is this besides, that not all bodies, which are thrown off severally from things, are endowed with the same effect of sense, nor suited in the same way to all things. First of all the sun bakes the ground and parches it, but ice it thaws and causes the snows piled high on the high mountains to melt beneath its rays. Again, wax becomes liquid when placed in the sun’s heat. Fire likewise makes bronze liquid and fuses gold, but skins and flesh it shrivels and draws all together. Moreover, the moisture of water hardens iron fresh from the fire, but skins and flesh it softens, when hardened in the heat. The wild olive as much delights the bearded she-goats, as though it breathed out a flavor steeped in ambrosia and real nectar; and yet for a man there is no leafy plant more bitter than this for food. Again, the pig shuns marjoram, and fears every kind of ointment; for to bristling pigs it is deadly poison, though to us it sometimes seems almost to give new life. But on the other hand, though to us mud is the foulest filth, this very thing is seen to be pleasant to pigs, so that they wallow all over in it and never have enough.

[979] This too remains, which it is clear should be said, before I start to speak of the thing itself. Since many pores are assigned to diverse things, they must needs be endowed with a nature differing from one another, and have each their own nature and passages. For verily there are diverse senses in living creatures, each of which in its own way takes in its own object within itself. For we see that sounds pass into one place and the taste from savours into another, and to another the scent of smells. Moreover, one thing is seen to pierce through rocks, another through wood, and another to pass through gold, and yet another to make its way out from silver and glass. For through the one vision is seen to stream, though the other heat to travel, and one thing is seen to force its way along the same path quicker than others. We may know that the nature of the passages causes this to come to pass, since it varies in many ways, as we have shown a little before on account of the unlike nature and texture of things.

[998] Wherefore, when all these things have been surely established and settled for us, laid down in advance and ready for use, for what remains, from them we shall easily give account, and the whole cause will be laid bare, which attracts the force of iron.

"All we really want in life is pleasure."

I don't think sentence rings Epicurean, and that's a tip-off. I think we (and Epicurus too) are all familiar with people who have convinced themselves that pain and hardship are to be pursued in themselves. From Torquatus in "On Ends" - " But I must explain to you how all this mistaken idea of reprobating pleasure and extolling pain arose."

"a life well lived even in the hardest of times"

I think that's actually a very good formulation - better than he probably realizes given the rest of his views of Epicurus. For me, I am convinced that Epicurus' fundamental starting point was exactly that - to compare the alternatives (theism, idealism) and determine which one is well lived in the sens of *true* (meaning consistent with reality and nature). That's how you end up realizing that Nature gives us only pleasure and pain as stop and go signals, and that's why you end up with pleasure as the goal - not because you're soft and indulgent and just want to hide in your hole and escape pain, but because your rigorously and vigorously clear-eyed about the reality of life.

* * *

You combine the text which Joshua quoted with the Stoic background both Don and Joshua cite and what do you come up with?

The nine-hundred ninety-ninth example that - if you are a writer grounded in England - you are seemingly of necessity going to be so "stoic" (small "s") that you would make Marcus Aurelius himself shake his head in embarrassment.

I don't really get that same vibe from David Sedley, so I have to question whether Sedley is really an Englishman. The situation is bad enough that it would make Epicurus himself doubt the existence of the swerve!

Martin after I finish editing this week's podcast I am going to turn to editing this presentation. I want to get it out as soon as possible but there's no deadline or schedule so we will take as much time as we need to get it right. Before we release it to the public at all I will post it for the participants to review first, and we will make sure that we get it into good form before going further.

We can even talk about doing another session to record over from scratch, but I think if we edit properly, and I insert some good caveat material as an introduction at the beginning, we can get something well worth using.

I know myself that I make mistakes all the time and we can't let the "perfect be the enemy of the good" or else we wouldn't be here today having come as far as we have. We'll explain any misstatements that we leave in, and we'll also emphasize that just like with postings on the board people have to be free to change their minds, learn new ways to state things, etc.

I just appreciate how much effort you've put into this already, and I am confident that by us all working through these issues - mistakes and all - the final conclusions and implications of this information will become much more clear.

Another point as to the significance of what we are talking about:

It seems to me that a good case can be made that Plato's entire form of argument is encompassed within this term of "dialectic." Epicurus was objecting not just to conclusions, but to the entire "logic-based" approach.

So for example we have Plato's Philebus, which is one of the primary Platonic dialogues arguing against the view that pleasure is the guide of life. We have dialectical exchanges such as this:

Quote

SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?

PHILEBUS: They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree.

SOCRATES: Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of good. But now — admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature of the infinite — in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and mind? And let us be careful, for I think that the danger will be very serious if we err on this point.

PHILEBUS: You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god.

SOCRATES: And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite goddess; but still I must beg you to answer the question.

SOCRATES: And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies but in every way fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source?

PROTARCHUS: Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source.

SOCRATES: Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and the cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving to our bodies souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, and operating in other ways to heal and organize, having too all the attributes of wisdom; — we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the self-same elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in great provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest things?

PROTARCHUS: Such a supposition is quite unreasonable.

SOCRATES: Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting the other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well as a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind?

PROTARCHUS: Most justly.

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So what I have argued before, and will still argue, is that an argument against Pleasure as the goal such as this needs to be approached on two levels:

(1) You can point out that these propositional classes that Plato is throwing around - here, (1)"those things that have a limit," and (2) "those things that do not have a limit" in that there can always be more or less of them - have to be tied to reality in order for them to have any significance to us. "Tying them to reality" means verifying them through the canonical faculties (senses, passions, anticipations). That's a general way that you can respond to any propositional reasoning, by diving into the definitions and questioning those.

