Posts by Cassius

As Joshua cited above, one person we need to really turn a spotlight on is COSMA RAIMONDI. See the link below for more on his letter. It may well be that Raimondi is both the first and oldest firm exponent of Epicurus that we have in our records emerging out of the dark ages. As such it would be very very interesting to learn more about him, as he seems to have been active, and discussing Epicurus with others, right around the same time, or possibly even before, the "rediscovery" of Lucretius' poem. I have not been able to find out anything more about him, but his name probably deserves to be right up there on the list of people who most faithfully argued for Epicurus during the extremely long dark spell when he had so few defenders. At present Cosma Raimondi does not even have a Wikipedia entry for his name -- that needs to change!

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Cosma Raimondi's Letter to Ambrogio Tignosi

A Letter to Ambrogio Tignosi in Defence of Epicurus against the Stoics, Academics and Peripatetics

translated by Martin Davies (from Google Books)



I have very little leisure at the moment to argue my views on the subject which your letters raise, being taken up with more weighty and much more difficult matters. I do not mind saying that I am very much occupied with my studies in astronomy. But since I have always followed and wholly approved the authority and doctrine of Epicurus, the very…

Cassius

August 29, 2023 at 7:42 PM

A Letter to Ambrogio Tignosi in Defence of Epicurus against the Stoics, Academics and Peripatetics

translated by Martin Davies (from Google Books)

I have very little leisure at the moment to argue my views on the subject which your letters raise, being taken up with more weighty and much more difficult matters. I do not mind saying that I am very much occupied with my studies in astronomy. But since I have always followed and wholly approved the authority and doctrine of Epicurus, the very wisest of men, and now see his standing bitterly attacked, harassed, and distorted by you, I have taken it upon myself to defend him. It is only right that tried and true pupils (as I have proved myself in all fields of learning) should defend their master’s teaching when it is attacked. Otherwise, when teachers are criticized, the pupil’s studies may themselves seem to be under attack. The great pains you have taken to gather material against Epicurus seem directed not so much at refuting him, but me, his follower and disciple. But I shall pay you back as you deserve.

It is not just a dispute between ourselves, for all the ancient philosophers, principally the three sects of Academics, Stoics and Aristotelians, declared war to the death against this one man who was the master of them all. Their onslaught sought to leave no place for him in philosophy and to declare all his opinions invalid — in my view, because they were envious at seeing so many more pupils taking themselves to the school of Epicurus than to their own. So I shall now set about doing within the limits of a letter what I had meant to do at greater length elsewhere, and defend him as fully as I can. And if the defense appears rather long-winded, it might well seem too short when you consider that debate on this topic could fill not just a longish letter but thick books. The subject—what is the supreme good—is important and difficult; and it requires lengthy exposition: it is an investigation that attracted a good deal of discussion among the ancients, and many books survive on either side of the question.

To show how unjustly you have attacked Epicurus and to make plain what he thinks is our ultimate goal, I shall therefore begin by treating the topic in some depth. Then I shall answer your letter and explain the whole matter in such a manner that you may actually be glad to return to the Epicurean camp you abandoned. Those who are not involved will say that it would be better first to refute the opponent’s position and then state one’s own. Yet the subject is so complex and obscure that I think it will perhaps be granted that we should first explain it as a whole, so that it becomes clearer what it is we are seeking.

Epicurus is criticized, then, because he is thought to have taken too effeminate a view on what the supreme good is, by identifying it with pleasure and using that as the standard to measure everything else. But the more closely I consider the proposition, the more right it seems to be, as though it were something decreed not by a man but by Apollo or some sort of higher being. Epicurus scrutinized the force of nature in everything and grasped that nature has made and formed us in such a way that nothing suits us more than having and keeping our bodies sound and whole and remaining free from afflictions of mind or body. And so he laid down that the supreme good was located in pleasure. And how wise he was! What more can be said on the matter? What else can human happiness consist of? A man whose soul is in turmoil cannot be happy, no more than someone whose body is in pain can fail to be miserable. In case anyone thinks I am unaware of the temper of the times in which I discuss such things, I wish it to be understood that I am not now considering that absolute and true philosophy which we call theology. This entire enquiry concerns the human good of humankind and the various competing views of ancient philosophers on the matter.

Though this was Epicurus’s judgment, the Stoics took a different view, arguing that happiness was to be found in virtue alone. For them the wise man would still be happy even if he were being tortured by the cruelest butchers. This is a position I most emphatically reject. What could be more absurd than to call a man ‘happy’ when he is in fact utterly miserable? What could be sillier than to say that the man being roasted in the bull of Phalaris,¹ and subject to the most extreme torment, was not wretched? How again could you be further from any sort of happiness than to lack all or most of the things that themselves make up happiness? The Stoics think that someone who is starving and lame and afflicted with all the other disadvantages of health or external circumstances is nonetheless in a state of perfect felicity as long as he can display his virtue. All their books praise and celebrate the famous Marcus Regulus for his courage under torture.² For my part I think that Regulus or anyone else, even someone utterly virtuous and constant, of the utmost innocence and integrity, who is being roasted in the bull of Phalaris or who is exiled from his country or afflicted quite undeservedly with misfortunes even more bitter, can be accounted not simply not happy but truly unhappy, and all the more so because the great and prominent virtue that should have led to a happier outcome has instead proved so disastrous for them.

