Posts by Cassius

So the Epicurus wiki puts preconceptions there but the others do not? Possible to tell why?

That must be where once long ago I thought I read that.

To elaborate more on what we need, we have layers and layers of commentary like this one from the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy:

Quote

The latter point holds especially for the objects of philosophical knowledge that Plato later on in the dialogue (103e) refers to as “Forms.” Here Forms are mentioned for what is perhaps the first time in Plato’s dialogues: the Just itself, the Beautiful, and the Good; Bigness, Health, and Strength; and “in a word, the reality of all other things, that which each of them essentially is” (65d). They are best approached not by sense perception but by pure thought alone. These entities are granted again without argument by Simmias and Cebes, and are discussed in more detail later. .

All told, then, the body is a constant impediment to philosophers in their search for truth: “It fills us with wants, desires, fears, all sorts of illusions and much nonsense, so that, as it is said, in truth and in fact no thought of any kind ever comes to us from the body” (66c). To have pure knowledge, therefore, philosophers must escape from the influence of the body as much as is possible in this life. Philosophy itself is, in fact, a kind of “training for dying” (67e), a purification of the philosopher’s soul from its bodily attachment.

But unless we can marshal and command reliable and convincing quotes in our discussions, our arguments will seem less than convincing.

We need a series of quotes that are so clear as to the differences between Epicurus and Plato (and to pin down the others too is desirable) that the issue is beyond dispute and absolutely clear even to the newer student.

Thank you for posting that Joshua. We ran into a number of complicated issues in this podcast that I think we could greatly improve on, so I will try to get this one edited in time for posting and review by others a little more quickly than usual.

We particularly ran into difficulty in describing in summary terms the differences between Plato and Epicurus in terms of their attitude toward the senses. I think all of us are pretty familiar with the emphasis that Epicurus placed on it, but I wasn't prepared to cite chapter and verse on Plato or Aristotle, and without a firm point of reference it is not easy to illustrate the point.

I will trot out my usual cite to the appendix by DeLacy on Philodemus' On Methods of Inference, but we need specific quotes to make the issue more clear.

Much more needs to be done on this issue so when we produce the final edited product I will find a way to make clear that we are not the last word especially on these other philosophers, so we need to marshal our cites in better form.

The audio recording of Session Eight of our Book Review of A Few Days In Athens (this week on Chapter Seven) is now available:

The audio version of this episode is coming up soon. As I edit it I want to draw attention to a point made by Kevin after the twenty minute mark that the Stoics were arguing that "pursuit of pleasure can be dangerous for an Epicurean, but for a Stoic, pursuit of virtue can never be dangerous - so ovbiously pursuit of pleasure can never be part of pursuit of virtue."

It's an interesting point that bears further discussion as to its implications.

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Fifteen of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world, and to Epicurus, the founder of the Epicurean School.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

Today we continue our review of Epicurus' letter to Herodotus, and we move further into fundamental physics.

Now let's join Martin reading today's text:

Bailey:

Moreover, the universe is bodies and space: for that bodies exist, sense itself witnesses in the experience of all men, and in accordance with the evidence of sense we must of necessity judge of the imperceptible by reasoning, as I have already said.

[40] And if there were not that which we term void and place and intangible existence, bodies would have nowhere to exist and nothing through which to move, as they are seen to move. And besides these two, nothing can even be thought of either by conception or on the analogy of things conceivable such as could be grasped as whole existences and not spoken of as the accidents or properties of such existences. Furthermore, among bodies some are compounds, and others those of which compounds are formed.

[41] And these latter are indivisible and unalterable (if, that is, all things are not to be destroyed into the non-existent, but something permanent is to remain behind at the dissolution of compounds): they are completely solid in nature, and can by no means be dissolved in any part. So it must needs be that the first beginnings are indivisible corporeal existences.

Moreover, the universe is boundless. For that which is bounded has an extreme point: and the extreme point is seen against something else. So that as it has no extreme point, it has no limit; and as it has no limit, it must be boundless and not bounded.

[42] Furthermore, the infinite is boundless both in the number of the bodies and in the extent of the void. For if on the one hand the void were boundless, and the bodies limited in number, the bodies could not stay anywhere, but would be carried about and scattered through the infinite void, not having other bodies to support them and keep them in place by means of collisions. But if, on the other hand, the void were limited, the infinite bodies would not have room wherein to take their place.

