If that's the concern, we would arguably have to throw out the majority of fragments and even Cicero since he also didn't necessarily cite context but cherry picked what he wanted.
Well that is definitely a consideration as to all the fragments. Everyone was cherrypicking to suit their purposes, and even Diogenes Laertius was apparently following a system so he could present similar material on all the different philosophers.
Not from my reading. The original specifically says "And Epicurus in On Choices says as follows..." Then gives the quote.
I didn't mean to dispute that the texts present this as a quote, just to point out that it is Diogenes Laertius presenting it out of context, so more than just relying on him to present it accurately, we're relying on him to have judged the context correctly.
t "pleasures would never differ from one another" (KD 9)
That's a good one to remember in this context.
Still ... there must be a significant reason this description exists.
To me, the issue of its being a response to Plato holding that pleasure could not be continuous is more than sufficient to justify its existence.
Lots of good deep thinking in this thread so thank you again to all who are putting time into it.
Please correct me if I am wrong, but in addition to being "rare" this is a statement by Diogenes Laertius, which we may presume to be a quote, but of which we don't for sure have an original sentence by Epicurus, or surrounding context.
That observation (absence of a clear original where we see Epicurus making the point in full context) is a key aspect of the criticism of Nikolsky/Gosling/Taylor) in pointing out that it is Diogenese Laertius and Cicero who bring this issue to our attention, not its prominence in original works of Epicurus or core Epicureans.
So we if are categorizing the main objections, they include, not necessarily in this order:
- Rare at best.
- Not featured as important in clear writings by core Epicureans
....and then combined with....
- All of the textual consistency issues that arise from any implication that Epicurus valued "katastematic" more (or even equal to) than "kinetic" pleasure.
Wow that is quite a collection thank you Nate!
For this reason, many scholars look for other ways to interpret the distinction. The debate
about this topic has produced a dizzying array of interpretations. For the purposes of this
chapter, I will describe just a few of the most prominent proposals.
THAT (underlined sentence) is for sure!!!
After reading all that I am still at the point ---
"Categorize the pleasures and experience them however you see fit, the guide of life is the feeling of pleasure, not virtue, not religion, not abstract logic."
I think we're generally in agreement except for this part....
Furthermore, wherever Epicurus is writing about calm, freedom from pain or trouble in body or mind, remembering or anticipating pleasure, etc. that he's writing about katastematic pleasure whether the word gets used or not.
...because I see no evidence in the core Epicurean texts that the Epicureans got around to mentioning the word "katastematic" except at best in rare instances. The idea that "absence of pain" equals katastematic pleasure seems to be an unwanted assumption. When the focus on life is pleasure, and you crowd out pains by replacing them with pleasures of all types, then there is no need to be concerned about what would happen if you attempted to bury yourself in a sensory deprivation chamber and somehow drained yourself if pains without replacing those pains with some form of mental or physical activity.
Cicero is attempting to go back to Plato's argument that pleasure cannot be continuous by insisting that if you aren't being stimulated in some way then you aren't experiencing pleasure. The very example he gives - of engaging in philosophic debate - has no need to be considered a hard case or a neutral state, because the mind is engaged in intense activity on an important subject - just like we are now - and we are experiencing a definite type of pleasure in hunting down the answers, even if there is much effort involved.
To me this argument from Cicero makes clear the problem in the whole "absence of pain" and "katastematic pleasure issue.". It is much more direct to consider all mental and physical consciousness of life to be pleasurable unless it involves significant pain, and thereby you never have to quibble about some "fancy pleasure" state that seems exotic and esoteric.
The discussion continues to convince me that the whole issue arises due to the desire of the anti-Epicureans to find a way to hijack Epicurus' focus on pleasure because they will not accept that pleasure as commonly understood is in fact desirable. They want to substitute their own "virtue-approved" definition for pleasure.