If we were indeed composed solely of a mind, I should be inclined to call Regulus `happy’ and entertain the Stoic view that we should find happiness in virtue alone. But since we are composed of a mind and a body, why do they leave out of this account of human happiness something that is part of mankind and properly pertains to it? Why do they consider only the mind and neglect the body, when the body houses the mind and is the other half of what man is? If you are seeking the totality of something made up of various parts, and yet some part is missing, I cannot think it perfect and complete. We use the term ‘human’, I take it, to refer to a being with both a mind and a body. And in the same way that the body is not to be thought healthy when some part of it is sick, so man himself cannot be thought happy if he is suffering in some part of himself. As for their assigning happiness to the mind alone on the grounds that it is in some sense the master and ruler of man’s body, it is quite absurd to disregard the body when the mind itself often depends on the state and condition of the body and indeed can do nothing without it. Should we not deride someone we saw sitting on a throne and calling himself a king when he had no courtiers or servants? Should we think someone a fine prince whose servants were slovenly and misshapen? Yet those who would separate the mind from the body in defining human happiness and think that someone whose body is being savaged and tortured may still be happy are just as ludicrous.

I find it surprising that these clever Stoics did not remember when investigating the subject that they themselves were men. Their conclusions came not from what human nature demanded but from what they could contrive in argument. Some of them, in my view, placed so much reliance on their ingenuity and facility in debate that they did not concern themselves with what was actually relevant to the enquiry. They were carried away instead by their enthusiasm for intellectual display, and tended to write what was merely novel and surprising — things we might aspire to, but not ones we should spend any effort in attaining. Then there were some rather cantankerous individuals who thought that we should only aim for what they themselves could imitate or lay claim to. Nature had produced some boorish and inhuman philosophers whose senses had been dulled or cut off altogether, ones who took no pleasure in anything; and these people laid down that the rest of mankind should avoid what their own natural severity and austerity shrank from. Others subsequently entered the debate, men of great and various intellectual abilities, who all delivered a view on what constituted the supreme good according to their own individual disposition. But in the middle of all this error and confusion, Epicurus finally appeared to correct and amend the mistakes of the older philosophers and put forward his own true and certain teaching on happiness.

Now that the Stoics have, I hope, been comprehensively refuted, I shall set about confirming his views as clearly as I can, which will at the same time rebut those of the Peripatetics and of the Academics too. On these last, though, I shall not need to dwell at length, as for them everything is uncertain. What sort of philosophy is it that denies that anything is certain? I do not think that even the Academics themselves understood what they were saying. If the Stoics are madmen, the Academics seem to me quite insane.³

There remain the Peripatetics, and they are more difficult to refute. Not only do they have a standard of certainty, but they argue in such a way that there seems to be some substance to what they are saying. But these philosophers too have in my judgment gone wholly astray. That will be more clearly grasped later on, once I have explained the main points of Epicurean doctrine. It will then be apparent to everyone that any others who lay claim to supremacy in philosophy and try to dislodge Epicurus from that position are utterly wrong, and that Epicurus’s teaching on happiness is entirely correct.

To show that this is so, there is no better place to begin than with nature herself, the sole mistress and teacher of everyone, whose judgment on each and every matter we must take to be absolutely true. When she was fashioning man, she polished her creation with so many little touches that he seems to have been made purely for enjoyment and to take advantage of every sort of pleasure. She endowed him with senses so distinct, varied and useful that though there were many different types of pleasure, there was none in which he could not share. First she gave him eyes, whose outstanding characteristic is that they shrink from looking on anything ugly or disgusting. We love to look at things of beauty, and not by any conscious or rational decision but because nature impels us to do so. Which of us, ever, if we are hurrying off elsewhere, does not stop to look if we catch a glimpse of some attractive sight? This effect is so marked that I think man would have been a poor thing indeed if nature had taken away from him the ability to gaze on all the many lovely and beautiful objects she had created. Is there anyone, again, who does not thoroughly enjoy hearing singing and the sweet sounds of music? The lyre and other such instruments seem to have been invented for the specific purpose of charming our souls. The same can be said of smell and the other senses, which the mind uses as its servants in sensing and grasping pleasure. I do not see what sort of pleasure can be found without the aid of the senses, unless perhaps it lies in study of the deep mysteries of the universe, which I do not deny can be a source of great mental delight. Of all the pleasures that there are, in fact, this is the greatest; and this is where the Peripatetics see true felicity, in examining and contemplating those hidden things which are most worth knowing. But our enquiry is into man as a whole, and not just a part of him: the Peripatetic thinker, no matter how profound, cannot be happy without external and bodily goods.

Epicurus was right, then, to call pleasure the supreme good, since we are so constituted as almost to seem designed for that purpose. We also have a certain inherent mental disposition to seek and attain pleasure: as far as we can, we try to be happy and not sad. No one who ponders how much nature has produced for the sake of man alone, the quantity and copiousness and variety of her bounty, can doubt that pleasure is the greatest of all goods and that it should direct all our aims. We see a vast array of fine things on land and sea. Many of them are necessary to support life, but most are simply pleasurable— they are of such a sort that nothing but pleasure is to be gained from them. Nature would certainly not have created such objects of pleasure had it not intended man to enjoy them and concern himself with them.

