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Can we vote more than once? I think my "first" choice changes daily!
Yes, votes can definitely be changed.
And the same will go for the final result posted here -- Principal Doctrines
All of this will be changing over time as we try to improve the final product.
I would vote for Wallace. It's not perfect, but I think it's the only one with "incorruptible" and with "favor" instead of "gratitude".
I added Wallace to the poll options.
Also, just to keep the point in mind, I think that a good balance of accuracy but with consideration for "reputation for trustworthiness" probably calls for using Bailey or some other "authority" as the base, but with specific "tweaks" to address specific issues like the "immortality" issue here which jumps out as needing tweaking. Then in the footnote / reference we can give other options including fully rewritten versions that seem best based on the discussion here, regardless of whether they are based primarily on one author or another.
OK this is a good example of what I am thinking we should do with this project. Bailey seems good, but his "immortal" seems less accurate, and should be "incorruptible." I am entirely ok with a hybrid so long as we document the result.
Don do you agree that "incorruptible" or something like is is more appropriate than "immortal"?
Thank you for all the background info but where do you end up yourself? I see you are questioning the relationship of gratitude but everyone seems to throw that in there so is Bailey basically correct?
Gonna take a long time to go through these and then the Vatican Sayings too but maybe it is a good project to try to focus people on one or two before moving forward.
Here is the poll for PDO1
The following post is first of a series that I intend to make so that we can get our collection of the Princpal Doctrines into better shape. One service we can provide here at EpicureanFriends is to present a curated list that has been vetted and commented on by our regulars here who have either good sense of the philosophy, or an ability to read the original Greek and Latin - and preferably both the good sense and the language ability. I plan to post one of these on each doctrine over time and then transfer the result over to
the main list under the "Texts" section.
Although this thread will include a "poll" in the next post, what we are really looking for is the "best" combination of faithfulness to the original combined with clarity in modern English. I will get with a collection of the Level 3 participants here to work on editing the final list, but the full discussion should be open to everyone to consider, so that's what we will do here. The results of the poll won't control what is featured on the text page but will definitely influence in and probably at least result in a footnote to this thread.
The English translation of PD01 currently featured here in our Texts section is that of Cyril Bailey from his Extant Remains:
The blessed and immortal nature knows no trouble itself, nor causes trouble to any other, so that it is never constrained by anger or favor. For all such things exist only in the weak.
We have access (thanks to Nate's full collection) to many different variations including:
“That which is happy and imperishable, neither has trouble itself, nor does it cause it to anything; so that it is not subject to feelings of either anger or gratitude; for these feelings only exist in what is weak.” Yonge (1853)
“The blessed and incorruptible has no toil or trouble of its own, and causes none to others. It is not subject either to anger or favour.” Wallace, Epicureanism 110 (1880)
“A blessed and eternal being has no trouble itself and brings no trouble upon any other being; hence it is exempt from movements of anger and favour, for every such movement implies weakness.” Hicks (1910)
“A happy and eternal being has no trouble himself and brings no trouble upon any other being ; hence he is exempt from movements of anger and partiality, for every such movement implies weakness.” Hicks (1925)
“The blessed and immortal nature knows no trouble itself nor causes trouble to any other, so that it is never constrained by anger or favour. For all such things exist only in the weak.” Bailey (1926)
“The blissful and incorruptible being neither knows trouble itself nor occasions trouble to another, and is consequently immune to either anger or gratitude, for all such emotions reside in a weak creature.” De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 252 (1954)
“The blessed and incorruptible being neither knows tribulation itself nor occasions it to another; it is consequently immune to feelings of either anger or gratitude, for all such emotion signifies a weak creature." De Witt, St. Paul and Epicurus 187 (1954)
“That which is blessed and immortal is not troubled itself, nor does it cause trouble to another. As a result, it is not affected by anger or favor, for these belong to weakness.” Geer (1964)
“That which is blessed and imperishable neither suffers nor inflicts trouble, and therefore is affected neither by anger nor by favour. For all such things are marks of weakness.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 140 (1987)
“The blessed and immortal is itself free from trouble nor does it cause trouble for anyone else; therefore, it is not constrained either by anger or by favor. For such sentiments exist only in the weak.” O'Connor (1993)
“ What is blessed and indestructible has no trouble itself nor does it give trouble to anyone else, so that it is not affected by feelings of anger or gratitude. For all such things are a sign of weakness.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)
“A blessed and imperishable being neither has trouble itself nor does it cause trouble for anyone else; therefore, it does not experience feelings of anger or indebtedness, for such feelings signify weakness.” Anderson (2004)
“That which is blessed and indestructible has no affairs of its own to attend to; nor does it inflict any trouble on others. So, it is agitated neither by ire nor by partiality. For all such are to be found in that which lacks power.” Makridis (2005)
“That which is blissful and immortal has no troubles itself, nor does it cause trouble for others, so that it is not affected by anger or gratitude (for all such things come about through weakness).” Saint-Andre (2008)
“The blessed and indestructible being of the divine has no concerns of its own, nor does it make trouble for others. It is not affected by feelings of anger or benevolence,because these are found where there is a lack of strength.” Strodach (2012)
“The blessed and immortal has no troubles himself and causes none for anyone else; hence he has nothing to do with resentments and partisanship; for all such impulses are a sign of weakness.” Mensch (2018)
“What is in bliss and imperishable neither has troubles itself nor causes any for others, so it experiences no feelings of either anger or gratitude; for everything of that sort indicates weakness.” White (2021)
Which of the above, or which with changes you would suggest, should be featured here in the main list? In the interest of space the poll will not include every option, so please add a comment in the thread if you would suggest a variation not listed.
