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Dare I hope that you Godfrey will push on with this topic and help us come up with a reference work similar to Nate's compiled doctrines/list of historic Epicureans, or Don's translation work on Menoeceus, or Joshua's Torquatus recording and other material, or Martins presentation on propositional logic? 
I know others like Kalosyni are working on things too, (and I probably forgot some in my list). "Projects" like these are key aspects of us being able to work together using the forum !
Last comment for now: I very much agree with the "lens" analogy because that gives us the ability to illustrate the "intuitiveness" parallel with how a lens works:. Each lens has a specific size and shape and type of glass, resulting in them focusing with different degrees of sharpness and focal length and light gathering ability and color separation (and maybe other ways I could describe if I were an optician).
Those methods of focusing are part of the automatic nature of the particular lens, and by analogy a faculty of anticipations would work the same way - allowing us to focus our minds on something but not in random or all possible ways, but only in ways that are consistent with the makeup of the lens.
And the "unfolding" part over time (Velleius) could be analogized to: over time, as we grow up, we can and do "polish" the lens and are able to some degree to further tune its operation so that it focuses more sharply (such as with practice we are able to improve our hearing so that we can appreciate or create more elaborate music). But at any particular moment the lens is always functioning "automatically" according to its nature and tuning.
But I believe I'm correct in my understanding that this snippet is only referring to the signs, not the method of inference
Here I am not sure but my comment would be that I think you are hinting correctly that there are definitely two processes involved in human life:. There is (1) the operation of the canonical faculties, which presents raw perceptual data to us automatically without injection of opinion, and (2) the conceptual reasoning process, where we weigh the evidence and form our opinions, and this is the stage that is not automatic and where our opinions formed can be "right" or "wrong" depending on our method of processing.
In other words, I have always thought that Diogenes Laertius's statement about seeing multiple oxen and then over time forming a picture or definition of an ox is something that definitely does happen - I think that's probably the conceptual reasoning process. But I think that is what I list there as function (2), not function (1), and function (1) is where anticipations and feelings and the 5 senses are in operation. So I think the process Diogenes Laertius is describing does exist and Epicurus talked about it, but what he is describing is not the operation of anticipations, but what we do with the data from anticipations (and from the other 2 legs too).
What we are discussing in the "inference" stage is function 2, where we have the ability to think through the alternative methods of reasoning and improve our understanding of the ways Epicurus is suggesting that we sift and way the evidence.
It seems to me that the canonical faculties are DeWitts "witnesses in court" who are testifying "truthfully" in not giving their own opinion, but sometimes (not always) suffering under having been too far away from the action to see what happened with clarity, so we have to piece together their testimony. Sometimes their testimony is clear and direct with no reason for doubt and we embrace the obvious conclusion with confidence, and sometimes we have to judge prudently and "wait" until more witness testimony is available. Sometimes we have the luxury of waiting for as long as necessary to get more evidence, and sometimes life demands that we go with our best judgement on the available evidence.
The inferential reasoning process is more equivalent to the "jury instructions" that the judge gives to the jury to tell them how to view the evidence and what principles of law to apply. This latter stage is full of opinion and discretion and is where all sorts of things can go right or wrong - but we hold that the best results are obtained when the jury understands the rules of evidence and weighs all the facts carefully without bias or prejudice or artificial rules. That's why our common law system has focused on decisions as to reasonable conduct being made by "a jury of our peers" rather than by trying to get a single "expert" to enforce a "one size fits all" rule.
Maybe instead of "self-evident" it could be called "evidence from perception"?
YES I agree and think that's far preferable, and more consistent with the way Epicurus seems to be expressing it. Evidence from perception = "evidence from the canonical faculties.". I think the term "perceiving" applies equally to all three legs of the canon. We perceive not only using the five senses but also through the feeling of pleasure and pain and also through the faculty of anticipations.
If "focusing of thought" is thought of as a non-conscious process, such as light focusing through a lens, that would read similarly to Bailey's "intuitive apprehension", "apprehension" meaning understanding or grasp. This seems to be describing the anticipations if I'm understanding it correctly
And yes again I agree here too.
I am not sure whether you mean Bailey or DeWitt though, because I associate "intuitive" with DeWitts views.
Either way, I have always thought that a key aspect of any leg of the canon must be its "non-rationality" (its automatic functioning) -not its "non-consciousness" - so again I would substitute non-rationality in your sentence there rather than non-conscious.
First of all, Herodotus, we must GRASP the ideas attached to words, in order that we may be able to refer to them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of investigation or reflection, so that we may not either leave everything uncertain and go on explaining to infinity or use words devoid of meaning.
[38] For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be REGARDED and that there should be no need of explanation, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference. And besides we must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate APPREHENSIONS whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgment, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, in order that we may have indications whereby we may judge both the problem of sense perception and the unseen.
First of all, Herodotus, we must grasp the ideas attached to words, in order that we may be able to refer to them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of investigation or reflection, so that we may not either leave everything uncertain and go on explaining to infinity or use words devoid of meaning.
[38] For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference. And besides we must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate apprehensions whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgment, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, in order that we may have indications whereby we may judge both the problem of sense perception and the unseen.
