Posts by Cassius

Yes indeed Joshua is right but I am thinking of he was off his game I am sure my wandering in the topic contributed to it. I will get it edited into something coherent as soon as possible but in the meantime Godfrey I do think that a "position on the role of logic" (rather than logic itself) does fall under the "canonical" heading.

I presume you're reading other recent threads like the one by Eric and my goal is that we come up with a presentation on these issues understandable enough for the average junior high age student.

The physics gets combined with the logic I think mainly because a theory of how the senses work (including "images") is tied to physics so that's the intersection point.

That intersection is probably also a key to our answer on how speculative logical assertions must necessarily be given a secondary role to that which we derive from things that are perceptible, but that's the link that needs further work to articulate. WHY is that the case? Why should speculation without evidence be seen as a waste of time or even harmful or at least viewed with suspicion?

These are questions addressed by Lucretius in book 4 so we have some answers, but we need to draw them out and highlight them with greater force.

Quote from Nate

With respect, I am proposing that these questions are incoherent. We're chasing ghosts.

The part of this conversation that I want to emphasize is that even though I think this ("chasing ghosts") is true in at least a figurative sense, I think these "ghosts" are very real in the sense that they inhabit (or "possess") probably 90% or more of the people in the world.

Of course a forum like this has multiple reasons for existence, and from at least one perspective we are talking to people who are highly educated and sympathetic with Epicurus' positions, so we can use shorthand to remind each other of particular traps or lines of thought that are dead ends.

But I think if we stop there (as we often do) we're missing one of the greatest hurdles in front of us, which - if we could get over it - would really open a new world of "Philosophy for the Millions" (DeWitt's term).

The "millions" out there are trapped every day by fallacies of reasoning which we ought to be able to do more to address. I am all in favor of us continuing to strain out ever bit of meaning we can about the "pleasure" discussions, and I'll continue to engage in that as always in the past.

But I just want to emphasize that the issues being discussed in this thread need to be addressed in a similar way -- we need more materials dedicated to explaining from the ground up (and yes to younger people too) how these questions arise and how they can be met and defeated.

There's a very unatrractive "logic game" side of this that is distasteful to deal with, but all of us want more "Epicurean Friends" in our daily local lives, and I think this "thinking" issue poses as much of an obstacle to that as anything regarding pleasure vs virtue.

So what I would say is that yes the arguments that Eric is suggesting are probably defective in a number of ways, but we need to be able to point to a well-developed explanation that addresses from the ground up how the different varieties of incorrect assumptions arise, and have to be defeated.

And that's a project we've hardly - if at all - begun.

We can and should address the individual questions like Eric is raising, but we've got to integrate them into a broader presentation so we can not only say "that's incorrect reasoning" but point to a clear explanation as to how that is so.

This is gonna take a lot of effort and won't be accomplished quickly but it has to be done.

Going back to the post that started this thread, it seems to me that even the most devoted proponent of whatever latest theory is out there in the scientific community ought to be experienced enough to see that over and over and over the "latest theory" gets turned to dust by something newer sooner or later.

If we accept that likelihood, then we either turn to Francis Wright style "forget the whole thing" compartmentalization (because she's still very firm on certain conclusions) or we take a broader position on "going with the best we have available to us" which recognizes that there is a balance between the latest science vs never letting "the latest science" trump the conclusions that are based on the three-legged canonical analysis.

It seems to me that's the direction that needs explanation and articulation but it's the direction that Epicurus was headed based on sound reasoning.

Quote from EricR

There are serious philosophical arguments involved in this, but they take us a long way from EP and what I think is its strength, a practical set of principles for achieving happiness in the world.

Eric the only thing that you have typed that I disagree with is the "they take us a long way from EP." And I say that because I think its strength IS a practical set of principles for achieving happiness, and I think also that Epicurus agreed with you that one of the tool sets that is necessary for the greatest happiness is the ability to deal with epistemological questions with dexterity.

What you're talking about here is pretty much what I see as the number one weakness of "modern" Epicureans - we're focusing too much on the broad ethical generalizations and not enough on the reasoning process that supports it.

I have been convinced for a long time, and am getting more convinced every day, that the looseness and ambiguity with which many people seem to interpret the ethical pronouncements derives from this failure to understand the metaphysical / epistemological approach that Epicurus was teaching.