Looks very interesting thank you!
My thoughts and beliefs are still being formed, but I am glad to share them here
And thank you very much for doing so!
Wow great post! This is such a an important point, and you do a great job of linking it to the specifics of friendship, like it should be linked to everything else:
just because something is relative, it does not mean it is not objective and real. They seem to think that if the person does not possess intrinsic value outside of its relations, then it cannot possess it in its relations either. But I think that an Epicurean response could address that presupposition by pointing out that relative properties can truly belong to an object, personal or not, due to their causal contribution (if I got this right. I have Polystratus' reasoning in mind).
Epicurus does not say that just because something is the abstract product of experience and reflection over time that it is not "real" and that we should not consider it capable of generating pleasure and pain that are also very real to us.
I see this as a subset of the phrase I am pilfering from David Sedley that Epicurus was not a radical atomic reductionist. Even though it is true that only atoms have an eternal unchanging existence, the "qualities" that emerge from combinations of atoms have just as much "truth" to them as do the atoms themselves, and it is wrong for us to act as if our level of existence is less "important" to us than the atomic level. The pleasure and pain that result from friendship relationships may not have the same permanence as the atoms themselves, but they are among the most important to us in life.
Thanks for the post Warjuning.
I didn't have time to read the full thing yet but I see this from the conclusion.
Considering SV 66 and SV 39 each within the context of Epicurus’ other writings on friendship in particular, and his ethics more generally, strengthens the case that Epicureanism is both directly egoistic and committed to other-concern. Addi-tionally, the most plausible understanding of friendship is one according to which the other-concern required by it is compatible with avowing our own good as our only final good. We are, if I am correct, left with no reason to think that committed Epicureans cannot have genuine friends.
Seems like lost of people (including some shaky Epicureans) think that the anti-Epicureans have point in arguing that if you follow Epicurus you can't truly have friendship, but this has always been a very poor argument and it looks like the article hits the right points.
Probably good here to include the way Torquatus dealt with this:
[65] XX. One topic remains, which is of prime importance for this discussion, that relating to friendship, which you declare will cease to exist, if pleasure be the supreme good, yet Epicurus makes this declaration concerning it, that of all the aids to happiness procured for us by wisdom, none is greater than friendship, none more fruitful, none more delightful. Nor in fact did he sanction this view by his language alone, but much more by his life and actions and character. And the greatness of friendship is made evident by the imaginary stories of the ancients, in which, numerous and diversified as they are, and reaching back to extreme antiquity, scarce three pairs of friends are mentioned, so that beginning with Theseus you end with Orestes. But in truth within the limits of a single school, and that restricted in numbers, what great flocks of friends did Epicurus secure, and how great was that harmony of affection wherein they all agreed! And his example is followed by the Epicureans in our day also. But let us return to our theme; there is no need to speak of persons.
[66] I see then that friendship has been discussed by our school in three ways. Some, denying that the pleasures which affect our friends are in themselves as desirable to us as those we desire for ourselves, a view which certain persons think shakes the foundation of friendship, still defend their position, and in my opinion easily escape from their difficulties. For they affirm that friendship, like the virtues of which we spoke already, cannot be dissociated from pleasure. Now since isolation and a life without friends abound in treacheries and alarms, reason herself advises us to procure friendships, by the acquisition of which the spirit is strengthened, and cannot then be severed from the hope of achieving pleasures.
[67] And as enmity, spitefulness, scorn, are opposed to pleasures, so friendships are not only the truest promoters, but are actually efficient causes of pleasures, as well to a man's friends as to himself; and friends not only have the immediate enjoyment of these pleasures but are elate with hope as regards future and later times. Now because we can by no means apart from friendship preserve the agreeableness of life strong and unbroken, nor further can we maintain friendship itself unless we esteem our friends in the same degree as ourselves; on that account this principle is acted on in friendship, and so friendship is linked with pleasure. Truly we both rejoice at the joy of our friends as much as at our own joy, and we are equally pained by their vexations.
[68] Therefore the wise man will entertain the same feeling for his friend as for himself, and the very same efforts which he would undergo to procure his own pleasure, these he will undergo to procure that of his friend. And all that we said of the virtues to shew how they always have their root in pleasures, must be said over about friendship. For it was nobly declared by Epicurus, almost in these words: "It is one and the same feeling which strengthens the mind against the fear of eternal or lasting evil, and which clearly sees that in this actual span of life the protection afforded by friendship is the most powerful of all."