The passions and activities of mankind themselves make plain that everything is done for the sake of pleasure. Why on earth should we spend anxious nights and days involved in such great struggles to find and keep what we need for daily life unless we were sustained by the hope that some day we should be able to live a life of pleasure and enjoyment? If that hope were gone, our minds would be decidedly less inclined to take those pains and less keen and steadfast in enduring them. Why are scholarship and the disciplines of arts and letters thought so desirable unless there is some special natural enjoyment in acquiring them, besides the help they afford in gaining the wherewithal to pass our lives in pleasure? Nor should we be so keen on honours and glory, on kingdoms and empires, to acquire and defend which great battles and disputes often arise, if these were not objects of the utmost delight. Decisions on war and peace alike are taken on the basis of keeping, protecting and increasing those things by which we live and in which we take pleasure.

Virtue, finally, is both the cause and guide of pleasure: it constrains us and warns us that we should pursue each thing within those same limits by which virtue itself is circumscribed. Why then should virtue be desired if not to allow us to lead an enjoyable life by avoiding those pleasures we should not seek and seeking those should? If virtue brings no pleasure or delight, why should we want it or make so much of it? But if it does, why not concede that the greatest of all goods — what should seek above all — is that for the sake of which virtue itself is desirable? We see that man’s whole constitution is geared towards the perception of pleasure, that nature carries us towards it, that a great many important things exist for the sake of pleasure, that all our actions are measured against its standard so that in the end lives may be free of care, in short that everything is desired purely on account of pleasure it will give us. In these circumstances, now that Epicurus’s case has conclusively proved by these rigorous and convincing arguments, who could still so hostile to him as not to assent to his doctrine and admit that the highest felicity will be found in pleasure?

But the Peripatetics do deny his doctrine and cannot bear the thought that pleasure is the supreme good, placing it rather in virtue. I should like to ask them: if virtue itself is going to bring in its train sadness, grief, pain and fear, is it still to be desired? That, I think, they will not agree to. Since, then, virtue is sought for the tranquility it brings to life (in which, under the name of pleasure, Epicurus identified the supreme good), again I ask the Peripatetics why they are unwilling to place the greatest good in pleasure. If perhaps some think that by this Epicurus meant that we should spend our days wallowing in feasting and drinking, in gambling, games and the pleasures of sex, such a wastrel Epicurus would hardly deserve our praise. His teaching would indeed be lamentable if he wanted us to be gluttonous, drunken, debauched, boastful and promiscuous. But that is not what Epicurus in his wisdom said or recommended. In fact, so far was he from wanting us to live without virtue that virtue is actually essential for living up to his teaching, since it constrains and directs, as it were, all the bodily senses (as we argued already) and does not permit us to make use of them except when needed. Epicurus does not slide into pleasure in the manner of animals, without the exercise of judgment and when necessity does not require it, but rather enjoys it with restraint when it is right to do so. His theories, therefore, should not be neglected, nor should they be treated as condemned; and it is clear that the Peripatetics have not sufficiently understood what it is they are saying.

I have run through these matters briefly and cursorily even though I do not suppose they necessarily respond to your letter directly. The discussion here will have answered it in full measure, or very largely. Yet I should still like to complete this refutation by touching on each single point you raise. You think that we should not let pleasure direct all our aims. That, I think, has been demolished at length, and with some elegance, by what I have said: it has been shown that pleasure is the standard to which everything must be referred. As for your adding that Epicurus likened us to animals,⁵ in that you seem to be not merely not attacking him but actually supporting his case. Since pleasure is endowed with such power that it is sought even by animals — brutes bereft of reason whose impulses are entirely guided by nature —Epicurus could draw from that fact the very firm conclusion that what all beings seek is the greatest of all goods. When I wrote that the severe Catos of old would on occasion take ample refreshment of wine, and you thought that a matter for criticism, it is in fact wholly admirable if a sage (as the Catos were taken to be)⁶ sometimes engages in conviviality of a rather exuberant sort. Your following remarks, whose drift is that if we embrace Epicurus we should be obliged to live like beasts, have, I think, been dealt with by what I said before: since Epicurus does not suppose that life should be lived without virtue, I do not think he leads the life of animals. So he is not to be shunned like some traitor who would overthrow or pervert human society. He does not corrupt public morals; his whole doctrine is instead directed at making us as happy as we can be.

You must at length give up your attacks on Epicurus, then: reform yourself and return to the camp in which you once fought with distinction. You have now turned against him, under the spell of Stoic subtlety of argument and seduced by the majesty and splendor of the Academics and Peripatetics. But you may be forgiven for that, since you are a younger man not yet of an age to form a proper judgment on these very difficult matters, with the indulgence granted to youth. But now that you have been fully instructed in the arguments of Epicurus, if you persevere in your hostility towards him, you will be thought intolerably arrogant, and not a little stupid.

Turn then to embrace Epicurus, whose teaching I shall perhaps expound at more length if ever I have greater leisure (this letter took me just two days to write, though I fear it may still be rather prolix). Shortage of time did not allow me to pursue all those aspects of the controversy which I feel could still benefit from clear exposition and discussion. I have had to leave many important points untouched, which someone who wanted to take an opposing view could seize upon to rebut my arguments, either-from disinterested love of truth or as an intellectual exercise. And that is not some thing which I should find unwelcome: I encourage any one who wants to contribute to the debate to enter the fray.