Besides this the indivisible and solid bodies, out of which too the compounds are created and into which they are dissolved, have an incomprehensible number of varieties in shape: for it is not possible that such great varieties of things should arise from the same atomic shapes, if they are limited in number. And so in each shape the atoms are quite infinite in number, but their differences of shape are not quite infinite, but only incomprehensible in number.

[43] And the atoms move continuously for all time, some of them falling straight down, others swerving, and others recoiling from their collisions. And of the latter, some are borne on, separating to a long distance from one another, while others again recoil and recoil, whenever they chance to be checked by the interlacing with others, or else shut in by atoms interlaced around them.

[44] For on the one hand the nature of the void which separates each atom by itself brings this about, as it is not able to afford resistance, and on the other hand the hardness which belongs to the atoms makes them recoil after collision to as great a distance as the interlacing permits separation after the collision. And these motions have no beginning, since the atoms and the void are the cause.

[45] These brief sayings, if all these points are borne in mind, afford a sufficient outline for our understanding of the nature of existing things.

HICKS

Further this he says also in the Larger Epitome near the beginning and in his First Book "On Nature", the whole of being consists of bodies and space. For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known.

[40] And if there were no space (which we call also void and place and intangible nature), bodies would have nothing in which to be and through which to move, as they are plainly seen to move. Beyond bodies and space there is nothing which by mental apprehension or on its analogy we can conceive to exist. When we speak of bodies and space, both are regarded as wholes or separate things, not as the properties or accidents of separate things.

Again he repeats this in the First Book and in Books XIV. and XV. of the work "On Nature" and in the Larger Epitome, of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made.

[41] These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved. It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities.

Again, the sum of things is infinite. For what is finite has an extremity, and the extremity of anything is discerned only by comparison with something else. (Now the sum of things is not discerned by comparison with anything else: hence, since it has no extremity, it has no limit; and, since it has no limit, it must be unlimited or infinite.

[42] Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void. For if the void were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through the infinite void, not having any supports or counter-checks to send them back on their upward rebound. Again, if the void were finite, the infinity of bodies would not have anywhere to be.

Furthermore, the atoms, which have no void in them – out of which composite bodies arise and into which they are dissolved – vary indefinitely in their shapes; for so many varieties of things as we see could never have arisen out of a recurrence of a definite number of the same shapes. The like atoms of each shape are absolutely infinite; but the variety of shapes, though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite. For neither does the divisibility go on "ad infinitum," he says below; but he adds, since the qualities change, unless one is prepared to keep enlarging their magnitudes also simply "ad infinitum."

[43] The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity. Further, he says below, that the atoms move with equal speed, since the void makes way for the lightest and heaviest alike. Some of them rebound to a considerable distance from each other, while others merely oscillate in one place when they chance to have got entangled or to be enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.

[44] This is because each atom is separated from the rest by void, which is incapable of offering any resistance to the rebound; while it is the solidity of the atom which makes it rebound after a collision, however short the distance to which it rebounds, when it finds itself imprisoned in a mass of entangling atoms. Of all this there is no beginning, since both atoms and void exist from everlasting. He says below that atoms have no quality at all except shape, size, and weight. But that colour varies with the arrangement of the atoms he states in his "Twelve Rudiments"; further, that they are not of any and every size; at any rate no atom has ever been seen by our sense.

[45] The repetition at such length of all that we are now recalling to mind furnishes an adequate outline for our conception of the nature of things.

YONGE

"Further [this he says also in the Larger Epitome near the beginning and in his First Book "On Nature"], the whole of being consists of bodies and space. For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known.

[40] And if there were no space (which we call also void and place and intangible nature), bodies would have nothing in which to be and through which to move, as they are plainly seen to move. Beyond bodies and space there is nothing which by mental apprehension or on its analogy we can conceive to exist. When we speak of bodies and space, both are regarded as wholes or separate things, not as the properties or accidents of separate things. "Again [he repeats this in the First Book and in Books XIV. and XV. of the work "On Nature" and in the Larger Epitome], of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made.

[41] These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved. It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities. "Again, the sum of things is infinite. For what is finite has an extremity, and the extremity of anything is discerned only by comparison with something else. (Now the sum of things is not discerned by comparison with anything else: hence, since it has no extremity, it has no limit; and, since it has no limit, it must be unlimited or infinite.

[42] Moreover, the sum of things is unlimited both by reason of the multitude of the atoms and the extent of the void.