In that sense "Modern Epicureanism" in many camps has become a lot like "Modern Stoicism": Divorce the philosophy from its physics and epistemology and you end up with a gooey (and ineffective) self-medication for pain that is 180 degrees away from what the founders of both schools were trying to accomplish. Both modern Stoics an modern Epicureans would be better off just checking themselves into a psychiatric or medical clinic if "freedom from pain" or "apathy" is all that they want from life.

That's why I think the best term for what we should doing here is "Classical Epicurean" philosophy - and one of the main things on the agenda needs to be to make more progress on the issues we're discussing in this thread.

Quote from EricR

I genuinely stumble over this point. Frankly, without solidly finding firm philosophical ground for asserting there is "nothing other than atoms and void" and being able to explain this, EP is in the same position as other systems of thought, and yes, religions. ie: a metaphysical belief system.

I completely agree. I think the footing is essentially there, but that's my personal opinion and as far as I know there is no one currently in the "Epicurean movement" who is articulating it sufficiently.

Yes I would say that us a fair conclusion.

But I think Epicurus was looking for greater precision in describing the problem and addressing it.

Part of it is no doubt " the canon of truth" in which had his three categories of tools by which to judge that which is perceptible.

But - anticipating and negating Frances Wright's "don't worry about it" position, I think it's clear that Epicurus thought we can develop some "rules of thought" by which to judge the imperceptible. He was clearly willing to take firm positions on things like infinite divisibility, and I think he was right that we can develop some pretty clear bright line rules along the line of -

1. The conclusions which we find to be confirmable by using the three legs of the canon of truth (both as to the perceptible and the imperceptible) are never to be considered overthrowable by opinions reached through reasoning which cannot be confirmed through the canon of truth.

2. The goal of life set by nature is to beings who live happily by following the lead of pleasure and pain, not to be beings who are professional speculators wasting time on questions which can never be answered and on activities which are not consistent with nature's goal.

No doubt we can do better than that to articulate the principle but I think that is the right direction.

You may not be one of them, and I grant that some aren't, but I truly believe that is a small minority of people, and under pressure, that number shrinks even more dramatically.

I think that Epicurus was attempting to deal with EXACTLY what you are raising here, and I think he thought that we could do very much better than had been done previously - and I would say since then too - to explain this issue and provide an answer to people of relatively normal intelligence.

Yes it does require some degree of brainpower and experience "to be able to figure the problem out" (a phrase in one of the PD's or fragments) but I think that's exactly what Epicurus was working on, and I frankly think that it constitutes probably the most important part of his project both then and now for us today.

Yes Epicurus was good with observations, and good with coming up with logical deductions, but this issue of "how to think" constitutes pretty much the ultimate challenge where religion beats (or nihilism) beats us back again and again.

We can do much better than we've done already to reconstruct Epicurus' work in this area.

Quote

I'll get our podcast from yesterday up as soon as I can while these issues are fresh in our minds, because I think we're talking about exactly the point introduced in Herodotus as:

[38] For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference. And besides we must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate apprehensions whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgment, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, in order that we may have indications whereby we may judge both the problem of sense perception and the unseen. Having made these points clear, we must now consider things imperceptible to the senses.

It's when we turn to "things imperceptible to the senses" that we need to observe his process of reasoning and use that to explain statements such as PD22-25. Right now we largely skip over them fairly superficially, but it's likely Epicurus thought they were key to unwinding exactly what we are asking.

PD22. We must consider both the real purpose, and all the evidence of direct perception, to which we always refer the conclusions of opinion; otherwise, all will be full of doubt and confusion.

PD23. If you fight against all sensations, you will have no standard by which to judge even those of them which you say are false.

PD24. If you reject any single sensation, and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion, as to the appearance awaiting confirmation, and that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will confound all other sensations, as well, with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgment. And if among the mental images created by your opinion you affirm both that which awaits confirmation, and that which does not, you will not escape error, since you will have preserved the whole cause of doubt in every judgment between what is right and what is wrong.

PD25. If on each occasion, instead of referring your actions to the end of nature, you turn to some other, nearer, standard, when you are making a choice or an avoidance, your actions will not be consistent with your principles.

Yes Eric you're now fully focusing on the epistemology issue, which is where we need to focus here and in your recent question about what keeps you from fully embracing Epicurean Philosophy.

