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I am surprised to find that there don't seem to be any academic articles devoted to this hand question.
But maybe we need to be prepared to find a number of surprising things - such as that Chrysippus is alleged to have died of laughter, and that he was extremely arrogant (the latter is not surprising). This below from Diogenes Laertius (Yonge
btw I applaud Cassius 's optimism in calling this the definitive thread
Definitive because this time we will pursue this as long as it takes! 
Episode 170 of the podcast is now available!
it's an all or nothing...
Yes -- and they are somehow convinced to go for the "All"
Again for anyone who has time on their hands, I recommend Lucian's HERMOTIMUS for background on that aspect., with an Epicurean or Epicurean-sympathizer arguing against a Stoic on some of these points.
EDIT: I know I am droning on about "Hermotimus" but for anyone who has not read it i think you are in for a big and most pleasant surprise -- it is very witty, easy to read, and covers a lot of important material from an Epicurean-Friendly perspective, in dialog form, almost as if we had our own variation of a Platonic presentation - with all of the elegance combined with wisdom as opposed to frequent deceit.
Wecome @Lucas !
Note: In order to minimize spam registrations, all new registrants must respond in this thread to this welcome message within 72 hours of its posting, or their account is subject to deletion. All that is required is a "Hello!" but of course we hope you will introduce yourself -- tell us a little about yourself and what prompted your interest in Epicureanism -- and/or post a question.
This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.
Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.
All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.
One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.
In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.
It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.
And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.
(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).
Welcome to the forum!
Wecome Rocco !
Note: In order to minimize spam registrations, all new registrants must respond here in this thread to this welcome message within 72 hours of its posting, or their account is subject to deletion. Please introduce yourself -- tell us what prompted your interest in Epicureanism, a little about yourself, and/or post a question.
This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.
Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.
All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.
One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.
In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.
It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.
And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.
(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).
Welcome to the forum!
I'm again thinking of virtue: do Stoics consider that you can reach a state where you are virtuous, and therefore don't long for it any more?
I think that is a definite yes - when you get to the summit you are at the top and there is nothing greater.
Cant call a cite but I am pretty sure the summit analogy is a favorite, and that is another argument they use against pleasure - that it has no summit or limit.
We can hold this question out there as long as needs be because I would surely think that they took it seriously
I don't know that the difference between lack or long for makes a difference, but I think the rest is interesting. Apparently the stoics agreed with Epicurus that Nature is the standard. Chrysipus would also have known that Epicurus said to look to babies for the pure standard. Maybe chrysipus was saying "I will up you Epicurus and look to a hand, which is TOTALLY uncorrupted since it has no mind to corrupt."
Maybe.
Yes, but as you quoted above, it seems that Chrysippus thought that the following argument is self-contained:
C: Does your hand, being in its present condition, feel the lack of anything at all?
S: Certainly of nothing.
C: But if pleasure were the supreme good, it would feel a lack.
S: I agree.
C: Pleasure then is not the supreme good.
And that seems to imply that the "absence of lack" is the critical issue. He does not seem to me to be arguing about what to call the absence of lack, it is the absence of lack itself that he thinks says something.
Yes he would presumably and eventually agree with Cicero and argue that the absence of lack should not be called pleasure, but he seems to think already that the absence of lack speaks for itself as to why pleasure is not the highest good. As you also indicated earlier, I see no reason why the highest good should be required to be always present. There seems to be an element missing in Chrysippus' argument that would explain why he thinks it must always be present. The only possibility I can think of is the implicit requirement that the highest good (or the guide to the highest good) must be always available in order for it to meet some definition that Chrysippus thinks is agreed upon as to the nature of the highest good or guide to the highest good.
Is there any other possible reason for his argument? He could have simply said "the absence of any feeling is not pleasure and no one thinks of it that way" if his argument was over nothing more than what to call the state being discussed. That's what Cicero eventually argued, but Chrysippus does not seem to be saying that. He is saying that the "absence of lack" means something in and of itself as to why pleasure is not the good.
IF (and I am not taking that as established) we were to conclude that the issue Chrysippus is alluding to is that the guide or the greatest good must be continuously present (for some combination of practical or philosophical reasons that we still need to clarify) , then we have DeWitt's explanation of the "continuity" issue in the following clips.
It boils down to:
The argument is most fully stated in the section "Pleasure can be Continuous" on page 239. Here are two isolated references, then part of the section devoted to the topic so people can evaluate for themselves whether this is the relevant issue:
I was looking for a passage that I thought I remembered from Lucian, where he remarked (or so I thought) that it was surprising or un-Stoic to look for an ever-present "guide." Unfortunately I cannot find what I am looking for, but while looking I found this, a cute list of illustrations of the type of logic as the guide of life to which Lucian and presumably Epicurus objected. This is from an appendix to the Fowler translation of the Works of Lucian of Samosata:
This is an outstanding effort Don and I urge everyone to take a look at it. It took a LOT of time to put something like this together but the result really drives home an important point about the size and the location of Epicurus' working environment.