Epicurus had a clear and important reason for his sweeping definition of pleasure - to show how pleasure of some kind (including situations that seem to involve only calm reflection) is always available to be referenced as the guide of life. His enemies took this sweeping definition and decided to elevate the calm reflection part (which they consider themselves to be kings of) as the ultimate goal. They did this by taking Epicurus' accurate observation - that when you have filled your life full of pleasure you cannot add any more because you are full - and took it out of context to adopt the "absence of pain" part as if it were something in itself, which it is not.
It is essential and important to explain to people that Pleasure in life comes through any kind of positive mental or physical activity that you don't find painful, including calm reflection. The contrast is made vivid by comparing it with the nothingness of availability of feeling after death. That part I think we are all agreed on.
But is it necessary to explain as a part of core Epicurean teaching the difference between kinetic and katastematic? The core texts don't, and even Torquatus himself, in his main narrative explaining Epicurean ethics, does not so much as mention the issue. It is only when it is used as an attack point by Cicero that Torquatus may address it at all. Lucretius and Philodemus, devoted advocates of the core, are also silent on it.
The value I am seeing in this conversation is that it is reinforcing to me that the entire katastematic/ kinetic discussion needs to be ejected from presentations of core Epicurean philosophy. Its main use going forward into the future in the presentation of an Epicurean curriculum should be to teach advanced students how the argument was used over the last two thousand years to relegate Epicurus into the corner of being a philosopher for nursing homes, and which thereby ejected from the largest part of normal healthy life. In that context the discussion is absolutely essential.
If one forces Hercules to spend every moment of his life clipping his toenails then even the physical strength and mental a acuity of a Hercules becomes absolutely neutered. There is no better way to sap the vitality from Epicurus as a savior of mankind than to force him to spin around endlessly in a word game like a dog chasing its own tale. I fully believe that Cicero saw just that opportunity, and his example has been followed ever since. No Epicurus in the camp, no Epicurus in the Senate, and no Epicurus anywhere in real human life.
Episode 130 of the Lucretius Today podcast is now available. This week we continue with the letter to Pythocles and further discuss phenomena of the sun and moon. Lots of good epistemology discussion in this episode!
"Iron sharpens iron" as the saying goes. Keep the questions coming!
Yes thank you Don - that is the key attitude and exactly the right frame of mind to bring to this discussion,
The current "mainstream' discussion of K/K issues strikes me as the opposite of iron - it's like jelly or worse - and something that people assert to be as important as this - to take the place of pleasure itself in the discussion of Epicurus - very much needs to be sharpened down to a fine point so that it can be placed in proper perspective.
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I know I seem like Negative Nellie here, but wouldn't the pleasure you get from planning and carrying out some activity in expectation of the reward that the activity will bring be something that has to ring of "action"? I thought that katastematic was supposedly implying "rest" or "static." When I am all wrapped up in building my moon rocket the expectation of getting into space may be the reward but I am certainly very involved in "action" during the building of the rocket.
Dividing things up like you are suggesting is a tempting way of categorizing things by "the time the reward is experienced," but "the timing of the reward" isn't anywhere suggested as relevant in any of the material we have been working from that DL or Cicero talk about as to "katastematic", is it?
Welcome to Episode One Hundred Thirty-One of Lucretius Today.
This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.
I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.
If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.
Today we continue Epicurus' Letter to Pythocles and we look at the implications of the Epicurean position on certain weather phenomena. Now let's join Joshua reading today's text:
BAILEY:
[99] Signs of the weather may occur owing to the coincidence of occasions, as happens with animals we can all see on earth, and also through alterations and changes in the atmosphere. For both these are in accordance with phenomena. But under what circumstances the cause is produced by this or that, we cannot perceive.
Clouds may be produced and formed both by the condensation of the atmosphere owing to compression by winds and by the interlacing of atoms clinging to one another and suitable for producing this result, and again by the gathering of streams from earth and the waters: and there are several other ways in which the formation of such things may not impossibly be brought about.
