Posts by Cassius

Well I am not sure we need to pursue it, but what I was trying to focus in on is why what you stated led you to doubt Epicureanism.....

Quote from smoothiekiwi

stuff, and tried only to active my dopamine reserve (which obviously failed). And that, in turn, led me to doubt Epicureanism.

I guess what you mean here is that you simply pursued whatever you found pleasing, without regard to ultimate consequences, so you were ignoring Epicurus' clear statement to look to the ultimate result?

If that's what you mean, then ultimately concluding Epicurus was right did not need to be tied to an understanding of dopamine or any other detailed science that was not available to him.

Do I misunderstand your reasoning and how you reached your conclusion?

Major Philosophical Questions Include:

1. Is the life of virtue steep and difficult or steady and smooth?
   1. See to that luminary! lovely and glorious in the dawn, he gathers strength and beauty to his meridian, and passes in peace and grandeur to his rest. So do thou, my son. Open your ears and your eyes; know, and choose what is good; enter the path of virtue, and thou shalt follow it, for you shall find it sweet. Thorns are not in it, nor is it difficult or steep: like the garden you have now entered, all there is pleasure and repose.”
2. Are the Stoic and Epicurean paths open equally to everyone?
   1. “The doctrine of Zeno,” replied the sage, “is sublime: many great men shall come from his school; an amiable world, from mine. Zeno has his eye on man — I, mine on men: none but philosophers can be stoics; Epicureans all may be.”
3. Is there more than one virtue? Are the goals of the schools the same?
   1. “No, but men clothe her differently; some in clouds and thunders; some in smiles and pleasures. Doctors, my son, quarrel more about words than things, and more about the means than the end. In the Portico, in the Lyceum, in the Academy, in the school of Pythagoras, in the Tub of Diogenes, the teacher points you to virtue; in the garden he points you to happiness. Now open your eyes, my son, and examine the two Deities. Say, are they not the same? virtue is it not happiness? and is not happiness, virtue?”
4. What is the relationship between virtue, good, and evil vs pleasure and pain?
   1. I shall say, that I feel myself virtuous, because my soul is at rest.”
      “If this be your criterion, you should with the stoics deny that pain is an evil.” “By no means: so much the contrary, I hold it the greatest of all evils, and the whole aim of my life, and of my philosophy, is to escape from it. To deny that pain is an evil is such another quibble as the Elean’s denial of motion: that must exist to man which exists to his senses; and as to existence or non existence abstracted from them, though it may afford an idle argument for an idle hour, it can never enter as a truth, from which to draw conclusions, in the practical lessons of a master. To deny that pain is an evil seems more absurd than to deny its existence, which has also been done, for its existence is only apparent from its effect upon our senses; how then shall we admit the existence, and deny the effect, which alone forces that admittance? But we will leave these matters to the dialecticians of the Portico. I feel myself virtuous because my soul is at rest. With evil passions I should be disturbed and uneasy; with uncontrolled appetites I should be disordered in body as well as mind — for this reason, and for this reason only, I avoid both.” “Only!” “Only: virtue is pleasure; were it not so, I should not follow it.”
   2. “The masters who would have us to follow virtue for her own sake, independent of any pleasure or advantage that we may find in the pursuit, are sublime visionaries, who build a theory without examining the ground on which they build it, who advance doctrines without examining principles. Why do I gaze on the Cupid of Praxiteles? because it is beautiful; because it gives me pleasurable sensations. If it gave me no pleasurable sensations, should I find it beautiful? should I gaze upon it? or would you call me wise if then I gave a drachma for its possession? What other means have we of judging of things than by the effect they produce upon our senses? Our senses then being the judges of all things, the aim of all men is to gratify their senses; in other words, their aim is pleasure or happiness: and if virtue were not found to conduce to this, men would do well to shun her, as they now do well to shun vice.” “You own then no pleasure but virtue, and no misery but vice?” “Not at all: I think virtue only the highest pleasure, and vice, or ungoverned passions and appetites, the worst misery. Other pleasures are requisite to form a state of perfect ease, which is happiness; and other miseries are capable of troubling, perhaps destroying, the peace of the most virtuous and the wisest man.”
5. What is the point of the extended discussion about Metrodorus' painting of Leontium?
   1. “Pray, young man, if you want to be a philosopher, never find an eye for painting, a finger for music, or a brain for poetry. Any one of these will keep a man from wisdom.”
   2. “Much more than common: — It is your Master’s self. The dignity of his figure, the grace of his attitude, the nobility of his features, the divine benignity of his expression. Had we not the original to worship, we might worship your copy.”