You have had a pretty long letter which sets out the whole truth about Epicurus; You must either find it convincing or refute it by contrary arguments, so that if you come up with something better, I in turn may be persuaded by that.

Farewell.

Yes that's a good question. I tend to think that some degree of reading of what we are talking about is helpful, but we did not do that with DeWitt primarily because his book was most commentary. When we are targeting the analysis of a particular text like we did with Lucretius or the letters to Epicurus, it makes sense to read them. This Cicero material is somewhere in between.

I will be there!

Quote from Joshua

Ha! We should communicate better, that was about as far as I get in my transcription on Saturday.

Thinking about this further, we really should start at the beginning for the sake of continuity, but I don't think there's an awful lot that will occupy us for very long other than the sort of background points you are making.

And we have to decide what if anything to read, and if we do read anything, I suspect we should start with section V

Yes very good point. And it's sort of related to the point I was thinking about yesterday that that Lucretius makes over and over and over that it's not just "daylight" (which presumably means something like clear evidence) that brings the key insight, but by what must be something like "understanding" that comes from the study of nature. You can't "understand" if you can't read the arguments yourself, and "seeing" alone isn't enough.

Book One

[146] This terror then, this darkness of the mind, must needs be scattered not by the rays of the sun and the gleaming shafts of day, but by the outer view and the inner law of nature; whose first rule shall take its start for us from this, that nothing is ever begotten of nothing by divine will.

Book Two

50 For even as children tremble and fear everything in blinding darkness, so we sometimes dread in the light things that are no whit more to be feared than what children shudder at in the dark, and imagine will come to pass. This terror then, this darkness of the mind, must needs be scattered not by the rays of the sun and the gleaming shafts of day, but by the outer view and the inner law of nature.

Book Three

74 For even as children tremble and fear everything in blinding darkness, so we sometimes dread in the light things that are no whit more to be feared than what children shudder at in the dark, and imagine will come to pass. This terror then, this darkness of the mind, must needs be scattered, not by the rays of the sun and the gleaming shafts of day, but by the outer view and the inner law of nature.

Bpok Six

40 For even as children tremble and fear everything in blinding darkness, so we sometimes dread in the light things that are no whit more to be feared than what children shudder at in the dark and imagine will come to pass. This terror then, this darkness of the mind, must needs be scattered not by the rays and the gleaming shafts of day, but by the outer view and the inner law of nature. Wherefore I will hasten the more to weave the thread of my task in my discourse.

Note -- see this thread I set up on Posidonius

Post

Posidonius - The Stoic Astrologer

Joshua's reference to DeWitt's article on the history of Roman Epicureanism leads to this, on Posidonius, the Stoic of Roman period (died 51 BC) who embraced astrology. This is of course relevant to Epicurean philosophy's rejection of all sorts of divination, traceable to Epicurus himself, but which position would have been more relevant if promoted by Stoics like Posidonius.

DeWitt Says:

[…]

From Wikipedia on Posidonius:

Physics[edit]

[…]

The Wikipedia article includes that David Sedley also…

Cassius

August 29, 2023 at 10:02 AM

It sure would be nice some day to set up a full graphical timeline of people and their positions (both friendly and unfriendly) who are particularly relevant to core Epicurean philosophy positions.

Joshua's reference to DeWitt's article on the history of Roman Epicureanism leads to this, on Posidonius, the Stoic of Roman period (died 51 BC) who embraced astrology. This is of course relevant to Epicurean philosophy's rejection of all sorts of divination, traceable to Epicurus himself, but which position would have been more relevant if promoted by Stoics like Posidonius.

DeWitt Says:

Quote

It was not the multiplication of its rivals, however, nor their combination, nor sumptuary laws, nor even the disorder of civil wars, that finally destroyed Roman Epicureanism as a distinctive movement. These were hostile influences, of course, but the real solvent was the irresistible Roman tendency to syncretism, which is much preferable to the term eclecticism. The latter distinctly implies the act of choosing, which is falsely assumed. For example, Posidonius did not choose out the Stoic belief in fate as an element of the Stoic creed which might be combined with astrology. The process was quite different. Practice preceded synthesis. The Stoic belief in fate had been held in certain Roman circles for a century. The practice of astrology grew up alongside of it. Syncretism took place in spite of the philosophers, and all they could do was to acknowledge it. Philosophy, like theology, often pretends to lead the procession, when in reality it follows it.

