Posts by Cassius

This is a thread to work toward a summary of "General principles of deception detection." At this point the purpose of the thread would be to collect and comment on good sources which discuss techniques for detecting deception. The thread can go in many directions but largely in the spirit of this from Lucian's "Alexander the Oracle Monger," to collect advice and methods for evaluating credibility and detecting fraud:

Quote from Lucian

And at this point, my dear Celsus, we may, if we will be candid, make some allowance for these Paphlagonians and Pontics; the poor uneducated “fat-heads” might well be taken in when they handled the serpent—a privilege conceded to all who choose—and saw in that dim light its head with the mouth that opened and shut. It was an occasion for a Democritus, nay, for an Epicurus or a Metrodorus, perhaps, a man whose intelligence was steeled against such assaults by skepticism and insight, one who, if he could not detect the precise imposture, would at any rate have been perfectly certain that, though this escaped him, the whole thing was a lie and an impossibility.

and this from Lucretius Book One:

Quote from Lucretius

You may, Yourself, some time or other, feel like turning Away from my instruction, terrified By priestly rant. How many fantasies They can invent to overturn your sense Of logic, muddle your estates by fear! And rightly so, for if we ever saw A limit to our troubles, we'd be strong, Resisters of religion, rant and cant, But as things are, we have no chance at all With all their everlasting punishments waiting us after death.

For example, the United States Ninth Circuit has this list of instructions given to jurors in evaluating the credibility of witnesses in criminal cases: https://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/node/343

3.9 CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES

In deciding the facts in this case, you may have to decide which testimony to believe and which testimony not to believe. You may believe everything a witness says, or part of it, or none of it.

In considering the testimony of any witness, you may take into account:

(1) the opportunity and ability of the witness to see or hear or know the things testified to;

(2) the witness’s memory;

(3) the witness’s manner while testifying;

(4) the witness’s interest in the outcome of the case, if any;

(5) the witness’s bias or prejudice, if any;

(6) whether other evidence contradicted the witness’s testimony;

(7) the reasonableness of the witness’s testimony in light of all the evidence; and

(8) any other factors that bear on believability.

Sometimes a witness may say something that is not consistent with something else he or she said. Sometimes different witnesses will give different versions of what happened. People often forget things or make mistakes in what they remember. Also, two people may see the same event but remember it differently. You may consider these differences, but do not decide that testimony is untrue just because it differs from other testimony.

However, if you decide that a witness has deliberately testified untruthfully about something important, you may choose not to believe anything that witness said. On the other hand, if you think the witness testified untruthfully about some things but told the truth about others, you may accept the part you think is true and ignore the rest.

The weight of the evidence as to a fact does not necessarily depend on the number of witnesses who testify. What is important is how believable the witnesses were, and how much weight you think their testimony deserves.

Quote from Don

I suppose you could state that out of the gate then give reasons for it.

Yes I think that's generally the best way. Try to make a clear statement, and then explain it, rather than go from question to question to question as Socrates does in the Platonic dialogues.

I think partly I am analyzing this as a lawyer, where the rules of court generally are that the judge will sometimes tell the witness (when the question is appropriate) to "Answer yes or no, and then you can explain your answer...."

And partly I am trying to analyze this from an "ordinary person" standard, which is where we generally want to be proficient in talking (as opposed to talking within professional philosophy settings). We can't help normal people if they can't understand what we are talking about.

It's not a question of being more or less accurate, because it's possible to state the issue in understandable terms, as Lucretius does in Book 4. Or as Diogenes of Oinoanda does when he says that we admit that there is a flux, but it is no so fast that we are not able to comprehend it. Maybe the issue is one of "rhetoric" but that's another example of a word which has connotations that have overcome the word's usefulness.

It's certainly possible to debate the question of knowledge into oblivion, but I think Epicurus has his finger on a very practical problem. The "priests" succeed in their manipulations in many cases precisely because they have convinced normal people that the questions and answers are too complicated for them to understand. The only way out of that box is to begin to unwind the issues involved in what "understanding" is in the first place so that people can "resist the threats of the priests."

Quote from Diogenes of Oinoanda

Fr. 5

[Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] natural science as unnecessary, being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science? After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find?

Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.

I've always liked this phrase in particular: "After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find?"

The goal of the priests is to discourage people from even questioning them, and they succeed when they convince people that no answers and no knowledge is even possible. If you can never know anything, never be sure of anything, never be certain of anything - then why bother questioning authority in the first place?

It's interesting to think about what terms to talk in. When Don says:

Quote from Don

Are we talking about an actual place of fire and brimstone inhabited by condemned souls existing after death in the Christian mythology?

I'd have to say that I have no reason to believe such a "place" exists in the universe other than in the context of Christian mythology. My experience of the universe demonstrates to me - to high degree of confidence - that there is no supernatural overlord - either benevolent or malicious - dealing out punishment. My experience also demonstrates to me that I am no more than my physical parts working in unison and out of that comes my consciousness. When I die, and my physical parts dissolve back into atoms and void, there's not going to be any thing - there will be no thing - which would or could be sent to a place like this Christian figment of the imagination.

.... most reasonable people (98%?) are going to interpret that as as clear answer, and they are going to say to themselves and to each other (when talking about Don).... "Don is certain hell does not exist / Don takes the position that he knows that hell does not exist."

We as people sensitive to philosophical niceties shy away from terms like "know" and "are certain" because we don't like the philosophical sparring that goes along with those terms in philosophical contexts, But I would wager that most of the world does not think like that. And borrowing the terminology from Seneca they are looking to us for answers that they can understand, not riddles where we seem like we are evading giving a direct answer for reasons they cannot understand.

I think that's where Epicurus was willing to go considerably further than people in modern philosophical discussions are willing to go. He was standing up to Pyrrho and Socrates and he was willing to directly assert that it is possible to have confidence in knowledge and to say that indeed there are things that you "know" to be true -- even though you haven't been there or seen it for yourself. (When we think Epicurean confidence in atoms - which the Epicureans never saw or touched - it's kind of funny to be even having this discussion about taking firm positions on things we can't sense directly. Of course Epicureans were confident about things they had never experienced - and could never experience - except through indirect evidence!)

We're talking here in this thread in the abstract, and not about particular conversations with particular people. The context is going to determine the best wording. But the point of this thread, and the real point of the epicurean manner of argument it seems to me, is that it is possible to have confidence in the core conclusions of Epicurus and for Epicureans to say that they "know" that pleasure and pain are the ultimate guides, that there is no life after death, etc. etc. And in the proper context, even to say to ourselves or to other people that we are "certain" of them.

We crossposted again and i added more:

Quote from Cassius

Or are you trying to drown me in a sea of words and answer questions with questions and leave me unsatisfied like that gadfly Socrates?"

And the youth might ask in reply: "And so, kind sir, are you telling me that all this adds up to your telling me that you are certain, and that you know, that there is no hell? Or are you trying to drown me in a sea of words and answer questions with questions and leave me unsatisfied like that gadfly Socrates?"

Quote from Don

You say "You've never been there." Again, I would ask "Where would I go to visit this place?" My senses and experience and reason tell me that there is no immortal soul that exists after I am dead. You say this "Hell" is a place of punishment potentially for me and for those who do evil in the world. But if I do not exist after I die - and I see no evidence that I do - how can this Hell-place affect me? Even if it does exist, who dwells in it? Spirits without bodies? And if they have bodies, where do they stand? If they are Spirit, they can have no effect on me now, while I am alive. And once I'm dead, I no longer exist for them to have an affect on me. If you say I've never there, you would be correct, because, to my understanding of the universe, there is no "there" to go to.

Probably the Latin for this jab from Cicero in "On The Nature of the Gods" is also going to be relevant:

Hereupon Velleius began, in the confident manner (I need not say) that is customary with Epicureans, afraid of nothing so much as lest he should appear to have doubts about anything. One would have supposed he had just come down from the assembly of the gods in the intermundane spaces of Epicurus!

I will see if i can find the Latin.....