From the Torquatus narrative:
These facts he thinks are simply perceived, just as the fact that fire is hot, snow is white, and honey sweet, no one of which facts are we bound to support by elaborate arguments; it is enough merely to DRAW ATTENTION to the fact; and there is a difference between proof and formal argument on the one hand and a slight hint and DIRECTION OF ATTENTION on the other; the one process reveals to us mysteries and things under a veil, so to speak; the other enables us to PRONOUNCE UPON patent and evident facts.....
Thank you very much Godfrey! All this is extremely helpful and a great step forward in organizing. I particularly like the different translation of Herodotus from Long and Sedley.
In the second post I am going to suggest a tweak to Section One: Somewhere over the years I picked up an aversion to the term "self-evident" - probably because of Jeffersons use of the term in the Declaration to describe a number of assertions that history has shown to be not "self-evident" at all to later generations.
I think the term we are looking for is something more directly related to the force of the evidence and our manner of receiving it - this may in fact be a place where the "ante oculos" term was used by the ancient Epicureans. The words that strike me as more appropriate are more like "plain" and "clear" and "patent" and "obvious" --- with the unstated predicate of "clear to the senses" or "plain to the senses.". I would almost consider the possibility that the legal terms "clear and convincing evidence" and "beyond a reaonable doubt" might be appropriate, particularly if "beyond a reasonable doubt" were defined as something like "a doubt for which one can state a reason ( a reason grounded in evidence from one of the three canonical faculties).
Unless there is some connotation of "self-evident" that has escaped my foggy mind over the years (and that is very possible) it seems to me that Epicurus is focusing on a process of "pointing out to our attention" the thing being considered, and that indeed it is an act of our mind that is involved in paying attention. ... And that's sort of the opposite of being "SELF- evident" which is probably something that might actually contradict the rest of the philosophy. There's "evident to our senses" after we pay attention, but probably not something that is "self-evident" without our act of attention. (In sum, the "self" part being the problem.)
If I recall correctly both the letter to Herodotus and the Torquatus section on Epicurus explaining his observation that please need no logical argument that both seem to highly the issue of "paying attention."
What do you think about that?
Episode 113 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today we continue our discussion of the Letter to Herodotus with a discussion of principles of clear thinking.
Yes I am leaning toward the second outline, and I agree with your last comment.
You used the word "mediated" - i might prefer something like "processed through"....
Also Godfrey I meant to type this earlier:
We need to look at the first half of Book 4 as to the processing of images, and how to deal with illusions. I think that gives us concrete examples of how the data from the senses has to be "processed" in order to form valid opinions, and that process is I think what we are talking about.
To my understanding, the type of logic that doesn't connect to canonic data is not really a part of Epicurus' philosophy and doesn't belong in the outline.
And to repeat - yes, i agree with that conclusion that it doesn't belong in the outline, any more than would "divine revelation." As to it being a part of Epicurean philosophy, it's a part only insofar as it is discussed as something to affirmatively reject.
s to placing "MOI" in an outline, it shouldn't be in the canon as it's not direct experience
Godfrey I am not sure this is a correct inference. The Canon would (I think) include discussion of the "methods of processing" of the data that comes through the canon. The raw data doesn't mean anything on its own, but I am not sure I would separate out the raw data from the immediate methods of processing it.
I am thinking that the problem with "logic" is the type of logic that doesn't ever connect to these three sets of data. The manner of processing the data correctly, however, might well be called "epicurean logic" or "epicurean reasoning." Not saying that definitely but I think it's a possibility
Followup to the original thread:
I think there is - though I cant really say where - examples of epicureus or at least ancient epicureans say its prudent to say that at the point we dont know the answer to this problem though it surely is one. I think there is two important things to say about the atomism point that everyone can have an opinion on in addition to what Cassius Amicus mentions - 1) if something is put forth that is in direct conflict with observable reality (like I would say part of quantum mechanics is) then there is something wrong with the theory, not nature. A cat is either dead or alive thats observable logic. 2) there is no need to go to any supernatural explanation just because the exact nature of the phenomena is unknown. We dont know why eels migrate as they do but there is nothing indicating its supernatural. Some day we might know. Surely the nature of existence has greater implications but the logic is the same. We dont assume supernatural eel-explanations as we have no indication of this (and if we had that would change the nature of nature just as much). Same - that we dont know exactly the nature of the substance of nature does not make the direct (or indirect) empirism of epicureanism less valid. I even think that the epicurean atoms more represent a concept then an exact description but that is a more diffuse argument and not really the essence of the matter I would say. Hope this has some validity for you
NOW WAIT A MINUTE!
Now we're going in zig-zag fashion to find the code?
And only two letters - the "V" and the "M" (in the wrong order!)- is referenced in "signing his name?"
Castelletti accounts for the inversion of Vergil's tria nomina (from [Publius] Vergilius Maro to [Publius] Maro Vergilius) by claiming that Vergil drew inspiration from the Greek poet Aratus, who included a similar acrostic sequence.
Don, are you signing on to that one too?