[100] And from them again rain may be produced if they are squeezed in one part or changed in another, or again by a downward current of wind moving through the atmosphere from appropriate places, a more violent shower being produced from certain conglomerations of atoms suited to create such downfalls.
Thunder may be produced by the rushing about of wind in the hollows of the clouds, as happens in vessels on earth, or by the reverberation of fire filled with wind inside them, or by the rending and tearing of clouds, or by the friction and bursting of clouds when they have been congealed into a form like ice: phenomena demand that we should say that this department of celestial events, just like them all, may be caused in several ways.
[101] And lightnings too are produced in several ways: for both owing to the friction and collision of clouds a conformation of atoms which produces fire slips out and gives birth to the lightning, and owing to wind bodies which give rise to this flash are dashed from the clouds: or compression may be the cause, when clouds are squeezed either by one another or by the wind. Or again it may be that the light scattered abroad from the heavenly bodies is taken in by the clouds, and then is driven together by the movement of the clouds and wind, and falls out through the clouds; or else light composed of most subtle particles may filter through the clouds, whereby the clouds may be set on fire by the flame and thunder produced by the movement of the fire.
[102] Or the wind may be fired owing to the strain of motion and its violent rotation, or clouds may be rent by wind and atoms fall out which produce fire and cause the appearance of lightning. And several other methods may easily be observed, if one clings always to phenomena and can compare what is akin to these things. Lightning precedes thunder in such a conformation of the clouds, either because at the moment when the wind dashes in, the formation of atoms which gives rise to lightning is driven out, but afterwards the wind whirls about and produces the reverberation; or because they both dash out at the same moment, but lightning moves at a higher speed towards us, and thunder comes after, as in the case of some things seen at a distance and producing blows.
[103] Thunderbolts may occur because there are frequent gatherings of wind, which whirls about and is fanned into a fierce flame, and then a portion of it breaks off and rushes violently on the places beneath, the breaking taking place because the regions approached are successively denser owing to the condensation of clouds, or as the result of the actual outburst of the whirling fire, in the same way that thunder may be produced, when the fire becomes too great and is too violently fanned by wind and so breaks through the cloud, because it cannot retreat to the next regions owing to the constant condensation of clouds one on the other.
[104] And thunderbolts may be produced in other ways too. Only superstition must be excluded, as it will, if one successfully follows the lead of seen phenomena to gain indications about the invisible.
Cyclones may be produced either by the driving down of a cloud into the regions below in the form of a pillar, because it is pushed by the wind gathered inside it and is driven on by the violence of the wind, while at the same time the wind outside impels it sideways; or by wind forming into circular motion, while mist is simultaneously thrust down from above; or when a great rush of wind takes place and cannot pass through sideways owing to the surrounding condensation of the atmosphere.
[105] And when the spout is let down on to the land, whirlwinds are produced in all the various ways in which their creation may occur owing to the movement of the wind, but if it reaches the sea it produces waterspouts.
HICKS
[99] "The signs in the sky which betoken the weather may be due to mere coincidence of the seasons, as is the case with signs from animals seen on earth, or they may be caused by changes and alterations in the air. For neither the one explanation nor the other is in conflict with facts, and it is not easy to see in which cases the effect is due to one cause or to the other.
"Clouds may form and gather either because the air is condensed under the pressure of winds, or because atoms which hold together and are suitable to produce this result become mutually entangled, or because currents collect from the earth and the waters; and there are several other ways in which it is not impossible for the aggregations of such bodies into clouds to be brought about.
[100] And that being so, rain may be produced from them sometimes by their compression, sometimes by their transformation; or again may be caused by exhalations of moisture rising from suitable places through the air, while a more violent inundation is due to certain accumulations suitable for such discharge. Thunder may be due to the rolling of wind in the hollow parts of the clouds, as it is sometimes imprisoned in vessels which we use; or to the roaring of fire in them when blown by a wind, or to the rending and disruption of clouds, or to the friction and splitting up of clouds when they have become as firm as ice. As in the whole survey, so in this particular point, the facts invite us to give a plurality of explanations.