In addition to the question of lying, what you're talking about now is probably under the category of what "opinion" is - and how truth and error is a matter that we talk about under the topic of "opinion" rather than in terms of truth or error being what the senses provide to us.

There's a lot to unpack in that word "opinion" -- and in associated words like "knowledge" and "true" and "false."

Quote from Martin

Cecilia Payne proved already around 1925.

A lot of what we're talking about in this topic is "what does it mean to 'prove' something." We could say that we're coming to the conclusion that it means something like "establishes to the satisfaction of every reasonable scientist" but obviously that definition has lots of problems too.'

I see this, which also seems rather circular and to avoid a clear statement of a standard of proof:

Quote

prove

[ proov ]

See synonyms for: prove / proved / proven / proves on Thesaurus.com

verb (used with object), proved, proved or prov·en, prov·ing. to establish the truth or genuineness of, as by evidence or argument: to prove one's claim. Law. to establish the authenticity or validity of (a will); probate. to give demonstration of by action. to subject to a test, experiment, comparison, analysis, or the like, to determine quality, amount, acceptability, characteristics, etc.: to prove ore.

to show (oneself) to have the character or ability expected of one, especially through one's actions. Mathematics. to verify the correctness or validity of by mathematical demonstration or arithmetical proof. Also proof. Printing. to take a trial impression of (type, a cut, etc.). to cause (dough) to rise to the necessary lightness. Archaic. to experience.

Very possibly it would be good to create a special recording session, like we did on Martin's "logic" presentation, on PD23 and PD24 - possibly focusing on PD24 and references to the evaluation of multiple possibilities, and when to choose between them, rather than strictly on the issue of the reliability of sensations.

PD23. If you fight against all sensations, you will have no standard by which to judge even those of them which you say are false.

PD24. If you reject any single sensation, and fail to distinguish between the conclusion of opinion, as to the appearance awaiting confirmation, and that which is actually given by the sensation or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind, you will confound all other sensations, as well, with the same groundless opinion, so that you will reject every standard of judgment. And if among the mental images created by your opinion you affirm both that which awaits confirmation, and that which does not, you will not escape error, since you will have preserved the whole cause of doubt in every judgment between what is right and what is wrong.

Gosh I apologize for my poor spelling (dress instead of stress). It's easy to lower ones standards when using telephones to type.

Cassius started a new event:

Event

"A Few Days In Athens" Zoom Book Club Meeting #4: Continue Chapter Three And Commenorate 20th (Feb 20 - 8:00 PM EST)

"A Few Days In Athens" Zoom Book Club Meeting #4: Complete Chapter Three and Commemorate 20th (Feb 20 - 8:00 PM EST)

This will be the fourth session on "A Few Days In Athens."

The rough agenda for our one hour session is:

1 - Twenty Minute or so overview of Frances Wright, the Introduction, and Chapter Two by led Cassius and any other volunteer regular forum participants who have read the whole book.

2 - Brief introduction of everyone on the call. (We will go around the zoom list and ask everyone…

Sun, Feb 20th 2022, 8:00 pm – 9:00 pm

Cassius

February 11, 2022 at 7:53 PM

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"A Few Days In Athens" Zoom Book Club Meeting #4: Complete Chapter Three and Commemorate 20th (Feb 20 - 8:00 PM EST)

This will be the fourth session on "A Few Days In Athens."

The rough agenda for our one hour session is:

1 - Twenty Minute or so overview of Frances Wright, the Introduction, and Chapter Two by led Cassius and any other volunteer regular forum participants who have read the whole book.

2 - Brief introduction of everyone on the call. (We will go around the zoom list and ask everyone to say their first names (real or otherwise) and tell us about their background and interest in Epicurus. For example: "My name is Joshua, I am from (country), and I have been interested in Epicurus ever since _______________. I have read (describe how many books on Epicurus you have read) and I have / have not read the entire "A Few Days In Athens."

3 - After we do the introductions, we will then open the floor for open discussion of Chapter Three from all participants. Depending on how many people we have we will probably use the "raise your hand" method of going around the table with Cassius or other moderator calling on people to keep the conversation organized. We will monitor the text chat also and people can use that to indicate that they want to speak, and what about.

Note: The use of video is strictly optional. We anticipate many of our friends will choose to use audio only.

Important Links:

Link to PDF of the original book at Archive.org.