For if the void were infinite and bodies finite, the bodies would not have stayed anywhere but would have been dispersed in their course through the infinite void, not having any supports or counter-checks to send them back on their upward rebound. Again, if the void were finite, the infinity of bodies would not have anywhere to be. "Furthermore, the atoms, which have no void in them - out of which composite bodies arise and into which they are dissolved - vary indefinitely in their shapes; for so many varieties of things as we see could never have arisen out of a recurrence of a definite number of the same shapes. The like atoms of each shape are absolutely infinite; but the variety of shapes, though indefinitely large, is not absolutely infinite.

[For neither does the divisibility go on "ad infinitum," he says below; but he adds, since the qualities change, unless one is prepared to keep enlarging their magnitudes also simply "ad infinitum."]

[43] "The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity. [Further, he says below, that the atoms move with equal speed, since the void makes way for the lightest and heaviest alike.] Some of them rebound to a considerable distance from each other, while others merely oscillate in one place when they chance to have got entangled or to be enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.

[44] This is because each atom is separated from the rest by void, which is incapable of offering any resistance to the rebound; while it is the solidity of the atom which makes it rebound after a collision, however short the distance to which it rebounds, when it finds itself imprisoned in a mass of entangling atoms. Of all this there is no beginning, since both atoms and void exist from everlasting. [He says below that atoms have no quality at all except shape, size, and weight. But that colour varies with the arrangement of the atoms he states in his "Twelve Rudiments"; further, that they are not of any and every size; at any rate no atom has ever been seen by our sense.]

[45] The repetition at such length of all that we are now recalling to mind furnishes an adequate outline for our conception of the nature of things.

Episode 114 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today we continue our discussion of the Letter to Herodotus with first principles of Physics.

Episode 114 will be out soon (later today). In final editing, I am finding that I think we have significantly more work to do on the topic discussed near the end of the podcast, which is the line:

Quote

Furthermore, the universe always was such as it is now, and always will be the same. For there is nothing into which it changes: for outside the universe there is nothing which could come into it and bring about the change.

We (correctly I think) discussed this as an example of Epicurus reasoning at a "logical" rather than "empirical" level, but I am not sure by the end of the podcast we had put this in perspective of how much of Epicurean physics follows exactly this course (reasoning from what is observable to draw things that are not observable). We're pretty comfortable that atoms are an example of things we can't see and yet we draw firm conclusions about, but in dealing with this conclusion (that there is nothing outside the universe which can come into it) we probably need to spend more time discussing what level of confidence Epicurus placed in this conclusion. Our discussion may not have been clear enough in bringing out that issue of level of confidence.

I'm not sure that what I am noting here deserves specific backtracking to cover more in the next episode, but I wanted this note here in case someone listening to the podcast also makes the same observation that this issue probably needs further treatment as part of our development of discussion of Epicurean logic.

Today (March 24th), we moved to the Home Page a section that was formerly on the "Visitors" page.

The box that appeared near to the top of the page with a link to the Dashboard has now been replaced by a DASH entry in the very top menu.

Let us know if the changes cause any problems in your navigation or use of the page.

It probably makes sense to continue to suggest to people that after they get familiar with the home page they bookmark the DASHBOARD page as the best place to return to find all the latest content.

You can always return to the HOME page by clicking the main logo, which continues to appear at the top of every page.

Quote from Don

do I remember mention somewhere of Epicurus approving music but not dance or some such thing (other than than "I can't imagine the good without... pleasing movements, etc.")?

Hmmm at the moment I cannot confirm your memory there, and given the previous identification of the good by one of the earlier guys as "smooth motion" which seems to fit the atomism paradigm, I am thinking he probably didn't disapprove of dancing in any kind of general way -- probably the opposite in fact - and I don't recall any specific denunciation of it either. Maybe there's a passing reference in Lucretius to not liking aspects of some of the mystery cults which contained wild out-of-control dancing? But at the moment I can't even confirm that.

Quote from Nate

Perhaps Epicurus took the best of the public gatherings while quietly rejecting the intellectual propositions of the priests?)

I have to think that you are 100% right on this. Those sentences in Diogenes Laertius are far too slender for us to read into it that he wholesale embraced all sorts of religious mysteries just for the sake of a good time at their meetings. He was teaching that those views weren't just wrong, but impious, so you have to be right.

Thanks for the effort involved in composing that. Strikes me as a very logical and fundamentally Epicurean viewpoint.

Quote from Matt

I do hold that sincerity of belief is important to trusting the rest of a person’s character. If perhaps Epicurus was acting in a manner that fit the description held by his opponents, that he was merely hiding a form of atheism while constructing a false theology that allowed for him to remain in good standing with the pious Greeks, then that would cause the rest of his system to be called into question in my opinion. That would be a very troubling situation. But I don’t believe he did that.