Your hand doesn't "feel" anything. You may sense something with your hand, on your hand, in your hand, and so on; but your hand, in its present condition, is merely a part of your sensory apparatus. If you feel that your hand doesn't lack anything, it's in homeostasis. It is in balance.
While I think this angle of approach is true, I don't think it meets directly what Chrysippus was saying so I wouldn't start with this one. I don't see any reason why he could not have picked out any other part of the body, or even a total person, and made the same point, just so long as that person was sitting quietly and not being stimulated from the outside.
Very well said. So another mistake by Chryssipus is that according to his argument, virtue can't be the supreme good. For that matter, nothing can be. But I may be missing something: it's been a long day.
That's the feeling I have - that we are missing something that from Chrysippus' point of view is vital.
Referring to Joshua's list:
1. The hand either feels pleasure, or it feels pain, or it feels neither pleasure nor pain.
2. If pleasure is the highest good, then the absence of pleasure would feel like a lack of pleasure.
3. This lack of pleasure would be felt in every member of the body.
4. My hand does not feel pleasure or pain.
5. My hand does not feel a lack of pleasure.
1 - Don's comment goes to 1, but I think that to be fair to Chrysippus that 1 is a reasonable premise that most people would accept under normal discussion. Now Epicurus would not accept the last phrase "or it feels neither pleasure nor pain" but that's the subject in question that we're trying to prove, so I don't know we can object to it here at this point in the argument.
2- I am thinking that 2 is the missing link in our comprehension. WHY would this be the case? As Don asks why would the highest good necessarily be present at all times? What gives Chrysippus the right to presume that? At the moment the main thing that occurs to me is that rather than highest good the operative perspective is more "guide" than "highest good" and we would want our "guide" to be always present in order for it to truly be our ultimate guide. But that may not be the point or it may be only a part of the point. But SOMEHOW there is a reason behind this presumption that Chrysippus thought that we would accept, and quite possibly that we would accept it even as Cyreniacs or Epicureans devoted to he central role of pleasure.
3 - I am not sure about that one, but yes I can see that being presumed, in order to pick out the hand.
4 - Yes he's presuming a state of inactivity does not involve pleasure or pain.
5 - Yes he's presuming that too, and that is something that we would probably accept.
Earlier today, after revisiting the "Chrysippus hand argument" from Torquatus' "On Ends" speech, I am convinced that we - unlike Chrysippus' hand - have a lack for something - and that something is a Definitive Thread on the topic. I would like to eventually make a graphic for the front page of the website that highlights this episode in the Epicurean texts because I think it is a good way to focus on a critical issue. We have discussed the issue previously a number of times, probably more than the two threads listed below, and I know we discussed it in the Lucretius Today podcast when we went through the Torquatus material.
But I am convinced from my own lack of comfort with this passage that there is a lot more to be learned. Chrysippus and/or the Stoics seemed to think that this argument against pleasure as the good was a killer, significant enough to be featured in the statue dedicated to his memory - at least if Torquatus's story can be credited as supporting that conclusion.
So the first thing I will do in this thread is to quote again the Reid translation of the relevant passage, and before going further, I would like to challenge anyone who has the time to contribute - before we go much further - their explanation of what he is arguing. Before we can deal with whether he is right or wrong, we first have to understand what he is saying, and it seems clear that there are some underlying and unstated presumptions behind his framing of the question that have to be brought to the surface.
First, here is the quote:
[38] Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.
[39] But actually at Athens, as my father used to tell me, when he wittily and humorously ridiculed the Stoics, there is in the Ceramicus a statue of Chrysippus, sitting with his hand extended, which hand indicates that he was fond of the following little argument: Does your hand, being in its present condition, feel the lack of anything at all? Certainly of nothing. But if pleasure were the supreme good, it would feel a lack. I agree. Pleasure then is not the supreme good. My father used to say that even a statue would not talk in that way, if it had power of speech. The inference is shrewd enough as against the Cyrenaics, but does not touch Epicurus. For if the only pleasure were that which, as it were, tickles the senses, if I may say so, and attended by sweetness overflows them and insinuates itself into them, neither the hand nor any other member would be able to rest satisfied with the absence of pain apart from a joyous activity of pleasure. But if it is the highest pleasure, as Epicurus believes, to be in no pain, then the first admission, that the hand in its then existing condition felt no lack, was properly made to you, Chrysippus, but the second improperly, I mean that it would have felt a lack had pleasure been the supreme good. It would certainly feel no lack, and on this ground, that anything which is cut off from the state of pain is in the state of pleasure.