Here it is: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…%3Asection%3D18

18] Tum Velleius fidenter sane, ut solent isti, nihil tam verens quam ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur, tamquam modo ex deorum concilio et ex Epicuri intermundiis descendisset, “Audite” inquit “non futtilis commenticiasque sententias, non opificem aedificatoremque mundi Platonis de Timaeo deum, nec anum fatidicam Stoicorum Pronoeam, quam Latine licet Providentiam dicere, neque vero mundum ipsum animo et sensibus praeditum rutundum ardentem volubilem deum, portenta et miracula non disserentium philosophorum sed somniantium.

Interlinear translation: https://nodictionaries.com/novifex?text=1…et%2C+%E2%80%9C

So for 'certain' we are talking "certo"?

"You don't know there's no hell - and there's no way you can be certain - because you've never been there!"

Is that really a trump-card argument that should stymie an Epicurean into saying, "Well gee I guess you're right!"

No I don't think so.

Nor is it sufficient as a general rule to say "We can never be sure of anything. Life is only a matter of probabilities." [Yes that's sufficient for those who are committed to be professional skeptics. I have to wonder how large a percentage of the world's population that is. I doubt it's 10% and it's probably a lot less.]

And if those aren't sufficient answers, and if Epicurean philosophy is open to and can be grasped by everyone who is of normal intelligence (as I think we all agree, which applies to everyone expect possibly very small children and those with true mental issues) then we have to be able to articulate an understandable theory of what it means to know something -- just as it appears the ancient Epicureans were doing in rebelling against Socrates/Plato and Pyrrho.

I think I understand and I do respect where you are coming from on "certainty" Pacatus. I think the question of wording has to depend on the audience we are addressing at a particular time, much as Don referenced in his recent post in this thread.

Due to the corruption of language there doesn't seem to be a way to get around the need to explain our terms pretty much no matter what term we use.

In this section of Lucretius there are no doubt various words that could be used to convey the intended meaning......

But the anxiety that the skeptics will have with these formulations will always be present too, and I am afraid that is a problem that can be improved with explanations, but can't be addressed by using the same words with all audiences. And if the skeptics cling to a P=1.0 requirement for holding that there is no hell -- and no doubt some will! - then I am afraid they are providing exactly the type of example of a self-limitation on happiness that Epicurus is warning against.

I think he is pointing to brown translation here:

Lastly, if anyone thinks that he knows nothing, he cannot be sure that he knows this, when he confesses that he knows nothing at all. I shall avoid disputing with such a trifler, who perverts all things, and like a tumbler with his head prone to the earth, can go no otherwise than backwards. And yet allow that he knows this, I would ask (since he had nothing before to lead him into such a knowledge) whence he had the notion what it was to know, or not to know; what it was that gave him an idea of Truth or Falsehood, and what taught him to distinguish between doubt and certainty?

that would be around line 469

This is Bailey:

[469] Again, if any one thinks that nothing is known, he knows not whether that can be known either, since he admits that he knows nothing. Against him then I will refrain from joining issue, who plants himself with his head in the place of his feet. And yet were I to grant that he knows this too, yet I would ask this one question; since he has never before seen any truth in things, whence does he know what is knowing, and not knowing each in turn, what thing has begotten the concept of the true and the false, what thing has proved that the doubtful differs from the certain?

Pacatus you are approaching this exactly the way I appreciate detailed scientist to do, and that analysis will help inform whatever conclusions need to be reached. I think you're saying this yourself and therefore you won't take offense to note that this kind of approach is just totally beyond the reach of the "average man" who has need of guidance for living today - in the moment - and who will never be able to appreciate half of where you are coming from.

There is a segment of people who are into such calculations as you are discussing who will take the position: "Well the masses will never understand what I am talking about so they just need to listen to ME!: That's an attitude that I think well describes most "priestly classes."

But I think the reason you and most of us are interested in Epicurus is because we recognize that real people need a real and effective approach by which to guide their lives, and implying to them that nothing can be reduced to a P=1.0 certainty is not relevant to their lives or thought processes. Many of them when faced with such a discussion will simply conclude that what is being asserted is that nothing is knowable and that they should just give up trying to make sense of anything -- which is to play into the hands of the aforesaid priestly class, whether they are priests of Yahweh or priests of "science."