[69] There are however certain Epicureans who are somewhat more nervous in facing the reproaches of your school, but are still shrewd enough ; these are afraid that if we suppose friendship to be desirable with a view to our own pleasure, friendship may appear to be altogether maimed, as it were. So they say that while the earliest meetings and associations and tendencies towards the establishment of familiarity do arise on account of pleasure, yet when experience has gradually produced intimacy, then affection ripens to such a degree that though no interest be served by the friendship, yet friends are loved in themselves and for their own sake. Again, if by familiarity we get to love localities, shrines, cities, the exercise ground, the park, dogs, horses, and exhibitions either of gymnastics or of combats with beasts, how much more easily and properly may this come about when our familiarity is with human beings?
[70] Men are found to say that there is a certain treaty of alliance which binds wise men not to esteem their friends less than they do themselves. Such alliance we not only understand to be possible, but often see it realized, and it is plain that nothing can be found more conducive to pleasantness of life than union of this kind. From all these different views we may conclude that not only are the principles of friendship left unconstrained, if the supreme good be made to reside in pleasure, but that without this view it is entirely impossible to discover a basis for friendship.
When we get to Honesty DeWitt quotes:
"In his book On Kingship he even advised monarchs to entertain themselves with military anecdotes or coarse buffoonery rather than try to counterfeit a refinement they did not possess. This advice must have been galling to young Platonists who groomed themselves for court appointments. It was galling to Plutarch, who reports it."
Here's the Perseus link to the Greek, but if they have the English I can't find the link:
Plutarch, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, stephpage 1095c
It doesn't seem easy to find an English translation of Non Posse so this is something we need to fix.
Edit: - http://demonax.info/doku.php?id=te…ine_of_epicurus
Edit2 - I have posted a copy of the Demonax version here. We need to clean this up over time as the formatting is off and the page numbers do not match how DeWitt quote it.: Plutarch: That it is Not Possible to Live Pleasurably According to the Doctrine of Epicurus If we can find a better public domain copy we can substitute it, or add the correct line numbers to this version.
Thanks to Don (see his post below):
As to the other delights of the mind, we have already treated of them, as they occurred to us. But their aversedness and dislike to music, that affords us so great delights and such charming satisfactions, a man could not forget if he would, by reason of the inconsistency of what Epicurus saith, when he pronounceth in his book called his Doubts that his wise man ought to be a lover of public spectacles and to delight above any other man in the music and shows of the Bacchanals; and yet he will not admit of music problems or of the critical enquiries of philologists, no, not so much as at a compotation. Yea, he advises such princes as are lovers of the Muses rather to entertain themselves at their feasts either with some narration of military adventures or with the importune scurrilities of drolls and buffoons, than to engage in disputes about music or in questions of poetry. For this very thing he had the face to write in his treatise of Monarchy, as if he were writing to Sardanapalus, or to Nanarus satrap of Babylon. For neither would a Hiero nor an Attalus nor an Archelaus be persuaded to make a Euripides, a Simonides, a Melanippides, a Crates, or a Diodotus rise up from their tables, and to place such scaramuchios in their rooms as a Cardax, an Agrias, or a Callias, or fellows like Thrasonides and Thrasyleon, to make people disorder the house with hollowing and clapping. Had the great Ptolemy, who was the first that formed a consort of musicians, but met with these excellent and royal admonitions, would he not, think you, have thus addressed himself to the Samians:
This seems to be reflected in a way in what Torquatus said in Book One:
"Surely no one recoils from or dislikes or avoids pleasure in itself because it is pleasure, but because great pains come upon those who do not know how to follow pleasure rationally.
Nor again is there any one who loves or pursues or wishes to win pain on its own account, merely because it is pain, but rather because circumstances sometimes occur which compel him to seek some great pleasure at the cost of exertion and pain. To come down to petty details, who among us ever undertakes any toilsome bodily exercise, except in the hope of gaining some advantage from it? Who again would have any right to reproach either a man who desires to be surrounded by pleasure unaccompanied by any annoyance, or another man who shrinks from any pain which is not productive of pleasure?"
Any possibility they trying to save space on the paper as much as possible so writing in continuous lines, but somehow marking where lines started on the manuscript from which they were copying?
So do you have any theory at all as to the use of the red?
We don't make a super big deal about birthdays here at Epicureanfriends but we do mark them in this thread. Today's birthday - Nate - is that of someone who plays an important and highly-appreciated role here, so please check out his timeline as a place to mark it - Nate
Happy Birthday to Nate! Learn more about Nate and say happy birthday on Nate's timeline: Nate
I know it is a lot of work so it never hurts to say "Thank you for all your work Don!!"
YES that works!
Are looking on mobile or laptop?
I am on a laptop (Albeit with a small screen)
Welcome to Episode 182 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics. We are now in the process of a series of podcasts intended to provide a general overview of Epicurean philosophy based on the organizational structure employed by Norman DeWitt in his book "Epicurus and His Philosophy."
This week we continue our discussion of Chapter 14, entitled "The New Virtues."
Well it opens up but to the book cover. I was hoping to find somewhere a direct link to the page where the particular text appears.