As to underlying but unstated presumptions, there seems to be something going on in the assertion: "But if pleasure were the supreme good, it would feel a lack."
Chrysippus seems to expect us to take as a given that hand would feel the absence of the supreme good at that moment if the supreme good were pleasure. Is that an assertion with which everyone would agree? What is it presuming that might need to be brought to the surface? That one characteristic of the supreme good is that it is always present and - if absent - that the presence would be felt immediately? Why would that be so and what is the implication of it?
I don't think we can understand Chrysippus' assertion, or Torquatus' explanation of why it is wrong, if we don't understand that point.
Anyone want to try to explain in their own words what Chrysippus is saying and why?
Prior Threads:
1 - Starting here in a thread from 2021 (probably the best existing thread)
2 -Comments in Kalosyni's "Slider" thread of 2023
#HighestGood
James Warren raised the issue, but did not write much about it, here:
as to Martin's comment
The reference to "intermediate subsystems" seems to me to be related to the issues raised by Chrysippus' "hand question." Atoms don't feel pleasure and pain, and it's not at all clear that we would say that individual cells do - it takes more organization and up the system before pain and pleasure register. By the time you get to a hand it definitely feels pleasure and pain, but so do lots of other parts of the body at the same time, and you have to consider as Martin says "the total effect."
I think it would be excellent to set as a goal for both the book review and the forum to turn that example cited by Torquatus inside out until we are comfortable that we completely understand what is meant by Chryssipus' argument and why it is wrong.
We've left it floating out there ambiguously far too long, and I think the source Cicero was borrowing from to write Torquatus was right to think that it is an example that is critical to understand so we can overcome the Stoic argument.
"Pleasure" does not only refer to overt active stimulation. The act of experiencing any part of life without pain should be considered to be an act of experiencing pleasure. That's the only way the logic-chopping arguments against Epicurus and pleasure can be defeated. Anytime "absence of pain" is stated we should immediately infer and treat it the same as if "presence of pleasure" had been stated.
And the difficulties in making that point clear would appear to be why Chrysippis used the argument and Torquatus brings it up to ridicule it. Leaving the issue ambiguous leads to all sorts of difficulties. People normally don't refer to absence of pain as a pleasure, and those who don't know Epicurus' philosophical context think is wording is ridiculous or that he is saying something mysterious. Worse, it opens the door to argue that "absence of pain" really means "tranquility," which improperly elevates tranquility to something more than simply one among many important pleasures. And that improper elevation makes it easy to think that tranquility is all we need, that tranquility is outside of and higher than pleasure itself, and that we don't really need or want pleasure at all. Stoics and Buddhists and all sorts of other "spiritualists" jump all over this to make Epicurus seem like one of them.
Saying that the goal is to rid one's experience from pains is exactly the same thing as saying that the goal is filling one's experience with pleasures.
And that's the same as saying that the goal of "Absence of Pain" is exactly the same as the goal of "Presence of Pleasure."
And that equivalence is why - and only why - it is appropriate to say that "the greatest pleasure" is "the absence of pain." As PD03 says, "the limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once."
All this works because we have ascertained that there's no true middle ground between pleasure and pain. Once we've ascertained that, we can see that it's totally inappropriate to think that this middle ground (which does not exist) is "tranquility." But that's exactly the incorrect deduction that a lot of people (especially those of Buddhist or Stoic bent) are reading into Epicurus.
Again, the cite:
"[38] Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension."
"[39] But actually at Athens, as my father used to tell me, when he wittily and humorously ridiculed the Stoics, there is in the Ceramicus a statue of Chrysippus, sitting with his hand extended, which hand indicates that he was fond of the following little argument: Does your hand, being in its present condition, feel the lack of anything at all? Certainly of nothing. But if pleasure were the supreme good, it would feel a lack. I agree. Pleasure then is not the supreme good. My father used to say that even a statue would not talk in that way, if it had power of speech. The inference is shrewd enough as against the Cyrenaics, but does not touch Epicurus. For if the only pleasure were that which, as it were, tickles the senses, if I may say so, and attended by sweetness overows them and insinuates itself into them, neither the hand nor any other member would be able to rest satised with the absence of pain apart from a joyous activity of pleasure. But if it is the highest pleasure, as Epicurus believes, to be in no pain, then the rst admission, that the hand in its then existing condition felt no lack, was properly made to you, Chrysippus, but the second improperly, I mean that it would have felt a lack had pleasure been the supreme good. It would certainly feel no lack, and on this ground, that anything which is cut off from the state of pain is in the state of pleasure."