From Wikipedia on Posidonius:

Physics[edit]

Quote

The philosophical grand vision of Posidonius was that the universe itself was interconnected as an organic whole, providential and organised in all respects, from the development of the physical world to the behaviour of living creatures.^[34] Panaetius had doubted both the reality of divination and the Stoic doctrine of the future conflagration (ekpyrosis), but Posidonius wrote in favour of these ideas.^[31] As a Stoic, Posidonius was an advocate of cosmic "sympathy" (συμπάθεια, sympatheia)—the organic interrelation of all appearances in the world, from the sky to the Earth, as part of a rational design uniting humanity and all things in the universe. He believed valid predictions could be made from signs in nature—whether through astrology or prophetic dreams—as a kind of scientific prediction.^[35]

The Wikipedia article includes that David Sedley also says Posidonius drew on Plato and Artistotle:

He [Posidonius] followed not only the earlier Stoics, but made use of the writings of Plato and Aristotle.^[28] Posidonius studied Plato's Timaeus, and seems to have written a commentary on it emphasizing its Pythagorean features.^[29] As a creative philosopher, Posidonius would however be expected to create innovations within the tradition of the philosophical school to which he belonged.^[30] David Sedley remarks:^[31]

Quote

On the vast majority of philosophical issues, what we know of both Panaetius and Posidonius places them firmly within the main current of Stoic debate. Their innovatively hospitable attitude to Plato and Aristotle enables them to enrich and, to a limited extent, reorientate their inherited Stoicism, but, for all that, they remain palpably Stoics, working within the established tradition.

So Roman Epicureans at the time Cicero was writing his Torquatus material in both "On Ends" and "On The Nature of the Gods" would have reason to have been recently confronting claims by at least some Stoics of the validity of astrology.

One other thing to follow up on at some point as to Horace:

To these indications of a general attitude a score of examples might easily be added to demonstrate his familiarity

with minor Epicurean topics. An outstanding example of this class is his exhortation not to postpone the decision to save oneself.33 The identification of this topic as Epicurean depends upon a letter of the younger Seneca, who, unlike his immediate predecessors, dares to mention Epicurus by name, but apologizes for doing so.34

33 Ep. , 2, 37-43.

34 Ib. III, 1, 5-6; I, 12, 11 (Hense).

Here's the key point on syncretism:

This drift towards fatalistic beliefs was augmented by the growing practice of consulting astrologers, and received a smart fillip when Posidonius arrived to propose a syncretism of Stoic determinism and astral fatalism. The rivals of Epicureanism were swiftly combining to crush it. Its denial of the possibility of divination was being negatived by a manifold practice yearly growing more universal. Its capacity for self-defense was simultaneously destroyed by the increase of gross hedonism under the same name. Between the Epicurean voluptuary and the Epicurean ascetic neither popular opinion nor serious legislation was likely to make a distinction. Julius Caesar enacted laws against both riotous living and new collegia.25 It is likely that both of these resulted in the dispersal of the Epicureans. Vergil's teacher Siro certainly withdrew from the city, and his pupils probably followed him.26

It was not the multiplication of its rivals, however, nor their combination, nor sumptuary laws, nor even the disorder of civil wars, that finally destroyed Roman Epicureanism as a distinctive movement. These were hostile influences, of course, but the real solvent was the irresistible Roman tendency to syncretism, which is much preferable to the term eclecticism. The latter distinctly implies the act of choosing, which is falsely assumed. For example, Posidonius did not choose out the Stoic belief in fate as an element of the Stoic creed which might be combined with astrology. The process was quite different. Practice preceded synthesis. The Stoic belief in fate had been held in certain Roman circles for a century. The practice of astrology grew up alongside of it. Syncretism took place in spite of the philosophers, and all they could do was to acknowledge it. Philosophy, like theology, often pretends to lead the procession, when in reality it follows it.

This process of syncretism, which in practice had been going on for a century, was abruptly and effectually, though somewhat prematurely perhaps, consummated by the philosophical writings of Cicero. The cessation of public life, which to him had been as bread and meat, threw him back upon the rich resources of his memory, and the death of Tullia spurred his mind and his pen alike to preternatural activity. In the two years and a half of life that remained he turned himself away from the immediate audience and synthesized the intellectual life of Rome for posterity. He hastened the syncretism that was all the while going on, and he absorbed the doctrines of all the schools into a composite fabric, not of true philosophy but of general culture.

Thanks for pointing again to that Dewitt article -- it contains what I consider to be very good analysis, and even sheds some light on our recent discussions about DeWitt's on views.

It is interesting that he labels the "Great Commission" as "trite," and that he says about Lucretius;

The wish is father to the thought, as Julius Caesar once remarked, and out of our great love and admiration for

Lucretius we are tempted to magnify his influence, but if his works had perished there is no denying that we should know little more than his name.

This is also an interesting statement about Lucretius, who he says "seems to have withdrawn within himself and to have become an unsocial socialist, dreaming of redeeming the common run of mankind by a work of reason fit only for the few."

More comments of interest:

"Somewhere about this date the Aetna was composed, the only poem that is composed entirely in the Lucretian

manner." (I realize he refers to manner and not to content, but still might be interesting to review "Aetna" at some point.)

"The lack of Stoic professors in the capital was remedied by the arrival of Posidonius in 51, who healed the quarrel between Stoic and astrological determinism, which had been necessary to the purer teaching of Panaetius." (That's an issue and a development of which I am unaware.)

We can talk about the earlier part before that too, if you've reviewed it, but it was so generic I was concerned that it some of our podcast fans who are less interested in Roman history might revolt . But good to know that you read it because we definitely need to set some background before we get to the main Epicurean part.

Welcome to Episode 190 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics. We are now in the process of a series of podcasts intended to provide a general overview of Epicurean philosophy based on the organizational structure employed by Norman DeWitt in his book "Epicurus and His Philosophy."