So that leads back to the question of how to understand and appreciate Epicurus' perspective on this, which was apprently understood by the people of his time to be a combination of skeptical questioning of all claims of authority combined with a common sense attitude that certain decisions do have to be made with confidence, and that we do the best we can to make the best decisions we can without holding ourselves up to unrealistic expectations. What I perceive, and what I think Epicurus was also perceiving and saying, is that the pendulum can swing too far in the direction of skepticism leading to nihilism, and that it is necessary to articulate a common sense and usable approach to knowledge formation which allows for happy living.

So that seems to me to be the direction that these discussions need to proceed. By all means we take the input from all of the complicated abstractions to which we can gain access and on which we can draw upon, but that in the end we articulate an understandable technique for trusting the senses and making the everyday decisions with confidence that allow us to live happily -- rather than take the position of a Socrates and play games with the idea that we know nothing except that we know nothing.

Quote from Lucretius Book IV

Many more things of this kind we observe and wonder at, which attempt to overthrow the certainty of our senses, but to no purpose - for things of this sort generally deceive us upon account of the judgment of the mind which we apply to them, and so we conclude we see things which we really do not; for nothing is more difficult than to distinguish things clear and plain from such as are doubtful, to which the mind is ready to add its assent, as it is inclined to believe everything imparted by the senses.

Lastly, if anyone thinks that he knows nothing, he cannot be sure that he knows this, when he confesses that he knows nothing at all. I shall avoid disputing with such a trifler, who perverts all things, and like a tumbler with his head prone to the earth, can go no otherwise than backwards. And yet allow that he knows this, I would ask (since he had nothing before to lead him into such a knowledge) whence he had the notion what it was to know, or not to know; what it was that gave him an idea of Truth or Falsehood, and what taught him to distinguish between doubt and certainty? But you will find that knowledge of truth is originally derived from the senses, nor can the senses be contradicted, for whatever is able by the evidence of an opposite truth to convince the senses of falsehood, must be something of greater certainty than they. But what can deserve greater credit than the senses require from us?

Will reason, derived from erring sense, claim the privilege to contradict it? Reason – that depends wholly upon the senses,which unless you allow to be true, all reason must be false. Can the ears correct the eyes? Or the touch the ears? Or will taste confute the touch? Or shall the nose or eyes convince the rest? This, I think, cannot be, for every sense has a separate faculty of its own, each has its distinct powers; and therefore an object, soft or hard, hot or cold, must necessarily be distinguished as soft or hard, hot or cold, by one sense separately, that is, the touch. It is the sole province of another, the sight, to perceive the colors of things, and the several properties that belong to them. The taste has a distinct office. Odors particularly affect the smell, and sound the ears. And therefore it cannot be that one sense should correct another, nor can the same sense correct itself, since an equal credit ought to be given to each; and therefore whatever the senses at any time discover to us must be certain.

And though reason is not able to assign a cause why an object that is really four-square when near, should appear round when seen at a distance; yet, if we cannot explain this difficulty, it is better to give any solution, even a false one, than to deliver up all Certainty out of our power, to break in upon our first principle of belief, and tear up all foundations upon which our life and security depend. For not only all reason must be overthrown, but life itself must be immediately extinguished, unless you give credit to your senses. These direct you to fly from a precipice and other evils of this sort which are to be avoided, and to pursue what tends to your security. All therefore is nothing more than an empty parade of words that can be offered against the certainty of sense.

Lastly, as in a building, if the principle rule of the artificer be not true, if his line be not exact, or his level bear in to the least to either side, every thing must needs be wrong and crooked, the whole fabric must be ill-shaped, declining, hanging over, leaning and irregular, so that some parts will seem ready to fall and tumble down, because the whole was at first disordered by false principles. So the reason of things must of necessity be wrong and false which is founded upon a false representation of the senses.

Here's another way of saying it:

If we run into people who say "I am washing in the blood of the lamb and therefore I am certain that I will spend an eternity in heaven...." it is not the concept of "certainty" that we should question, but the sanity of the person making such a statement!

So I don't think we let the existence of people who misuse a legitimate concept such as "certainty" or "confidence" (both of which we need to be clear in defining) drive us away from using legitimate concepts. That's much the same way that Epicurus did not let supernatural religion drive him away from referring to "gods."