[101] Lightnings too happen in a variety of ways. For when the clouds rub against each other and collide, that collocation of atoms which is the cause of fire generates lightning; or it may be due to the flashing forth from the clouds, by reason of winds, of particles capable of producing this brightness; or else it is squeezed out of the clouds when they have been condensed either by their own action or by that of the winds; or again, the light diffused from the stars may be enclosed in the clouds, then driven about by their motion and by that of the winds, and finally make its escape from the clouds; or light of the finest texture may be filtered through the clouds (whereby the clouds may be set on fire and thunder produced), and the motion of this light may make lightning;
[102] or it may arise from the combustion of wind brought about by the violence of its motion and the intensity of its compression; or, when the clouds are rent asunder by winds, and the atoms which generate fire are expelled, these likewise cause lightning to appear. And it may easily be seen that its occurrence is possible in many other ways, so long as we hold fast to facts and take a general view of what is analogous to them. Lightning precedes thunder, when the clouds are constituted as mentioned above and the configuration which produces lightning is expelled at the moment when the wind falls upon the cloud, and the wind being rolled up afterwards produces the roar of thunder; or, if both are simultaneous, the lightning moves with a greater velocity towards us and the thunder lags behind, exactly as when persons who are striking blows are observed from a distance.
[103] A thunderbolt is caused when winds are repeatedly collected, imprisoned, and violently ignited; or when a part is torn asunder and is more violently expelled downwards, the rending being due to the fact that the compression of the clouds has made the neighbouring parts more dense; or again it may be due like thunder merely to the expulsion of the imprisoned fire, when this has accumulated and been more violently inflated with wind and has torn the cloud, being unable to withdraw to the adjacent parts because it is continually more and more closely compressed – generally by some high mountain where thunderbolts mostly fall.
[104] And there are several other ways in which thunderbolts may possibly be produced. Exclusion of myth is the sole condition necessary; and it will be excluded, if one properly attends to the facts and hence draws inferences to interpret what is obscure.
Fiery whirlwinds are due to the descent of a cloud forced downwards like a pillar by the wind in full force and carried by a gale round and round, while at the same time the outside wind gives the cloud a lateral thrust; or it may be due to a change of the wind which veers to all points of the compass as a current of air from above helps to force it to move; or it may be that a strong eddy of winds has been started and is unable to burst through laterally because the air around is closely condensed. 10
[105] And when they descend upon land, they cause what are called tornadoes, in accordance with the various ways in which they are produced through the force of the wind; and when let down upon the sea, they cause waterspouts.
Yes it has always been something of a mystery to me too what the Cyreniacs really thought. I suspect the caricatures of them cannot really be true either, so as usual it will be "stepping in the dark" trying to sniff it out.
Aye, there's the rub
Yes indeed that is the rub of this whole discussion.
In the absence of clear authority from Epicurus as to how he was doing it, the whole endeavor is little more than speculation. Even attempting to use the examples that seem reliable (for example the reference to joy and delight as kinetic) can in my mind be equally something entirely volitional or "automatic" and without analysis.
But the approach you are taking in attempting to be specific is almost certainly the way forward as that will provide good examples of which we can debate the merits. From there we can work on more precision and the precision will (I am confident) point out the problems with the current mainstream analysis.
Nate:
Thanks for a very good list! By what criteria did you place each reference in each category? Someone reading your post casually might think that the cites themselves categorize the pleasure into the location you placed it, but I gather of course that that is not the case, and you are categorizing them yourself according to some criteria.
Can you spell out as best you can how you organized the two lists?
Kinetic pleasures - those sanctioned by the Cyrenaics and others as "pleasures" - are active pleasures in which one engages in the moment. Kinetic pleasures are fleeting but they provide variety to one's existence.
