Posts by Cassius

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Quote from Todd

If I once did, it was before I had any interest in Epicurus. I guess I will have to remedy this deficiency before I take up more of your time.

No, no, don't let that hold you back at all -- I always see something new in them eveytime I read i, so I am just letting you know that there's a lot more controversy where the part you've already quoted comes from!

Quote from Todd

Well, I haven't been thinking about it in terms of the highest good, but that's a good idea.

It's interesting that you seem not to have read the full or main part of the Torquatus dialog. Probably you'll have much more to say when you do!

Quote from Todd

Hmm...maybe that's all that's necessary?

I might agree with you on that, but I think Epicurus would say that ultimately it is important to take a stand on what is "objectively" the highest good, and not just rely on what you or others think personally to be the case. I would say that is probably why we are having the debate about how to tie this opinion to Nature.

And how do YOU arrive at the conclusion that pleasure is the highest good?

Todd can you clarify for me what your own current views are as to whether "pleasure" is the highest good, and the role of "reason" in the establishment of truth?

If we were clear on those things that might help light the way toward making some progress.

Why do you see looking to the newborn as rotten and pessimistic?

At least several days (or maybe a week or so) I changed the banner headline for page one to a fragment that seems to me directly applicable as another illustration of Epicurus' approach to base identification of "the good" on feeling rather than abstract analysis:

“That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about, prating meaninglessly about the good.” Epicurus, as cited in Usener Fragment U423

It's been an interesting thread and whether it is over or just starting, it is an important question. I take it your ultimate question is probably "Why" should we look to nature at all, regardless of whether we look at children or any other phase of life?

Why does "is" give rise to "ought"? And you definitely have another step in that process in getting from is to ought.

Of the alternatives in Torquatus it seems to me that "anticipations" makes some sense to look to as a foundation of pleasure, but why does pleasure exist at all for us to follow?

I think we're on very important territory here and the resolution comes very close to (paraphrasing Nietsche) whether we choose to say "yes" to nature or "no". Nature allows us to do either and it is ultimately up to us to decide and pay the price / reap the consequences for our decisions.

Regardless of what we as individuals decide, Epicurus seems clearly to have chosen to say "yes" to a view of nature based on sensation/ feeling, rather than abstract logic, as the standard of a proper human life.

So how would you restate your concern Todd, that looking to examples of people who have not had the time or exposure to ground their actions on "abstract reasoning" is a poor idea for getting at examples of the calling of Nature?

Why is that a poor way of looking at the question? Because they are not "educated" in some goal other than the one they were born with?

So as to the question of whether the cradle argument is reasoning, we have the cradle argument being a form of " direction of attention" rather than "proof and formal argument."

".. no one of which facts are we bound to support by elaborate arguments; it is enough merely to draw attention to the fact; and there is a difference between proof and formal argument on the one hand and a slight hint and direction of the attention on the other; the one process reveals to us mysteries and things under a veil, so to speak; the other enables us to pronounce upon patent and evident facts. Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?"

just so we have the text in front of us:

[30] Every creature, as soon as it is born, seeks after pleasure and delights therein as in its supreme good, while it recoils from pain as its supreme evil, and banishes that, so far as it can, from its own presence, and this it does while still uncorrupted, and while nature herself prompts unbiased and unaffected decisions. So he says we need no reasoning or debate to shew why pleasure is matter for desire, pain for aversion. These facts he thinks are simply perceived, just as the fact that fire is hot, snow is white, and honey sweet, no one of which facts are we bound to support by elaborate arguments; it is enough merely to draw attention to the fact; and there is a difference between proof and formal argument on the one hand and a slight hint and direction of the attention on the other; the one process reveals to us mysteries and things under a veil, so to speak; the other enables us to pronounce upon patent and evident facts. Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?

[31] There are however some of our own school, who want to state these principles with greater refinement, and who say that it is not enough to leave the question of good or evil to the decision of sense, but that thought and reasoning also enable us to understand both that pleasure in itself is matter for desire and that pain is in itself matter for aversion. So they say that there lies in our minds a kind of natural and inbred conception leading us to feel that the one thing is t for us to seek, the other to reject. Others again, with whom I agree, finding that many arguments are alleged by philosophers to prove that pleasure is not to be reckoned among things good nor pain among things evil, judge that we ought not to be too condent about our case, and think that we should lead proof and argue carefully and carry on the debate about pleasure and pain by using the most elaborate reasonings

I think the best presentation of this issues is going to be in the section of DeWittt's book starting here, although it is covered in a lot of other places in the book too. I am not citing this to say "you should believe it because Dewitt said it" but as a starting point for anyone lurking who might want to follow the argument.

Quote from Todd

Hmm...disagree, but not sure how to proceed beyond this point.