If we allow those things to happen we really do end up throwing the babies out with the bathwater.

And I don't mean to be demeaning even to the people who talk about being washed in the blood of the lamb. Many good people are confused or have been deceived through no real fault on their own, and the process of communicating with such people and hopefully improving such situations revolves around being able to explain when and when it is not appropriate to have confidence in things. "I don't know" is sometimes all we have, but it's not ALWAYS all we have.

I don't think you have overshot the question and I appreciate your engaging on it because I do think it needs to be discussed at length as part of Epicurean discussions. I don't think we ultimately disagree but I am pushing the envelope for purposes of clarifying the "skepticism vs dogmatism" issue and so we can work toward clarifying Epicurus' position in way that normal people can understand. And that will mean as future discussions proceed to try to foreswear use of terms such as "ontological certainty" or other "big words" that these discussions often involved, but that ordinary people can't understand.

I see the issue as revolving more around the issue of thinking that there is in fact a standard of "infallibility" that is derived from a theological viewpoint. I don't think that it is a contradiction to take both the position "I am certain sugar is sweet" and "there might be some context hitherto unknown to me in which sugar is not sweet." The issue comes down to "must I experience everything in the universe to be "certain" of anything? And the answer to that in all practical terms is "no."

Now maybe the issue comes down as it often does to the meaning of words, and someone wants to say "Only god can truly be certain of anything because only HE is omnipotent and omniscient and omnipresent." If that is the definition of the word "certain" that is required to be used then the word is useless because such a being does not exist.

But in our real world we often use the word "certain" and "confident" to mean things that sound like "human certainty" without requiring omniscience and omnipotence and omnipresence. That too seems to me to be a legitimate use of vocabulary and something that Epicurus was in fact saying is a valid concept for humans to maintain about many things in life.

Are there in fact some people for whom it creates anxiety to think that they are not certain of everything in the godlike sense? Certainly there are, but those people are operating with an invalid standard of what it can possibly mean to be certain as a human being, and as such they need to be disabused of their false notion of certainty - not disabused of the idea that there are in fact many things in life that they can be confident to the point of "certainty" about.

Quote from Pacatus

And, for me personally, once I let go of a perceived need for certainty, a lot of prior anxiety fell away too.

I skimmed some of this but I don't think my comment here is a disagreement. Before *letting go of certainty" the question should be asked "what do we mean by certainty?" And is that the same as confidence. Much of the problem with "certainty" I think resolves when we dig into what is meant by that term and what reasonable to seek. There is a lot of distance between being confident in major issues vs being totally uncertain of everything, and it is hard to even talk intelligently about the subject without defining some parameters of what is confidence vs what is foolhardiness.

This also gets very close to the issue on which Licretius / Epicurus take a firm position as to the possibility of knowledge in book 4 (they of course say that knowledge IS possible).

Don before I go back to Pan can you summarize where you are currently or point me to the right post?

I don't think there is a specific one and that would be good to start

I think this is covered by the texts (such as Alexander the Oracle monger) which discuss detecting fraud, and that gives us a lot to talk about. Extending this too far in terms of contemporary political issues will get us in trouble with our forum rules so I would advise against going that direction and instead stay on the generic level of how we detect imposition in gernal and how we deal with who should be trusted and who not, and related issues of bias and prejudice, at a general level. There's probably plenty to explore there without crossing swords on exactly who is a trusted source and on what topic in 2022. But in general even there the reasons why some will disagree (even here) on who should be trusted and who not can be explored dispassionately I think.

Not all who call out the name of Jesus are Christians, as the saying goes, and not all who speak in the name of "science" or "fairness" or " objectivity" can be trusted either. How do we make these distinctions? Is it purely or primarily or even partly a matter of consensus, or can in fact consensus be the enemy of truth, as Galileo might say? When do we know when to follow consensus and when not?

Sorry to muddy the water but Pan has responded back to me:

Hi from Athens.

Panagiotis

28 Jan 2023

-------------------

We have quite a long thread but scrolling back to Nate's chart this is not one of the proposed solutions, or is it?

Here's another way to step through the same reasoning process:

1. The best life (the goal) is a life completely filled with pleasures of many kinds from which all pain has been expelled. [Torquatus' identification of the best life in On Ends: "The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement." ... "If then even the glory of the Virtues, on which all the other philosophers love to expatiate so eloquently, has in the last resort no meaning unless it be based on pleasure, whereas pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically attractive and alluring, it cannot be doubted that pleasure is the one supreme and final Good and that a life of happiness is nothing else than a life of pleasure." Letter to Menoeceus: " And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good."]
2. It is impossible to expel all pain from life unless you expel fear of the gods and fear of death and fear of unmanageable pain. [PD12. "A man cannot dispel his fear about the most important matters if he does not know what is the nature of the universe, but suspects the truth of some mythical story. So that, without natural science, it is not possible to attain our pleasures unalloyed. PD13. There is no profit in securing protection in relation to men, if things above, and things beneath the earth, and indeed all in the boundless universe, remain matters of suspicion. PD04. Pain does not last continuously in the flesh, but the acutest pain is there for a very short time, and even that which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not continue for many days at once. But chronic illnesses permit a predominance of pleasure over pain in the flesh."]
3. It is impossible to expel all fear of the gods and fear of death and fear of unmanageable pain through the senses alone, and for this Epicurean philosophy is needed. [PD18. "The pleasure in the flesh is not increased when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding of these very pleasures, and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind." PD20. "The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited, and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits, and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time; but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short, in any way, of the best life." PD03. "The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once." PD04. "Pain does not last continuously in the flesh, but the acutest pain is there for a very short time, and even that which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not continue for many days at once. But chronic illnesses permit a predominance of pleasure over pain in the flesh."]
4. The key element of Epicurean philosophy needed to accomplish this is the understanding of how to have confidence in conclusions formed through use of the observations of the senses (which includes the ability to detect and reject deceptions and imaginary threats). [PD22, PD23] [Torquatus: "Further, our mental perceptions all arise from our sensations; and if these are all to be true, as the system of Epicurus proves to us, then only will cognition and perception become possible. Now those who invalidate sensations and say that perception is altogether impossible, cannot even clear the way for this very argument of theirs when they have thrust the senses aside. Moreover, when cognition and knowledge have been invalidated, every principle concerning the conduct of life and the performance of its business becomes invalidated. So from natural science we borrow courage to withstand the fear of death, and firmness to face superstitious dread, and tranquility of mind, through the removal of ignorance concerning the mysteries of the world, and self-control, arising from the elucidation of the nature of the passions and their different classes, and as I shewed just now, our leader again has established the canon and criterion of knowledge and thus has imparted to us a method for marking off falsehood from truth." Lucian - Alexander the Oracle-Monger: "And at this point, my dear Celsus, we may, if we will be candid, make some allowance for these Paphlagonians and Pontics; the poor uneducated ‘fat-heads’ might well be taken in when they handled the serpent—a privilege conceded to all who choose—and saw in that dim light its head with the mouth that opened and shut. It was an occasion for a Democritus, nay, for an Epicurus or a Metrodorus, perhaps, a man whose intelligence was steeled against such assaults by skepticism and insight, one who, if he could not detect the precise imposture, would at any rate have been perfectly certain that, though this escaped him, the whole thing was a lie and an impossibility."]