I am thinking that even a description like that cedes too much to the people who are acting as if Epicurus' every third word was "katastematic."
The problem that most people legitimately won't understand is that "engagement with the moment" involves every intellectual and emotional response in life no matter how "sublime" and "high" and even "noble.". If you feel it in the normal sense of feeling, then that is active engagement with the world and that is what life is all about - life is lived moment by moment and there is no "stored up capital" like a Christian might say about storing up treasures in heaven.
The commentators seem to be all over the board about what katastematic really means, and I see some of the recent articles are asserting that katastematic pleasure is "felt" just like kinetic.
There is definitely in Epicurean thought a strong emphasis on considering "healthy functioning" and even "attitudes" as important pleasures. But to consider it important to categorize them as "katastematic" rather than explaining clearly what he is talking about and giving examples in the letter to Menoeceus, for example, which would have been followed clearly by Lucretius and Philodemus, is just not something I can see as a pattern Epicurus generally followed.
I am generally very hesitant to read too much into the fragmentary Philodemus material, but to me observing Philodemus and Lucretius failing to utter anything that would appear to support this as an important distinction speaks volumes.
require some type of energetic motion to instigate,
Yes Nate I agree with everything you wrote but / and I want to stress that in saying that I agree I am not saying that I disagree with anyone else. This is not a contest of sides between us here but a struggle to better define the full picture so we develop a more usable interpretation that will help ourselves and others.
Not one single person in this thread has chosen life in a cave with bread and water, because we know we are capable of much greater pleasure in life than that.
That's why we can't let the implication stand of any formulation that implies that "desire in general" is to be condemned or reduced - to what? The minimal required to continue breathing?
No one would suggest that in real life, and yet the formulations that are batted around not only "leave open that implication" (I am thinking of the phrasing Frances Wright used in the big debate between Zeno and Epicurus) - they not only leave open the implication of asceticism, they COMPEL it if "reducing the desires" is an accurate statement of the road to happiness.
Epicurus was a philosopher and he would never have embraced such a general rule as "The way to happiness is to reduce the desires" because the best way to "reduce the desires" .... (I will space us another metaphor involving bullets!)
However that IS the explicit teaching of major worldviews that are out there, and I would label all Abrahamic religion (maybe is should just say monotheistic religion) as essentially guilty of the same mischief when they command you to replace YOUR desires with those of "God."
I am really glad that we are having this discussion because it's another variation of one of the key issues that prevents Epicurean philosophy from being understandable to "normal healthy people" (who we all need, even if we are like me rapidly approaching my expiration date :-). )
OK those are helpful. Here's one of the BIG quotes that is thrown out often, and we need to be able to put it in context of the global philosophy and especially VS63: "Frugality too has a limit, and the man who disregards it is like him who errs through excess."
An obvious approach might be to note that money or wealth is specifically referred to, rather than all the "joy and delight" pleasures in general so perhaps there was a context in which this Pythocles was too interested in money in particular. I can't imagine Epicurus saying, for example, "If you wish to make Pythocles Happy, do not give him more happiness, but diminish his joy and delight."
Does Philodemus in his "On Property Management" mention anything like this?
It would be interesting if the sources that preserve this are not the core ancient Epicureans but Seneca the Stoic and Stobaues (Of whom Wikipedia says: "Of his life nothing is known.[2] He derived his surname apparently from being a native of Stobi in Macedonia Salutaris.[3] The age in which he lived cannot be fixed with accuracy.[3] He quotes no writer later than the early 5th century, and he probably lived around this time.[3] From his silence in regard to Christian authors, it has been inferred that he was not a Christian.[2] However, his name would probably indicate that he was a Christian, or at least the son of Christian parents.[3]")
This is NOT in Diogenes Laertius or Diogenes of Oinoanda(???)