If we can't answer which confidence a child's question such as "There COULD be pink ponies dancing on the other side of the moon, right Dad?"

...then we can't answer anything with confidence at all.

So we need to address questions such as:

1. "Under what circumstances, if any, do we admit as 'possibilities' things for which there is no evidence whatsoever of any kind?"
2. "Under what circumstances, if any, do we admit as 'possibilities' things for which the evidence that is asserted is through reasoning that is consistent within itself, but which cannot be validated through evidence perceptible to the senses?"
3. "Under what circumstances, if any, do we admit as 'possibilities' assertions about which we have no experience whatsoever, neither positive nor negative, either inferential or perceptible?"

We got into this issue to degree in our last podcast (not yet posted) but we didn't make much progress.

My suggested questions are amateurish and need a lot of polishing, but I am convinced that this is a direction we need to explore. The hints in the principal doctrines and in Philodemus (On Signs) and other places give us a starting point, but what's left to us is not articulated in way that most normal people in 2022 can grasp the direction.

One of the issues that came up in this podcast goes beyond some of our prior discussions of syllogisms and propositional logic.

This section of Epicurus makes the transition from discussing how we make decisions about things we can observe with our senses versus those things that are not perceptible to our senses.

We quickly discovered that it is not so easy to describe the reasoning that is involved.

Is it "deductive"? If so, what are examples?

Is it "inductive"? If so, what are examples?

Is it both? If so, what are examples and how do we distinguish?

Do we need either term "deductive" or "inductive"?

Is this related to references to "comparison" and "analogy" in Torquatus' narrative?

How is this related to Philodemus' work known variously as "On Signs" or "On Methods of Inference"?

These are issues that need to be readily articulable, and this episode will give us a chance to discuss this.

The edited session -

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Thirteen of Lucretius and Epicurus Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world, and to Epicurus, the founder of the Epicurean School.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

Today we continue our review of Epicurus' letter to Herodotus, and we introduce Epicurus' views on principles of clear thinking

Now let's join Martin reading today's text:

Bailey:

First of all, Herodotus, we must grasp the ideas attached to words, in order that we may be able to refer to them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of investigation or reflection, so that we may not either leave everything uncertain and go on explaining to infinity or use words devoid of meaning.

[38] For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference. And besides we must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate apprehensions whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgment, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, in order that we may have indications whereby we may judge both the problem of sense perception and the unseen.

Having made these points clear, we must now consider things imperceptible to the senses. First of all, that nothing is created out of that which does not exist: for if it were, everything would be created out of everything with no need of seeds.

[39] And again, if that which disappears were destroyed into that which did not exist, all things would have perished, since that into which they were dissolved would not exist. Furthermore, the universe always was such as it is now, and always will be the same. For there is nothing into which it changes: for outside the universe there is nothing which could come into it and bring about the change.

Moreover, the universe is bodies and space: for that bodies exist, sense itself witnesses in the experience of all men, and in accordance with the evidence of sense we must of necessity judge of the imperceptible by reasoning, as I have already said.

[40] And if there were not that which we term void and place and intangible existence, bodies would have nowhere to exist and nothing through which to move, as they are seen to move. And besides these two, nothing can even be thought of either by conception or on the analogy of things conceivable such as could be grasped as whole existences and not spoken of as the accidents or properties of such existences. Furthermore, among bodies some are compounds, and others those of which compounds are formed.

[41] And these latter are indivisible and unalterable (if, that is, all things are not to be destroyed into the non-existent, but something permanent is to remain behind at the dissolution of compounds): they are completely solid in nature, and can by no means be dissolved in any part. So it must needs be that the first beginnings are indivisible corporeal existences.

Moreover, the universe is boundless. For that which is bounded has an extreme point: and the extreme point is seen against something else. So that as it has no extreme point, it has no limit; and as it has no limit, it must be boundless and not bounded.

[42] Furthermore, the infinite is boundless both in the number of the bodies and in the extent of the void. For if on the one hand the void were boundless, and the bodies limited in number, the bodies could not stay anywhere, but would be carried about and scattered through the infinite void, not having other bodies to support them and keep them in place by means of collisions. But if, on the other hand, the void were limited, the infinite bodies would not have room wherein to take their place.