Yes that's my view almost exactly. Other philosophers were known to be atheist, and I have a very hard time believing that Epicurus could not himself have found a living situation somewhere - outside of Athens if necessary - where he could teach his views with complete honesty. That means that if he chose to stay in Athens for simple convenience or for the "good life" that it offered, at the expense of being honest with his students, he would be open to charges of the worst kind of hypocrisy. He wasn't hemmed in by some of the scientific views that we think hem us in today.

It appears to me that Epicurus thought that there was nothing at all contradictory to science about gods being made of a form of atoms that they could replenish, any more than that anything contradicted the view that life exists at other places throughout the universe. We don't have to accept the same viewpoint today if we think that there's some scientific fact that contradicts it, but there's no reason to impute modern concerns about the limits of life in the rest of the universe back in time to Epicurus.

A lot of this comes down to the issue of "philosophy" vs "science" and their relative roles, as we've discussed before here on the forum and if I recall maybe even in this thread. I don't think it's necessary to take sides, and I think they both can be reconciled, but I think what Epicurus was warning against in his day, and it still applies today, that it is very tempting for some people to take "science" and make speculative claims that can't be reconciled with sound "philosophy," and whenever that happens a lot of warning bells ought to go off in our minds.

You mean like a "yard light" or "There's a light on outside that darn window and I can't get to sleep"?

I completely agree Don and I am sorry if I was unclear. We generally talk in terms of two possibilities as to whether the gods are "real" or not, and I can live with either one, but regardless of that in either case they DO serve the purposes you list, and I did not mean to imply that dispensing with those purposes is possible.

I do my best Pacatus - thank you for the kind words.

Lest anyone think, however, that I am in danger of retiring the helmet, I should probably clarify and say this:

I've never felt that the "gods" issue is the hill to die on (so to speak) in working toward a reconstituted Epicurean philosophic school. As long as everyone understands that there are no supernatural gods out there creating universes and meddling in human life, that's the great majority of the issue right there. Further, most people don't seem to have a problem in accepting the Epicurean view that there is other life in the universe besides ours, some of which is likely to be higher and some lower than us. That's most of the rest of the way to what Epicurus pretty clearly taught, and whatever is left for dispute doesn't really end up in much different a place whether the "gods" we're talking about literally exist or not.

Unfortunately, I don't expect to ever put the helmet permanently in retirement, because I do think that there will always remain "hills to die on" for the EpicureanFriends project. Those hills are primarily in the lands that border "Stoicism," and in the tendency that some have to want to blend Epicurus with semi-mystical views that are close to Stoicism or even Buddhism. Even in mentioning Stoicism and Buddhism, I know that many of us have been through one or both of those schools, so even those of us who are now the most "fundamentalist" should know from experience that it will always be necessary to be tolerant of people who need time to study and reflect on the differences.

In the end though, we can expect (and this sounds like the discussion of Epicurus and Zeno in chapter seven of AFDIA that we discussed last Sunday) that in the future there will be calls to water down what we're doing here. There will always be a well-intentioned incentive to be more inclusive of those who want to maintain strong posittions (Stoic and Buddhist are only two of many) that amount to rejections of core Epicurean views.

I hope to be around a long time to take care of those issues as they arise, but what I would remind everyone in the future is that the purpose of this forum is not to be a general philosophical forum for everyone regardless of viewpoint. Theree many other and better places for that. The purpose of the EpicureanFriends forum is to provide a place where those who really are convinced of the prudence of the core Epicurean positions to work together for the continuance of the school. Because I think the core Epicurean view is correct, I see no conflict at all between the goals of continuing to follow Epicurus, the goal of the pursuit of the truth, and the goal of pursuing the best possible life.

But we know that given human nature there are always going to be disagreements about how to define and pursue those goals. We have to be prepared to respect the right and desire of others to go off in different directions, just as we need to work in a friendly but firm way to preserve the path that we've staked out here.

A very constructive post Pacatus and it is good to have you back again!

I recall one of DeWitt's comments being to the effect that Epicurean philosophy faded away when the arguments around it faded away, so perhaps even in the most unbridgeable of disagreements (which this one is not, by any stretch, unbridgeable) we gain from the energy that is generated.

If it prompted you to reappear and post then I am glad even if we aren't in the most complete possible agreement!

Thank you for responding BeberH - and welcome!