Posts by Cassius

I agree with that but especially in the context that it is always a matter of comparing the resulting pleasure to the resulting pain and never a strict out-of-context analysis

Very good start!

Quote from Kalosyni

The "Epicurus in Lycia" source says three different versions of KD's !!!

That's why flexibility, insight, and willingness to think independently from the crowd are so important in studying Epicurus.

The truth is out there, but has to be dug out, and controversies abound, so I recommend wearing a helmet while digging for it=

From Lucretius Book One:

[398] Wherefore, however long you hang back with much objection, you must needs confess at last that there is void in things. And besides by telling you many an instance, I can heap up proof for my words. But these light footprints are enough for a keen mind: by them you may detect the rest for yourself. For as dogs ranging over mountains often find by scent the lairs of wild beasts shrouded under leafage, when once they are set on sure traces of their track, so for yourself you will be able in such themes as this to see one thing after another, to win your way to all the secret places and draw out the truth thence.

Also:

If you know this, It only takes a very little trouble To learn the rest: the lessons, one by one, Brighten each other, no dark night will keep you, Pathless, astray, from ultimate vision and light, All things illumined in each other's radiance.

Again thanks to Don for finding that material in the Lycia book. My thoughts are definitely parallel with those of Usener to the effect that this was a collection that seems very unlikely to have been arranged by Epicurus himself, but which likely constitutes a series of quotes from Epicurus' writings. The result of that reasoning would be that the material is authentic to Epicurus himself, but not the collection or arrangement, and that brings into play important limitations in how we "read between the lines" from this single document.

Great refernce to the Lycia book. Here are key clips:

As for the "K" in the KD issue let's also discuss our thoughts on whether this list was assembled BY Epicurus himself or assembled FROM his works by others. I am beginning to trend toward the latter view.

Quote from Don

To address your "which is best?" The best is φυσικός but seriously they both have good points and bad points but any English word is ultimately going to bring its own semantic baggage and be looking at the texts through a glass darkly. The best we can do is be aware of this and NEVER rely on one translation like it's the King James Bible

Yes I think that is the key point and this emphasizes the danger of taking passages out of the context of the whole philosophy. If something seems to deviate from the whole that is a big clue to look for differences in word constructions and connotations, and this to look for ways to reconcile rather than adopt a construction that conflicts with the big picture.

I suppose if we did not invest the word "natural" with a positive moral judgment then "natural" and "physical" would seem much more interchangeable. So is this going on throughout the "natural and necessary" discussion?

If so that puts a whole different spin on the formula as an "ethical" doctrine and would cause one to question whether the analysis applies to purely "mental" desires.

I tend to think it does apply to both, but this highlights the view of the nature of mental activity as also being physical.

Don or Nate, what about the varying translations of "natural" vs "physical"? What explains that variation and which do you think is best?

Several related questions came up last night which would be very good for discussion. If I am missing one in this list below, someone please add it:

1. PD26 and PD30 are almost identical. Why are they so similar and is there a significant difference between them?
2. PD30 is pretty hard to follow whether in isolation or in context. Taken alone it could easily be used by Stoic sympathizers to say that Epicurus was basically preaching not to pursue any desire (even natural desires!) which takes significant effort, regardless of the amount of pleasure thereby obtained. Probably the first and most important observation is that no single statement should be taken out of context, and there are many other texts that would not lead in that direction, including Epicurus himself saying in the letter to Menoeceus that we sometimes choose pain in order to pursue greater pleasure. But mainly using the text of PD30 itself, what's the best translation and way to untangle it consist with the whole?
3. Also as to PD30, some translators say "natural" desires while others say "physical" desires? Why this ambiguity in the translators? Which is correct? Of the translators, which ones make the most sense and seem most consistent with the rest of the philosophy?
4. PDs 26, 29, and 30 are tightly focused on the issue of proper analysis and dealing with desires. But why were PD27 and PD28 as to friendship inserted in the middle of that sequence, totally (or almost totally) breaking the train of thought?
5. Given the questions above (especially question 4), what is best position to take on whether the PD's were authored in the form we have them by Epicurus himself? Did he write them in that form? Or are they like the Vatican Sayings, clearly compiled by someone else, probably after Epicurus' death? We know they were referred to as "Authorized" but does that mean by Epicurus personally, or by later heads of the school? Epicurus himself advised the use of outlines in the letter to Herodotus, and this appears to be an outline, and in an outline we do "jump around" and we don't demand the kind of strict continuity between headings that we would in a continuous presentation. But does not the issue raised in item 4 raise the objection that Epicurus himself (or maybe even any one person) would not have created such a break as was created by putting PD27 and PD28 in that order, when they could easily have been placed elsewhere where they would be more in context?
6. Last but not least: Onenski raised the point (after reading a chapter in Martha Nussbaum) that PD30 probably includes "romance/sexual love/etc" as a natural desire that (by the wording of the doctrine) should be dispelled Does it make sense to consider romantic love as falling under PD30?