Is reason fallible, of course. But it's our only tool for judging, and that's what is being done here.

Yep it is difficult or impossible to bridge that divide, and it seems to me that the issue of the proper place of "reason" led to much of the revolt of Epicurus against the positions of Plato and Aristotle.

Quote from Todd

the cradle argument takes a particular part of nature, and elevates it above the rest.

Yes, the part of nature before human reasoning, with its potential for error, has weighed in with its first opinion - that its own opinion itself can supply a guide to life superior to the feelings of pleasure and pain.

Quote from Todd

Right, but if that it is the only issue, then you could look to the "uneducated" for ethical guidance.

Indeed so, as Thomas Jefferson said to Peter Carr in 1787, and as I read it Epicurus would agree with this:

Moral Philosophy. I think it lost time to attend lectures on this branch. He who made us would have been a pitiful bungler, if he had made the rules of our moral conduct a matter of science. For one man of science, there are thousands who are not. What would have become of them? Man was destined for society. His morality, therefore, was to be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong, merely relative to this. This sense is as much a part of his Nature, as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation of morality, and not the [beautiful], truth, &c., as fanciful writers have imagined. The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is given them in a greater or less degree. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body. This sense is submitted, indeed, in some degree, to the guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this: even a less one than what we call common sense. State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, & often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules.

I would say that the 'nature as the norm' position is foundational to Epicurus position, so I agree with your comment here that we have to look to the question of whether we should look to Nature or not.

Quote from Todd

To give a (hopefully) non-controversial example, one of the assumptions in any kind of "look to nature" argument is that nature is the right place to look. I don't think I've ever heard anyone explain why nature is the right place to look. It's taken for granted. I'm fine with that, because nature IS usually a good place to look, and there aren't too many alternatives.

If we conclude through our observations and Epicurean reasoning that there is no world of forms or essences or "true world" beyond this one, and that all knowledge is based on the evidence of the senses, then what other foundation would support a conclusion of looking anywhere else for the norrm? Because we have the capacity to revolt against nature, does that mean that we should? It's certainly possible to argue that we should, but on what foundation? Not on a foundation of gods or abstract logic, surely?

Quote from Todd

My problem is with the implicit assumption that any deviation from the original state of nature is necessarily for the worse.

I would say that is not implicit Epicurus' position at all. He was certainly in favor of living in civilization and seems to have enjoyed a good life under the Athenian system, which is not at all a state of nature.

If the point is that pleasure and pain are the only faculties that Nature has given for ultimate determination of what to choose and what to avoid, what other or higher faculty would you suggest? Certainly not "reason" because why would anyone choose reason if it did not bring pleasure?

If you want an "anti-life" or "anti-nature" argument it seems to me that there is nothing more pure than that men can invent for themselves a faculty of choice better than what nature has provided.

I sure am glad we split this off into a new thread!

Faunus I would say it would probably be better to view that as something like:

The evidence of the senses is never 'wrong' but the opinions we draw from the evidence certainly can be. in this case there is some evidence and some argument that the universe is finite (what you are referring to) set against other evidence that the universe has no end (every time we expand the reach of our observation we find more).

This is the constant question in lots of areas - where the evidence conflicts we have to entertain multiple possibilities or wait before attaching ourselves to a single opinion. But the one conclusion to avoid above all is that the senses are ultimately untrustworthy and that we therefore have no capacity to be confident of anything. If you fall to that level you will walk off the precipice and your life will be unsustainable.

Quote from Todd

but I'll need to try to collect my thoughts a bit more to keep this from becoming a rambling stream-of-consciousness on my end.

Don't let that worry you too much!

Also:

To me what you are bringing up reminds me of this which Frances Wright addresses in her Chapter 15. I am not at all sure that what she is writing is what Epicurus would say, and in fact I think she goes significantly further and off in a different direction than Epicurus did. But the description of the topic I think is very much on point, and deciding whether what she says is right or consistent with Epicurus might help people think about what is really involved in the question of "theory" in the first place. Is this correct? - "In philosophy — that is, in knowledge — inquiry is everything; theory and hypothesis are worse than nothing."

Quote from Frances Wright A Few Days In Athens Chapter 15

“I admit the truth of the metaphor,” said Theon. “But may we not simplify too much as well as too little? May we not push investigation beyond the limits assigned to human reason, and, with a boldness approaching to profanity, tear, without removing, the veil which enwraps the mysteries of creation from our scrutiny?”

“Without challenging the meaning of the terms you have employed,” said Metrodorus, “I would observe, that there is little danger of our pushing investigation too far. Unhappily the limits prescribed to us by our few and imperfect senses must ever cramp the sphere of our observation, as compared to the boundless range of things; and that even when we shall have strained and improved our senses to the uttermost. We trace an effect to a cause, and that cause to another cause, and so on, till we hold some few links of a chain, whose extent like the charmed circle, is without beginning as without end.”