Besides this the indivisible and solid bodies, out of which too the compounds are created and into which they are dissolved, have an incomprehensible number of varieties in shape: for it is not possible that such great varieties of things should arise from the same atomic shapes, if they are limited in number. And so in each shape the atoms are quite infinite in number, but their differences of shape are not quite infinite, but only incomprehensible in number.

[43] And the atoms move continuously for all time, some of them falling straight down, others swerving, and others recoiling from their collisions. And of the latter, some are borne on, separating to a long distance from one another, while others again recoil and recoil, whenever they chance to be checked by the interlacing with others, or else shut in by atoms interlaced around them.

[44] For on the one hand the nature of the void which separates each atom by itself brings this about, as it is not able to afford resistance, and on the other hand the hardness which belongs to the atoms makes them recoil after collision to as great a distance as the interlacing permits separation after the collision. And these motions have no beginning, since the atoms and the void are the cause.

[45] These brief sayings, if all these points are borne in mind, afford a sufficient outline for our understanding of the nature of existing things.

HICKS

In the first place, Herodotus, you must understand what it is that words denote, in order that by reference to this we may be in a position to test opinions, inquiries, or problems, so that our proofs may not run on untested ad infinitum, nor the terms we use be empty of meaning.

[38] For the primary signification of every term employed must be clearly seen, and ought to need no proving; this being necessary, if we are to have something to which the point at issue or the problem or the opinion before us can be referred.

Next, we must by all means stick to our sensations, that is, simply to the present impressions whether of the mind or of any criterion whatever, and similarly to our actual feelings, in order that we may have the means of determining that which needs confirmation and that which is obscure.

When this is clearly understood, it is time to consider generally things which are obscure. To begin with, nothing comes into being out of what is non-existent. For in that case anything would have arisen out of anything, standing as it would in no need of its proper germs.

[39]And if that which disappears had been destroyed and become non-existent, everything would have perished, that into which the things were dissolved being non-existent. Moreover, the sum total of things was always such as it is now, and such it will ever remain. For there is nothing into which it can change. For outside the sum of things there is nothing which could enter into it and bring about the change.

Further this he says also in the Larger Epitome near the beginning and in his First Book "On Nature", the whole of being consists of bodies and space. For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known.

[40] And if there were no space (which we call also void and place and intangible nature), bodies would have nothing in which to be and through which to move, as they are plainly seen to move. Beyond bodies and space there is nothing which by mental apprehension or on its analogy we can conceive to exist. When we speak of bodies and space, both are regarded as wholes or separate things, not as the properties or accidents of separate things.

Again he repeats this in the First Book and in Books XIV. and XV. of the work "On Nature" and in the Larger Epitome, of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made.

[41] These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved. It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities.

Again, the sum of things is infinite. For what is finite has an extremity, and the extremity of anything is discerned only by comparison with something else. (Now the sum of things is not discerned by comparison with anything else: hence, since it has no extremity, it has no limit; and, since it has no limit, it must be unlimited or infinite.

[42] Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void. For if the void were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through the infinite void, not having any supports or counter-checks to send them back on their upward rebound. Again, if the void were finite, the infinity of bodies would not have anywhere to be.

Furthermore, the atoms, which have no void in them – out of which composite bodies arise and into which they are dissolved – vary indefinitely in their shapes; for so many varieties of things as we see could never have arisen out of a recurrence of a definite number of the same shapes. The like atoms of each shape are absolutely infinite; but the variety of shapes, though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite. For neither does the divisibility go on "ad infinitum," he says below; but he adds, since the qualities change, unless one is prepared to keep enlarging their magnitudes also simply "ad infinitum."

[43] The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity. Further, he says below, that the atoms move with equal speed, since the void makes way for the lightest and heaviest alike. Some of them rebound to a considerable distance from each other, while others merely oscillate in one place when they chance to have got entangled or to be enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.

[44] This is because each atom is separated from the rest by void, which is incapable of offering any resistance to the rebound; while it is the solidity of the atom which makes it rebound after a collision, however short the distance to which it rebounds, when it finds itself imprisoned in a mass of entangling atoms. Of all this there is no beginning, since both atoms and void exist from everlasting. He says below that atoms have no quality at all except shape, size, and weight. But that colour varies with the arrangement of the atoms he states in his "Twelve Rudiments"; further, that they are not of any and every size; at any rate no atom has ever been seen by our sense.