We can split these questions up later over time, if needed, but I wanted to first get them recorded.

Yes I would love to know more about this edition. It's so much better than Creech that it seems likely that whoever translated it probably had much of interest to say about Lucretius and Epicurus. Even though it is probably now lost, it's very interesting to work on fleshing out a picture of the type of people who made themselves part of the Epicurean transmission chain.

Not sure at the moment that this hasn't already been posted in this thread, and I haven't had time to re-read it, but this David Sedley article is probably very relevant to this discussion:

Sextus Empiricus and the atomist criteria of truth

Sextus Empiricus and the atomist criteria of truth

www.academia.edu

Don't forget to join us tonight if you can at 8:30 PM Eastern time

Welcome to Episode One Hundred Forty-Three of Lucretius Today.

This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we will continue with the Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda, and discuss Epicurean view of the superiority of their point of view about divinity over the supernatural religious views of much of the rest of the world.

Now let's join Joshua reading today's text, starting with Fragment 16:

Fr. 16 ..... and [they vehemently] denounce the [most pious people] as [atheistic]. And in fact it will become evident that it is not we [who deny] the [gods, but others.] Thus [Diagoras of Melos, with certain others who closely followed his] theory, categorically asserted that gods do not exist and [vigorously] attacked [all those who thought otherwise.] Protagoras of Abdera in effect put forward the same view as Diagoras, but expressed it differently to avoid its excessive audacity. For he said that he did not know whether gods exist, which is the same as saying that he knew that they do not exist. If indeed he had balanced the first statement with «However, I do not know that they do not exist,» [perhaps] he [would] almost have a [circumlocution] to [avoid the appearance of denying] the gods completely. [But he said] «I do not know that they exist,» [and not] «I do not know that they do not exist,» doing [exactly] the same [as Diagoras, who indefatigably did not stop] saying that [he did] not [know] that they exist. ....

Fr. 19 [Let us then contradict Homer, who] talks [all sorts of nonsense] about them, [representing them sometimes as adulterers, sometimes as] lame, [sometimes as thievish, or even as being struck by mortals with a spear,] as well as inducing the craftsmen to produce inappropriate portrayals. Some statues of gods shoot arrows and are produced holding] a bow, [represented] like Heracles in Homer; others are attended by a body-guard of wild beasts; others are angry with the prosperous, like Nemesis according to popular opinion; whereas we ought to make statues of the gods genial and smiling, so that we may smile back at them rather than be afraid of them. Well, then, you people, let us reverence the gods [rightly] both at festivals and on [unhallowed occasions, both] publicly [and privately], and let us observe the customs [of our fathers in relation to them and let not the imperishable beings be falsely accused at all] by us [in our vain fear that they are responsible for all misfortunes], bringing [sufferings to us] and [contriving burdensome obligations] for themselves. ,,,,