AFDIA Website with the entire book: http://www.afewdaysinathens.com

Link to previous and ongoing discussion of chapter three here at EpicureanFriends - Please post new substantive comments about the topic of the chapter here, where the text is also located: AFDIA - Chapter Three - Text and Discussion

Discussion thread for 2022 meeting logistics - please post comments about your attendance or other non-substantive comments here: "A Few Days In Athens" Zoom Book Club Meeting #4: Continue Chapter Three And Commenorate 20th (Feb 20 - 8:00 PM EST) (Sun, Feb 20th 2022, 8:00 pm-9:00 pm)

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Welcome to Episode One Hundred Nine of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

At this point in our podcast we have completed our first line-by-line review of the poem, and we have turned to the presentation of Epicurean ethics found in Cicero's On Ends. We have now completed a long but important section stressing the importance of the Epicurean emphasis on Epistemology and Natural Science, and today we turn to section 65 on Friendship, which will probably take us several sessions to complete.

Now let's join Martin reading today's text:

[65] XX. One topic remains, which is of prime importance for this discussion, that relating to friendship, which you declare will cease to exist, if pleasure be the supreme good, yet Epicurus makes this declaration concerning it, that of all the aids to happiness procured for us by wisdom, none is greater than friendship, none more fruitful, none more delightful. Nor in fact did he sanction this view by his language alone, but much more by his life and actions and character. And the greatness of friendship is made evident by the imaginary stories of the ancients, in which, numerous and diversified as they are, and reaching back to extreme antiquity, scarce three pairs of friends are mentioned, so that beginning with Theseus you end with Orestes. But in truth within the limits of a single school, and that restricted in numbers, what great flocks of friends did Epicurus secure, and how great was that harmony of affection wherein they all agreed! And his example is followed by the Epicureans in our day also. But let us return to our theme; there is no need to speak of persons.

[66] I see then that friendship has been discussed by our school in three ways. Some, denying that the pleasures which affect our friends are in themselves as desirable to us as those we desire for ourselves, a view which certain persons think shakes the foundation of friendship, still defend their position, and in my opinion easily escape from their difficulties. For they affirm that friendship, like the virtues of which we spoke already, cannot be dissociated from pleasure. Now since isolation and a life without friends abound in treacheries and alarms, reason herself advises us to procure friendships, by the acquisition of which the spirit is strengthened, and cannot then be severed from the hope of achieving pleasures.

[67] And as enmity, spitefulness, scorn, are opposed to pleasures, so friendships are not only the truest promoters, but are actually efficient causes of pleasures, as well to a man's friends as to himself; and friends not only have the immediate enjoyment of these pleasures but are elate with hope as regards future and later times. Now because we can by no means apart from friendship preserve the agreeableness of life strong and unbroken, nor further can we maintain friendship itself unless we esteem our friends in the same degree as ourselves; on that account this principle is acted on in friendship, and so friendship is linked with pleasure. Truly we both rejoice at the joy of our friends as much as at our own joy, and we are equally pained by their vexations.

Thank you! I think producing a table like that is very helpful for illustrating that all these are "labels" for which would have to have some way of measuring and identifying them precisely in order to use them.

Lacking that, they all reduce - to me - to nothing more than "too much" "just right" and "too little" - isn't that a nursery story of some kind about some bears? https://americanliterature.com/childrens-stor…the-three-bears

"And then she went to the porridge of the Little Wee Bear, and tasted it, and that was neither too hot nor too cold, but just right, and she liked it so well that she ate it all up, every bit!"

Quote from smoothiekiwi

But, as far as I can judge, the Epicurean is simply an empirical sceptic, right

In the way you mean it, probably yes, but in the way the standard dictionaries would apply that term, probably not. I am beginning to think there is never a safe way to use modern words to describe Epicurus other than just as "Epicurean" - or else use lots and lots of caveats every time.

The particular danger here lies in going too far with observation - as it appears to me Frances Wright did - and concluding that no matter how much evidence you have you can never come to a "conclusion" that you can regard as confidently proven. We will be discussing that in detail in Wrights case later in the AFDIA book review and we might find occasion to discuss it in the Lucretius podcast again too.

Wright's position on observationwhich I think deviates from Epicurus is set out in Chapter 15 of AFDIA.

"Even so, I don't find any fault in the idea that the virtue is the balance between two excesses; probably Epicurus would've agreed to that. So why not pleasure as well?"