That's the Reid translation and it's worth emphasizing the final line:
"Anything which is cut off from the state of pain is in the state of pleasure."
Any full presentation of Epicurean philosophy has to incorporate the issue being discussed here. Chrysippus and his Stoics may have made this confusion worse through their arguments, but we can use the fact that Cicero / Torquatus preserved those arguments to illustrate why they are wrong and what Epicurus really meant.
At first blush that sounds quite good, but I'm beginning to wonder if, to some, that might imply a limit that is the same for everybody. With all due respect to Diogenes, would a better phrasing be "desires that outrun the limits fixed by one's nature"?
I agree that the standard is one's own circumstances and what Nature has provided in those circumstances. There's no wider intent or absolute standard other than what nature has provided. If you're from a family where everyone lives to 100 then you're reasonable in desiring to live to 100. If you're from a family where everyone has physical issues that causes death at 30 then it's less likely to be a good bet to worry about living to 100.
So I agree, but I am not sure that it theoretically even makes sense to consider the implication that you are questioning - maybe it should be so clear to us that Nature works through particulars, and not through ideal patterns, that we should never use ideal patterns as a starting point for consideration.
Relevant citations to incorporate in this analysis:
PD02. Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us.
PD03. The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once."
PD18. The pleasure in the flesh is not increased when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding of these very pleasures, and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind.
Diogenes Laertius Biography of Epicurus: "The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined. "
Torquatus in On Ends:
"Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?"
"[38] Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension."
"[39] But actually at Athens, as my father used to tell me, when he wittily and humorously ridiculed the Stoics, there is in the Ceramicus a statue of Chrysippus, sitting with his hand extended, which hand indicates that he was fond of the following little argument: Does your hand, being in its present condition, feel the lack of anything at all? Certainly of nothing. But if pleasure were the supreme good, it would feel a lack. I agree. Pleasure then is not the supreme good. My father used to say that even a statue would not talk in that way, if it had power of speech. The inference is shrewd enough as against the Cyrenaics, but does not touch Epicurus. For if the only pleasure were that which, as it were, tickles the senses, if I may say so, and attended by sweetness overows them and insinuates itself into them, neither the hand nor any other member would be able to rest satised with the absence of pain apart from a joyous activity of pleasure. But if it is the highest pleasure, as Epicurus believes, to be in no pain, then the rst admission, that the hand in its then existing condition felt no lack, was properly made to you, Chrysippus, but the second improperly, I mean that it would have felt a lack had pleasure been the supreme good. It would certainly feel no lack, and on this ground, that anything which is cut off from the state of pain is in the state of pleasure."
"Now we admit that mental pleasures and pains spring from bodily pleasures and pains; so I allow what you alleged just now, that any of our school who differ from this opinion are out of court; and indeed I see there are many such, but unskilled thinkers. I grant that although mental pleasure brings us joy and mental pain brings us trouble, yet each feeling takes its rise in the body and is dependent on the body, though it does not follow that the pleasures and pains of the mind do not greatly surpass those of the body. With the body indeed we can perceive only what is present to us at the moment, but with the mind the past and future also. For granting that we feel just as great pain when our body is in pain, still mental pain may be very greatly intensified if we imagine some everlasting and unbounded evil to be menacing us. And we may apply the same argument to pleasure, so that it is increased by the absence of such fears. [56] By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain."
Diogenes of Oinoanda
Fragment 34:
Let us first discuss states, keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions which disturb the soul are removed, those which produce pleasure enter into it to take their place. Well, what are the disturbing emotions? [They are] fears —of the gods, of death, and of [pains]— and, besides [these], desires that [outrun] the limits fixed by nature. These are the roots of all evils, and, [unless] we cut them off, [a multitude] of evils will grow [upon] us.
(I put that "desires that outrun the limits fixed by nature" in red not because it is related to the current topic, but because that seems to me to be a good choice of words to describe something we often struggle with as "neither natural nor necessary" or all sorts of other adjectives." Seems to me that the factor that unites them all is that they "outrun the limits fixed by nature.")
Wecome @PrudentPleasure !
Note: In order to minimize spam registrations, all new registrants must respond in this thread to this welcome message within 72 hours of its posting, or their account is subject to deletion. All that is required is a "Hello!" but of course we hope you will introduce yourself -- tell us a little about yourself and what prompted your interest in Epicureanism -- and/or post a question.
This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.
Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.
All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.
One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and personal your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.
In that regard we have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.
It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.
And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.
(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).
Welcome to the forum!