[45] The repetition at such length of all that we are now recalling to mind furnishes an adequate outline for our conception of the nature of things.

YONGE

"Next, we must by all means stick to our sensations, that is, simply to the present impressions whether of the mind or of any criterion whatever, and similarly to our actual feelings, in order that we may have the means of determining that which needs confirmation and that which is obscure. "When this is clearly understood, it is time to consider generally things which are obscure. To begin with, nothing comes into being out of what is non-existent. For in that case anything would have arisen out of anything, standing as it would in no need of its proper germs.

[39] And if that which disappears had been destroyed and become non-existent, everything would have perished, that into which the things were dissolved being non-existent. Moreover, the sum total of things was always such as it is now, and such it will ever remain. For there is nothing into which it can change. For outside the sum of things there is nothing which could enter into it and bring about the change. "Further [this he says also in the Larger Epitome near the beginning and in his First Book "On Nature"], the whole of being consists of bodies and space. For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known.

[40] And if there were no space (which we call also void and place and intangible nature), bodies would have nothing in which to be and through which to move, as they are plainly seen to move. Beyond bodies and space there is nothing which by mental apprehension or on its analogy we can conceive to exist. When we speak of bodies and space, both are regarded as wholes or separate things, not as the properties or accidents of separate things. "Again [he repeats this in the First Book and in Books XIV. and XV. of the work "On Nature" and in the Larger Epitome], of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made.

[41] These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved. It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities. "Again, the sum of things is infinite. For what is finite has an extremity, and the extremity of anything is discerned only by comparison with something else. (Now the sum of things is not discerned by comparison with anything else: hence, since it has no extremity, it has no limit; and, since it has no limit, it must be unlimited or infinite.

[42] Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void.

For if the void were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through the infinite void, not having any supports or counter-checks to send them back on their upward rebound. Again, if the void were finite, the infinity of bodies would not have anywhere to be. "Furthermore, the atoms, which have no void in them - out of which composite bodies arise and into which they are dissolved - vary indefinitely in their shapes; for so many varieties of things as we see could never have arisen out of a recurrence of a definite number of the same shapes. The like atoms of each shape are absolutely infinite; but the variety of shapes, though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite.

[For neither does the divisibility go on "ad infinitum," he says below; but he adds, since the qualities change, unless one is prepared to keep enlarging their magnitudes also simply "ad infinitum."]

[43] "The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity. [Further, he says below, that the atoms move with equal speed, since the void makes way for the lightest and heaviest alike.] Some of them rebound to a considerable distance from each other, while others merely oscillate in one place when they chance to have got entangled or to be enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.

[44] This is because each atom is separated from the rest by void, which is incapable of offering any resistance to the rebound; while it is the solidity of the atom which makes it rebound after a collision, however short the distance to which it rebounds, when it finds itself imprisoned in a mass of entangling atoms. Of all this there is no beginning, since both atoms and void exist from everlasting. [He says below that atoms have no quality at all except shape, size, and weight. But that colour varies with the arrangement of the atoms he states in his "Twelve Rudiments"; further, that they are not of any and every size; at any rate no atom has ever been seen by our sense.]

[45] The repetition at such length of all that we are now recalling to mind furnishes an adequate outline for our conception of the nature of things.

Some quite interesting responses!

Chaz Ajy:

We do know the world is made of atoms. The contemporary thing where everything is non existent or mind made is just sensationalism. Think about it: if atoms are imaginary, then why does IBM have to go through such pains to make their little movies where they use just individual atoms then (see "A Boy and His Atom")? Shouldn't they just be able to imagine the movie into existence? If atoms don't exist when a human eye isn't observing them, then why doesn't the cat in Schrodinger's box observe them? Since atoms are too small to see with the eye anyway, how could we say that they must be observed by consciousness to exist? If they don't exist when not observed, then why would they interact and then make a wave pattern when observed again? If they make a wave pattern, doesn't that mean that they exist as a wave when unobserved? In reality, all of the fantastical interpretations of quantum mechanics that seem to harm our concrete understanding of the world are just that: interpretations.