I would say that this points out the problem and that Epicurus would not agree. Pleasure is a feeling that nature gives us as a canonical perception. We don't feel pain according to a set formula, and Aristotle is suggesting that there are extremes which can be identified prior to circumstances and experience, and these extremes give rise to the mean and therefore the optimum results. The problem is that these extremes are like Platonic ideals - they have no independent existence and to the extent we can estimate some kind of approximation, we do so based on the nature of the operation of the atoms and void involved, not on the basis of logical reasoning based on absolutes.

Someone can probably do better than that in piercing the issue but I am very appreciative of Nate finding that reference.

In all, I do think what we have here the difference between seeing virtue as something relative to the circumstances (the Epicurean perspective of identifying virtue by results that occur afterward), vs doing the reverse and trying to evaluate circumstances based on their adherence to some preset arbitrary standard of virtue that exists only in the human mind as a tool for prediction (the Atostotelian/Platonic perspective). Plato and Aristotle may look for their absolutes in different places, but in reality they are doing the same thing and Epicurus is in total opposition to both.

I think that you two are probably not so far from each other. It's probably true that in some significant number of cases an unhappy marriage can be hidden from the children so that they are not as affected as they would be by divorce. I would stress "sometimes" and that we have another situation where it depends on details and "always" isn't going to apply.

Quote from smoothiekiwi

Aristotle... wasn't that this position?

Thats a good question that we will have to one day figure out. Do you have a reference that you were thinking of, or anything in particular?

The only thing that I am aware of that may be applicable is that supposedly Aristotle transferred Plato's "ideas" from an external existence I may realm beyond the reach of the senses to an "intrinsic" or "essentialist" existence inside the object under consideration (things that appear yellow have an essence of yellow in them).

But I could not provide you with a good cite to that either, so unfortunately I am not in position to clarify the question.

Quote from Scott

The particular article you referenced, and its author, are not however, a very good sources of information. The article is littered with many bits of accurate information and truths, but also... lots of unsupported assertions, interesting anecdotal evidence, conflations, stretched analogies, etc. Debunking all those would take gobs of time. However, the article does stir up thought and offers interesting insights. I'

Yes you're definitely right. I didn't take the time to research him other than in the most cursory way, and so reading into the question really probably starts with the type article Don referenced combined with our own anecdote of personal experiences. I really considered the first part of the article (the only part I did more than "skim") as little more than an assertion of personal experience too.

I think I've read enough already not to be anxious about getting the "one eight hour chunk" type of sleep.

Like most people probably I have long been aware of the "siesta" in some cultures, but I've never followed up on that to see what that means for how long such people sleep at night.

Yes I am for the moment discounting that he has any real science behind him and just entertaining how the general observation compares with my (our!) Own experience. But even more, the thought that there may be a parallel between (1) modern health issues in regard to sugar and (2) modern sleep conditions in fact being more supportive of sleep at least physically, strikes me as possible.

I wish I could compare this to something in the Epicurean texts (probably Lucretius) but I am not able to think of anything on point, with the possible exception of the issue of "romantic love" or maybe more generally "wealth" to which we today may be more overstimulated then in the past.

in the study of Epicurus we find ourselves with a fair share of people who are going through rough times in their lives, and one of the ways that rough times manifest themselves is in alteration of "normal" sleep patterns.

A friend today sent me this article linked below, by someone who claims that we should re-examine just how much sleep is healthy. He argues that at times less sleep can correlate with a better - and not worse - frame of mind.

I know nothing about the author of this article and his qualifications or views on any other subject, but the opening section caught my eye, and I wonder how it correlates with the views of others here. The challenging initial section that caught my eye was this:

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Comfortable modern sleep is an unnatural superstimulus. Sleepiness, just like hunger, is normal.

In this section, I make the following analogy:

1. Experiencing hunger is normal and does not necessarily imply that you are not eating enough. Never being hungry means you are probably eating too much.
2. Experiencing sleepiness is normal and does not necessarily imply that you are undersleeping. Never being sleepy means you are probably sleeping too much.

Read the section and see what you think: https://guzey.com/theses-on-sleep/

Most of us i think probably agree that oversleeping correlates with some form or degree of depression.

So maybe occasionally being up at 2:30 AM, and being sleepy during the day, is not such a bad thing at all?

The Torquatus material is a gold mine and we have not finished it yet. The. We can turn to the letter to Herodotus (I think) which is also widely ignored but also very deep.

Joshua I very much appreciate both you and Martin and I agree this is very good stuff that needs wider circulation. The projects we could undertake are literally neverending but materials like this give us a base with which to work!

I am beginning to focus in on "always wants to go to new restaurants" as really good litmus test of something. Not sure exactly what, but a really good test