5. Proper reasoning based on the senses requires the understanding that the senses report honestly, but that the data from the senses must be processed for consistency until it is appropriate to have confidence that the opinion we form from them is true. Until then we "wait" before selecting any single opinion as true. At first we look for and identify as possible any and all opinions that are consistent with available evidence. Only when we can eliminate all but one as consistent with the evidence do we hold that only one opinion is true. Sometimes we can only conclude that any of several opinions, and even more than one, may be true. This is sufficient for peace of mind so long as we have identified at least one that is consistent with nature, leaving us free of fear of a supernatural cause. [PD24] [Torquatus: " He judged that the logic of your school possesses no efficacy either for the amelioration of life or for the facilitation of debate. He laid the greatest stress on natural science. That branch of knowledge enables us to realize clearly the force of words and the natural conditions of speech and the theory of consistent and contradictory expressions; and when we have learned the constitution of the universe we are relieved of superstition, are emancipated from the dread of death, are not agitated through ignorance of phenomena, from which ignorance, more than any thing else, terrible panics often arise ; finally, our characters will also be improved when we have learned what it is that nature craves. Then again if we grasp a firm knowledge of phenomena, and uphold that canon, which almost fell from heaven into human ken, that test to which we are to bring all our judgments concerning things, we shall never succumb to any man’s eloquence and abandon our opinions."]
6. The first and most fundamental step in the Epicurean process of chain reasoning is the observation that nothing is ever created from nothing at the will of gods or through any other means. From this observation, and from the related observation that nothing is ever destroyed to nothing, we conclude that at the heart of existence are eternal unchanging atoms moving though void, which allows us a fully sufficient explanation of the natural functioning of the universe that we observe around us, without need of supernatural or imaginary forces for which there is no evidence. [Lucretius Book 1 and 2, Letter to Herodotus] [Lucretius Book 1: "[146] These terrors of the mind, this darkness then, not the Sun’s beams, nor the bright rays of day, can ever dispel, but Nature’s light and reason, whose first of principles shall be my guide: Nothing was by the Gods of nothing made. For hence it is that fear disturbs the mind, that strange events in Earth and Heaven are seen, whose causes cannot appear by reason’s eye, and then we say they were from Powers Divine. But when we rest convinced that nothing can arise from nothing, then the way is clear to our pursuit; we distinctly see whence every thing comes into being, and how things are formed, without the help and trouble of the Gods. If things proceed from nothing, every thing might spring from any thing, and want no seed; Men from the sea might first arise, and fish and birds break from the Earth, and herds and tender flocks drop from the sky, and every kind of beast, fixed to no certain place, might find a being in deserts or in cultivated fields.... Again, if things could spring from nought, what need of time for bodies to fulfill their growth by accession of new matter? An infant then might instantly become a youth, and trees start up in full perfection from the Earth. But ‘tis not so, ‘tis plain; for things, we know, grow by degrees from certain seeds, and still, as they grow, keep their kind; and thus you find each being rise into bulk, and thrives from seed and matter proper to itself."]
7. This chain reasoning process continues from that point to allow us to conclude with confidence a number of crucial opinions, among the most important of which are: that the universe is eternal in time, that the universe is infinite in space, that nothing has an eternal unchanging existence except matter and void, that bodies are constantly changing and in the normal course of events do not remain together forever (thus the human soul does not survive death), and that the universe has no supernatural forces ruling over it. [Lucretius Book 1 and 2, Letter to Herodotus: "Having made these points clear, we must now consider things imperceptible to the senses. First of all, that nothing is created out of that which does not exist: for if it were, everything would be created out of everything with no need of seeds. [39] And again, if that which disappears were destroyed into that which did not exist, all things would have perished, since that into which they were dissolved would not exist. Furthermore, the universe always was such as it is now, and always will be the same. For there is nothing into which it changes: for outside the universe there is nothing which could come into it and bring about the change. Moreover, the universe is bodies and space: for that bodies exist, sense itself witnesses in the experience of all men, and in accordance with the evidence of sense we must of necessity judge of the imperceptible by reasoning, as I have already said. [40] And if there were not that which we term void and place and intangible existence, bodies would have nowhere to exist and nothing through which to move, as they are seen to move. And besides these two, nothing can even be thought of either by conception or on the analogy of things conceivable such as could be grasped as whole existences and not spoken of as the accidents or properties of such existences."]