And most of them stem from the fact that some of the early interpreters were really into Hinduism's Advaita Vedanta, which is a form of subjective idealism. People like the idea that things aren't just atoms, and that we can control our reality with our minds. But, nope, atoms exist, even though they spread out when isolated and super cooled. And even then, they still follow rules that are not dependent on any observer. The macro world is made of atoms. This has been proven. One has to jump through hoops to get an atom into a wave state. See Rodney Brookes "Fields of Color" book for a full explanation of quantum field theory. Here is a quote, where Brookes answers the question, "What is the most widely accepted solution of Schrödinger’s cat thought experiment?": "The measurement problem is also solved by quantum collapse. There is no role of the observer. Quantum collapse happens whether or not someone is looking. In Schrödinger’s cat experiment, if the radiated quantum collapses into an atom in the Geiger counter, the cat dies. If it doesn’t, the cat lives.

…

Is that all there is to it? Did I give too little space to discussing these “profound” paradoxes? Well, that’s really all there is to it. In QFT everything is fields. They spread out, they collapse, and they do all this without requiring an observer. When I hear people complaining about the weirdness and inaccessibility of modern physics, I want to ask, “What part of Quantum Field Theory don’t you understand?”

ALSO from Chaz:

See also, this paper abstract: Realist Analysis of Six Controversial Quantum Issues - Art Hobson

This paper presents a philosophically realistic analysis of quantization, field-particle duality, superposition, entanglement, nonlocality, and measurement. These are logically related: Realistically understanding measurement depends on realistically understanding superposition, entanglement, and nonlocality; understanding these three depends on understanding field-particle duality and quantization. This paper resolves all six, based on a realistic view of standard quantum physics. It concludes that, for these issues, standard quantum physics is consistent with scientific practice since Copernicus: Nature exists on its own and science's goal is to understand its operating principles, which are independent of humans. Quantum theory need not be regarded as merely the study of what humans can know about the microscopic world, but can instead view it as the study of real quanta such as electrons, photons, and atoms. This position has long been argued by Mario Bunge.

All this modern science means that there is no reason to question Epicurus's atomic theory into non existence. We may need to tweak it a little, but the core points are totally valid.

--------

Cassius:

Chaz I am not sufficiently well read to comment on the specifics of you posts, but I want to thank you for them and say how much I appreciate your contributing them. It looks like they give anyone wanting to explore these issues some excellent places to start!

Are those of us who don't have the training or time or ability to follow the details of these arguments ourselves to end up in the same position as "the masses" who we regard as having no choice but "trust in the experts" just like we are alleged to have to trust in those who teach divine revelation?

I don't think so. I think Epicurus' viewpoint offers a "common sense" approach that most anyone can grasp, and it makes sense for us to consider the burden of proof to be on those who seek to overturn the reality of the senses, and it makes sense that we should live life as nature tells us, regardless of theories that are beyond our ability to evaluate.
But since everyone has a different perspective and level of training and ability, it makes sense that some are going to want and to need more explanation of these theories than will others. It's very helpful to know that there are authorities such as those who you cite who evaluate the issues at highly technical levels and yet conclude that the basic take-home conclusions remain sound.

Again, I appreciate your contributions and those of others who are well read in this area very much!

The following post was added to the Epicurean Philosophy thread at facebook today by a D. O'Connell. Feel free to check it out if you like for other responses, but I am posting it here so I can add my response to it. I am sure some of you here can do better:

Quote

The problem with atomism is that we don't actually *know* whether the universe is comprised of irreducible atoms. I don't actually think we can reasonably accept philosophical naturalism as "true" since we just don't know. Is methodological naturalism/skepticism compatible with Epicureanism? Can we be accept that we don't know whether atomism is true or not, and still follow through to the four cures etc? Does it still hold together?

Cassius' Response:

I would propose in response to your question that the word you put in quotes ("know") is where some people are going to agree with Epicurus and some will never agree with him.

Epicurus taught irreducible primary entities because such a theory gives the basis for how the universe may work using non-supernatural means. Irreducible entities that have existed eternally need no supernatural creator or custodian.

Epicurus also had a theory of epistemology grounded in premises stemming from a non-supernatural universe in which he held that while the universe is in constant flux, the flux is not so fast and unintelligible that our senses cannot navigate it. From such a perspective the question of "knowing" has a practical focus - can we learn enough through our senses to survive? - and not an absolute focus based assertions of a supernatural "absolute" truth.