This week we begin our discussion of Books One and Two of Cicero's On Ends, which are largely devoted to Epicurean Philosophy. "On Ends" contains important criticisms of Epicurus that have set the tone for standard analysis of his philosophy for the last 2000 years. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.

This week we begin in Book One and we cover from the opening at Section I to the end of Section VII. Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition

We are using the Reid edition, so check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.

Full transcript in post 13 below.

I frequently find it frustrating how hard I find it to locate material in Lucretius, and after many years of reading I still don't have a good fix in my mind as to what might be the "theme" of each of the six books.

This past weekend I went through Lucretius again and put together a "topical outline" to try to make it easier to locate sections. That's now here:

Lucretius - Editions And Topical Outline

And I will see if I can't figure out additional formats to make this easier to reference. As it is, I have keyed this outline to the line numbers of the text in the most recent Loeb edition of Lucretius. That means that these line numbers won't match exactly with all of the texts, but they ought to be usable as a "finding aid" to at least get you in the ballpark of where the material occurs.

I've inserted headings that seem appropriate to make the text easier to find, and also drawn up a synopsis of each section as another level of outline. I am sure I will revise this many times but this is how it stands as of now. I see Lucretius as being over the last 2000 years the writer with the most intelligence, talent, creativity, available time, and available resources (both texts and teachers) to devote to the task of explaining Epicurean philosophy. I think his choice of topics and organization, which is presumably based on that of Epicurus himself, deserves a lot of deference in the way we present things here at EpicureanFriends.

Clicking on this outline below will take you over to the relevant section of the Lexicon page. Keep in mind that clicking the link then takes you to my larger synopsis / paraphrased version. From there you can find the approximate line number and then trace that back to the original in one of the Lucretius versions that we also have here, such as Bailey or Munro.

• 2. Lucretius Topical Outline
  • 2.1. Book I - Basics of Atomic Theory - All Things In the Universe Are Natural And Composed of Atoms And Void
    • 2.1.1. Venus / Nature / Pleasure As Motivator of All Life
    • 2.1.2. Epicurus Was a Liberating Conqueror Over False Religion
    • 2.1.3. Nothing Comes From Nothing
    • 2.1.4. Nothing Goes To Nothing
    • 2.1.5. The Atoms Are Invisible
    • 2.1.6. In Addition to Atoms There is Also The Void
    • 2.1.7. Nothing Exists At The Elemental Level Other than Atoms And Void
    • 2.1.8. The Properties of the Atoms And the Qualities of Bodies
    • 2.1.9. There is a Limit to Divisibility
    • 2.1.10. The Eternal Atoms Produce the Continuity of Nature
    • 2.1.11. The Error Of Thinking All Things Are Made of Fire, Earth, Air, or Water
    • 2.1.12. The Universe is Infinite In Extent
    • 2.1.13. The Universe Has No Center
  • 2.2. Book II - All Things Born of Atoms Will Grow And Die According to Nature
    • 2.2.1. It Is Pleasurable to Understand the Nature of the Universe And Not To Suffer Fears and Anxieties Caused By Errors
    • 2.2.2. The Motion of the Atoms
    • 2.2.3. The Swerve of the Atom Breaks The Grip of Fate
    • 2.2.4. The Shapes of the Atoms
    • 2.2.5. The Limited Number of Shapes
    • 2.2.6. All Things Contain Diverse Shapes of Atoms
    • 2.2.7. There Are Limits To The Ways Atoms Can Be Combined
    • 2.2.8. The Atoms Have No Color
    • 2.2.9. The Atoms Do Not Possess Sense Or Life
    • 2.2.10. There Are Many Worlds In The Universe With Life In Them Like Ours
    • 2.2.11. Nature Has No Supernatural Gods Over Her
  • 2.3. Book III - The Human Mind And Soul Die With the Body
    • 2.3.1. Epicurus As Pioneer Whom We Emulate
    • 2.3.2. Rejection of the "Harmony" Theory
    • 2.3.3. The Material Nature of Mind And Soul
    • 2.3.4. The Mind and Soul and Body Are Born and Grow and Die Together
    • 2.3.5. Death is Nothing To Us
    • 2.3.6. What Nature Would Say To Us About Loss of Life
  • 2.4. Book IV - The Flow of Atoms And The Senses Are the Basis of Human Knowledge, And Reason Can Overcome Dangers Such As The Intoxication Of Romance
    • 2.4.1. This Philosophy Frees The Mind from The Bondage of Religion And Brings Health
    • 2.4.2. The Nature of Images
    • 2.4.3. The Nature of Illusions
    • 2.4.4. The Mind, Not the Senses, Bring About False Judgments
    • 2.4.5. It Is Nonsense To Say That Nothing Is Knowable
    • 2.4.6. The Role of the Senses In Truth
    • 2.4.7. Reasoning Depends on The Senses
    • 2.4.8. The Nature of Sound
    • 2.4.9. The Nature of Taste
    • 2.4.10. The Nature of The Images That Directly Strike the Mind
    • 2.4.11. The Faculties Of The Body Were Not Created For Our Use But Were Born First Before Their Use Was Known
    • 2.4.12. The Mind's Direction of The Body
    • 2.4.13. The Nature of Sleep And Dreams
    • 2.4.14. The Nature of Sexual Attraction And its Dangers
  • 2.5. Book V - The World The Earth, Sky, Sun, Stars Are Not Divine But Mortal, and All Will One Day Pass Away
    • 2.5.1. Epicurus Was Godlike
    • 2.5.2. The World Is Mortal and Will One Day Pass Away
    • 2.5.3. The World Was Not Made For Men By The Gods
    • 2.5.4. The World Is Young And Not Immortal
    • 2.5.5. The Formation of the World
    • 2.5.6. The Sun And Moon And Stars Are the Sizes They Appear To Be
    • 2.5.7. The Movement of The Sun and Moon
    • 2.5.8. The Earth As Mother
    • 2.5.9. The Limitations On What Can Be Born
    • 2.5.10. Life Of Early Humans
    • 2.5.11. Language Was Developed Naturally
    • 2.5.12. Development of Human Society
    • 2.5.13. The Causes of The Rise of Religion
    • 2.5.14. Development of Technology And Human Progress
  • 2.6. Book VI - Storms And Other Mysterious Or Harmful Events Are Caused Not By Gods But Atoms
    • 2.6.1. Epicurus' Achievement in Diagnosing The Disease And Identifying The Cure
    • 2.6.2. The True Nature of Storms
    • 2.6.3. Foolishness of Believing That The Gods Hurl Thunderbolts
    • 2.6.4. Tempests
    • 2.6.5. Earthquakes
    • 2.6.6. Floods and The Water Cycle
    • 2.6.7. Volcanoes
    • 2.6.8. The Reversing Flow of the Nile
    • 2.6.9. Deadly Fumes
    • 2.6.10. Mysterious Fountains
    • 2.6.11. The Nature of Magnets
    • 2.6.12. The Natural Basis of Plagues