(2) You can opt out of this entire line of reasoning by taking the position cited by Torquatus: "This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, pain the Chief Evil. This he sets out to prove as follows: Every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in it as the Chief Good, while it recoils from pain as the Chief Evil, and so far as possible avoids it. This it does as long as it remains unperverted, at the prompting of Nature's own unbiased and honest verdict. Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, be thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.) Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that Nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature. What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance?"

So arguably Epicurus is telling people not even to engage in propositional logic of the dialectical sort given its propensity to be confusing and easily tending toward manipulation in the hands of skillful people (like Plato).

But I don't think Epicurus relied solely on "don't do dialectical argument." Just like we did in Martin's presentation, it is readily possible - for those who are so inclined - to dig into the premises and point out that the propositions are not consistent with reality. You can then restructure the propositional formulas into forms which more accurately approximate reality. But even there you have to keep in mind that it will only be an approximation of reality, and no matter how strong your formulation may appear, it will never be universally applicable to all people at all places and at all times. The entire structure of propositional logic is itself limited in what it can do, and that always has to be kept in mind or you'll get seduced by the apparent power of the propositional forms.

(More or my cites on this issue are here: The Full Cup / Fullness of Pleasure Model )

I look forward to having my commentary picked apart and corrected so I can get it better myself, but that's the best I can do at the moment.

The reason I think this is so profoundly important is that it is the ultimate resting point for the assertion that there is no "right" and "wrong" in the abstract. And unless we are a direct descendant of Nietzsche that attitude is what we were taught by our parents no matter whether they were snake-handling bible-banging rightists or Marxist humanist leftists. Everyone wants to enshrine their perspective in some kind of transcendental justification, and it seems to me that Epicurus is the most aggressive opponent of every variant of that.

In Epicurus' time it was stoicism and platonism vs standard Greco-Roman religion and even eastern mysteries including Judaism.

In our time the labels have changed but the attempt to justify one size fits all rules continues with just as much force, and maybe more , as it is now backed with modern technology and. Instant communication that triples down on the peer pressure.

As I see it Epicurus is the only philosophy who offers a reasonable and even compelling worldview that stands in opposition to that transcendental - idealist attitude

Probably better to say that he is responding to formal arguments about why Epicurean reasoning is insufficient by pointing out that all methods of verifying the truth of arguments based on formal logic ultimately themselves trace back to the senses / canonical faculties.

That sentence I keep highlighting in Delacy I think is most illustrative: The non-Epicurean Greeks allege that nothing can be confidently considered to be true unless you can supposedly validate the assertion through propositional logic.

The flaw in that argument is, as we discussed, that the propositions have no inherent "necessary" connection to true reality, so that all attempts to verify any logical proposition ultimately depend upon the senses.

In addition, the question arises as to under what circumstances an EPICUREAN is justified in asserting the truth of any assertion that cannot be verified through the senses themselves (such as assertions about places you have never been before).

The opponents allege that propositional logic is the best way to make assertions about issues such as that.

Philodemus argues that sufficient confidence can be attained in assertions about things which have never been experienced based on principles of analogy, without the use of dialectical logic.

That's the reference by Diogenes Laertius this way, where he emphasizes "analogy, similarity, and combination" - means which are unrelated to propositional logic. If I recall Philodemus goes into a number of examples, or at least emphasizes this argument, as the proper response to reliance on propositional formal logic:

Logic they reject as misleading. For they say it is sufficient for physicists to be guided by what things say of themselves. Thus in The Canon Epicurus says that the tests of truth are the sensations and concepts [preconceptions / anticipations] and the feelings; the Epicureans add to these the intuitive apprehensions of the mind. And this he says himself too in the summary addressed to Herodotus and in the Principal Doctrines. For, he says, all sensation is irrational and does not admit of memory; for it is not set in motion by itself, nor when it is set in motion by something else, can it add to it or take from it. Nor is there anything which can refute the sensations. For a similar sensation cannot refute a similar because it is equivalent in validity, nor a dissimilar a dissimilar, for the objects of which they are the criteria are not the same; nor again can reason, for all reason is dependent upon sensations; nor can one sensation refute another, for we attend to them all alike. Again, the fact of apperception confirms the truth of the sensations. And seeing and hearing are as much facts as feeling pain. From this it follows that as regards the imperceptible we must draw inferences from phenomena. For all thoughts have their origin in sensations by means of coincidence and analogy and similarity and combination, reasoning too contributing something. And the visions of the insane and those in dreams are true, for they cause movement, and that which does not exist cannot cause movement.

(I gather that "apperception" is intended to refer to repeated perceptions, indicating that what confirms the truth of a single sensation is the repeated experience of the same perception under the same conditions.)

You get into issues here too that I think are related to Frances Wright. She ended up (wrongly I think) taking the position ultimately that NOTHING but observation is significant - that you should never develop any conclusions or theories based on those perceptions, you should just trace one perception after another so long as you remain interested. I think Philodemus is a good place where we see that that was not Epicurus' position: Epicurus was apparently very willing to embrace theories about things which cannot be perceived (such at atoms) despite accepting that he had never and will never perceive them. He avoids improper dogmatism by accepting that sometimes we have to "Wait" and sometimes we have to accept multiple possibilities without choosing between them. But I think the point that Philodemus shows is that Epicurus did not go Frances Wright's extreme.

What's left of "On Methods of Inference" seems designed to argue that Epicurean theory is that under proper conditions we can and should reach inferences (opinions as to what is true) about things which cannot be perceived directly.