Fr. 20 [So it is obvious that wrong-doers, given that they do not fear the penalties imposed by the laws, are not] afraid of [the gods.] This [has to be] conceded. For if they were [afraid, they] would not [do wrong]. As for [all] the others, [it is my opinion] that the [wise] are not [(reasoning indicates) righteous] on account of the gods, but on account of [thinking] correctly and the [opinions] they hold [regarding] certain things [and especially] pains and death (for indeed invariably and without exception human beings do wrong either on account of fear or on account of pleasures), and that ordinary people on the other hand are righteous, in so far as they are righteous, on account of the laws and the penalties, imposed by the laws, hanging over them. But even if some of their number are conscientious on account of the laws, they are few: only just two or three individuals are to be found among great segments of multitudes, and not even these are steadfast in acting righteously; for they are not soundly persuaded about providence. A clear indication of the complete inability of the gods to prevent wrong-doings is provided by the nations of the Jews and Egyptians, who, as well as being the most superstitious of all peoples, are the vilest of all peoples. On account of what kind of gods, then, will human beings be righteous? For they are not righteous on account of the real ones or on account of Plato’s and Socrates’ Judges in Hades. We are left with this conclusion; otherwise, why should not those who disregard the laws scorn fables much more? So, with regard to righteousness, neither does our doctrine do harm [nor does] the opposite [doctrine help], while, with regard to the other condition, the opposite doctrine not only does not help, but on the contrary also does harm, whereas our doctrine not only does not harm, but also helps. For the one removes disturbances, while the other adds them, as has already been made clear to you before.

That not only [is our doctrine] helpful, [but also the opposite doctrine harmful, is clearly shown by] the [Stoics as they go astray. For they say in opposition to us] that the god both is maker of [the] world and takes providential care of it, providing for all things, including human beings. Well, in the first place, we come to this question: was it, may I ask, for his own sake that the god created the world [or for the sake of human beings? For it is obvious that it was from a wish to benefit either himself or human beings that he embarked on this] undertaking. For how could it have been otherwise, if nothing is produced without a cause and these things are produced by a god? Let us then examine this view and what Stoics mean. It was, they say, from a wish to have a city and fellow-citizens, just as if [he were an exile from a city, that] the god [created the world and human beings. However, this supposition, a concoction of empty talking, is] self-evidently a fable, composed to gain the attention of an audience, not a natural philosopher’s argument searching for the truth and inferring from probabilities things not palpable to sense. Yet even if, in the belief that he was doing some good [to himself, the god] really [made the world and human beings], ................. For god [is, I say], a living being, indestructible [and] blessed from [age to] age, having complete [self-sufficiency]. Moreover, what [god, if] he had existed for infinite [time] and enjoyed tranquillity [for thousands of years, would have got] this idea that he needed a city and fellow-citizens? Add to this absurdity that he, being a god, should seek to have beings as fellow-citizens. And there is this further point too: if he had created the world as a habitation and city for himself, I seek to know where he was living before the world was created; I do not find an answer, at any rate not one consistent with the doctrine of these people when they declare that this world is unique. So for that infinite time, apparently, the god of these people was cityless and homeless and, like an unfortunate man — I do not say «god» —, having neither city nor fellow-citizens, he was destitute and roaming about at random. If therefore the divine nature shall be deemed to have created things for its own sake, all this is absurd; and if for the sake of men, there are yet other more absurd consequences.

Episode 142 - The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda (Part Two) "Reality" is now available!

Yep - a pretty good summary of the "slippery slope" issue:

Quote

In its moral application, the contrast clearly allows for the same ambiguity as we have identified above in the physical sphere. On the one hand, we have the thesis that, though we believe some things to be just and some shameful, nothing is in fact just or shameful. Hence, all our moral beliefs are false; this amounts to what is called an “error theory” of moral belief.8 On the other hand, we have the thesis that things are just, or shameful, not intrinsically, but insofar as there is an established usage of regarding them as such. These different versions open the way for more or less radical criticisms of morality. At one extreme, if all moral beliefs are false, morality would appear to have the status of a discredited theory, such as witchcraft or astrology, and a defender of morality would have the difficult task of showing why it is better to hang on to a set of false beliefs than to abandon them, and to accommodate to a better theory the phenomena that those beliefs attempted to describe.9 Somewhat less radically, the theory that moral characterizations are relative to our social practices seems to shift the criticism and defense of morality to the level of those practices themselves. To the extent that those practices are arbitrary, grounded in nothing more than local usage or ancestral tradition (or even the product of conscious fraud perpetrated by interested parties), the moral judgments that express them are arbitrary too; but to the extent that those practices can be seen as well-founded (e.g., as meeting fundamental human needs, or interests that are constant across a wide range of different cultures), the moral judgments in which they issue can be defended as themselves well-founded.