8. These conclusions allow us to have confidence that there are no eternal forms or eternal essences on which any kind of absolute rules of human conduct (absolute notions of "virtue") can have any basis, and that the ultimate and only true basis of human conduct are the faculties given us by nature - the feelings of pleasure and pain. [Torquatus Narrative from On Ends, including as to virtue: "Those who place the Chief Good in virtue alone are beguiled by the glamour of a name, and do not understand the true demands of nature. If they will consent to listen to Epicurus, they will be delivered from the grossest error. Your school dilates on the transcendent beauty of the virtues; but were they not productive of pleasure, who would deem them either praiseworthy or desirable? We esteem the art of medicine not for its interest as a science, but for its conduciveness to health; the art of navigation is commended for its practical and not its scientific value, because it conveys the rules for sailing a ship with success. So also Wisdom, which must be considered as the art of living, if it effected no result would not be desired; but as it is, it is desired, because it is the artificer that procures and produces pleasure." And as to pleasure and pain: "Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that Nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature. What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance?"]
9. Just as the senses alone are incapable of eliminating all fear of gods and death and unmanageable pain without proper (Epicurean) philosophy, it is necessary for us to employ proper Epicurean philosophy to determine when to choose pain or to avoid choosing a particular pleasure for the sake of achieving greater pleasure through that prudent selection. [Letter to Menoeceus: And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. [130] Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good.' Torquatus: "But I must explain to you how all this mistaken idea of reprobating pleasure and extolling pain arose. To do so, I will give you a complete account of the system, and expound the actual teachings of the great explorer of the truth, the master-builder of human happiness. No one rejects, dislikes or avoids pleasure itself, because it is pleasure, but because those who do not know how to pursue pleasure rationally encounter consequences that are extremely painful. Nor again is there anyone who loves or pursues or desires to obtain pain of itself, because it is pain, but because occasionally circumstances occur in which toil and pain can procure him some great pleasure. To take a trivial example, which of us ever undertakes laborious physical exercise, except to obtain some advantage from it? But who has any right to find fault with a man who chooses to enjoy a pleasure that has no annoying consequences, or one who avoids a pain that produces no resultant pleasure? On the other hand, we denounce with righteous indignation and dislike men who are so beguiled and demoralized by the charms of the pleasure of the moment, so blinded by desire, that they cannot foresee the pain and trouble that are bound to ensue; and equal blame belongs to those who fail in their duty through weakness of will, which is the same as saying through shrinking from toil and pain. These cases are perfectly simple and easy to distinguish. In a free hour, when our power of choice is untrammelled and when nothing prevents our being able to do what we like best, every pleasure is to be welcomed and every pain avoided. But in certain emergencies and owing to the claims of duty or the obligations of business it will frequently occur that pleasures have to be repudiated and annoyances accepted. The wise man therefore always holds in these matters to this principle of selection: he rejects pleasures to secure other greater pleasures, or else he endures pains to avoid worse pains."]
10. All of this is why we need Epicurean philosophy and why - because he was the first to identify this system through which we can free ourselves from false religions and false fears - Epicurus deserves to be seen as one of the greatest reformers and benefactors in human history. [Torquatus narrative in On Ends, including: "If then the doctrine I have set forth is clearer and more luminous than daylight itself; if it is derived entirely from Nature's source; if my whole discourse relies throughout for confirmation on the unbiased and unimpeachable evidence of the senses; if lisping infants, nay even dumb animals, prompted by Nature's teaching, almost find voice to proclaim that there is no welfare but pleasure, no hardship but pain—and their judgment in these matters is neither sophisticated nor biased—ought we not to feel the greatest gratitude to him who caught this utterance of Nature's voice, and grasped its import so firmly and so fully that he has guided all sane-minded men into the paths of peace and happiness, calmness and repose?" Lucretius Book 1: "When human life, all too conspicuous, lay foully groveling on earth, weighed down by grim religion looming from the skies, horribly threatening mortal men, a man, a Greek, first raised his mortal eyes bravely against this menace. No report of gods, no lightning-flash, no thunder-peal made this man cower, but drove him all the more with passionate manliness of mind and will to be the first to spring the tight-barred gates of Nature's hold asunder. So his force, his vital force of mind, a conqueror beyond the flaming ramparts of the world, explored the vast immensities of space with wit and wisdom, and came back to us triumphant, bringing news of what can be and what cannot, limits and boundaries, the borderline, the bench mark, set forever. Religion, so, is trampled underfoot, and by his victory we reach the stars."]

Note: As a reminder to myself if I update this I will also update the easier-to-find "article" version here.

I think of all the three signs it is indeed likely Epicurue would be most happy to be associated with Aquarius and the Fifth Dimension song

Except for maybe the "mystic crystal revelations"a lot of the other words fit.