If one takes the position that "we just don't know" things about the nature of the way the universe works, because we don't know (and can never know) all the facts that we might like to know, then one is on the slippery slope to radical skepticism. That road that leads to nihilism and ultimately to despair and death, and the only way for a practical person to get off that road is to grapple with what it means to "know" something, and then reach for support from a practical perspective on knowledge such as Epicurus suggests.

From Torquatus in Cicero's On Ends:

Moreover, unless the constitution of the world is thoroughly understood, we shall by no means be able to justify the verdicts of our senses. Further, our mental perceptions all arise from our sensations; and if these are all to be true, as the system of Epicurus proves to us, then only will cognition and perception become possible. Now those who invalidate sensations and say that perception is altogether impossible, cannot even clear the way for this very argument of theirs when they have thrust the senses aside. Moreover, when cognition and knowledge have been invalidated, every principle concerning the conduct of life and the performance of its business becomes invalidated. So from natural science we borrow courage to withstand the fear of death, and firmness to face superstitious dread, and tranquility of mind, through the removal of ignorance concerning the mysteries of the world, and self-control, arising from the elucidation of the nature of the passions and their different classes, and as I shewed just now, our leader again has established the canon and criterion of knowledge and thus has imparted to us a method for marking off falsehood from truth.

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Further, I would suggest that referencing "four cures" is much less effective than focusing on the full statements of the first four principle doctrines, because those doctrines are positive assertions about the nature of the universe and much more than a cure for anxiety.

For me, the system of Epicurus holds together even more firmly than it ever did, because after almost three thousand years of scientific advancement we have no reason to question his ultimate conclusions as to how to live:

(1) There are no supernatural gods who either created the universe or reward their friends or punish their enemies.

(2) There is no existence after death in which we might be burned for eternity in hell, nor any heaven to look for as a reward for following unprovable religious promises.

(3) It is pleasure and pain (widely understood, to include all types of physical and mental feelings) which serve as the ultimate guides for life and by which all decisions must be evaluated.

(4) There are no absolute ethical rules in life (such as "virtue" in the abstract) to follow in place of the guidance of pleasure and pain (item 3)

I haven't had time to read this yet but thank you for all this work Don!

Episode 112 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today we begin our discussion of the Letter to Herodotus.

First comment: So he is including Caesar as an Epicurean? We've seen that asserted before, I think, but it's uncommon and needs study.

Second comment: I need to do more gardening (anything more than the current zero) so if you find any good places to start be sure to let us know!

I would add to Kalosyni's comment that in addition to what Simon said, as to "the universe is observable" comment, that part of what Simon is talking about is an understanding of "epistemology" - having a clear idea of what kind of evidence, and what amount of evidence, is sufficient for confidence in a conclusion. So yes I think Simon is correct and part of what we have to communicate is Epicurus' view of what is reasonable to expect in terms of evidence and how to process it.

A second issue that we discussed was exactly how many "epitomes" (outlines? summaries?) Epicurus prepared of his work.

Did Epicurus prepare (1) his 37 books which constitute his full work, and (2) the letter to Herodotus, which summarizes it at highest level?

Did Epicurus prepare (1) his 37 books which constitute his full work, and (2) the letter to Herodotus, an epitome which summarizes it at highest level, and (3) a larger epitome than Herodotus that also constituted a summary, but was significantly shorter than the full 37 book?

Our discussion included reference to the possibility that Lucretius was working from was (3) a larger epitome, which he was able to use as a guide to decide what excerpts from the 37 books to include in his own poem.

I seemed to remember that DeWitt might have suggested that, plus our text excerpt indicates that Epicurus had previously (before Herodotus) had prepared another summary.

Editing is going slowly this week but it's getting there. First note for this episode:

Near the beginning of the episode we make several comments regarding which letter Epicurus wrote first in time - to Herodotus, to Menoeceus, or to Pythocles.

Of course we know Herodotus comes first in Diogenes Laertius, but I am not sure if I have heard much commentary on whether they were written in an order different than how they appear.

I think Joshua mentions he thinks that DeWitt indicates Menoeceus might have been written first, but the main reason I am posting this is that we probably ought to check that in case we need to have a correction to the sequence here in this thread.

Right now I am not remembering what I have read about the order of writing.