I definitely think Epicurus would have been very concerned to prevent an improper view of atomism from being used to rip the foundation from under ALL morality, because people need a morality they can have confidence in to organize their lives successfully.

After discarding supernatural and Platonic-based morality, he would (and apparently did) thus spend a lot of time discussing how human relations can be built on a firm foundation of recognizing pleasure and pain (and probably the anticipations and feelings) as the true basis for a science of human relationships. Once based on the right foundation, we can deduce the Epicurean view of ethics that in fact leads to happy living, and in that pursuit we deal with all the ethical issues we see mentioned in the PDs and the Vatican sayings, including justice - and in fact all the "virtues" -- after first placing them on the proper foundation. That's largely what Cicero has preserved for us in the Torquatus narrative and what we see in Menoeceus and throughout the rest of the texts.

As to that article Don cited last, sounds like our back and forth on Democritus is not entirely different than the different interpretations of Democritus advanced by Sextus Empiricus vs that of Galen.

Quote

"Galen is, then, an objective relativist, who holds, contrary to Sextus’s view that it is false to call an apple red, that the apple really is red, only not intrinsically, but in relation to perceivers."

Sounds like the way to interpret Democritus in a pro-Epicurus way is through Galen, while Sextus seems to be happier with the "slippery slope to nihilism" side. (If Sextus is in fact saying that it is "wrong" to call an apple red.)

If one says that it is false to call an apple red, then (leaving aside issues of language and definitions) that is a statement that many people of common sense would interpret as a direct challenge to the reliability of the senses on which Epicurean philosophy is built. Epicurus could not allow such an opinion to go unchallenged.

Also:

Quote

Democritus may then be taken (following Sextus) as maintaining that things are not in fact flavored or colored, but are merely (falsely) called so (because that is how they seem to be), or (following Galen)as maintaining that things are flavored, colored, etc., not intrinsically, but insofar as that is how they seem to us and, consequently, how we (conventionally) describe them. It may be that Democritus did not in fact distinguish these two theses, which are not in any case sharply distinguished from one another, since it is frequently disputed how far something’s being generally regarded as F, or called F, is constitutive of its actually being F.

Excellent finds by Don and Godfrey above - this is where we can do so much more working together than alone.

And of course by now we are close to delinquent in not relating this to the "properties" and "qualities" that are discussed pretty extensively in both the letter to Herodotus and in Lucretius book one (I think), along with the "Trojan War" analogy. I think we are missing a key piece of the Epicurean worldview by not discussing this issue of properties and qualities more frequently. Its through that insight that we explain what is real to us and what, and how we divide the permanent from the temporary. Without this distinction the universe is pretty much indecipherable and it is as if the flux is indeed too fast for us to grasp anything.

This whole issue of explaining to people how to think about what is permanent and unchanging (atoms and void) versus what we should think about what we perceive with our senses (the qualities, which are not random, but which arise from the properties of the atoms and void then and there present in our contextual circumstances) is clearly a subject of first importance. If we don't understand why things in our experience change over time, but that they do not change "randomly" or "chaotically" or "supernaturally" but according to nature, then we can never have confidence in of our conclusions about anything. We will flip flop between (1) a variation of hard determinism with implications that lead to a sort of Calvinism that everything was set in motion without exception from the beginning of time, and (2) a radical skeptical / nihilistic view that nothing can be projected with any confidence whatsoever, and then we are like flotsam and jetsam tossed about helplessly in the waves.