U135
Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, 3.17.24: Again from Epicurus: “If you wish to make Pythocles rich, do not give him more money, but diminish his desire.”
Cf. Ibid., 23 [Arsenius, Paroemiogr. Gotting. t. II p. 382, 11]: The precept of Epicurus... & Ibid. XVII.37: Epicurus, when asked how one can enrich oneself, responded: “Not by accumulating extraneous goods, but rather by trimming one’s needs.”
Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 21.7: In order that Idomeneus may not be introduced free of charge into my letter, he shall make up the indebtedness form his own account. It was to him that Epicurus addressed his well-known saying, urging him to make Pythocles rich, but not rich in the vulgar and equivocal way. “If you wish to make Pythocles rich,” said he, “do not add to his store of money, but subtract from his desires.”
Also -
1 - we may need to split this out into its own topic.
2 - Any ultimate wording on this will need to explain the statement to pythocles about limiting desires in a way that does not seem to launch the way down the slope to Buddhism and even nihilism.
I agree it's an important issue because it is one of the lines of attack against Epicurus. Why not completely limit your desires and stay in your cave or even put a bullet in your brain?
I think Godfrey 's point that desires (επιθυμία ) and pleasure (ηδονή ) are two different things is a very important one, and conflating the two is part of the trouble in discussing this topic.
I think we had a good discussion about some of this last night.
I think most people will have no problem understanding that pleasure and pain are feelings.
But what are "desires"? I presume you are saying that they may generate feelings if met or unmet, but are not feelings themselves?
So how in plain English do we suggest Epicurus was considering desires to be described? Are they goals? Opinions? Thoughts? Will?
And how would this relate to the apparent use of the terms choices and avoidances?
I didn't think we disagreed on that - so very good.
I keep coming back in my mind to one of the biggest challenges here being the over-restrictive definition of pleasure that we live under today.
It's almost as if people today think that if you aren't presently engaged in sex or drinking bouts or massages then you aren't experiencing pleasure, and they INSIST on separating out what we might call "intellectual" or "emotional" feelings of satisfaction and other "background feelings" as something other than "Pleasure."
I think that extended quote from DeWitt is right on point with this, and its something with which I think everyone here on the forum basically agrees: that if you feel ANYTHING at all (and we are constantly feeling lots of things as part of being alive) then those feelings are either (1) pleasure or (2) pain.
This isn't psychological babble based on Epicurus having an "ebullient" personality like a child or a puppy or cat who is "easily amused."
It's the foundational understanding about a universe in which there isn't a god to tell us what to do, and there aren't absolute ideal forms of right and wrong to go by. The only stop and go standard given us by nature is Feeling (pleasure and pain). All good and evil comes to us through sensation, meaning what we feel, and the realization that this is the true foundation of morality is such a huge "fight" to get people to understand and accept that all the rest can sort of fade into the background.
As DeWitt points out, it was apparently argued in the ancient world (and still is today) that Feeling/Pleasure-pain can't serve as the guide of life because it isn't always available -- sometimes we're just numb -- and to what do we look when we are just feeling numb?
That's a decent argument against looking to Pleasure as your ultimate guide, so Epicurus had to meet it. And I think it's a good argument to point out that there are an innumerable number of types of pleasures, and some or other are "always" available in life -- even if it's only closing your eyes and remembering good things from the past. But the "always" has to be put in quotes because there are times when pain becomes so sharp and overwhelming and with no hope of relief that you do in fact choose to "exit the stage" under those circumstances. Epicurean philosophy isn't magical and can't fix every problem - which is why you do work hard to plan ahead and set future goals (as you're saying) to work toward future pleasure even when you're in a lot of pain.
And I feel confident that we should label that feeling that comes from looking ahead to future pleasure as - itself - a pleasure.
Maybe in the end Cicero realized the importance of this argument and that's why he shot so many barrages at it and tried to make it look ridiculous.
Remember to join us tonight if you can:
