Posts by Cassius

Thanks Nate - this (the "universe" of everything as a while) is another topic we discussed in Episode 114 of the Lucretius Podcast recorded today.

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All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
2. The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
3. "On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
4. "Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
5. The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
6. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
7. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
8. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
9. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
10. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
11. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
12. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

Welcome to the forum!

I think this is why the issue persistently bobbles up:

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Personally, I find it hard to believe that Epicurus would believe in over-sized anthropomorphic aliens existing somehow between universes/world-systems. I think he was more sophisticated in his theological leanings than that and had to work within the vocabulary of his time to convey his understanding and that of his school.

Speaking for myself, I personally don't find the alien physical god hypothesis at all unsophisticated. It's a lot easier for me to believe that he left the physical details loose, given our inability to observe them directly, than that he completely obscured what his opinion really was.

I think the dividing line on who accepts which premise arises from that issue - who finds the phsysics hard to square with modern science and rejects it total, vs who is willing to read it liberally and ground the issue only in that the gods have a material basis that we don't know the details about.

Yep that's another "practical" argument - which reminds me why I reject it, because it is not compatible with the strict candor that I believe Epicurus displays in everything. That's why I remain firmly in the camp that he said what he meant and meant what he said - which is a better way than saying "realist." Because it's really a matter of whether Epicurus was being truthful or a Platonic noble liar, and I'll never admit the latter.

Our summary of Chapter Seven:

Amazing that we would question that AND find a reputable solution!

Godfrey if you get a chance to listen to it, we struggle through some closely related topics beginning at the 34:25 minute mark of this week's episode of the podcast. Pretty much the whole episode is devoted to the topic, but at 34:25 I think you'll see the most direct attention paid to some of this :

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RE: Episode One Hundred Thirteen - Letter to Herodotus 02 - Principles of Thinking

Episode 113 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today we continue our discussion of the Letter to Herodotus with a discussion of principles of clear thinking.

spreaker.com/episode/49100316

Cassius

March 17, 2022 at 9:16 PM

We discuss in the podcast that it may not be necessary to use terms like induction and deduction, but in assembling your outline I bet you are going to conclude that these issues are relevant to what you are assembling.

When we record this episode, I'd like to propose that since:

(1) this letter to Epicurus is a high-level outline, and

(2) we've already gone through the process in the earlier episodes of Lucretius of comparing Epicurus' views with modern physics,

I'd like to see us discuss this section in sort of a "Reconstructionist" or "Survivalist" mode: in other words, trying to be sure that we capture what Epicurus was thinking, and how he was fitting things together for his own thought processes.

That way we end up not only with a more accurate version of what Epicurus was thinking, but we also produce a "higher level" set of principles that will be easier for most non-experts to grasp. In that sense we'll produce more of a "survivalist" tool -- something we can use when we're under pressure, or we're talking to young people, or for some reason we don't have access to the technical material.

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Fourteen of Lucretius and Epicurus Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world, and to Epicurus, the founder of the Epicurean School.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

Today we continue our review of Epicurus' letter to Herodotus, and we begin with the fundamentals of physics.

Now let's join Joshua reading today's text:

Bailey:

Having made these points clear, we must now consider things imperceptible to the senses. First of all, that nothing is created out of that which does not exist: for if it were, everything would be created out of everything with no need of seeds.

[39] And again, if that which disappears were destroyed into that which did not exist, all things would have perished, since that into which they were dissolved would not exist. Furthermore, the universe always was such as it is now, and always will be the same. For there is nothing into which it changes: for outside the universe there is nothing which could come into it and bring about the change.

Moreover, the universe is bodies and space: for that bodies exist, sense itself witnesses in the experience of all men, and in accordance with the evidence of sense we must of necessity judge of the imperceptible by reasoning, as I have already said.

[40] And if there were not that which we term void and place and intangible existence, bodies would have nowhere to exist and nothing through which to move, as they are seen to move. And besides these two, nothing can even be thought of either by conception or on the analogy of things conceivable such as could be grasped as whole existences and not spoken of as the accidents or properties of such existences. Furthermore, among bodies some are compounds, and others those of which compounds are formed.

[41] And these latter are indivisible and unalterable (if, that is, all things are not to be destroyed into the non-existent, but something permanent is to remain behind at the dissolution of compounds): they are completely solid in nature, and can by no means be dissolved in any part. So it must needs be that the first beginnings are indivisible corporeal existences.

Moreover, the universe is boundless. For that which is bounded has an extreme point: and the extreme point is seen against something else. So that as it has no extreme point, it has no limit; and as it has no limit, it must be boundless and not bounded.

[42] Furthermore, the infinite is boundless both in the number of the bodies and in the extent of the void. For if on the one hand the void were boundless, and the bodies limited in number, the bodies could not stay anywhere, but would be carried about and scattered through the infinite void, not having other bodies to support them and keep them in place by means of collisions. But if, on the other hand, the void were limited, the infinite bodies would not have room wherein to take their place.

Besides this the indivisible and solid bodies, out of which too the compounds are created and into which they are dissolved, have an incomprehensible number of varieties in shape: for it is not possible that such great varieties of things should arise from the same atomic shapes, if they are limited in number. And so in each shape the atoms are quite infinite in number, but their differences of shape are not quite infinite, but only incomprehensible in number.

[43] And the atoms move continuously for all time, some of them falling straight down, others swerving, and others recoiling from their collisions. And of the latter, some are borne on, separating to a long distance from one another, while others again recoil and recoil, whenever they chance to be checked by the interlacing with others, or else shut in by atoms interlaced around them.

[44] For on the one hand the nature of the void which separates each atom by itself brings this about, as it is not able to afford resistance, and on the other hand the hardness which belongs to the atoms makes them recoil after collision to as great a distance as the interlacing permits separation after the collision. And these motions have no beginning, since the atoms and the void are the cause.

[45] These brief sayings, if all these points are borne in mind, afford a sufficient outline for our understanding of the nature of existing things.

HICKS

When this is clearly understood, it is time to consider generally things which are obscure. To begin with, nothing comes into being out of what is non-existent. For in that case anything would have arisen out of anything, standing as it would in no need of its proper germs.

[39]And if that which disappears had been destroyed and become non-existent, everything would have perished, that into which the things were dissolved being non-existent. Moreover, the sum total of things was always such as it is now, and such it will ever remain. For there is nothing into which it can change. For outside the sum of things there is nothing which could enter into it and bring about the change.

Further this he says also in the Larger Epitome near the beginning and in his First Book "On Nature", the whole of being consists of bodies and space. For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known.

[40] And if there were no space (which we call also void and place and intangible nature), bodies would have nothing in which to be and through which to move, as they are plainly seen to move. Beyond bodies and space there is nothing which by mental apprehension or on its analogy we can conceive to exist. When we speak of bodies and space, both are regarded as wholes or separate things, not as the properties or accidents of separate things.

Again he repeats this in the First Book and in Books XIV. and XV. of the work "On Nature" and in the Larger Epitome, of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made.

[41] These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved. It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities.

Again, the sum of things is infinite. For what is finite has an extremity, and the extremity of anything is discerned only by comparison with something else. (Now the sum of things is not discerned by comparison with anything else: hence, since it has no extremity, it has no limit; and, since it has no limit, it must be unlimited or infinite.

[42] Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void. For if the void were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through the infinite void, not having any supports or counter-checks to send them back on their upward rebound. Again, if the void were finite, the infinity of bodies would not have anywhere to be.

Furthermore, the atoms, which have no void in them – out of which composite bodies arise and into which they are dissolved – vary indefinitely in their shapes; for so many varieties of things as we see could never have arisen out of a recurrence of a definite number of the same shapes. The like atoms of each shape are absolutely infinite; but the variety of shapes, though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite. For neither does the divisibility go on "ad infinitum," he says below; but he adds, since the qualities change, unless one is prepared to keep enlarging their magnitudes also simply "ad infinitum."

[43] The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity. Further, he says below, that the atoms move with equal speed, since the void makes way for the lightest and heaviest alike. Some of them rebound to a considerable distance from each other, while others merely oscillate in one place when they chance to have got entangled or to be enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.

[44] This is because each atom is separated from the rest by void, which is incapable of offering any resistance to the rebound; while it is the solidity of the atom which makes it rebound after a collision, however short the distance to which it rebounds, when it finds itself imprisoned in a mass of entangling atoms. Of all this there is no beginning, since both atoms and void exist from everlasting. He says below that atoms have no quality at all except shape, size, and weight. But that colour varies with the arrangement of the atoms he states in his "Twelve Rudiments"; further, that they are not of any and every size; at any rate no atom has ever been seen by our sense.

[45] The repetition at such length of all that we are now recalling to mind furnishes an adequate outline for our conception of the nature of things.

YONGE

"When this is clearly understood, it is time to consider generally things which are obscure. To begin with, nothing comes into being out of what is non-existent. For in that case anything would have arisen out of anything, standing as it would in no need of its proper germs.

[39] And if that which disappears had been destroyed and become non-existent, everything would have perished, that into which the things were dissolved being non-existent. Moreover, the sum total of things was always such as it is now, and such it will ever remain. For there is nothing into which it can change. For outside the sum of things there is nothing which could enter into it and bring about the change. "Further [this he says also in the Larger Epitome near the beginning and in his First Book "On Nature"], the whole of being consists of bodies and space. For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known.

[40] And if there were no space (which we call also void and place and intangible nature), bodies would have nothing in which to be and through which to move, as they are plainly seen to move. Beyond bodies and space there is nothing which by mental apprehension or on its analogy we can conceive to exist. When we speak of bodies and space, both are regarded as wholes or separate things, not as the properties or accidents of separate things. "Again [he repeats this in the First Book and in Books XIV. and XV. of the work "On Nature" and in the Larger Epitome], of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made.

[41] These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved. It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities. "Again, the sum of things is infinite. For what is finite has an extremity, and the extremity of anything is discerned only by comparison with something else. (Now the sum of things is not discerned by comparison with anything else: hence, since it has no extremity, it has no limit; and, since it has no limit, it must be unlimited or infinite.

[42] Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void.

For if the void were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through the infinite void, not having any supports or counter-checks to send them back on their upward rebound. Again, if the void were finite, the infinity of bodies would not have anywhere to be. "Furthermore, the atoms, which have no void in them - out of which composite bodies arise and into which they are dissolved - vary indefinitely in their shapes; for so many varieties of things as we see could never have arisen out of a recurrence of a definite number of the same shapes. The like atoms of each shape are absolutely infinite; but the variety of shapes, though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite.

[For neither does the divisibility go on "ad infinitum," he says below; but he adds, since the qualities change, unless one is prepared to keep enlarging their magnitudes also simply "ad infinitum."]

[43] "The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity. [Further, he says below, that the atoms move with equal speed, since the void makes way for the lightest and heaviest alike.] Some of them rebound to a considerable distance from each other, while others merely oscillate in one place when they chance to have got entangled or to be enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.

[44] This is because each atom is separated from the rest by void, which is incapable of offering any resistance to the rebound; while it is the solidity of the atom which makes it rebound after a collision, however short the distance to which it rebounds, when it finds itself imprisoned in a mass of entangling atoms. Of all this there is no beginning, since both atoms and void exist from everlasting. [He says below that atoms have no quality at all except shape, size, and weight. But that colour varies with the arrangement of the atoms he states in his "Twelve Rudiments"; further, that they are not of any and every size; at any rate no atom has ever been seen by our sense.]

[45] The repetition at such length of all that we are now recalling to mind furnishes an adequate outline for our conception of the nature of things.

Dare I hope that you Godfrey will push on with this topic and help us come up with a reference work similar to Nate's compiled doctrines/list of historic Epicureans, or Don's translation work on Menoeceus, or Joshua's Torquatus recording and other material, or Martins presentation on propositional logic?

I know others like Kalosyni are working on things too, (and I probably forgot some in my list). "Projects" like these are key aspects of us being able to work together using the forum !

Last comment for now: I very much agree with the "lens" analogy because that gives us the ability to illustrate the "intuitiveness" parallel with how a lens works:. Each lens has a specific size and shape and type of glass, resulting in them focusing with different degrees of sharpness and focal length and light gathering ability and color separation (and maybe other ways I could describe if I were an optician).

Those methods of focusing are part of the automatic nature of the particular lens, and by analogy a faculty of anticipations would work the same way - allowing us to focus our minds on something but not in random or all possible ways, but only in ways that are consistent with the makeup of the lens.

And the "unfolding" part over time (Velleius) could be analogized to: over time, as we grow up, we can and do "polish" the lens and are able to some degree to further tune its operation so that it focuses more sharply (such as with practice we are able to improve our hearing so that we can appreciate or create more elaborate music). But at any particular moment the lens is always functioning "automatically" according to its nature and tuning.

Quote from Godfrey

But I believe I'm correct in my understanding that this snippet is only referring to the signs, not the method of inference

Here I am not sure but my comment would be that I think you are hinting correctly that there are definitely two processes involved in human life:. There is (1) the operation of the canonical faculties, which presents raw perceptual data to us automatically without injection of opinion, and (2) the conceptual reasoning process, where we weigh the evidence and form our opinions, and this is the stage that is not automatic and where our opinions formed can be "right" or "wrong" depending on our method of processing.

In other words, I have always thought that Diogenes Laertius's statement about seeing multiple oxen and then over time forming a picture or definition of an ox is something that definitely does happen - I think that's probably the conceptual reasoning process. But I think that is what I list there as function (2), not function (1), and function (1) is where anticipations and feelings and the 5 senses are in operation. So I think the process Diogenes Laertius is describing does exist and Epicurus talked about it, but what he is describing is not the operation of anticipations, but what we do with the data from anticipations (and from the other 2 legs too).

What we are discussing in the "inference" stage is function 2, where we have the ability to think through the alternative methods of reasoning and improve our understanding of the ways Epicurus is suggesting that we sift and way the evidence.

It seems to me that the canonical faculties are DeWitts "witnesses in court" who are testifying "truthfully" in not giving their own opinion, but sometimes (not always) suffering under having been too far away from the action to see what happened with clarity, so we have to piece together their testimony. Sometimes their testimony is clear and direct with no reason for doubt and we embrace the obvious conclusion with confidence, and sometimes we have to judge prudently and "wait" until more witness testimony is available. Sometimes we have the luxury of waiting for as long as necessary to get more evidence, and sometimes life demands that we go with our best judgement on the available evidence.

The inferential reasoning process is more equivalent to the "jury instructions" that the judge gives to the jury to tell them how to view the evidence and what principles of law to apply. This latter stage is full of opinion and discretion and is where all sorts of things can go right or wrong - but we hold that the best results are obtained when the jury understands the rules of evidence and weighs all the facts carefully without bias or prejudice or artificial rules. That's why our common law system has focused on decisions as to reasonable conduct being made by "a jury of our peers" rather than by trying to get a single "expert" to enforce a "one size fits all" rule.

Quote from Godfrey

Maybe instead of "self-evident" it could be called "evidence from perception"?

YES I agree and think that's far preferable, and more consistent with the way Epicurus seems to be expressing it. Evidence from perception = "evidence from the canonical faculties.". I think the term "perceiving" applies equally to all three legs of the canon. We perceive not only using the five senses but also through the feeling of pleasure and pain and also through the faculty of anticipations.

Quote from Godfrey

If "focusing of thought" is thought of as a non-conscious process, such as light focusing through a lens, that would read similarly to Bailey's "intuitive apprehension", "apprehension" meaning understanding or grasp. This seems to be describing the anticipations if I'm understanding it correctly

And yes again I agree here too.

I am not sure whether you mean Bailey or DeWitt though, because I associate "intuitive" with DeWitts views.

Either way, I have always thought that a key aspect of any leg of the canon must be its "non-rationality" (its automatic functioning) -not its "non-consciousness" - so again I would substitute non-rationality in your sentence there rather than non-conscious.

Quote from Letter To Herodotus

Quote

First of all, Herodotus, we must GRASP the ideas attached to words, in order that we may be able to refer to them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of investigation or reflection, so that we may not either leave everything uncertain and go on explaining to infinity or use words devoid of meaning.

[38] For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be REGARDED and that there should be no need of explanation, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference. And besides we must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate APPREHENSIONS whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgment, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, in order that we may have indications whereby we may judge both the problem of sense perception and the unseen.

Quote

First of all, Herodotus, we must grasp the ideas attached to words, in order that we may be able to refer to them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of investigation or reflection, so that we may not either leave everything uncertain and go on explaining to infinity or use words devoid of meaning.

[38] For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or a mental inference. And besides we must keep all our investigations in accord with our sensations, and in particular with the immediate apprehensions whether of the mind or of any one of the instruments of judgment, and likewise in accord with the feelings existing in us, in order that we may have indications whereby we may judge both the problem of sense perception and the unseen.

From the Torquatus narrative:

Quote from Torquatus

These facts he thinks are simply perceived, just as the fact that fire is hot, snow is white, and honey sweet, no one of which facts are we bound to support by elaborate arguments; it is enough merely to DRAW ATTENTION to the fact; and there is a difference between proof and formal argument on the one hand and a slight hint and DIRECTION OF ATTENTION on the other; the one process reveals to us mysteries and things under a veil, so to speak; the other enables us to PRONOUNCE UPON patent and evident facts.....

Thank you very much Godfrey! All this is extremely helpful and a great step forward in organizing. I particularly like the different translation of Herodotus from Long and Sedley.

In the second post I am going to suggest a tweak to Section One: Somewhere over the years I picked up an aversion to the term "self-evident" - probably because of Jeffersons use of the term in the Declaration to describe a number of assertions that history has shown to be not "self-evident" at all to later generations.

I think the term we are looking for is something more directly related to the force of the evidence and our manner of receiving it - this may in fact be a place where the "ante oculos" term was used by the ancient Epicureans. The words that strike me as more appropriate are more like "plain" and "clear" and "patent" and "obvious" --- with the unstated predicate of "clear to the senses" or "plain to the senses.". I would almost consider the possibility that the legal terms "clear and convincing evidence" and "beyond a reaonable doubt" might be appropriate, particularly if "beyond a reasonable doubt" were defined as something like "a doubt for which one can state a reason ( a reason grounded in evidence from one of the three canonical faculties).

Unless there is some connotation of "self-evident" that has escaped my foggy mind over the years (and that is very possible) it seems to me that Epicurus is focusing on a process of "pointing out to our attention" the thing being considered, and that indeed it is an act of our mind that is involved in paying attention. ... And that's sort of the opposite of being "SELF- evident" which is probably something that might actually contradict the rest of the philosophy. There's "evident to our senses" after we pay attention, but probably not something that is "self-evident" without our act of attention. (In sum, the "self" part being the problem.)

If I recall correctly both the letter to Herodotus and the Torquatus section on Epicurus explaining his observation that please need no logical argument that both seem to highly the issue of "paying attention."

What do you think about that?

Episode 113 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today we continue our discussion of the Letter to Herodotus with a discussion of principles of clear thinking.

Yes I am leaning toward the second outline, and I agree with your last comment.

You used the word "mediated" - i might prefer something like "processed through"....

Also Godfrey I meant to type this earlier:

We need to look at the first half of Book 4 as to the processing of images, and how to deal with illusions. I think that gives us concrete examples of how the data from the senses has to be "processed" in order to form valid opinions, and that process is I think what we are talking about.

Quote from Godfrey

To my understanding, the type of logic that doesn't connect to canonic data is not really a part of Epicurus' philosophy and doesn't belong in the outline.

And to repeat - yes, i agree with that conclusion that it doesn't belong in the outline, any more than would "divine revelation." As to it being a part of Epicurean philosophy, it's a part only insofar as it is discussed as something to affirmatively reject.

Quote from Godfrey

s to placing "MOI" in an outline, it shouldn't be in the canon as it's not direct experience

Godfrey I am not sure this is a correct inference. The Canon would (I think) include discussion of the "methods of processing" of the data that comes through the canon. The raw data doesn't mean anything on its own, but I am not sure I would separate out the raw data from the immediate methods of processing it.

I am thinking that the problem with "logic" is the type of logic that doesn't ever connect to these three sets of data. The manner of processing the data correctly, however, might well be called "epicurean logic" or "epicurean reasoning." Not saying that definitely but I think it's a possibility