It's only through a coherent perspective from which we can unwind the changing from the seemingly permanent that we can make headway in explaining the universe without resorting to the supernatural or throwing up our hands in total frustration.

In a way I see this much as Sedley has talked about Epicurus' basis for the swerve. Epicurus didn't need an electron microscope to validate the swerve in particular or atomism in general. Atomism is where we arrive when we observe the facts around us and when we deduce from them a mechanism which allows us to rationally explain what we see in a way that is consistent with all the evidence we see and not contradicted by anything. The swerve is where we arrive when we observe the indeterminate actions of intelligent life, and think about the way elements must interact in space. And we have no grounds to criticize and say "Epicurus was just guessing because he didn't have an electron microscope" because what Epicurus was doing was not guesswork, but logical inquiry based strictly on justifiable rules of evidence - the same way we deduce no life after death. We don't think it's a legitimate argument in every case to require someone to go there (death, walk through a fire) and come back to tell us about it, and neither should we require that we "see" elemental particles directly before having confidence that they exist.

We never see the gods (or anything else) create something from nothing, but we see continuity and regularity in the physical world around us, so we can reason from those observations that there must be some elemental point of origin that is unchanging and eternal. It matters not whether that elemental origin is the "atom" or some "subatomic particle" or "energy" or what. What matters is that what we see, and what we do not see, impel us toward the conclusion thst there is a natural elemental foundation, without good reason (based on evidence from the senses) for doubt.

HA!

1 - Thanks Joshua for the cite.

2 - Yes it is sort of a dilemma isn't it? I would think that also relates to the issue of speaking publicly in crowds, etc, and the general issue of speaking clearly. If you know the people you are talking to will not understand or accept your message, do you even talk to them? That's the reason (well, one of them) I don't invite myself onto the local nursing home circuit to tell all the 90 year olds that they have been wrong all their lives in religion and that their last breath will in fact be their last.

But really the important point in this discussion I think is that I do think Epicurus meant that he would speak fully and completely, even though it might not be understood, and that he would in fact strive to make himself as clear as possible. The issue here is not that these clips are incorrect in and of themselves - they are not. But they are not the "whole truth" that is relevant to the issue, and if we know that by speaking only part of the truth that the statement we make will be misconstrued, then I would think that we would strive to be as clear as possible and tell the whole truth that is less likely to be misinterpreted. But of course the caveat I have been trying to include is that at least in the case of Epicurus I feel like he did in fact speak the whole truth, and that the rest of it has been lost to us (for reasons that Cicero and other opponents would be to blame for). In the case of Democritus I presume it is more likely that Epicurus had the full texts of Democritus, so if the Epicureans felt like he needed to be criticized on that point, there might be more reason to defer to their judgment, since they probably knew more about what Democritus said than we know about what Epicurus said.

This thread has me thinking back to what I think is very close to one of the (or the) ultimate points.

Epicurus seems to think that there is probably no greater plague on humanity than "otherworldiness." PD1 denounces the idea of a supernatural otherworldiness. PD2 denounces the idea of a heaven or hell otherwordiness. In emphasizing pleasure and pain, PDs 3 and 4 establishes the foundation for seeing that neither virtue nor platonic ideals nor anything other than the pleasure and pain of this world are of concern to us.

From that perspective, everything that focuses the mind on the importance of this life in this world is beneficial to us. Everything that distracts into thinking that this world is an illusion, or that minimizes the importance to us of this world, is detrimental.

It is certainly true from every atomistic perspective that only atoms and void have eternal unchanging existence. But we as humans are not eternal and unchanging beings. What matters to *us* is the world we have as we perceive it around us.

If a perspective about atomism assists us in a full understanding of our place in the universe and the way our world works, and allows us to tune our actions to live more happily, then it beneficial to our well-being and important for us to understand and remember.

If a perspective about atomism leaves out the fact that we are mortal and changing beings, and implies that our existence is somehow of lesser rank or less important than the atoms themselves, then that perspective is destructive to our well-being, and I would expect Epicurus to denounce that incomplete perspective just as he denounces supernatural religion or false claims of life after death.