Quote from Asclepiades

a research master in philosophy, specializing in Epicurean physics.

With that background you certainly ought to be able to contribute a lot!!

Welcome aboard.

Thanks for these updates Joshua! Some of these, especially Valla and Raimondi, we need to find the texts and post them in our Texts section. Will work on that.

Welcome Asclepiades !

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In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

1. "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
2. The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
3. "On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
4. "Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
5. The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
6. Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
7. Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
8. The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
9. A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
10. Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
11. Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
12. "The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

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Welcome to the forum!

My thoughts on this are spurred by what I did this afternoon. For years I have been kicking myself that I did not have a better "topical index" or "table of contents" for finding things in Lucretius. I have had a rough outline, but it wasn't keyed to line numbers and was not much help in finding things. And it really bugs me to have to say that "I remember that's in Lucretius but I can't remember where!"

So to help burn this in my memory and create a better reference for everyone, I am going to go through as quickly as I can an update my existing index with line references and better summaries. Today I completed Book One. I hope to spend this weekend getting as far as possible with the rest.

Lucretius - Editions And Topical Finding Aid

From this review of the explanation of how Epicurus derives the existence of matter and void, it's clear that he's using what Dewitt calls "chain reasoning." He's making observations about how things work, such as nothing is seen to come from nothing, and using those observations of what IS visible to make deductions about what IS NOT visible, and then carrying forward the reasoning from there all the way to "no supernatural gods" and "no eternal soul surviving death" and of course many other things. And by the time he reaches those conclusions, he considers them iron-clad and no longer open to doubt, so he asserts them firmly and without equivocation. I would expect that Epicurus saw PD01 as complimentary and supporting of the physics reasoning about no supernatural gods, rather than that PDO1 stands on its own as sufficient proof of the position. Likewise the physics point would not stand alone to establish that there are no higher beings that are capable of meddling in our affairs (like we are meddling in the affairs of the Moon and Mars), but the anticipation/prolepsis point would establish that any beings that do meddle don't merit being considered truly blessed and imperishable beings (regardless of whether they are natural or not).

It seems to me to be super important to observe that he's not starting with a conclusion ("there are no supernatural gods"). Rather, he's starting with evidence from observation from which he makes deductions and then builds those deductions as they naturally flow to a conclusion that is compelled not by desire or arbitrary assumption but by sound reasoning.

I would expect him to do exactly the same thing as to pleasure and pain. He would not assert that pleasure and pain are mutually exclusive unless he had some kind of framework of reasoning to support the contention. We can observe how we feel about pleasure and pain, but we can't directly observe the mechanism of action any more than we can directly observe the atoms and the void. So we can deduce how pleasure and pain "must" operate, just like we can deduce how the atoms "must" operate, in order to create the world as we live it.

The same reasoning that would make Epicurus comfortable to state dogmatically that matter and void never mix would make him comfortable stating that pain and pleasure never mix. The experience of the world dictates what we conclude about atoms and void, even though we can't see them directly, and the experience of living dictates what we conclude about pleasure and pain, even though we don't see atoms of pleasure or pain at work. That experience combined with "true reasoning" is the best standard of proof we can hope to obtain.

So a preliminary way of stating where this might lead would be to say that the same knowledge that tells us all bodies are composed of combinations of atoms and void tells us also that all feelings are composed of combinations of pleasure and pain, with each element always remaining discrete and true to its own nature, but moving and combining in different ways to produce something new. The mix of atoms and void produces bodies, the mix of pleasure and pain produces our overall experience (including happiness or unhappiness).