I know I've been campaigning for years against skepticism but do I now need to worry I've gone overboard? Have I been too hard on poor Pyrrho?
I think you're right Godfrey and that even in fun this is a good example of the issue.
My first inclination is to say that we consider the evidence from "all of the above" sources that you suggest be possibilities.
posit that there are two different prolepseis on display here as to what constitutes a poem
I am not sure what you mean there, however (?) I have a feeling that you are using the word "prolepsis" in that sentence as if it is interchangeable with "concept." I am still not ready to embrace that "anticipations" = "concepts." Are you?
One approach to the current evidence is to blindly accept the statements of classical scholars, one of which we have among us in the person of Joshua.
This would be an example of the "rely on the experts" method. No doubt we do in many situations rely on experts. That's an issue in itself as to how we do that, because sometimes experts do make mistakes, and there are differences of opinion as to who constitutes an expert. Someone wanting to write up a paper on that would find some good material in US Federal litigation case law, as there is an extensive line of cases that discusses issues revolving around the admissibility of expert testimony in court. No doubt there are significant differences in context but there is this important analogy: In court issues for fact determination, we think generally that the most fair result comes from a panel of impartial jurors; we want the jurors to make the decision in disputed issues to get the most "fair" result. What happens when jurors don't have the experience or training to be able to judge the issue? We let "experts" testify, and the task of the jurors switches to judging the credibility and persuasiveness of the experts, not of the ultimate facts directly. There is lots of interesting discussion about these issues in the legal system.
Yet another approach is to examine the odds of a given acrostic occurring and to make inferences from that.
This would be a statistics-based approach. That too can be helpful, but there too we have some helpful rules of thumb about how to separate statistics from "damned lies."
One could also say that we need to understand the motivations of each person making assertions
This kind of analysis of "bias and prejudice" is definitely a part of the legal frame of analysis.
So in short we could take your examples and generalize them into a series of bullet points on how generally to approach "methods of inference" in making judgments about the unknown.
Yes that rings a dim bell from the distant past, as indicated by the red circle. I didn't absorb much of it then but maybe today I / we would get a lot more out of it, especially since we're now used to the fact that the title given to these scrolls isn't necessary an accurate reflection of the contents.
I seem to remember reading that On rhetoric was one of the first ones that much progress was made on, and there is an old book somewhat equivalent to DeLacys version of On Methods of Inference......
Thank you that is interesting on many levels, not the least as the explanation under item two bears on our recent "logic" discussions.
I wonder where this comes from? The "on rhetoric" papyrus?
Item four seems cryptic.
"an accurate judgement of how to lead pupils from the known to the unknown" seems to be a good description of what we are looking for.
Joshua (or anyone) do we have record from the ancient world of an ancient writer discussing this as an intentional technique, or is it all surmise by the modern world?
In other words we are sure we are not talking some "Bible Code" nonsense?
I am fully prepared to accept this if there is enough evidence of intent.
. Or are you saying that logic belongs in the canon? I've understood logic, or reasoning, as a process that we use to evaluate our sensations, anticipations and feelings. Is logic/reasoning then "mental focusings"
I think Joshua's answer is the right track with the word "slippery."
What I am concluding is that the word "logic" is like the word "reason" in the way we use them colloquially.
From a technical point of view (I know Martin uses the term this way) "logic" has a very precise meaning, but both terms can be used colloquially to refer generally to a "manner of thinking," and I think this is where the confusion is arising.
Used colloquially there does seem indeed to be a "Stoic logic" as opposed to an Epicurean view of logic, and so the words "logic" and "reason" are not precise enough for our needs.
To me the key issue seems to be that to be considered persuasive any form of reasoning must be tied to premises thst can be verified perceptually through the three canonical faculties. It seems to me that logical or reasoning constructions that are internally valid, but not tied to perceptual data, are being held by Epicurus to be in a category of their own and especially dangerous to practical living. Epicurus seems to be warning us to specifically identify this activity as uniquely threatening to sound principles of living. However it looks to me like we today are so conditioned agsinst this by the arbitrariness and wishful thinking of religion, combined with a radical skepticism in which, because science is moving so fast that we have come to accept the appearance that everything we understand today will be necessarily understood differently tomorrow. Therefore we have come to think that radical skepticism has forever won the philosophical battle, and that the worst sin is to ever consider anything to be certain.
So I think the challenge is that of avoiding the Frances Wright "I don't care" position and instead articulating in understandable form the areas that can and do change (practical or applied science, for lack of better term) vs a set of metaphysical assumptions that do not change (the universe as whole is eternal; death is the end of our unique consciousness; there are no "absolute" standards of the way to live / virtue; nature gives us only pleasure and pain as ultimate guides; maybe a few more).
These are not ethical positions but in fact "natural science" positions that have to be viewed as entitles to a special place in our thinking, a special place that gives them a status in which we regard them as inherently unchallengable by non-perception-based theorizing and speculation.
That's the best way I can articulate this at present.
Wait a minute!
I just read an entire article based on going through thousands of lines of poem and finding four lines of which the first letters seem to spell out a synonym for "light"??????
Don are you impressed by this? Or is it much ado about nothing?