“I apprehend the difficulties,” observed Leontium, “which embarrass the mind of our young friend. Like most aspirants after knowledge, he has a vague and incorrect idea of what he is pursuing, and still more, of what may be attained. In the schools you have hitherto frequented,” she continued, addressing the youth, “certain images of virtue, vice, truth, knowledge, are presented to the imagination, and these abstract qualities, or we may call them, figurative beings, are made at once the objects of speculation and adoration. A law is laid down, and the feelings and opinions of men are predicated upon it; a theory is built, and all animate and inanimate nature is made to speak in its support; an hypothesis is advanced, and all the mysteries of nature are treated as explained. You have heard of, and studied various systems of philosophy; but real philosophy is opposed to all systems. Her whole business is observation; and the results of that observation constitute all her knowledge. She receives no truths, until she has tested them by experience; she advances no opinions, unsupported by the testimony of facts; she acknowledges no virtue, but that involved in beneficial actions; no vice, but that involved in actions hurtful to ourselves or to others. Above all, she advances no dogmas, — is slow to assert what is, — and calls nothing impossible.

The science of philosophy is simply a science of observation, both as regards the world without us, and the world within; and, to advance in it, are requisite only sound senses, well developed and exercised faculties, and a mind free of prejudice. The objects she has in view, as regards the external world, are, first, to see things as they are, and secondly, to examine their structure, to ascertain their properties, and to observe their relations one to the other. — As respects the world within, or the philosophy of mind, she has in view, first, to examine our sensations, or the impressions of external things on our senses; which operation involves, and is involved in, the examination of those external things themselves: secondly, to trace back to our sensations, the first development of all our faculties; and again, from these sensations, and the exercise of our different faculties as developed by them, to trace the gradual formation of our moral feelings, and of all our other emotions: thirdly, to analyze all these our sensations, thoughts, and emotions, — that is, to examine the qualities of our own internal, sentient matter, with the same, and yet more, closeness of scrutiny, than we have applied to the examination of the matter that is without us: finally, to investigate the justness of our moral feelings, and to weigh the merit and demerit of human actions; which is, in other words, to judge of their tendency to produce good or evil, — to excite pleasurable or painful feelings in ourselves or others. You will observe, therefore, that, both as regards the philosophy of physics, and the philosophy of mind, all is simply a process of investigation. It is a journey of discovery, in which, in the one case, we commission our senses to examine the qualities of that matter, which is around us, and, in the other, endeavor, by attention to the varieties of our consciousness, to gain a knowledge of those qualities of matter which constitute our susceptibilities of thought and feeling.”

“This explanation is new to me,” observed Theon, “and I will confess, startling to my imagination. It is pure materialism!”

“You may so call it,” rejoined Leontiurn, “But when you have so called it — what then? The question remains: is it true? or is it false?”

“I should be disposed to say — false, since it confounds all my preconceived notions of truth and error, of right and wrong.”

“Of truth and error, of right and wrong, in the sense of correct or incorrect is, I presume, your meaning,” said Leontium. “You do not involve moral rectitude or the contrary in a matter of opinion?”

“If the opinion have a moral or immoral tendency I do,” said the youth.

“A simple matter of fact can have no such tendency or ought not, if we are rational creatures.”

“And would not, if we were always reasoning beings,” said Metrodorus; “but as the ignorance and superstition which surround our infancy and youth, favor the development of the imagination at the expense of the judgment, we are ever employed in the coining of chimeras, rather than in the discovery of truths; and if ever the poor judgment make an effort to dispel these fancies of the brain, she is repulsed, like a sacrilegious intruder into religious mysteries.”

“Until our opinions are made to rest on facts,” said Leontium, “the error of our young friend — the most dangerous of all errors, being one of principle and involving many — must ever pervade the world. And it was because I suspected this leading misconception of the very nature — of the very end and aim of the science he is pursuing, that I attempted an explanation of what should be sought, and of what can alone be attained. In philosophy — that is, in knowledge — inquiry is everything; theory and hypothesis are worse than nothing. Truth is but approved facts. Truth, then, is one with the knowledge of these facts. To shrink from inquiry, is to shrink from knowledge. And to prejudge an opinion as true or false, because it interferes with some preconceived abstraction we call vice or virtue, is as if we were to draw the picture of a man we had never seen, and then, upon seeing him, were to dispute his being the man in question, because unlike our picture.”

“But if this opinion interfered with another, of whose truth we imagined ourselves certain.”

“Then clearly, in one or the other, we are mistaken; and the only way to settle the difficulty is to examine and compare the evidences of both.”

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The discussion goes on further from there but that part is probably the heart of the question. What is the proper attitude toward "theory"?