But the first point that would seem clear is that if we can use our reasoning to conclude that all of the universe is composed of atoms and void, and of nothing but atoms and void, then we can use similar reasoning to conclude that all of human experience is composed of pleasure and pain, and of nothing but pleasure and pain.

With the result that we can be dogmatically certain and insistent that just like where there is an atom there is no void and where there is void there is no atom, we can say that where there is pleasure there is no pain, and where there is pain there is no pleasure. And if Torquatus and the Epicureans were approaching the issue that way, then no matter how many ridiculous examples that Chryssippus or Cicero constructed to try to prove that there are more feelings than pleasure or pain, the Epicureans would **never** agree to such a suggestion.

There are only two components to the universe, atoms and void, and there are only two feelings, pleasure and pain. From basically that starting point, combined with the commitment to following the evidence of the senses/anticipations/feelings, you can deduce the rest of the physics and deduce the rest of the ethics.

Perhaps a similar analogous transfer of reasoning from one branch of the philosophy to another one in PD28?

PD28. The same knowledge that makes one confident that nothing dreadful is eternal or long-lasting also recognizes, in the face of these limited evils, the security afforded by friendship.

And potentially another transfer from physics to ethics in PD09 (the parallel being that in the same way that atoms cannot be unlimited in quantity or size, or else one or more atoms would fill up the universe and nothing could move, individual pleasures must be limited in experience, or else there would be no room for other pleasures to be experienced):

PD09. If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.

As another example, could we not compare these two similar statements:

(1) "Atoms come in numberless varieties, but we have the capacity through our senses to recognize the qualities of the bodies which they come together to form."

(2) "Experiences come in numberless varieties, but we have the capacity through our feelings of pleasure and pain to recognize the qualities of the lives which they come together to form."

In both cases, we are accepting the validity of our faculty of perceiving (the senses as to atoms and void and the feelings as to pleasure and pain) because these are the only faculties given to us by nature for use in these areas. (With the anticipations being the faculty which allows us to integrate all this into words, without which we could not be having this discussion.) We aren't claiming to understand every detail about how the five senses or the feelings of pleasure and pain operate, but the atomic theory gives us a framework for understanding how the the things we sense around us (the qualities of the bodies) and the things we feel (pleasure and pain) operate naturally and not supernaturally.

For now those are almost random thoughts to consider.

-------

Here's the summary of Book One. It's pretty long in itself, but I think can be used to construct some ways to make things easier to find across the many translations. Now I need to do the other five.

2.1. Book I

One implication of this:

We know due to the extending reasoning in Lucretius how Epicurus came to the conclusion that only atoms and void have an ultimate unchanging existence, that nothing has ultimate unchanging existence other than atoms and void, and that everything is made of atoms and void and only atoms and void.

That reasoning tells us how he "defined" atoms and void and how he deduced their existence and how he reached his "nothing but atoms and void" perspective.

Do we have a similar understanding of the chain of reasoning by which Epicurus concluded that Nature gives us only Pleasure and Pain by which to choose and avoid (Torquatus, Diogenes Laertius) and why the two do not mix and one cannot exist where the other is present (PD03)?

In other words, are we confident why Cicero was wrong to insist that most people are experiencing neither pleasure nor pain?

Are we confident why Chrysippus was wrong in asserting that the outstretched hand in a normal condition -- in which it is apparently not feeling a specific stimulus of pleasure) is not feeling pain or a lack of pleasure in that condition? (Simply saying "pleasure is the absence of pain" just begs the question - *Why* must we consider pleasure to be the absence of pain?)

And last of all, why are we confident that the host pouring the wine can be considered to be in the greatest of pleasure when the guest drinking it may not be?

It seems to me that these issues are all closely interrelated with the reasoning about atoms and void.

In preparing an outline of Lucretius Book One it appears to me that the following is a reasonable summary of Book One line 503:

Summary:

Since we have determined that everything is composed of only two things, atoms and void, and that nothing else can exist, we conclude that wherever there is empty space there is no body there, and where any body exists, there is no void, and from this we conclude that the atoms are solid bodies free from any void.

Here is Bailey:

[503] First, since we have found existing a twofold nature of things far differing, the nature of body and of space, in which all things take place, it must needs be that each exists alone by itself and unmixed. For wherever space lies empty, which we call the void, body is not there; moreover, wherever body has its station, there is by no means empty void. Therefore the first bodies are solid and free from void.

I would like to compare Munro and others on this point, but presuming that Bailey has it correct, it seems that this might be an example of reasoning similar to the distinctions that Epicurus draws between pleasure and pain and that where one exists the other is absence.

I make note of this because I would expect that if reasoning like this is embedded so closely into the Physics as to the nature of atoms, it is easy to suspect that the Epicureans became comfortable with such "black and white" logical division, and that this attitude of reasoning carries over from "bodies and void" into "pleasure and pain."

The parallel is pretty clear:

We are not able to observe the atoms or the void directly, but we are confident that they are there based on the impact that their combinations make on our senses. We are not able to observe the ultimate mechanisms of pleasure or pain either, but we are confident of our conclusions about them based on their impact on our feelings.

This method of argument is not going to impress a skeptic who argues that nothing can be known, but it works great for those who are willing to take confidence in reasoning based on repeated evidence, and who are willing to conclude that the results of repeated experience are reliable as a basis for knowledge.